

Joseph F. Fletcher, Jr.

Joseph F. Fletcher

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Edited by
Beatrice Forbes Manz

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PREFACE

Joseph F. Fletcher was born on July 14, 1934, and attended the Groton School, a boys' preparatory school in Massachusetts, where he began his formidable language training with the study of French, Latin, and Greek. From Groton he went on to Harvard University, and in 1957 received his bachelor's degree from the Slavic Department. At Harvard he studied Russian and, in his senior year, decided to learn Mongolian. For this purpose he approached the distinguished Mongolist and Sinologist Francis W. Cleaves, who directed him first to the study of Chinese. In 1958 he became a graduate student in the department of Far Eastern Languages at Harvard. He now began the study of Mongolian and Manchu with Professor Cleaves, who continued the traditions of the great French scholars E. Chavannes and P. Pelliot. Another important mentor was the Chinese scholar William Hung. Fletcher's training was meticulous and strongly philological, an approach mirrored in his doctoral dissertation, 'The Erdeni-yin erike as a Source for the Reconciliation of the Khalkha, 1681-1688', completed in 1965.

While in graduate school, Fletcher broadened his interests both linguistically and historically. He studied the history of the Ch'ing dynasty with John K. Fairbank, and began several new languages: Arabic, Turkic, Tibetan, and finally Persian. He took full advantage of the presence of scholars in numerous fields, notably Richard Pipes, Stanford Shaw, Omeljan Pritsak, Richard Frye, and Masatoshi Nagatomi. In 1962 he was elected as Junior Fellow at Harvard, a position of high honor which provided him support for several years of independent study and for extensive travels to collect manuscripts and continue his language studies. In 1966 he became assistant professor in the Department of Far Eastern Languages at Harvard.

Although Fletcher was trained primarily in philology, his strongest interest was history. The early articles in this collection, written before 1970, illustrate the contrast between his fascination with language and text, and his evolving interest in broad historical questions. As his later writings show, Fletcher's historical interests won out, and it is probably for this reason that he chose not to publish his doctoral dissertation. Nonetheless his philological

training always remained evident, and the combination of synthetic and speculative thought with detailed textual study became a hallmark of his writings.

What interested Fletcher particularly were communications and parallels among widely separated regions and peoples; the study of Inner Asia appealed to him in part because it provided the opportunity to trace these. Three particular agents of interconnection engaged his attention: the nomads of the Eurasian steppe, the great empires of the late medieval and early modern periods, and movements of religious revival and reform. All of these interests are mirrored in the articles reproduced here.

Joseph Fletcher loved people, and he devoted a significant portion of his energy to teaching and to maintaining ties with colleagues throughout the world. He spoke frequently at professional meetings over a wide range of fields: Chinese, Inner Asian and Middle Eastern and comparative history, area studies and social science. He was also a gifted and devoted teacher—a master communicator—and used the introduction of new courses to develop his thinking, particularly on comparative history.

Professor Fletcher died of cancer on June 14, 1984, at the age of forty-nine, when he was just beginning to publish the results of years of language study and research. In the last several years of his life he devoted much of his time to chapters for *The Cambridge History of China* and *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia*, covering the history of Inner Asia and the western Chinese borderlands from the fourteenth to the twentieth centuries. The subject which particularly fascinated him after the mid-1970s was the revival and reform movements among Islamic mystical orders, particularly the Naqshbandi order which connected Xinjiang and Northwest China to religious currents in the Middle East. Jonathan Lipman has summarized Fletcher's notes on the genesis of his research in the preface to the final article in this collection: 'The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China'. At the same time Fletcher actively pursued his theoretical interests and produced several broad and speculative essays, reproduced in this volume. Only one of these was published before his death: 'Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire', an exploration of the nomad practice of disputed succession for which he coined the term 'bloody tanistry', and which he suggested might lie behind the succession struggles of the post-Mongol Middle East.

Joseph Fletcher left behind a number of uncompleted manuscripts. At the request of Professor John K. Fairbank, I helped to gather a group of scholars familiar with various aspects of

Fletcher's research to review his unpublished work; these included besides myself John Voll, Jonathan Lipman, Isenbike Togan, Kim Ho-Dong and Morris Rossabi. Two manuscripts, written as conference papers, were sufficiently complete to be published without change. 'The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives', had already been revised for publication in a volume which did not appear. 'Parallels and Interconnections in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries', originally subtitled 'Fletcher's Plane Ride', remained as a conference paper and was published without change. These two pieces provide an illustration of Joseph Fletcher's thinking on two of his basic interests: the dynamics of nomad society, and the broad interconnections across Eurasia in the early modern period.

As I stated above Professor Fletcher had agreed to write a number of chapters for the Cambridge History series. Of these some had appeared and three more were complete at the time of his death. 'The Eastern Chaghadayid Realm from the Moghuls' Adoption of Islam to their Loss of Moghulistan', and 'Western Turkestan: the Emergence of the Uzbeks', were to be published in *The Cambridge History of Inner Asia*, vol. II. Since this volume has been canceled, these chapters will appear instead in a collective volume on the history of post-Mongol Central Asia edited by Yuri Bregel, in the Uralic and Altaic Series of Indiana University. 'The Rise of the Manchus', co-authored with Gertraude Roth Li, written for *The Cambridge History of China*, vol. 9, remains among his unpublished papers.

Professor Fletcher left two less complete articles which we decided to publish; these were edited and completed by Jonathan Lipman. One, 'The Taylor-Pickens Letters on the Jahrī Branch of the Naqshbandiyya in China' came out in 1989, (see attached bibliography); since this article consists primarily of letters written in English, with a relatively short introduction and commentary, we have not reproduced it here. A longer and more synthetic article, 'The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China' appears for the first time in this volume, with a preface by Jonathan Lipman.

The rest of Joseph Fletcher's materials were not finished enough to be published. These remain at the Harvard University Archives among his professional papers. They include a typed transcript of his Harvard course Social Science 20: 'The History of Inner Asia 1200 to the Present', missing one or two lectures, as well as a substantial manuscript history of the Khojas of Eastern Turkestan from the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, written as a rough draft in the early 1970s, and not revised thereafter. There are in addition numerous unpublished conference papers, drafts and

sketches of research projects, lecture notes, and course materials. As Fletcher studied and used a large number of languages, he preferred to read difficult texts with experts, whenever possible scholars who were native speakers. In cooperation with these scholars he prepared translations of texts or parts of texts which were central to his work, collecting large numbers of these for each major work. His papers contain many such translations, from materials in Chinese, Arabic, Persian and eastern Turkic, some from published texts, some from manuscripts. Most of these were supporting material for his work on the Khojas of Eastern Turkestan and the Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China.

The effort of preparing this volume has not been mine alone. I must thank a number of people for significant help. I am grateful first of all to the editors of journals and publishing houses who have given us permission to reproduce materials, and in some cases also provided us with offprints we could not obtain elsewhere. Joseph Fletcher's sister, Jane Fletcher Geniesse, provided the photograph for the frontispiece and gave us warm support for this as for earlier publication projects. Professor Edwin A. Cranston provided me with invaluable biographical material for use in the preface. John Voll has been always available and generous with help and advice. Xiangyun Wang produced the first draft of the index, and help on its revision. The camera-ready text of 'The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China' is the work of Jonathan Lipman, who has devoted many hours to editing and finalizing this article. Credit goes finally to the staff of the Committee on Inner Asian Studies at Harvard, Margaret Lindsey and her assistant Michael Bonner, who have shouldered much of the burden of typing, correspondence and organization for this project.

Tufts University
August 1994

BEATRICE FORBES MANZ

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

The articles in this volume, as in all others in the Collected Studies Series, have not been given a new, continuous pagination. In order to avoid confusion, and to facilitate their use where these same studies have been referred to elsewhere, the original pagination has been maintained wherever possible.

Each article has been given a Roman number in order of appearance, as listed in the Contents. This number is repeated in each page and is quoted in the index entries.

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I

A SOURCE OF THE *ERDENI-YIN ERIKE*

GALDAN'S *Erdeni-yin erike*,[1] the best known nineteenth-century Mongolian chronicle, has been too well received. Ever since A. M. Pozdneev published a part of it dealing with the Qalqa Mongols of the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,[2] scholars have used the *Erdeni-yin erike* as a historical source, and, as recently as 1959, an article by P. Baldanžapov[3] has affirmed its value as such. But the point which has been neglected is that Galdan's chronicle is in large part not Galdan's work at all but rather an assemblage of passages taken verbatim from other works. The purpose of this short paper is to indicate a series of such passages from a work hitherto unidentified as one of the chronicle's sources.

At the beginning of the *Erdeni-yin erike*, Galdan includes *Jarliγ-iyar toγtaγaγsan bodolγ-a-yin debter-üd*[4] among his sources. L. S. Pučkovskiĭ notes this in his catalogue.[5] On page 72, he cites the *Erdeni-yin*

[1] Mentioned in B. Laufer, *Očerk mongol'skoĭ literatury* [=*Izdaniya Leningradskogo Vostočnogo Instituta imeni A.S. Enukidze*, 20], Leningrad, 1927, p. 50. Part of the text was published by A. M. Pozdneev in *Mongol'skaya letopis' "Erdeniĭn erixe." Podlinnyĭ tekst s perevodom i poyasneniyami, zaklyučayuščimi v sebe Materialy dlya istorii Xalxi s 1636 po 1736 g.* [*The Mongolian Chronicle* Erdeni-yin erike. *Original Text with Translation and Explanations, Containing Material for the History of Qalqa from 1636 to 1736*], Saint Petersburg, 1883. Cf. also the text as edited by Č. Nasunbaljur: Galdan, *Erdeni-yin erike kemekü teüke bolai* [=*Monumenta historica Instituti Historiae Comitetі Scientiarum et Educationis Altae Reipublicae Populi Mongoli* (*sic*), Tomus III, Fasciculus 1], Ulaanbaatar, 1960.

[2] Pozdneev, *op. cit.* See note 1 above.

[3] P. Baldanžapov, "Mongol'skaya letopis' 'Erdeniĭn erixe' i ee značenie v mongol'skoĭ istoriografii" ["The Mongolian Chronicle *Erdeni-yin erike* and Its Significance in Mongolian Historiography"], in *Mongol'skiĭ sbornik. Ekonomika, istoriya, arxeologiya* [=*Učenye zapiski Instituta vostokovedeniya*, Tom 24], Moscow, 1959, pp. 163–170.

[4] Nasunbaljur, *op. cit.*, p. 6a, line 1.

[5] L. S. Pučkovskiĭ, *Mongol'skie, buryat-mongol'skie i oĭratskie rukopisi i ksilografy Instituta vostokovedeniya*, 1, *Istoriya, pravo* [*Mongolian, Buriyad-Mongolian and Oyirad Manu-*

erike (manuscript F 316): "*J̌arliγ ǰiči ǰarliγ-iyar toγtaγaγsan bodolγ-a-yin debter-üd*," which he translates, "*Knigi imperatorskix ukazov, a takže vysočaiše utverždennyx rešenii*" ["Books of imperial edicts as well as of imperially confirmed decisions"]. On page 75, he cites manuscript F 246, simply: "*ǰarliγ-iyar toγtaγaγsan bodolγ-a-yin debter-üd*," translated, "*Knigi vysočaiše utverždennyx rešenii*" ["Books of imperially confirmed decisions"]. But "Books of imperially confirmed decisions" is not sufficiently exact, because the expression *bodolγ-a-yin debter* represents the Chinese historiographical category *fang-lüeh* 方略.[6]

E. Hauer has already indicated[7] that the Mongolian *bodolγ-a-yin bičig* is equivalent to the Manchu *bodoγon-i bitxe*[8] and the Chinese *fang-lüeh*. Galdan's *bodolγ-a-yin debter* must be a variant form of the same. This also seems to be Č. Nasunbalǰur's understanding, because, in the introduction to his edition of the *Erdeni-yin erike*,[9] he enumerates Galdan's sources and mentions among them, "*Manǰu-yin Engke Amuγulang Qaγan-u bodolγ-a-yin bičig-üd*" ["*Bodolγ-a-yin bičig-üd* of the Manchu Engke Amuγulang (=K'ang-hsi) Qaγan"]. Moreover, an examination of that part of the *Erdeni-yin erike* which covers the turbulent K'ang-hsi period reveals whole sections translated word for word from the *Beye dayilame Wargi Amargi babe nečixiyeme toqtobuxa bodoγon-i bitxe*,[10] which is the Manchu version of the *Ch'in-cheng p'ing-ting Shuo-mo fang-lüeh* 親征平定朔漠方略.

scripts and Xylographs of the Institute of Oriental Studies, I, *History, Law*], Moscow-Leningrad, 1957.

[6] For the term *fang-lüeh*, see Erich Hauer, *Huang-Ts'ing k'ai-kuo fang-lüeh. Die Gründung des mandschurischen Kaiserreiches*, Berlin and Leipzig, 1926, pp. XXI and 605–606.

[7] Hauer, *op. cit.*, p. 605, where he gives no source for the identification of the Mongolian term.

Ferdinand D. Lessing (General Editor), *Mongolian-English Dictionary*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960, pp. 109–110, fails to include *bodolγ-a-yin bičig* under "*bodolγ-a*" (which Lessing transcribes "BODULΓ-A").

[8] I have used the Manchu transcription system proposed by L. Ligeti in "A propos de l'écriture mandchoue," *AOASH* 2 (1952).235–301, with the exception of *ayi*, *eyi*, etc., which Ligeti transcribes *ai*, *ei*, etc. (as, for example, *taizu* and *beile* in the Manchu passage transcribed on p. 275, note 2). I have followed the practice usual in transcribing Mongolian, namely *ayi*, *eyi*, etc., as has G. Kara in "Sur deux canons chinois des Ts'ing," *AOASH* 10 (1960).249–253. Here, for example, Kara has *Dayičing* (p. 250), not *Daičing*.

[9] Nasunbalǰur, *op. cit.*, p. 3b, lines 17–18.

[10] See Li Teh Ch'i (Yu Dawchyuan, ed.), *Union Catalogue of Manchu Books in the National Library of Peiping and the Library of the Palace Museum*, Peiping, 1933, pp. 37–38. See also Walter Fuchs, *Beiträge zur Mandjurischen Bibliographie und Literatur*, Tokyo, 1936, p. 100. Pozdneev (*op. cit.*, p. XXV) mentions this *bodoγon-i bitxe* as one of the two Manchu sources which he has consulted for Qalqa history and even generally describes its contents without noticing that over a third of his text comes from it.

It is possible that Galdan did not do the translation himself. The *Wargi Amargi babe nečixiyeme toqtobuxa bodoγon-i bitxe* may have been translated entirely or in part into Mongolian, and, if so, Galdan could have made use of this translation in his *Erdeni-yin erike*.

Passages such as Pozdneev 2.6–7/Nasunbalǰur 91a.18–22/*Shuo-mo fang-lüeh* 1.12v.6,[11] Pozdneev 3.3–6/Nasunbalǰur 91b.8–11/*Shuo-mo fang-lüeh* 1.12v.7–13r.2, Pozdneev 6.1–3/Nasunbalǰur 92b.18–21/*Shuo-mo fang-lüeh* 1.13r.3–5, and even Pozdneev 6.4–11/Nasunbalǰur 92b.24–93a.8/*Shuo-mo fang-lüeh* 1.13r.5–13v.5 are too short to prove that they come from the *Wargi Amargi babe nečixiyeme toqtobuxa bodoγon-i bitxe*. But there can be no doubt about the following passages taken just from that portion of the *Erdeni-yin erike* published by Pozdneev:

Pozdneev	Nasunbalǰur	*Bodoγon-i bitxe*	*Fang-lüeh*
7.12–8.10	93b.6–26	2.3r.7–4r.7	2.2v.5–3v.3
8.13–11.7	94a.1–95a.3	3.1r.2–4r.7	3.1r.2–3r.6
11.7–12.7	95a.3–24	3.6v.4–7v.5	3.5r.3–6r.2
12.13–14.3	95b.6–96a.8	3.7v.6–9v.1	3.6r.3–7r.6
14.3–15.3	96a.9–96b.8	3.12r.1–13r.6	3.9r.6–10r.7
15.3–17.11	96b.9–23, 97a.3–97b.28= 99a.22–100a.20[12]	3.21r.6–24v.6	3.16v.7–19v.4
17.11–18.11	97b.28–98a.17= 100a.20–100b.10, 96b.23–27[13]	3.24v.7–26r.3	3.19v.5–20v.3

[11] I.e., Pozdneev, *op. cit.*, p. 2, lines 6–7/Nasunbalǰur, *op. cit.*, p. 91a (i.e., top), lines 18–22/*Shuo-mo fang-lüeh*, *chüan* 1, p. 12v, line 6. Since I do not presently have access to the first *debtelin* of the *Wargi Amargi babe nečixiyeme toqtobuxa bodoγon-i bitxe*, I can only refer the reader to passages in the first *chüan* of the *Shuo-mo fang-lüeh* which seem to have corresponding passages in the *Erdeni-yin erike*.

[12] Because of a copyist's error, the continuity of this passage in the Nasunbalǰur text is interrupted. The sign of equation (=) indicates the copyist's inadvertent repetition of a given passage. For example, the copyist has repeated the text of p. 97a.3–97b.28 on pp. 99a.22–100a.20.

[13] See note 12 above.

Pozdneev	Nasunbaljur	*Bodoγon-i bitxe*	*Fang-lüeh*
18.11–21.9	96b.28–97a.2, 98a.17–99a.21, 100b.11–14[14]	3.29v.2–33r.5	3.23r.7–26r.2
23.3–24.9	101a.29–102a.3	4.1r.2–3r.5	4.1r.2–2v.2
24.9–25.9	102a.4–102b.2	4.3r.6–4v.7	4.2v.3–3v.2
25.9–27.1	102b.2–103a.4	4.5r.1–6v.6	4.3v.3–4v.6
28.3–29.8	103b.5–104a.6	5.6r.7–8r.1	5.6r.1–7r.5[15]

These passages, which comprise well over a third of A. M. Pozdneev's text, are direct extractions. Galdan has not merely consulted the *Wargi Amargi babe nečixiyeme toqtobuxa bodoγon-i bitxe.* He has incorporated whole sections from it in simple "scissors-and-paste" fashion, including even the subject headings at the beginning of various sections. These are not the only passages which Galdan has taken verbatim from other works.[16] The *Jarliγ-iyar toγtaγaγsan Γadaγadu Mongγol Qotong ayimaγ-un wang güng-üd-ün iledkel šastir*,[17] to cite only one example, has contributed greatly to the text of the *Erdeni-yin*

[14] Both interruptions here are part of the same error as that mentioned in note 12 above.

[15] In the preceding passages, Galdan has occasionally made a few minor changes for the sake of his narration.

[16] To judge by the plural suffix *-üd* which Galdan has appended to *bodolγ-a-yin debter*, there should also be other *bodoγon-i bitxe* or *fang-lüeh* which he consulted. Č. Nasunbaljur (see note 9 above) indicates that there are others of the K'ang-hsi period, but he does not mention any by title. For Manchu editions of *fang-lüeh*, see Fuchs, *op. cit.*, pp. 100–103.

[17] Published also in Chinese (*Ch'in-ting Wai-fan Meng-ku Hui-pu wang kung piao chuan* 欽定外藩蒙古回部王公表傳) and Manchu (*Xesei toqtobuxa Tulergi Mongγo Xoyise ayiman-i wang gung-sai iletun ulabun*) in several editions. Cf. Li, *op. cit.*, pp. 48–49, and Fuchs, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–104.

Pučkovskiĭ, *op. cit.*, p. 53, translates the Mongolian title, "Vysočaĭše utverždennye [rodoslovnye i] biografii knyazeĭ Vnešneĭ Mongolii i Turkestana" ["Imperially Confirmed (Genealogies and) Biographies of the Princes of Outer Mongolia and Turkestan"]. The use of square brackets around *rodoslovnye* ["genealogies"] betrays a misunderstanding of the Mongolian term *iledkel. Iledkel šastir* represents the Chinese *piao chuan* 表傳; i.e., *piao* ["(genealogical) tables"] and *chuan* ["biographies"]. Therefore, in this context, *iledkel* means "genealogies" and does not serve as a modifier of *šastir* ["biographies"]. *Iledkel šastir* means "Genealogies and Biographies," without brackets.

Lessing, *op. cit.*, p. 404, gives only "Report, account; lecture" as meanings for *iledkel.* The same work also lacks "biography" as a meaning for *šastir*, p. 753.

For *piao* and *chuan*, see the explanation in Charles S. Gardner, *Chinese Traditional*

erike. And there is a variety of other works, many of which, like the *Iledkel šastir*, Galdan himself has named as sources. These must be compared with Galdan's chronicle in order to determine how much the *Erdeni-yin erike* has to offer on its own.

In view of the chronicle's patchwork composition, it is no surprise that P. Baldanžapov should find contradictory attitudes expressed in it. "Being discontented with the colonial policy of the Manchu conquerors," the Soviet scholar explains, "Galdan at the same time was far from the struggle for liberation which the progressive segment of Mongolian society was waging. And this has been evidenced in his chronicle, *Erdeni-yin erike*, which is self-contradictory: in it there is contained much factual material from the life of the people side by side with apologetics for the feudal order and everything backward and reactionary. Ideas of the unity and independence of the Mongols, which are in separate chapters of the chronicle, are combined with the expression of loyal feelings towards the Manchu conquerors."[18]

It is not unreasonable to suppose that Galdan, who served as an official of the Manchu administration in Mongolia, might have been discontented with Manchu colonialism and at the same time largely identified with Manchu interests. But it is dangerous to adduce this from conflicting attitudes in his chronicle. Unlike modern historians, Galdan did not consult his sources and then write his history from an integrated point of view. His is a more primitive type of historiography. His work is often more compilation than composition, and much of his own writing serves principally to tie together his extractions from other books. Therefore, contradictions in Galdan's chronicle do not necessarily represent contradictions in Galdan's own thinking or in his personality. Excerpts from official Sino-Manchu publications like the *Wargi Amargi babe nečixiyeme toqtobuxa bodoγon-i bitxe* obviously reflect Manchu loyalties. Excerpts from purely Mongolian sources reflect other attitudes. Neither tell anything about Galdan.

The value of the *Erdeni-yin erike* cannot be determined until all the passages extracted from other works have been identified. Until then, the chronicle should be used as a historical source only with great caution.

Historiography, Cambridge [Mass.], 1961 [first published in 1938], p. 99, under "*Biao*" and "*Lieh Juan.*"

[18] Baldanžapov, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

II

CHINA AND CENTRAL ASIA, 1368–1884

On May 9, 1421, lightning from Heaven struck the Yung-lo Emperor's new palace. Five days later, in public penance, the emperor solemnly pronounced the duties in his charge: "Reverently we hold the mandate of Heaven to rule both China and foreigners."[1] The fulfillment of these duties had been and would remain the basic policy objective of imperial China's throne. Benign guidance over an obedient world was an emperor's cherished ambition and the basis of his self-image.

"Tribute" from Central Asia

On the distant fringes of the world that China knew and sought to lead lay Central Asia, sprawling and diverse. Mountains divided it, and deserts made much of it unfit to sustain a sedentary population. Central Asia's people, concentrated in the river valleys, lived by oasis farming and trade. Outside the river valleys only the nomad could live off the land, grazing his animals on the sparse vegetation of the semidesert.

The recorded history of China's relations with Central Asia goes back

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to 126 B.C., when Chang Ch'ien returned from a mission that had been sent to form an alliance against the Huns.[2] There had been times, as in the Han (206 B.C.–A.D. 220) and T'ang (618–907) dynasties, when China's actual military control had extended into Central Asia, but more recently, during the Yüan dynasty (1234–1368, the period of Mongolian rule), the current had flowed in the other direction, and Central Asian administrators, merchants, technicians, and craftsmen had flooded into the Middle Kingdom under the aegis of the Mongols. In 1368 the Ming dynasty drove the alien Mongols out of China, and their Central Asian officials went with them, but the international character of the Yüan left its mark on early Ming China, and for more than sixty years after the founding of the new dynasty the Chinese court carried on some of the most extensive foreign explorations the world had ever seen. The maritime expeditions of the famous eunuch Cheng Ho are well known, but in Central Asia, too, Chinese missions traveled overland to such distant cities as Samarkand, Bukhara, Andkhui, Herat—and beyond to Shiraz and Isfahan in Persia.

The official history of the Ming gives as the reason for these missions to Central Asia the Yung-lo Emperor's desire "that none of the ten thousand countries in distant lands should not be his subject."[3] The emperor may in other words have been trying "to bring all the known world within the Chinese tributary scheme of things."[4] If so, it is interesting, as I shall show farther on, that the Yung-lo Emperor was willing in 1418 to compromise even the very cornerstone of the Chinese conception of world order: his suzerainty in the world. No doubt numerous motives and interests lay behind the costly expeditions to Central Asia: prestige, military intelligence, and the profits of trade. Mixed in with these and other motives, which are still very much open to speculation, was the Ming court's specific interest in certain Central Asian commodities—in particular, horses. In any case, Chinese interest in intercourse with Central Asia was more than matched by Central Asian interest in intercourse with China.

It has long been known in the West that Chinese custom insisted upon an official footing for foreign trade. The Ming generally prevented private individuals from going to Central Asia for commerce,[5] although outlaw Chinese merchants did carry on some illicit private trade of their own during periods of upheaval (when official missions could not travel freely)[6] and, one suspects, during times of peace as well. By and large, however, foreign trade seems to have proceeded through the proper channels, that is to say, in accordance with the "tributary scheme of things." Since Ming China, within its own borders, recognized foreign states only as vassals,

Central Asian merchants who wanted to trade inside the Middle Kingdom had to come as part of a diplomatic mission from a vassal state bringing "tribute" to the emperor.

"Tribute" (*kung*) was a vague term that could mean anything given to the Chinese emperor, irrespective of the relationship between the emperor and the giver. *Kung* covered everything from tribute and taxes required on a regular basis from the emperor's confirmed subjects to diplomatic gifts presented by distant rulers who in no way recognized the Chinese emperor's authority. One must always bear in mind in reading Chinese history that gifts received as tribute were not necessarily given as such. It was not in the interest of imperial claims to preserve any nice distinctions.

Rulers of the petty oasis states on Ming China's Central Asian periphery gladly complied with the tributary formalities. Tribute missions were a lucrative business, and there was always the hope (usually unfounded) that Ming overlordship would carry with it some degree of protection as well. The profits of trade also attracted other, more distant states. Yarkand, for example, served as an entrepôt where, according to the Italian Jesuit Matteo Ricci, "the caravan of Kabul merchants is ended, and from there a new one is formed for China, the leadership of which caravan the king [of Yarkand] sells at a high price, and he imparts to the leader [of the caravan] a royal authority over all the merchants throughout the whole journey."[7] Businessmen from Western Turkestan and yet remoter lands were drawn into the trade, and since it was well known that ambassadorial status was the prerequisite for entry into China,[8] as well as the ticket to Chinese subsidy of the trip, ambassadorial status was readily forthcoming.

The Chinese authorities were happy to be deceived. The emperor's prestige was not enhanced if his ministers exposed the real nature of his "vassals," and the court had surer pick of the merchandise if traders, instead of selling their wares at frontier markets, brought them along to the capital. As a result, counterfeit embassies bearing counterfeit credentials rode back and forth regularly to the Chinese court. Merchants and ministers alike were parties to what could only have been an open secret,[9] and indeed the trade motives of these embassies could have been no secret at all, since the very "tribute" memorials often specified the gifts wanted in exchange.[10] According to Ricci, "the Chinese themselves (who are by no means ignorant of the deception) delude their king, fawning with devotion, as if truly the whole world paid taxes to the Chinese kingdom, whereas on the contrary tribute is more truly paid to those kingdoms by China."[11]

And if Ricci was in any way mistaken, it was only in believing that the emperor himself was not in on the game as well.

The "tribute system" left Central Asian trade in Central Asian hands but kept it under imperial control. Private Chinese merchants had to stay in China, and because the system gave entry only to "vassals" of the empire, Chinese subjects met no foreigners who were not also "subjects" of the realm: no living challenge to the ruler's claims walked the streets of the Middle Kingdom. Foreign envoys returning home glorified China's name abroad (since the system admitted only those foreigners whom the court was prepared to impress on a lavish scale), and the court could adjust tribute intervals to fit its own demand. For Central Asia, relations with China meant trade; for China, the basis of trade was tribute.[12]

Chu Ti and Shāhrukh Bahādur

Sultan Shāhrukh Bahādur was no vassal of the Ming, nor indeed was his father Temür the Lame, "Lord of the Happy Conjunction," but both are enrolled as tributaries in the Ming official history.[13] These two Central Asian monarchs' relations with Chu Ti of the Ming (the celebrated Yung-lo Emperor) challenge the widespread belief that "whoever wished to enter into relations with China must do so as China's vassal, acknowledging the supremacy of the Chinese emperor and obeying his commands," and that this neo-Confucian dogma ruled out "all possibility of international intercourse on terms of equality."[14]

It was in the first place the Hung-wu Emperor Chu Yüan-chang himself, founder of the Ming, who initiated diplomatic relations with Temür.[15] After some time, on October 4, 1394, according to the Ming annals, the Chinese court received from Temür a tribute of two hundred horses and a letter of submission. The letter said all the obsequious things that Chinese rulers liked to hear, acknowledged the Hung-wu Emperor's mandate of Heaven to rule the world, and expressed gratitude that he had facilitated trade with foreign lands.[16] The emperor commended Temür's literary style,[17] but the wrong man certainly received the credit, since there is nothing in the Muslim conqueror's character to make one suppose that Temür would have acquiesced knowingly in any infidel's "mandate of Heaven" to rule the world.[18] Whether a real letter from Temür was "translated" into Chinese by a merchant, or by a Ming official too frightened or too servile to render the original, or whether, as is less likely, the letter is a

total fiction remains unknown, but Temür's "submission" is in all probability an example of how the "tributary scheme of things" transformed reality to fit its own image.

The attempt to put Temür into the role of vassal within the Chinese world order, whoever may have been responsible, could well have cost China her freedom, because in 1395 the Ming emperor sent a return embassy to thank the conqueror for his letter of submission.[19] Previously Temür's relations (that is to say, trade) with King Pig[20] of China had been amicable, and the traffic had been profitable enough for Temür's annual "tribute" to have reached 1,000 horses,[21] but now with the arrival of the Chinese embassy of 1395 the Muslim ruler changed his attitude—infidel China considered him a vassal, and the insult must some day be avenged.[22] Temür detained the embassy and in time began gathering military intelligence about China,[23] but meanwhile he had business elsewhere in India and in western Asia.

In 1398 the Hung-wu Emperor died, and in 1402 after a struggle for the throne Chu Ti, the Yung-lo Emperor, succeeded. The new Ming ruler, apparently unaware of Temür's determination to invade China and annihilate the "idolators," sent out a new embassy to ask why he had let seven years go by without paying his annual tribute.[24] This embassy was no show of force like the mighty armadas of Cheng Ho which had their way with coastal principalities: it was a normal embassy, at the mercy of the countries through which it passed, accompanied by a Chinese trade caravan of 800 camels laden with merchandise.[25]

That China regarded Temür's gifts as tribute was now a matter of general knowledge. Scornfully the conqueror promised to deliver the tribute in person, seized the entire caravan of 800 camels, publicly insulted the Chinese emperor and his ambassadors, and even ordered that the latter should be hanged, so that no Chinese might ever dare bring such an embassy again.[26] When Temür died in 1405 he was on his way to destroy the Ming. His death ended the campaign, but it was clear that he was no tributary of China.

With the accession of Shāhrukh Bahādur, the "Happy Khāqān" (ruled 1405–1447), the hostility of Sino–Central Asian relations faded away. On July 25, 1407, the detained Chinese embassy of 1395 returned to the Ming court and reported the Muslim conqueror's death.[27] On April 29, 1408, Chu Ti sent ambassadors back to Central Asia[28] to offer his condolences and, presumably, to promote good relations. When the embassy arrived in Herat with gifts during January of 1409, the Timurid emperor Shāhrukh

received it warmly[29] and sent a return embassy which was received at the Ming court on August 9 of the same year. The Chinese emperor responded with another embassy to the Timurids.[30]

On March 14 of the following year, 1410, Chu Ti received still another embassy from Herat, which prompted him to dispatch ambassadors to Shāhrukh once again, this time carrying the usual kind of document sent by Chinese emperors to foreign rulers.[31] In his letter, which arrived during April of 1412,[32] Chu Ti proclaimed himself "lord of the realms of the face of the earth"[33] who "makes no distinction between far and near and regards all equally and impartially."[34] Using the royal "we," he addressed Shāhrukh in the second person singular and in condescending terms commended him for being a good ruler and for sending an ambassador to do the Chinese emperor homage (*khidmat*), as he claimed Shāhrukh's father Temür had done before him. In concluding, Chu Ti spoke of keeping communications open for the sake of trade and advised Shāhrukh to make peace with his nephew Khalīl Sulṭān. The only concession, if it can be regarded as such, that the Ming emperor made to the sensibilities of his Muslim correspondent was to ascribe to God the authorship of all things in heaven and earth—Chu Ti did not blush, however, to make the point that it was by God's command[35] that he, Chu Ti, was "lord of the realms of the face of the earth."[36]

Shāhrukh responded in kind to this haughty document. He sent the Ming emperor a letter in Arabic and another in Persian advising Chu Ti to put aside his infidel ways and adopt Islam. He patronized him by naming off a list of other princes who had adopted the religion and reminded him that since "sovereignty and power" (*salṭanat wa dawlat*) are brought about by faith (*īmān*), submission to the will of God (*islām*), and God's favor, he "should live in justice, equity and fairness toward [his] subjects." Shāhrukh called for friendly relations in continuation of "the affection and friendship which existed between [our] fathers," and counseled an open road to commerce, since this would result in "the prosperity of kingdoms and good repute in [this] world and [in the world] to come."[37]

Shāhrukh's response produced a kind of diplomatic stalemate but did not lead to a break in relations as the similar (and famous) Japanese refusal to recognize Chinese suzerainty had done three decades earlier. Both emperors, Ming and Timurid, moderated their imperious tone and continued to exchange embassies. The official Ming annals (*shih-lu*) of course make no mention of Shāhrukh's patronizing letter and report only that the Ming ambassador returned from Herat and other places on July

23, 1413, with a Timurid embassy which had come to present "tribute."[38] The Timurid ambassadors were honored with an imperial feast on July 29,[39] and on October 12 they were sent back to Central Asia along with a Ming embassy.[40] On November 30, 1415, this same Ming embassy returned to the Chinese court with more "tribute"-bearers from the Timurids.[41] The court feasted the Central Asian ambassadors on December 4[42] and again on December 31[43] and sent them back to Central Asia on July 13, 1416, with still another Chinese embassy.[44] This embassy reached Shāhrukh in the spring of the following year[45] with a letter from Chu Ti cordially urging that "from both sides [they] should lift the veil of difference and disunity and order the opening of the door of agreement and unity, so that subjects and merchants may come and go at will and the roads may be secure."[46]

Shāhrukh responded with an embassy whose advance party reached the Ming court on January 21, 1418, and is duly recorded in the Ming annals as a mission coming to present "tribute."[47] The Timurid ambassador, who did not himself arrive until September 19, was entertained by the Board of Rites[48] and then on the thirtieth of the month was sent back to Central Asia.[49] With him went another Chinese embassy bearing a letter from the Ming emperor which affords us a rare glimpse of the discrepancy between myth and reality in traditional Chinese foreign relations.

Chu Ti's letter of 1418 to Shāhrukh Bahādur is written as a message to a fellow monarch. The Ming emperor is not guilty of humility, but in addressing his Timurid counterpart he abandons the condescending second person singular, dispenses with the customary imperial claims to world suzerainty, and accepts Shāhrukh's gifts as gifts rather than tribute. At the same time, to keep up appearances in China, Chu Ti's letter also complies with the Chinese practice of honorific elevation, so that the Ming emperor's title at the beginning of the letter extends farther into the margin than Shāhrukh's title of "sultan." This subtle device allows Chu Ti to maintain two postures at once: political equality in Central Asia and world supremacy in China. The letter reads as follows:

The Grand Dāyming Pādshāh sends [this] letter to

Sultan Shāhrukh. We reflect [that] the
Lord Most High has created him knowing, wise, and mature [of judgment] so that he may hold the realm of Islam. Because of this, the men of that realm have grown rich. The

Sultan [is] enlightened, perceptive, knowing, mature, sensible, and greater than all the Muslims, and to the command of the
Lord Most High has done homage and obedience, and in His work has been diligent, because it is in keeping with [His]
Heavenly assistance. We formerly sent as envoys *Amīr-i Sarāy* Līdā with his retinue. They reached the
Sultan. According to the rules of etiquette he commanded much pomp and ceremony [for their reception]. Līdā and his retinue have returned and have reported. Everything has become right, clear, and evident to us, and [the Sultan's] envoys, Beg Būqā and the rest, have returned together with Līdā and his retinue. They have brought along for us as gifts (*hadāyā*) a lion, Arabian (Tāzī) horses, leopards (*yūzān*), and other things. To this court they have brought [them] all. We have viewed them all. They have made manifest the sincerity of [the Sultan's] affection. We are extremely grateful. [In] the Western Regions, which are the place of Islam, of the wise men and good men of old, no one has been greater than the
Sultan, and he is well able to give security and comfort to the men of that realm, which is in accordance with the will of
God, may His Glory be exalted! How should the
Lord Most High not be pleased and glad? In manly fashion men have befriended one another. [Our friendship] is heart to heart [reflecting] like a mirror, although there be [such a] distance [between us]. From the [point of] view of friendship it seems that good will and compassion are more precious than anything, but in the spirit of those [virtues] something precious [that is, a gift or two] is also [sent]. Now Līdā and Jāngqwā with their retinue have been specially sent along with the envoys Beg Būqā and the rest to deliver seven falcons (*sūngqūr*) as gifts (*hadāyā*) to the
Sultan: all these falcons we have flown with our own hand. And also gifts of embroidered silk (*kimkhā*) and other things as well have been sent. Although [these] falcons are not [indigenous] to our Chinese realm, nevertheless [people] are continually bringing [them] from the seacoast for us as rarities. Because of this there is no scarcity. In that land of yours they have been difficult to find. They have been sent specially that they may be tokens of [our] gratitude worthy of the Sultan's great generosity. Although [these] things are of no account, since they are nevertheless the [only] means [we have in which to express] our affection, may they be acceptable to the

Sultan. Hereafter the sincerity of [our] affection should increase, and envoys and merchants should constantly come and go, and there should be no interruption, so that men may all enjoy the riches of safety, security, and ease. Surely the
Lord Most High will [then] increase [His] goodness and mercy [toward us]. This is what [we] have had to say. Finis.[50]

Needless to say, the text of Chu Ti's letter is not recorded in the Ming annals; still, there can be little doubt about its authenticity. The phraseology of the letter is the odd language of literal translation, and the Timurid chronicler himself remarks upon the curious Chinese practice of honorific elevation. In this letter Chu Ti abandons all pretense that he is Shāhrukh's suzerain and addresses him as a political equal. In so doing, the Ming ruler violates the neo-Confucian myth that as emperor of China he is suzerain of the world.[51]

The embassy bearing Chu Ti's letter arrived in Samarkand about August 22, 1419,[52] and reached Herat in October.[53] Shāhrukh soon dismissed the Chinese embassy, and it returned to China by way of Samarkand.[54] On December 4 a Timurid return embassy left Herat with instructions that one of the envoys, a certain Ghiyāth al-Dīn Naqqāsh, was to keep a detailed record of the embassy's journey.[55] The embassy record that Ghiyāth al-Dīn kept shows plainly that the Ming emperor's willingness to communicate as an equal at a distance is not to be construed as a symptom of any such fraternal attitude on his own ground in China.

In the early morning of December 14, 1420, while it was still dark,[56] the Timurid embassy arrived at the gates of Peking and was at length received in audience by the emperor. Ghiyāth al-Dīn's account describes the sumptuous Ming court[57] and the ambassadors' reception: first, an official read aloud a statement in Chinese to the effect that "from a long distance away, from the presence of his Majesty Shāhrukh and his children, the envoys have come, and [they] have brought gifts (*tabarrukāt*) for the padshah and have come to knock their heads at the foot of the throne." Next, some of the emperor's Muslim officials approached the ambassadors and said, "First bow down and after that put your heads on the floor three times." Accordingly, the ambassadors put down their heads, but, if we are to believe Ghiyāth al-Dīn's account, they "did not let their foreheads reach the floor."[58] The ambassadors' claim not to have performed the full kotow in formal audience shows that they understood the implications of the act. The Ming ruler was not treating the Timurid emperor as his

political equal in Peking, regardless of what he may have said in his letter to faraway Herat. What is more, the ambassadors' fear of compromising their sovereign's honor is doubly clear, because on other occasions, when it was simply a question of abasing *themselves* and not their ruler, the ambassadors were quite willing to perform the kotow, however distasteful this Chinese custom may have been to them.[59]

Ghiyāth al-Dīn describes the rest of the audience: the letters from the Timurids were presented to Chu Ti, who asked the ambassadors several questions about their country and about the Turkmen chief Qara Yūsuf. The emperor also expressed an interest in acquiring good horses.[60] The embassy was feasted on the following day[61] and again three days later,[62] and on the Chinese New Year (February 2, 1421) the ambassadors were included in the ceremonies officially inaugurating Peking as capital of the Ming empire.[63] The embassy was present at court on February 17[64] and had further audiences with Chu Ti on March 6 and 7.[65] On the thirteenth, Chu Ti granted special gifts to Ulugh Beg's ambassadors and their ladies (*khātūnān*), perhaps because these envoys had brought better horses than the other Timurid ambassadors.[66] The embassy also saw the emperor again on March 18,[67] and April 6[68] and April 8,[69] before obtaining leave from the ailing emperor's son in May and departing from the capital.[70]

Chu Ti's relations with Temür and Shāhrukh Bahādur reveal the inconsistency between Ming doctrine and practice and challenge some widely held notions about Chinese foreign relations. Neo-Confucian myth asserted the emperor's world supremacy by the will of Heaven. That is to say, whether he ruled, or reigned, or (as some prefer) gave order to the world, the emperor of China, by the very nature of things, had a moral authority over all mankind. It has been claimed that this Chinese doctrine was not "a dogma . . . of universal dominion,"[71] but we have Chu Ti's own words that as emperor of China he held "the mandate of Heaven to rule both China and foreigners." Chu Ti had launched his fleets to the Western Seas and sent his missions overland to Shiraz and Isfahan, but he had also fostered the examination system based on neo-Confucian orthodoxy and ordered definitive editions of the neo-Confucian scriptures. Later the emperor's desire for world dominion was given as the principal explanation for his grandiose expeditions.[72]

According to the official myth, foreigners could trade with China only by petition to the Son of Heaven and recognition of his authority. In practice, however, the early Ming court took Chinese commerce to the

foreigners. To say that in Ming times "All who wished to enter into relations with China . . . must acknowledge the suzerainty of the Chinese emperor," or that "Any violation of the elaborate code governing tribute mission[s] and trade was penalized by the breaking of relations," or that such irregularities could be overlooked only "so long as the emperor did not get wind of them"[73] is to ignore the early Ming experience with Central Asia. "Irregularities," when they were in the imperial interest, could be and were initiated by the emperor himself. The court not only winked at counterfeit "tribute" embassies and dealt with rulers who, with the court's full knowledge, did not recognize the emperor's authority; it even took the initiative and promoted commerce.[74] When a foreign ruler would not acquiesce in the language of the Chinese myth, the Chinese emperor could and did abandon his posture of world supremacy to address that ruler on equal terms.

The contrast between Chu Ti's letter of 1410 and his letter of 1418 is striking and inescapable. It is well known that the Manchus later dealt with the encroaching Russians on an equal basis at a time of military emergency, but the letter of 1418 is of even greater institutional interest because it was sent by a Chinese emperor at a time of great Chinese power to a ruler thousands of miles away. In other words, to preserve desirable relations the Ming court was flexible enough to use a double standard, and, except for a few officials in the chancellery and the embassies concerned, the Chinese court and populace were none the wiser. The Ming emperor could suppress his mandate to suit his own convenience so long as his dealings were conducted at a distance and so long as the necessary appearances were preserved in China. Within China's borders such concessions were impossible, and when the Timurid envoys arrived in 1420 they were told to knock their heads upon the floor.

Tribute and Trade: Traditional Relations to 1755

On September 7, 1424, shortly after his accession to the Ming throne, the Yung-lo Emperor's son Chu Kao-chih abolished overland missions "to buy horses" in Central Asia.[75] To be sure, he died after reigning less than a year, and his successors did occasionally send ambassadors abroad,[76] but in time the substance of Chu Kao-chih's policy prevailed and the Ming court gradually gave up its active international role.

From Chu Kao-chih to the end of the dynasty, China's relations with

Central Asia remained essentially the "tributary" relations that have come to be regarded as traditional. China let Central Asian traders come to her.[77] Eventually the court even began to accept "tribute" less readily than it had before. Horses, which had been the most important concrete item of Chinese interest in the Western Regions,[78] and also jade and other luxury goods, had to be balanced against the terrible expense of the "tribute" missions and the trouble they caused.[79] "Rare birds and strange beasts" were curiosities that had no real use[80] and, although emperors liked to receive such exotic presents, the literati, upholders of Confucian values, disapproved.[81] Too much interest in frivolous luxuries on the part of the emperor was unseemly, and when in 1487 a mission from Samarkand asked to ship a lion to the court by sea the emperor refused the request so that neighboring countries would not laugh at China.[82]

As border threats grew more dangerous from the direction of Mongolia, as Ming vitality weakened, and as the neo-Confucian revival took hold in official thinking, trade grew less respectable in official eyes and came to be regarded largely as a concession that the court could use to buy peace with the Mongols.[83] Accordingly, during the fifteenth, sixteenth, and seventeenth centuries Central Asian merchants carried on much of their commerce via Mongolian "tributary" trade. Mongolian chieftains either sold the leadership of their "tribute" missions to Central Asian merchants outright or included them in their embassies to Peking.[84]

The wider geographical aspirations which Chu Yüan-chang and Chu Ti had inherited from the Mongolian empire had proved impracticable, and the Ming emperors now began to fulfill their mandate more passively. More and more, China stood aloof, disdained trade, and viewed the acceptance of Central Asian tribute as a concession; nevertheless, it would be a distortion to regard the early Ming explorations simply as the events of an isolated episode. That the Ming tried to draw the world closer during the early years of the dynasty and not afterward reflects the Ming's early strength and its later weakness. It does not reflect a change of doctrine or an abdication of the emperor's world supremacy. The early initiative and the later withdrawal occurred within the context of the same institutions and imperial claims. The foreign expeditions and diplomatic concessions of the Hung-wu and Yung-lo periods represent Ming values in a period of strength, while the antiforeignism and anticommercialism of the later Ming are their expression in a period of weakness.

In its declining years the Ming court, principally alert to dangers from Mongolia, focused its attention on developments north of the Great Wall

and was not much concerned with the "Western Regions." Central Asia likewise remained little concerned with China, and by the end of the Ming dynasty Central Asians saw China mostly as a distant empire, a market partly dependent on Central Asian commerce,[85] and an enormous body of heathen whom Muslims would some day convert.[86] Central Asians considered China's culture developed but inferior to their own, and they found the Chinese ignorant of the world.[87] China's emperor was a great potentate, but seen from Central Asia he was not necessarily foremost among such figures as the Crimean, Russian, Indian Moghul, and Ottoman rulers.[88] Many Central Asians believed the emperor of China to be a Muslim in private life; some even thought him a Christian.[89]

By the time of the Manchu invasion of China in 1644 and the establishment of the Manchu Ch'ing empire, the Timurid and Moghul[90] realms of Central Asia had disintegrated into numerous smaller kingdoms and principalities. Because most of Central Asia was cut off from China by mountains, deserts, and considerable distance, that region seemed to present no immediate threat to China's security, and from 1646, when Turfan established "tributary" relations with the new dynasty,[91] to 1696, when Hami formally submitted to the K'ang-hsi Emperor,[92] Ch'ing relations with Central Asia remained essentially commercial. During this time, however, with the rise of the Oyirad (or Kalmuk) empire in Zungharia, the Ch'ing court gradually began to regard Central Asia as a potential source of danger, especially after the Oyirad ruler Galdan invaded Eastern Turkestan in the late 1670's and incorporated it into the Oyirad empire.[93]

Eastern Turkestan was by now divided among a profusion of city-states.[94] The inhabitants of these city-states spoke closely related Turkic languages and shared a common Islamic culture and sedentary mode of life, but they had no sense of belonging to a single nationality, and their cities were not united by any common political structure other than that provided by the Oyirad conquest. The southwestern cities, known variously as Kashgaria, or the Six, Seven, or Eight Cities,[95] were largely a cultural extension of Western Turkestan, whereas the northeastern cities of Uighuristan,[96] because of their small size, mixed ethnological composition,[97] and proximity to China, had long been part of the Chinese orbit. For Kashgarians, Turfan (the center of Uighuristan) was *Gharībāna* Turfan, a city "of foreigners."[98]

In 1688 the Oyirad invaded Outer Mongolia, and by 1690 they were openly at war with the Ch'ing. Six years later the Manchu forces succeeded

in driving the Oyirad out of Mongolia, but the fighting recommenced in 1715, and it took another forty years of intermittent warfare for the Manchu forces to eliminate the Oyirad menace. During this time Ch'ing relations with Central Asia proper (Eastern and Western Turkestan) were restricted to the traditional blend of "tribute" and trade, with merchants sometimes coming directly from Central Asia and sometimes coming as part of Oyirad "tribute" embassies.

The Manchus and the Khojas: China Takes a Piece of Central Asia

When the Ch'ing army finally entered the Oyirad capital in 1755, among the prisoners who fell into their hands were two brothers of a family of khojas whom the Oyirad had held as hostages. These khojas belonged to a dynasty of Muslim holy men whom the inhabitants of Kashgaria regarded as their legitimate rulers. The khojas had all the symbols of legitimation that one could have wanted in the Central Asia of that time. They claimed genealogical descent from Muḥammad, religious succession as heads of a sufi order that went back to the Prophet, and some of them claimed genealogical descent from the imperial house of Chinggis Khan.[99] The Oyirad had held the khojas as hostages in order to ensure Kashgaria's obedience, and now, in 1755, with the defeat of the Oyirad, the two khoja brothers were captured by the Ch'ing. From the Ch'ing point of view, their capture made them vassals of the emperor and made a vassal state of their domain, Kashgaria. It was on this understanding that the Manchus sent the so-called Elder Khoja back to govern Kashgaria, while they continued to hold the Younger Khoja as a hostage.

In the spring of 1756 the ambitious Younger Khoja escaped and joined his brother in Kashgaria. In the autumn of that year, when the Manchus sent an envoy to establish the tribute that the "vassal" khojas would have to pay, the two brothers did not respond, and in the spring of 1757, when the Ch'ing court sent a mission to impose its demands, the khojas, claiming their independence, massacred the mission.[100] To the Manchus, who were at the height of their military power, rebellion from a vassal was intolerable, and if they allowed the offense to go unpunished it might encourage rebellion in other quarters. Accordingly, on February 10, 1758, the Ch'ien-lung Emperor dispatched an army against the khojas in Kashgaria,[101] and on December 12 of the following year he received formal notification that his army had destroyed them.[102] In this way the Ch'ing empire encum-

bered itself with Kashgaria, a Central Asia territory which from then on it would have to defend.

News of the Ch'ing victory in Kashgaria spread fear throughout Central Asia and brought to life the prophecy of Central Asian folklore that a Chinese conquest would foreshadow the end of the world.[103] In the face of the Ch'ing threat many Central Asian rulers sent conciliatory letters to the Ch'ing emperor so as to win time while they strove to marshal a united force to roll the Manchus back into China. Here the Afghan Aḥmad Shāh Durrānī played the leading role. He sent an army in 1762 to stand between Kokand and Tashkent while he tried to arrange a Central Asian embargo on Chinese trade and raise enough military support to expel the invaders. In the same year the Afghan shah also sent an embassy to Peking to enter a plea on behalf of the khoja house, but the Ch'ien-lung Emperor, true to his inherited ideal of world supremacy, received the embassy as a tribute mission and a sign of surrender, so that the embassy did not achieve its purpose.[104] In the end, the united Central Asian force failed to materialize because of the mutual suspicions of its would-be participants and the seeming hopelessness of its objective, but by this time it was 1764 and the Ch'ing court was satisfied with its conquests, largely because of the submissive letters it had received from Central Asia west of the Pamirs.

When the Manchus took over Kashgaria, they ran it essentially as it had been organized under the Oyirad empire. They tolerated the local customs and religion and maintained the scale of taxation that the Oyirad had imposed, and by and large the sixty-year period of Ch'ing control from 1759 until 1820 was marked by order and greater material prosperity than the region had known for at least a century.[105]

Three principal factors contributed to Eastern Turkestan's sixty years of peace under Manchu rule. First, the enormous military might of the Ch'ing empire inspired the Kashgarians with fear and prevented the states of western Central Asia from committing any overt act of aggression. Second, in destroying the two khoja brothers the Manchus had eliminated the most effective rallying point for Kashgarian opposition. Third, the Manchus had found collaborators among the local elites of Eastern Turkestan, and to these collaborators, known by their Turkish official titles as "begs," the Ch'ing government delegated all local authority, even permitting them to govern by Islamic law. Because the begs derived their power from the Ch'ing empire, they and their kinsmen, officers, and retainers had a vested interest in Ch'ing rule.

By 1820 the basis of stable Ch'ing rule in Kashgaria was gone. In China, the White Lotus Rebellion had questioned the dynasty's power; the Miao tribes had revolted; and in 1813 the Heavenly Reason rebels had even stormed the walls of the imperial palace. Shortages of food plagued the expanded Chinese population, and the Ch'ing army had grown weak. In the khanate of Kokand, west of Kashgar, three surviving khoja grandsons had established a base from which to launch a khoja restoration in Kashgaria, and in Kashgaria itself the begs had begun to squeeze the landowning classes so severely that by 1820 the growing numbers of the dispossessed presented an internal threat to Ch'ing authority.[106]

Accordingly, in the summer of 1820, Jahāngīr Khoja, grandson of the defeated Elder Khoja of 1759, left his base in Kokand and began to harry the borders of the Ch'ing empire. His first allies were freebooting Kirghiz from the mountains north of Kashgaria. These unruly nomads had always been ready for plunder, but as the khoja successfully continued his raids, other more stable elements began to join him, and since by 1827 the Ch'ing army still had not yet managed to destroy the khoja, the Ch'ing field commanders urged the throne to compromise. The suggestion of compromise greatly displeased the emperor, who stripped these officers of their rank.[107]

By its very ideology the Ch'ing dynasty was committed to an uncompromising defense of its empire. As a consequence of his claim to be master of the world by the mandate of Heaven, the emperor could not tolerate denial of his authority or the alienation of any of his domains; moreover, the dangerous connection between external attacks and internal rebellions had always been a cardinal point in Chinese statecraft. As a result, although distant Kashgaria was a nuisance, it had to be defended. The emperor was a prisoner of his own possessions.

Forced to continue their campaign, the Ch'ing generals circulated a false rumor that the army had withdrawn from Kashgaria, and Jahāngīr Khoja, misled by this ruse, left his hiding place among the Kirghiz and advanced on Kashgar with a small force, only to be seized by the Ch'ing army on February 14, 1828.[108] The captured khoja was then sent to Peking, where he was ceremonially offered to the imperial ancestors, then hacked into pieces and thrown ingloriously to the dogs.[109]

The Manchus had no sooner destroyed Jahāngīr Khoja than they found themselves face to face with a new enemy in Central Asia: the khanate of Kokand[110] adjoining the Ch'ing empire on its Kashgarian frontier. Ever since 1759 the Ch'ing court had been dealing with Kokand on a basis of quasi-equality while maintaining the pretense in China that the Central

Asian state was simply a Manchu vassal. Outwardly, Kokandian ambassadors had been received in Peking as tribute-bearers, but when the emperor had addressed the ambassadors through his Turki interpreters he had referred to the Kokandian ruler as "my son,"[111] a phrase which (as the Manchus well knew) was altogether different in Inner Asia from "my subject."[112] The emperor's use of the phrase "my son" converted the humbling court ritual from an act of submission into just another Chinese custom and in so doing facilitated relations with Kokand, but the price the emperor had paid was a covert renunciation of his suzerain claims.

By the 1820's Kokand, straddling the caravan route, clearly dominated Kashgaria's Russian and Central Asian trade. In Kashgaria itself, Kokandian merchants had acquired a growing influence by intermarriage and the purchase of Kashgarian lands,[113] and throughout Jahāngīr Khoja's rebellion Kokand had given open aid to the khoja forces. Now, with Jahāngīr's defeat, the Ch'ing court resolved to punish the Kokandian government, which still harbored other khojas and still threatened the peace in Kashgaria.

Not feeling strong enough to humble the khanate with an armed invasion, the Ch'ing authorities arrested all Kokandian merchants in Eastern Turkestan, sealed the Kashgarian border to Kokandian commerce, and made special trade arrangements with other Central Asian countries so as to bypass Kokand altogether.[114] The results of this stratagem were not long in coming, but they were different from what the Ch'ing court had expected. The stoppage of trade deprived Kokand of its profits and tax revenues, but the khanate, now at the height of its power, did not come to terms. Instead, seeing the weakness of the Ch'ing position in Kashgaria, Kokand declared a Muslim holy war in the name of the khojas and in the early autumn of 1830 invaded Kashgaria with an army of about 40,000 men.[115] Roughly three months later, laden with booty, the Kokandian forces voluntarily withdrew, but by then it was clear that Kashgaria's peace was no longer within Ch'ing control.

Having failed with punishments, the Manchus now tried to buy the Kokandian government, and in 1832 the court offered Kokand a resumption of trade, the right to station political agents in Kashgaria, political and administrative control over all foreigners in Kashgaria, and receipt of all duties that might be collected in Kashgaria from Kokandian merchants. In return Kokand was supposed to respect the peace and keep the khojas out of Eastern Turkestan.[116] Kokand agreed but, conscious of its ability to dictate terms, soon pressed the Ch'ing for the right to tax all foreign merchants in Kashgaria as well. Because such a concession meant a virtual Kokandian monopoly of Kashgaria's trade, the Manchus refused, only to have Kokand raid the Kashgarian borderlands regularly for the next five years[117] and impose its monopoly anyway.

Until 1864 the Manchu empire tried to keep order in Eastern Turkestan at the price of its Central Asian trade. At first Kokand found its monopoly too profitable to risk and kept the khojas confined, giving the Ch'ing government an opportunity to concentrate on a program of land reclamation, while it tried at the same time to incorporate Kashgaria more fully into China by settling Chinese colonists on Kashgarian lands.[118] After about a decade, however, Kokand began to take further advantage of the Ch'ing government's precarious hold over Kashgaria, and in 1847, 1855, 1857, and 1862, khoja forces entered Kashgaria from Kokand to take booty and stir up Kashgarian revolt.[119] Each time, the Ch'ing army found the strength to drive them out again, but the army was not strong enough to follow the khojas across the mountains and destroy their base or to punish Kokand, their protector. As a result, the Manchus felt constrained to perpetuate Kokandian trade rights after each khoja attack in the futile hope that Kokand would eventually find stability to its commercial advantage.

The troubled state of peace lasted until 1862, when the great Tungan (Chinese Muslim) rebellion flared up in Shensi and Kansu and cut Kashgaria off from Ch'ing control for a period of about twelve years.[120] While the Tungans were challenging the Manchu emperor's authority in northwest China, in Eastern Turkestan a Kokandian adventurer and khoja partisan named Ya'qūb Beg reconquered Kashgaria for Islam and established an independent emirate. With the dynasty's prestige at stake, the Ch'ing government outwardly assumed an uncompromising posture, but, as in the case of the Ming relations with Shāhrukh Bahādur and the Ch'ing court's own relations with Kokand, the government was free unofficially to follow the dictates of the situation. Accordingly, the Manchus established contact with Ya'qūb Beg's "rebel" regime. The full extent of this contact is unknown, but the memoirs of a contemporary Greek traveler to Eastern Turkestan reveal that the Ch'ing at least sent an embassy to the Kokandian "rebel" in 1871 and that the Ch'ing authorities in Hami honored a passport that the outlaw emir had issued.[121]

Not until 1876 did the Ch'ing forces extinguish the Tungan rebellion, and by the time they had managed to destroy Ya'qūb Beg and recover Kashgaria two years later, in 1878, Central Asia had a very different face: the expanding Russian empire had annexed Kokand and was now swiftly

subjugating the rest of Western Turkestan, while the dynasty of the once-dangerous khojas had finally disappeared. Again the Manchus felt it necessary to change their policy, and on November 18, 1884, wary of the Russian threat and determined to eliminate Kashgaria's constant disorders, the Ch'ing court abolished the rule of the begs and integrated Eastern Turkestan into the administration of China proper by incorporating it into a new province called Sinkiang, the "New Dominion."[122]

With the formation of Sinkiang as a province Ch'ing relations with Central Asia came to an end. Eastern Turkestan was now part of China. Western Turkestan was part of Russia, and with the single exception of Afghanistan the independent states of Central Asia had ceased to exist. The era of traditional China was also swiftly drawing to a close. The emperor's claim to rule the world was empty. Even in China the imperial government ruled only with difficulty and only for a few more years.

It has been widely supposed that from the beginning of the Ming dynasty to the second half of the nineteenth century Chinese emperors recognized foreign rulers only as "tributaries," or vassals. Manchu relations with Tibet in the middle of the seventeenth century, the equal Russo–Manchu Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), and the fact that Manchu envoys performed the kotow in Moscow (1731) and Saint Petersburg (1732) have been seen as deviations from the rule, but only as partial deviations, because the early Ch'ing emperors had not yet been assimilated by Chinese culture. In other words, they were not yet "Chinese" emperors. More serious exceptions appear in the history of Sino–Central Asian relations. The Yung-lo Emperor of the Ming, a full-blooded Chinese monarch, dealt with the Timurid emperor Shāhrukh Bahādur on an equal footing, and the Ch'ien-lung Emperor of the mid-Ch'ing conceded the political equality of the Kokandian king. Other examples can surely be found, but the flexible approach of China's emperors to the problems of international relations is already clear.

Within the empire, the myth of world suzerainty was a useful ideological instrument for ruling China, and, as Shāhrukh's ambassadors and the khojas found, it was not to be compromised. But in foreign affairs the myth often proved a hindrance. Then, quietly, the emperor practiced what he pleased, not what he preached. Relations on an equal basis with Herat, Lhasa, Kokand, or Moscow were not exceptions to Chinese practice at all. They were customary dealings on the unseen side of a long-established tradition.

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Notes

Wherever possible I have tried to direct the reader to published translations of the works cited, because sources in numerous languages are involved and readers of different disciplines cannot be expected to know them all. Dates cited from Chinese sources are the dates when events happened "officially," that is, when a given event or document was brought to the emperor's attention and registered in the official record. Persian citations have been transcribed as Arabic.

1. "Chen kung ying T'ien-ming t'ung-yü Hua I"—*Ming shih-lu* (1940 photolithographic ed. of Chiang-su kuo-hsüeh t'u-shu-kuan MS), Yung-lo, 120:3r1: Yung-lo 19.iv.13 (cycl. 42)/14.v.1421. Cf. the account of the Timurid envoy Ghiyāth al-Dīn Naqqāsh, who was present in Peking at the time of the fire, in 'Abd al-Razzāq Samarqandī, *Maṭla'-i sa'dayn wa majma'-i baḥrayn*, (completed ca.1475), Vol. 2, Pts. 1-3, ed. Muḥammad Shafī' (Lahore, 1946–1949), Vol.2, Pt. 1, p. 286, lines 13-23. Cf. also the partial French translation of 'Abd al-Razzāq's history by Etienne Marc Quatremère, "Notice de l'ouvrage persan qui a pour titre *Matla-assaadeïn ou-madjma-albahreïn* et qui contient l'histoire des deux sultans Schah-Rokh et Abou-Saïd," *Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du roi et autres bibliothèques* (Paris, 1843), Persian text, 14.1:338, lines 3-17; French tr., 14.1:422-423.

Ghiyāth al-Dīn's chronology at this point does not appear to coincide exactly with the date recorded in the *Ming shih-lu*. According to the latter (120:1r9-10), "fire from Heaven" *(tsai)* struck the Feng-t'ien tien, the Hua-kai tien and the Chin-shen tien on Yung-lo 19.iv.8 (cycl. 37)/9.v.1421/6 Jumādā I, A.H. 824, and on iv.10 (cycl. 39)/11.v/8 Jumādā I the emperor called his civil and military officials together and made a preliminary statement on the ominous sign from Heaven (*ibid.*, 120:1r10-2r1; the proclamation of 14.v.1421 was a later pronouncement). Ghiyāth al-Dīn on the other hand writes that on 8 Jumādā I the death of one of the emperor's wives (who had died some time previously) was announced and that "on this night, by Divine decree, a fire caused by lightning" struck the palace. Unfortunately I have at my disposal only the text of Ghiyāth al-Dīn's account included in 'Abd al-Razzāq. The earlier text of Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, "Zubdat al-tawārīkh-i Bāysunghurī" (MS, completed ca. 1427), may give some clue to the reasons for the apparent discrepancy, but I have been unable to consult it.

2. Ssu-ma Kuang, comp., and Hu San-hsing, annotator, *Tzu-chih t'ung-chien*, punctuated ed. (Shanghai, 1956), Vol. 1, *chüan* 18, p. 611.

3. " . . . yüan-fang wan-kuo wu pu ch'en-fu"—*Ming shih* (Peking: Wu ying tien, 1739), 332:18r8-9: cf. Emil Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches from Eastern Asiatic Sources* (London, 1910), II, 247.

4. Edwin O. Reischauer and John K. Fairbank, *East Asia: The Great Tradition*, Vol. 1 of *A History of East Asian Civilization* (Boston, 1960), p. 322.

5. This prohibition was remarked upon in Europe as early as the sixteenth century by the Central Asian merchant Ḥājjī Muḥammad ("Chaggi Memet"). See Giovanni Battista Ramusio, ed., *Secondo volvme delle navigationi et viaggi nel qvale si contengono L'Historia delle cose de Tartari, & diuersi fatti de loro Imperatori, descritta da M. Marco Polo Gentilhuomo Venetiano, & da Hayton Armeno* (Venice, 1559), fol. 16v. Cf. the English translation of this passage in Henry Yule, tr. and ed., *Cathay and the Way Thither,*

Being a Collection of Medieval Notices of China, 2nd ed., rev. Henri Cordier (London, 1913–1916), I, 295.

6. One bit of evidence pointing to such merchants in the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century is mentioned in Wilhelm Barthold, "Ocherk istorii Semirech'ia," *Akademik V. V. Bartol'd: Sochineniia* (Moscow, 1963–), Vol. 2. Pt. 1, p. 84. When the ruler of Ferghana besieged Aksu, the inhabitants, in order to buy him off, handed over to him the rich Chinese merchants in the city along with all their property. Cf. the English translation in Barthold's *Four Studies on the History of Central Asia,* tr. Vladimir Fedorovich and T. Minorsky (Leiden, 1956–1962), I, 144.

Maritime violations of restrictions on private Chinese trade abroad are comparatively well documented for the late Ming. See, e.g., John K. Fairbank, "Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West," *The Far Eastern Quarterly,* 1.2:142 (Febraury 1942); and John Hall, "Notes on the Early Ch'ing Copper Trade with Japan," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies,* 12.3-4:444-461 (December 1949), esp. pp. 446-448.

7. "In hac Regia finem accipit Cabulensium Negotiatorum comitatus: & inde instituitur nouus Cataium versus, cuius comitatus praefecturam Rex multo pretio vendit, ac Praefecto Regiam in Negotiatores omnes per iter vniuersum communicat potestatem" —Matteo Ricci, S. J., *De Christiana Expeditione Apvd Sinas Svscepta ab Societate Iesu,* ed. Nicolaus Trigautius (Rome, 1615), pp. 551-552. Cf. the English translation in Louis Joseph Gallagher, S.J., tr., *China in the Sixteenth Century: The Journals of Matthew Ricci: 1583–1610* (New York, 1953), p. 505. Gallagher has misunderstood the Latin text: "The leadership of the Cathay caravan is sold to the King, and the chieftain who makes the purchase is granted a sort of royal authority over the travelers during the whole journey." The situation is the reverse: the king profits from selling the leadership of the caravan to Kabul merchants.

The sources of this information were papers of the Jesuit lay brother Bento de Góis (Goes) and the recollections of his Armenian companion Isaac. Their travels (1603–1607) had established the identity of China and Cathay. See Eduardo Brazão, *Em demanda do Cataio: A viagem de Bento de Goes à China, 1603–1607,* (Lisbon, 1954), esp. pp. 75-100.

8. Note the following observations, all reported from the point of view of Central Asia during roughly the first half of the sixteenth century. "First, people who come by way of land from the realms of Islam absolutely must have the title of envoy *(ilchī)* before arriving."—Sayyid 'Alī Akbar Khiṭāyī, "Khiṭāy nāma" (MS completed in Constantinople, 1516), in Charles Schefer, "Trois chapitres du 'Khitay Namèh': Texte persan et traduction française," *Mélanges orientaux* (Paris, 1883), Persian text, p. 81, lines 14-15; French tr., p. 62. From Ramusio, fol. 14v: " . . . and [Ḥājjī Muḥammad] traveled with the caravan which goes with merchandise from the country of Persia, and from those near the Caspian Sea, for the regions of China, which caravan these people do not allow to penetrate farther than Su-chou (Succuir) and Kan-chou (Campion): nor similarly any merchant who may be in it, unless he go as ambassador to the great Khan (gran Cane)."— also in Yule, I, 291. In the story of the Turkish dervish reported by Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq the requirement of ambassadorial status is not mentioned explicitly, but the requirement of "tribute" is alluded to in the following manner: "Hic inprimis quid singuli portent profitentur dein regem honoris causa, quo visum est munere impertiunt" ("Here [in the Chinese capital] they first have to declare what they each bring, then they share with the king, as a mark of honor, what seems right as a gift").—*Augerii Gislenii Busbequii omnia quae extant* (Pest, 1758), p. 195; cf. the English translation by Edward Seymour Forster, *The Turkish Letters of Oghier Ghiselin de Busbecq, Imperial Ambassador at Constantinople, 1554–1562* (Oxford, 1927), p. 206.

9. Even the Ming History, written during traditional times, is explicit about the merchants' false claims; see *Ming shih,* 332:18r10, and Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 247 and 248, n. 1040. Ricci, in speaking of the caravans, says, "When the time for the legation [of merchants] arrives, they forge the official documents of their kings in which they offer cliental submission *(clientelare obsequium)* to the king of China."—Trigault, p. 562, and Gallagher, p. 515 (Gallagher says that "the letters are filled with the highest praise of the Emperor of China," which does not reflect the meaning of *clientelare obsequium* in the Latin text).

Ming relations with the Moghuls of Eastern Turkestan also provide an interesting sidelight on "tribute." As Ney Elias points out, the *Ming shih* is full of references to "tribute" from the Moghuls, whereas relations with China are not even mentioned in the "Ta'rīkh-i Rashīdī" of Muḥammad Ḥaydar Dūghlāt (MS, completed ca. 1546). What is more, these same Moghuls whose envoys kotowed to the Ming emperors (see note 59 below) were at the same time not at all intimidated by Temür, even though his power was "near and visible." Elias suggests that Moghul homage at the Chinese court "was, presumably, looked upon as a mere form, or indeed a farce."—Ney Elias, ed., *A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia, Being the "Tarikh-i-Rashidi" of Mirza Muhammad Haidar, Dughlát,* tr. Edward Denison Ross (London, 1898), "Introduction," pp. 62-63.

10. For some examples of these memorials, see the documents translated by Joseph Marie Amiot, S.J., in *Mémoires concernant l'histoire, les sciences, les arts, les moeurs, les usages, &c. des Chinois,* Vol. 14 (Paris, 1789), pp. 241-248, 272-279. Cf. the Persian texts and French summaries of some of these documents in Charles Schefer, "Notice sur les relations des peuples musulmans avec les Chinois, depuis l'extension de l'islamisme jusqu'à la fin du XV^e^ siècle," *Centenaire de l'Ecole des Langues Orientales Vivantes, 1795–1895* (Paris, 1895), pp. 28-29, 31-43. Cf. also the remarks in Jean Pierre Abel-Rémusat, *Mélanges asiatiques* (Paris, 1825–1826), II, 250-251; and those in Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 308-309, where he makes a case for the existence of the "King (Malik) of Egypt."

Amiot (*Mémoires,* XIV, 16) aptly sums up Central Asian "tribute" when he says: "En 1657, le Roi de *Tourfan* envoya des Ambassadeurs pour apporter le tribut, ce qui veut dire en bon François, qu'il envoya des gens pour faire le commerce, & pour recevoir des présens de la part de l'Empereur." Amiot had lived in China long enough to know.

11. " . . . ipsi Sinae (qui fraudem minimè ignorant) Regem suum ludunt, adulandi studio, quasi vero Sinensi regno vectigal orbis penderet vniuersus, cum è contrario verius ijs regnis à Sinis tributa pendantur."—Trigault, p. 562, and Gallagher, p. 515.

12. These suggestions are not given as a summary of the tribute system in general, but rather as points of interest for Sino-Central Asian relations during much of the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties. For background on the tribute system itself, see the article by John K. Fairbank and Teng Ssu-yü, "On the Ch'ing Tributary System," in *Ch'ing Administration: Three Studies* (Cambridge, Mass. 1960), pp. 107-218.

13. In *Ming shih,* 332:2r7f, Temür (Timur, Tamerlane) is recorded as having sent

"tribute." In *ibid.*, 2v6f, Temür is quoted as referring to himself as *ch'en* ([Your Majesty's] servant, subject) in addressing the Ming emperor, and in *ibid.*, 3r4, he refers to his empire as *ch'en-kuo* ([Your Majesty's] servant's country, subject country). In *ibid.*, 14r3f, Shāhrukh is recorded as having sent "tribute."

Note that the Ming even recognized Temür in his capacity of *gūrgān*, or *gūrakān* (from the Mongolian *küregen*, "son-in-law"), the title being rendered in Chinese as *Yüan fu-ma* (son-in-law of the Yüan). In other words, the Ming did not consider it *lèse-majesté* that Temür officially recognized the legitimacy of the Mongolian royal house, even though the Ming had just supplanted the Mongolian Yüan dynasty in China, and despite the fact that Yüan descendants could still menace the Ming from Mongolia. Furthermore, even though this unruly "subject" of the Ming died on his way to destroy the Ming empire (and possibly, from the Ming point of view, to restore the Yüan), he was referred to in Ming works both as a subject and as *Yüan fu-ma* (i.e., he openly recognized another legitimacy) down to the end of the Ming dynasty. See, e.g., the military work by Mao Yüan-i, comp., *Wu pei chih* (1621), 235:8r8.

Edgar Blochet, *Introduction à l'Histoire des Mongols de Fadl Allah Rashid ed-Din* (Leiden and London, 1910), pp. 242-265, argues that both Temür and Shāhrukh actually did acknowledge Ming suzerainty, but Blochet has been misled by the official Chinese record and has also misconstrued the evidence given by 'Abd al-Razzāq. See note 51 below.

14. From the excellent article by T. F. Tsiang (Chiang T'ing-fu), "China and European Expansion," *Politica*, 2.5:3 (March 1936). It is not my purpose here to take issue with Tsiang's summary of the neo-Confucian "dogma in regard to international relations" (which has been given great currency by its inclusion in Fairbank and Teng, p. 112) but rather to challenge his assertion that this "dogma" was "to hold sway in China right to the middle of the 19th century." According to Tsiang, pp. 3-4, "This dogma was inherited by the Ming emperors, who ruled China from the end of the 14th to the middle of the 17th century. In their hands it became a political system." The history of Sino-Central Asian relations during the early Ming gives evidence to the contrary.

15. *Ming shih*, 332:2r5-6, says that Chu Yüan-chang desired relations *(t'ung)* with the Western Regions (Hsi-yü) and repeatedly sent envoys there. Cf. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches*, II, 257-258.

16. *Ming shih-lu*, Hung-wu, 234:4r2-4v5: Hung-wu 27.ix.9 (cycl. 43). The text of the letter given in *Ming shih*, 332:2v3-3r6, and the explanatory note on 3r6-7 are substantially the same as the *Shih-lu* text, except that the *Ming shih* compilers have mistakenly associated the receipt of the letter with the eighth lunar month of Yung-lo 27. Cf. Amiot's French translation in *Mémoires*, XIV, 34-35, and Bretschneider's English translation in *Mediaeval Researches*, II, 258-260. In this letter Temür acknowledges that the Hung-wu Emperor "has received the bright mandate of Heaven *(T'ien ming-ming)* to rule as one [all within] the four seas *(t'ung-i ssu-hai)*." Bretschneider, in trying to reconcile the contents of the letter with Temür's known personality, translates *ssu-hai* ([all within] the four seas) simply as "China," but here this is a misinterpretation. Temür would not have used such an expression to reply to China; the whole letter is out of character and is better read as such without trying to bend it to fit Temür.

17. *Ming shih*, 332:3r7; cf. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches*, II, 260.

18. Barthold, misled by Bretschneider's translation of Temür's letter, which does not bring out the "mandate of Heaven" idea or the use of *ch'en* and *ch'en-kuo* (mentioned in note 13 above), takes the *Ming shih* at its word.—Wilhelm Barthold, *Ulugbek i ego vremia*, in *Bartol'd Sochineniia*, Vol. 2, Pt. 2, p. 67, and Barthold, *Four Studies*, II, 48.

19. *Ming shih*, 332:3r7-8; Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches*, II, 260. Cf. Barthold, *Ulugbek*, pp. 67-68, and his *Four Studies*, II, 49.

20. *Tonghuz Khan* in Central Asian Turkish—see, e.g., the Persian works by Niẓām al-Dīn Shāmī, *Ẓafar nāma*, ed. Felix Tauer (Prague, 1937 and 1956), I, 213, line 13; and Sharaf al-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī, *Ẓafar nāma*, ed. Muḥammad 'Abbāsī (Teheran, 1957), II, 17, line 13. "King Pig" seems to me to be a Chinese pun on the surname of Chu Yüan-chang, the Hung-wu Emperor, about whom there was a great deal of folklore during his lifetime and who was supposedly very ugly and like a pig. *Chu* (a different Chinese character) means "pig." Cf. Ruy González de Clavijo, *Embajada a Tamorlán*, ed. Francisco López Estrada (Madrid, 1943), p. 160; and the English translation by Guy Le Strange, *Clavijo: Embassy to Tamerlane, 1403-1406* (London, 1928), pp. 223 and 358n2. Cf. also Barthold, *Ulugbek*, p. 68, and *Four Studies*, II, 49. Barthold suggests that the name "King Pig" was no longer used under Shāhrukh and Ulugh Beg because relations with China had become friendly again. A better explanation lies in the simple fact that by then Chu Yüan-chang ("King Pig") was dead.

21. *Ming shih*, 332:3r8, and Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches*, II, 260. *Pao-ch'ao* does not mean "precious stones and money in banknotes," as Bretschneider translates it on p. 261, but simply "paper money" (the distinction is important since, as Barthold points out, paper money had to be spent in China.—Barthold, *Ulugbek*, p. 67, and *Four Studies*, II, 48).

22. My interpretation is reasoned as follows. (1) Temür would not have tolerated being China's vassal. (2) A Chinese response to his "letter of submission" would certainly make it clear that he was considered a vassal and would be an affront to his honor. (3) Temür cut off his "tribute" missions to China after receiving the Ming embassy of 1395: Temür received the embassy toward the end of 1397 (for the approximate date see Sharaf al-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī, II, 16, lines 20-21; cf. the abridged translation by François Pétis de la Croix [the Younger], *Histoire de Timur-Bec* [Delft, 1723], II, 427, in which the date does not coincide) and detained it (Barthold, *Ulugbek*, p. 67, and *Four Studies*, II, 49), and in 1404 another Ming embassy arrived to ask why Temür had not paid tribute for seven years (Clavijo, pp. 209-210, and Le Strange, pp. 290-291). The chronology of these events fits my interpretation. (4) Temür invaded the Ottoman empire, as he intended to invade China, for similar reasons of honor. (5) Sharaf al-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī's failure to mention the offensive Ming reply brought by the embassy of 1395 (see Barthold, *Ulugbek*, p. 68, and *Four Studies*, II, 49) does not show that the letter did not serve as a provocation, since the same author omits the similarly offensive letter from the Yung-lo Emperor to Shāhrukh.—William Chambers, "An Account of Embassies and Letters That Passed Between the Emperor of China and Sultan Shahrokh, Son of Amir Timur," in *The Asiatick Miscellany* (Calcutta, 1785–1786), I, 73. That Bāyazīd's insult is reported (Sharaf al-Dīn 'Alī Yazdī, II, 191, lines 4-5, and Pétis de la Croix, III, 262) is a different matter; the Ottoman sultan was a Muslim, and his taunting insult was a challenge to a war which Temür won.

The first explicit mention of Temür's determination to conquer China is associated with the year 1398. See Barthold, *Ulugbek*, p. 68, and *Four Studies*, II, 49. Cf. Ghiyāth

al-Dīn 'Alī, *Dnevnik pokhoda Timūra v Indiiu,* tr. Aleksandr Aleksandrovich Semenov (Moscow, 1958), p. 61 (I do not have access to the Persian text), and Semenov's n. 6 on p. 62. See Niẓām al-Dīn Shāmī, I, 170, lines 14-16, for the corresponding passage which relates to Temür's designs on China and Khotan.

23. Note that any information concerning China's size and power that Temür may have received from this embassy of 1395, the embassy that arrived in 1404 (Clavijo, pp. 210-211, and Le Strange, p. 292), or from any other sources, did not shake him from his idea of conquest.

24. *Ming shih,* 332:3r9, and Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 261; Clavijo, pp. 209-210, and Le Strange, pp. 290-291. The period is given as five years in Johannes Schiltberger, *Reisen des Johannes Schiltberger aus München in Europa, Asia, und Afrika von 1394 bis 1427,* ed. Karl Friedrich Neumann (Munich, 1895), p. 81. For an English translation, see John Buchan Telfer, tr. and ed., *The Bondage and Travels of Johann Schiltberger, a Native of Bavaria, in Europe, Asia, and Africa, 1396–1427,* annotated by Philip Bruun (London, 1879), p. 28. Here, Clavijo is more reliable than Schiltberger.

25. Clavijo, p. 210, and Le Strange, p. 291.

26. Clavijo, pp. 159-160, 209-210, and Le Strange, pp. 222-223, 290-291. Clavijo clearly believed that Temür previously had been sending tribute to China. See also Schiltberger, p. 81, and Telfer, p. 28.

27. *Ming shih-lu,* Yung-lo, 50:13r6-13v2: Yung-lo 5.vi.21 (cycl. 40). The ambassador and his party returned from Samarkand under the misapprehension that Khalīl Sulṭān had succeeded his grandfather Temür. Note also that when the Yung-lo Emperor had come to power he had sent a mission to Herat that was not reciprocated. Herat offered the excuse that it had sent a return embassy but that the great distance had prevented it from reaching China.—*Ming shih,* 332:13v8-10, and Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 279.

28. *Ming shih-lu,* Yung-lo, 56:1r4-6: Yung-lo 6.iv.4 (cycl. 19).

29. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 76, lines 9-13; Quatremère, p. 145; and Chambers, Persian text, p. 76, lines 4-7; *ibid.,* English tr., p. 77. The Ming embassy arrived in Herat about the beginning of Ramaḍān, A.H. 811/18.i-16.ii.1409, or shortly thereafter. The *Ming shih-lu* (see n. 28 above) says nothing about condolences. The information about the sending of condolences on the death of Temür *(rasānīdan-i ta'ziyat-i Ḥaḍrat-i Ṣāḥibqirān)* is supplied in 'Abd al-Razzāq, p. 76, lines 10-11, and is confirmed in Mao Yüan-i, 235:5r2, and in *Ming shih,* 332:3v4, and Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 262.

30. *Ming shih-lu,* Yung-lo, 64:9r8-10: Yung-lo 7.vi.28 (cycl. 6).

31. *Ibid.,* 68:8v8-9r7: Yung-lo 8.ii.9 (cycl. 43). The *Shih-lu* passage contains an abridged version of Chu Ti's letter *(ch'ih,* "imperial command"), which, according to 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 130, lines 19-21 (Chambers, Persian text, p. 80, lines 1-4; *ibid.,* English tr., p. 81; Quatremère, p. 215), was sent in three languages: Persian, Uighur, and Chinese. Cf. the English translation of the letter in Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 280.

The Persian text of the letter is in 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 129, line 20–p. 130, line 17, and Chambers, Persian text, p. 78, lines 2-18. Cf. Chambers' English tr., pp. 79 and 81, which is reproduced with minor changes in Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 281-282. Cf. also the French tr. in Blochet, *Introduction,* pp. 244-247, and Blochet's

Persian text, in *ibid.,* pp. 247-248. In Quatremère's French translation, pp. 213-215, the next-to-last sentence reads: "Il convient également que vous nous témoigniez votre soumission d'une manière franche et loyale." Blochet's translation, based on the same MS as Quatremère's translation, is substantially the same, but the texts of Muḥammad Shafī' and Chambers agree on a different meaning altogether: "You should follow our sincerity and advice."

32. Ca. 10 Muḥarram, A.H. 815/22.iv.1412 ('Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 129, line 8, and Quatremère, p. 213).

33. Persian *mā . . . khudāwand-i mamālik-i rū-yi zamīn gashta īm* (we . . . have become lord of the realms of the face of the earth).—'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 130, line 1. Chambers, Persian text, p. 78, line 4, has simply *khudāwand-i rū-yi zamīn* (lord of the face of the earth). This formula is based on the familiar Chinese imperial claim *chen t'ung-yü t'ien-hsia* (we rule the world).—*Ming shih-lu,* Yung-lo, 68:9r2. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 280, translates the phrase, "I am now ruling over China," but *t'ien-hsia* ([all] under Heaven) extends far beyond the boundaries of the empire.

34. Persian *miyān-i dūr wa nazdīk farq namīkunīm. hama rā barābar wa yaksān nigāh mīdārīm* (we make no distinction between far and near; we regard all equally and impartially).—'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 130, lines 2-3. This formula is based on the Chinese *i shih t'ung jen wu chien hsia erh* (we regard [all creatures] with impartial benevolence without distinguishing between far and near).—*Ming shih-lu,* Yung-lo, 68:9r2.

35. Almost certainly the Persian phrase *amr-i Khudā-yi ta'ālā* (command of God most high) reflects the Chinese term *T'ien-ming* (Mandate of Heaven).

36. Quatremère, p. 214, also represents Chu Ti as saying, "Nous avons ainsi reconnu votre franchise," but the Persian text as given by Muḥammad Shafī', Chambers, and Blochet does not allow such an interpretation.

37. Arabic letter: 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 131, line 19–p. 133, line 6; Chambers, Persian text, p. 82, lines 2-15, and p. 84, lines 1-7; *ibid.,* English tr., pp. 83 and 85; Quatremère, pp. 216-219; Blochet, *Introduction,* pp. 251-253. Persian letter: 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 133, line 8–p. 134, line 19; Chambers, Persian text, p. 84, lines 9-10, p. 86, lines 1-15, and p. 88, lines 1-14; *ibid.,* English tr., pp. 85, 87 and 89; Quatremère, pp. 219-221; Blochet, *Introduction,* pp. 249-251. The Muḥammad Shafī' ed., p. 134, line 18, lacks the passage *ba'd azīn . . . wa āyand ki,* which is in Chambers, Persian text, p. 88, lines 12-13, and in Blochet, *Introduction,* p. 251, lines 17-18.

Chambers, pp. 103n14-104, finds the Arabic letter more presumptuous than the one in Persian ("Those that reason in this manner have need of the sword to inforce their arguments"), and he suggests that it may have been written in Arabic on the assumption that it would not be understood in China. From the point of view of the Ming court, however, there could have been little to choose from in the effrontery of the two letters, both of which are markedly condescending.

38. *Ming shih-lu,* Yung-lo, 88:11r7-10: Yung-lo 11.vi.26 (cycl. 10). In addition to the Timurid embassy from Herat and Samarkand, the Ming ambassador brought with him embassies from such other places as Shiraz (in Iran), Andkhui (in present-day Afghanistan), and Andijan (in the Ferghana valley).

39. *Ibid.,* 89:1v2: Yung-lo 11.vii.2 (cycl. 16).

40. *Ibid.,* 89:9r9-9v1: Yung-lo 11.ix.18 (cycl. 31). This Ming embassy of 1413 is not

reported by 'Abd al-Razzāq, and its precise purpose is unknown.

41. *Ibid.*, 98:3r6-8r5: Yung-lo 13.x.29 (cycl. 30). The Ming embassy was also accompanied on its return to China by ambassadors from Qara Khojo, Turfan, Shiraz, and Andkhui. A recension of the embassy record by the ambassadors Ch'en Ch'eng and Li Hsien, entitled *Shih Hsi-yü chi,* has been incorporated into the above passage in the *Ming shih-lu.* For other recensions see Shen Te-fu, *Yeh huo pien* (preface 1606, reissued 1827), 30:18r8-24r5; *Hsüeh-hai lei-pien,* comp. Ts'ao Jung, enlarged by T'ao Yüeh (Shanghai, 1920), *ts'e* 120; and *Ts'ung-shu chi-ch'eng, Ch'u pien,* ed. Wang Yün-wu (Shanghai, 1935–1940), *ts'e* 3253. Also a Ming MS edition, entitled *Hsi-yü fan-kuo chih,* has been published in *Kuo-li Pei-p'ing t'u-shu-kuan shan-pen ts'ung-shu,* Pt. 1 (Shanghai, 1937), preceded by a day-by-day account of the embassy's journey to Herat by the same two authors, entitled *Hsi-yü hsing-ch'eng chi.* As Bretschneider *(Mediaeval Researches,* II, 147–148, 268, and 287) has already observed, the *Shih Hsi-yü chi* is one of the principal sources of Ming information about Central Asia.

42. *Ming shih-lu,* Yung-lo, 99:1r6-7: Yung-lo 13.xi.4 (cycl. 34).

43. *Ibid.*, 99:5r5-6: Yung-lo 13.xii.1 (cycl. 1).

44. *Ibid.*, 101:6v9-7r4: Yung-lo 14.vi.19 (cycl. 16). The court gave orders that the ambassadors were to be feasted along the way to the border. The Ming embassy was bound not only for Herat and Samarkand but for Andijan, Andkhui, Isfahan, and Shiraz. *Ming shih,* 332:14v10, and Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 283, mention another tribute mission from Herat to the Ming in 1416, but this is not confirmed by the *Ming shih : Pen-chi* (see *Ming shih,* 7:4r) nor by the *Ming shih-lu.*

45. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 201, lines 1-2, says that the Ming embassy, which had come a few months earlier, was given permission to return at the end of Rabī' I, A.H. 820/18.iv-17.v.1417. On line 12 of the same page (line 11 according to the faulty marginal line-number), it is said that the Ming ambassadors arrived during Rabī' I. Mīrkhwānd (Mīr Muḥammad b. Sayyid Burhān al-Dīn Khwāwand Shāh), *Ta'rīkh-i rawḍat al-ṣafā,* including the extension by Riḍā Qulīkhān Hidāyat, *Ta'rīkh-i rawḍat al-ṣafā-yi Nāṣirī* (Teheran, 1959–1960), VI, 642, lines 2-5, says that the embassy was allowed to return at the end of Rabī' II/18.v-15.vi.1417. The "Zubdat al-tawārīkh-i Bāysunghurī" of Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū is not available to me, but Barthold, apparently drawing on Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, says that the embassy's farewell audience was on 23 Rabī' I, A.H. 820/10.v.1417.—Barthold, *Ulugbek,* p. 118n145, and *Four Studies,* II, 110n5; Barthold has "11 May." Quatremère's abridged translation, p. 304, gives the impression that two Ming embassies were involved, but this is improbable.

46. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 201, lines 17-18 (lines 16-17 according to the faulty marginal line-number), Chambers, Persian text, p. 90, lines 6-7 (in which the passage *numūd wa fatḥ-i . . . wa yaqānigī* is lacking); *ibid.*, English tr., p. 91; Quatremère, p. 305; Blochet, *Introduction,* p. 253, lines 11-14. The *Ming shih-lu* does not give the contents of Chu Ti's letter.

47. *Ming shih-lu,* Yung-lo 108:6r4-5: Yung-lo 15.xii.15 (cycl. 33).

48. *Ibid.*, 111:5r9-5v1: Yung-lo 16.viii.20 (cycl. 34). The ambassador's name was Ardashīr (Artaxerxes): in Chinese, A-erh-tu-sha.

49. *Ibid.*, 111:6r4-8: Yung-lo 16.ix.1 (cycl. 45).

50. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 217, line 5–p. 218, line 9; Chambers, Persian text, p. 92, lines 7-15, p. 94, lines 1-16, and p. 96, line 1; *ibid.*, English tr., pp. 93, 95, and 97; Blochet, *Introduction,* French tr., pp. 258-261; *ibid.*, Persian text, pp. 261-263. The three Persian texts are not identical, Chambers' text being a little fuller than the other two. My translation is based on all three, and I have tried to choose the most likely reading in any given instance. For example, *aṭrāf-i daryā* (seacoast) is a better reading than *aṭrāf-i diyār* (areas of [nearby] regions), since especially prized falcons came from Liaotung. Unfortunately I have been unable to consult the French translation of this letter in Louis-Mathieu Langlès, *Ambassades réciproques d'un roi des Indes, de la Perse, etc., et d'un empereur de la Chine* (Paris and London, 1788), for which cf. Quatremère, p. 13, and Blochet, *Introduction,* pp. 263-264n1. As in the case of other correspondence from Chu Ti to Shāhrukh, the letter arrived in three versions: Persian, Uighur, and Chinese. Only the Persian text has been preserved.

Amīr-i Sarāy (Palace Emir) Līdā is the *Chung-kuan* ("interior official," i.e., eunuch) Li Ta; Blochet (*Introduction,* pp. 259, 262, line 8, and p. 264n) is in error on this point. Beg Būqā is apparently the chief envoy of the Herat embassy's advance party, which reached the Ming court on January 21, 1418. The identity of the Ming envoy Jāngqwā (Shafī', Jāngqa; Blochet, Chāngqū) is uncertain.

'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 216, line 14, refers to the Ming embassy of 1418 as the third Chinese embassy to Shāhrukh. The embassy of 1408 is identified as the first (*ibid.*, p. 75, line 21). 'Abd al-Razzāq has either lost track, or, among the Ming embassies of 1409, 1410, 1413, and 1416, only one was officially counted as an embassy.

51. For the language of Chu Ti's letter, see Chambers, p. 74. For honorific elevations in the letter, see 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 216, line 20–p. 217, line 3; Chambers, Persian text, p. 92, lines 2-5; *ibid.*, English tr., p. 93; Blochet, *Introduction,* Persian text, p. 255, lines 12-17; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 257.

Blochet (*Introduction,* p. 256n, and pp. 264-265) discusses the Chinese practice of honorific elevation at some length and concludes that the phrase "Grand Dāyming Pādshāh" at the beginning of the letter, as well as the names for God, must have extended farther into the margin than the word "Sultan." In this he is probably right (cf., however, Chambers' Persian text), and I have arranged the text of my translation accordingly. Chinese protocol required that the emperor be honored by the elevation of his titles, and, although Shāhrukh might have found this Chinese custom conceited, the Ming emperor's airs would not have been an offense to the sultan's dignity as long as the Ming emperor laid no claim to authority in Central Asia. Blochet offers the elevation of "Sultan" as evidence that Chu Ti now considered Shāhrukh a vassal prince of the blood. Inside China Chu Ti certainly did class Shāhrukh officially as a vassal (as the Chinese records show), but Blochet is mistaken in assuming that outside China relations with Shāhrukh were conducted on any such basis.

Despite the distance separating China from the Timurid empire and the fact that the Ming had neither sufficient military strength nor motive to subjugate Temür or Shāhrukh Bahādur, Blochet comes to the strange conclusion that the Ming emperors had somehow intimidated both the conqueror and his son into acknowledging Chinese suzerainty. The evidence on which Blochet bases his contention is: (1) Chu Ti's imperious letter of 1410 in which he claims to be "lord of the realms of the face of the earth" (*Introduction,* p. 248); (2) the fact that Shāhrukh, in reply, invokes his father's "friendship" with the founder of the Ming (*ibid.*, p. 244); and (3) the official Ming account, which claims (of course) that both Temür and Shāhrukh were China's vassals (*ibid.*, pp. 243-244).

Blochet's basic error is his failure to see the Ming letters in their total context. 'Abd al-Razzāq (notwithstanding Blochet's praise of his impartiality, pp. 85-86 and 268) was, after all, a Timurid court historian, and when he recorded Chu Ti's pompous letter of 1410 in all its arrogance he did so to show how Shāhrukh made the Ming emperor change his tone. Had Shāhrukh really been a crypto-vassal, as Blochet suggests, it is most unlikely that 'Abd al-Razzāq would have included any of the Ming-Timurid correspondence at all, let alone the letter of 1410. Blochet misses the significance of Shāhrukh's retort to Chu Ti in 1421 (he gives the texts of Shāhrukh's Arabic and Persian letters but no translations) and is forced to invent a hypothetical secret letter (*ibid.*, pp. 250-251) which Shāhrukh supposedly sends to Chu Ti so as to nullify the effect of his unsubmissive reply. Likewise, Blochet fails to notice that, in his reply, Shāhrukh's reference to Temür's "friendship" with Chu Yüan-chang is at least a little ironic and possibly even threatening. Blochet also fails to recognize the conciliatory tone of Chu Ti's letter of 1416, and he is so preoccupied with the probable form (i.e., honorific elevations) of Chu Ti's letter of 1418 that he does not seem to have noticed its contents.

52. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 221, line 1; Quatremère, p. 305: the end of Rajab, A.H. 822.

53. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 216, line 17; Chambers, Persian text, p. 90, line 15; *ibid.*, English tr., p. 91: the end of Ramaḍān. Barthold, drawing on Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, gives the date as 23 Ramaḍān/13 October (*Ulugbek*, p. 118n147, and *Four Studies*, II, 110n7).

54. 'Abd al-Razzāq would lead us to believe that the Chinese embassy was back in Samarkand from Herat by October 22/2 Shawwāl (Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 221, lines 15-16; Quatremère, p. 306), but this does not allow enough time for the journey. Apparently the embassy was feasted by Ulugh Beg in Samarkand on 11 Muḥarram, A.H. 823/27.i.-1420, before being sent on to China (see n. 55 below). The embassy seems to have returned to the Ming capital, in company with the first of the Timurid return envoys (those of Ulugh Beg), by July 22, 1420/Yung-lo 18.vi.12 (cycl. 46), because the *Ming shih-lu*, Yung-lo, 117:6r8-10, mentions the arrival of "tribute" from Herat, Samarkand, Badakhshan, and Khotan about that time.

55. Ghiyāth al-Dīn has written a credible account which merits more attention than it has received from historians of Ming China. Although the *Ming shih-lu* mentions the Timurid embassy of 1419 only once (see n. 54 above), Ghiyāth al-Dīn's narrative is generally substantiated by Chinese information. The lightning that struck the imperial palace, the inauguration of Peking as the new capital, the emperor's failing health, and other observations, are borne out by Chinese sources.

'Abd al-Razzāq includes an abridgment of the embassy record in his chronicle (Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 267, line 3–p. 288, line 14; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 308, line 1–p. 341, line 6; *ibid.*, French tr., pp. 387-426. For a list of extracts and translations of Ghiyāth al-Dīn's account, see Charles Ambrose Storey, *Persian Literature: A Bio-Bibliographical Survey* (London, 1927–), Vol. 1, Pt. 1, pp. 295-297, and Pt. 2, pp. 1235-36, 1276. Note the translation of Mīrkhwānd's abridged version by Edward Rehatsek, entitled "An Embassy to Khatá or China A.D. 1419," in *The Indian Antiquary*, 2:75-83 (March 1873). Unfortunately I do not have access to the fuller text of Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū (Storey, Vol. 1, Pt. 2, pp. 1235-36), nor to K. M. Maitra's translation (*ibid.*, p. 1236), nor to the article by D. M. Dunlop, "Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū's Version of the Timurid Embassy to China in A.D. 1420," *Glasgow University Oriental Society Transactions*, 11:15-19 (1946).

The dates recorded by Ghiyāth al-Dīn ('Abd al-Razzāq's text) are not always accurate, but it is not easy to determine how many of these chronological errors can be ascribed to the author himself and how many to the copyists who have transmitted the text in its various recensions. For example, the date on which lightning struck the imperial palace appears to be inaccurate in Ghiyāth al-Dīn's account (see n. 1 above), and A.H. 822 and 823 in 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 280, line 12 (Quatremère, Persian text, p. 329, lines 2-3; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 411) should read A.H. 823 and 824. The date of the embassy's return to Herat also presents a problem (see n. 70 below). Similarly, 'Abd al-Razzāq's own chronology is not careful: Ulugh Beg could not have feasted Ghiyāth al-Dīn and the other ambassadors who had come from Herat in Samarkand on 11 Muḥarram, A.H. 824/16.i.1421, since the whole Timurid embassy was then in China. If we correct the date to A.H. 823 (see n. 54 above), the feast could only have included the Chinese ambassadors and Ulugh Beg's own embassy to China (which left Samarkand before the arrival of the ambassadors coming from Herat), since Ghiyāth al-Dīn did not reach Samarkand until 22 Muḥarram, A.H. 823/7.ii.1420 ('Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 267, line 18; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 309, line 1; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 388). Cf. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 235, lines 18-19, and Quatremère, p. 306. Barthold, apparently still drawing on Ḥāfiẓ-i Abrū, says that when Ghiyāth al-Dīn's party reached Samarkand the Chinese ambassadors were still there (*Ulugbek*, p. 118, and *Four Studies*, II, 111). However, some of the members of the Chinese embassy must have left earlier with Ulugh Beg's ambassadors (see 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 267, lines 18-19; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 309, lines 1-3; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 388).

Ghiyāth al-Dīn says that the Timurid embassy in which he participated left Herat on 16 Dhū'l-Qa'da, A.H. 822/December 4, 1419.—'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 267, line 16; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 308, lines 17-18; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 388.

56. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 275, line 1; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 320, line 11; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 401: 8 Dhū'l-Ḥijja, A.H. 823/Yung-lo 18.xi.10 (cycl. 11).

57. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 275, line 5–p. 276, line 13; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 320, line 16–p. 323, line 1; *ibid.*, French tr., pp. 401-404.

58. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 276, line 21–p. 277, line 3; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 323, lines 9-18; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 405.

59. The ambassadors performed the kotow in Kan-chou ('Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 272, line 18; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 316, lines 18-19; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 397); before the emperor in Peking prior to a feast ('Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 278, lines 7-8; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 325, line 14; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 407); at the feast ('Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 279, line 16; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 327, line 17; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 410); at a general audience ('Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 282, line 14; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 332, line 6; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 415); and before the angry emperor, outisde the capital on a hunting expedition, after he had fallen from a horse which the ambassadors had brought as a present ('Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 285, line 11; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 336, line 12; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 420). Ghiyāth al-Dīn also notes that the ambassador from the Moghuls did perform the full kotow before the Chinese emperor ('Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 283, lines 14-15; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 333, lines 17-19; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 417).

60. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 277, lines 4-17; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 323,

line 8–p. 324, line 17; *ibid.*, French tr., pp. 405-406.

The emperor asked about the wealth of the Timurid empire, the price of grain, and the safety of the roads. The ambassadors responded that the country was rich, that grain was cheap, and that the roads were safe if one had the sultan's permission *(ḥukm)*. As regards Qara Yūsuf, an enemy of the Timurids, the emperor wanted to know whether the Turkmen chief would send an ambassador to offer tribute *(māl)*. The emperor also expressed an interest in sending an ambassador to Qara Yūsuf, because the Turkmen were supposed to have good horses. Shāhrukh had gone to war against Qara Yūsuf, and Qara Yūsuf had already been dead a year, but news of his death had apparently not yet reached China.

61. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 278, line 4–p. 280, line 11; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 325, line 8–p. 329, line 1; *ibid.*, French tr., pp. 407-411.

62. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 280, lines 16-17; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 329, lines 9-10; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 411.

63. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 281, lines 2-18; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 329, line 19–p. 330, line 20; *ibid.*, French tr., pp. 412-413. The ceremonies of Yung-lo 19.i.1 (cycl. 1), which corresponds to the date given by Ghiyāth al-Dīn (28 Muḥarram, A.H. 824), are given in *Ming shih-lu,* Yung-lo, 119:1r3-6. The *Ming shih-lu* records the emperor's adoption of the Northern Capital (Peking), but makes no mention of the Herat embassy. Ghiyāth al-Dīn says that the new palace had taken nineteen years to complete.

64. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 282, lines 12-23; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 332, lines 2-19; *ibid.*, French tr., pp. 415-416. The date was 13 Ṣafar, A.H. 824/ Yung-lo 19.i.16 (cycl. 16).

65. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 283, lines 1-9; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 332, line 19–p. 333, line 11; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 416. The dates of these audiences were 1 and 2 Rabī' I, A.H. 824/Yung-lo 19.ii.3 and 4 (cycl. 33 and 34).

66. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 283, lines 10-13; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 333, lines 11-17; *ibid.*, French tr., pp. 416-417. Quatremère's reference to "Ahmed-schah" (p. 416) is an inadvertence: the ambassador's name was Sulṭān Shāh. The date of the audience was 8 Rabī' I, A.H. 824/Yung-lo 19.ii.10 (cycl. 40). The emperor's special gifts to Ulugh Beg's ambassadors are mentioned again later ('Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 286, lines 10-11; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 337, line 20–p. 338, line 1; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 422). On 6 April/2 Rabī' II/Yung-lo 19.iii.5 (cycl. 4), the ambassadors saw the emperor astride one of the fine horses which Ulugh Beg had sent him as a present ('Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 285, line 1; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 335, lines 19-20; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 419).

67. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 283, lines 17-19; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 333, line 20–p. 334, line 4; *ibid.*, French tr., p. 417. The date was 13 Rabī' I/Yung-lo 19.ii.15 (cycl. 45). Chu Ti scolded the ambassadors for taking good falcons and bringing poor horses.

68. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 283, line 23–p. 285, line 20; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 334, line 7–p. 337, line 9; *ibid.*, French tr., pp. 417-421. The audience, held outside the capital upon the emperor's return from hunting, took place on 2 Rabī' II, A.H. 824/Yung-lo 19.iii.5 (cycl. 4).

69. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 285, line 21–p. 286, line 11; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 337, line 9–p. 338, line 1; *ibid.*, French tr., pp. 421-422. According to the edition of Muḥammad Shafī' the date was 4 Rabī' II, A.H. 824/Yung-lo 19.iii.7 (cycl. 6), which is in line with the chronological sequence of Ghiyāth al-Dīn's narrative. Quatremère's text has 4 Rabī' I, A.H. 824/Yung-lo 19.ii.6 (cycl. 36)/9.iii.1421.

70. 'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 287, lines 8-10; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 339, lines 7-10; *ibid.*, French tr., pp. 423-424. The embassy left Peking (Khān Bāliq, Khān Bālīq) in the middle of Jumādā I, A.H. 824/4.v-2.vi.1421, and arrived in Herat on 10 Ramaḍān, A.H. 825/28.viii.1422 ('Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 288, line 9; text lacking in Quatremère). According to Khwāndamīr's version of Ghiyāth al-Dīn's account, the ambassadors were received by Shāhrukh in Herat on 15 Ramaḍān/2.ix.1422.—Khwāndamīr (Ghiyāth al-Dīn b. Humām al-Dīn al-Ḥusaynī), *Ta'rīkh-i ḥabīb al-siyar fī akhbār-i afrād-i bashar,* with an introduction by Jalāl al-Dīn Humāyī (Teheran, 1954), IV, 647, line 8 (see Quatremère, p. 426n1). It is possible that "10" *(dahum)* Ramaḍān (in the Muḥammad Shafī' edition of 'Abd al-Razzāq) is simply an error for "15" *(pānz-dahum)*.

71. "It [the neo-Confucian 'dogma in regard to international relations'] must not be construed to be a dogma of conquest or universal dominion, for it imposed nothing on foreign peoples who chose to remain outside the Chinese world."—Tsiang, p. 3. The Yung-lo Emperor not only claimed universal dominion in Peking: his maritime expeditions imposed it on coastal rulers, and inside China he pretended that his universal dominion had been accepted in Central Asia. The emperor did not rule the world in fact, but on the level of *dogma* his "mandate of Heaven" was unmistakably universal.

72. The *Ming shih* is explicit on this point. See n. 3 above.

73. Tsiang, p. 4.

74. Fairbank and Teng, p. 113, mention "the interesting possibility . . . of an imperial economic interest" in the "tributary system."

Tsiang, p. 4, says, "It must not be assumed that the Chinese Court made a profit out of such tributes. The imperial gifts bestowed in return were usually more valuable than the tribute." While this may be true insofar as the "tributary" and imperial gifts themselves were concerned, it has yet to be proved that Sino-foreign gifts and trade taken as a whole were anything less than a mutually profitable exchange.

75. *Ming shih-lu,* Hung-hsi, 1A:10r6-7: Yung-lo 22.viii.15 (cycl. 54). Cf. *Ming shih,* 8:2v2-3. The new emperor ordered quite a number of reforms: he decreed an end to Cheng Ho's "treasure ship" expeditions to the Western Seas and curtailed commercial enterprises in Yunnan and Cochin China.

76. For example, the Ming court sent ambassadors to Samarkand in 1432 *(Ming shih,* 332:4r1-2), 1457 *(ibid.,* 332:4v6-7), and 1463 *(ibid.,* 332:4v8-9).—cf. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 263-265. Also, as is well known, another expedition to the Western Seas was commissioned in 1430 *(Ming shih,* 304:4r1-2).

77. Compare, however, China's unofficial trade relations with Southeast Asia: "Chinese trade with southeast Asia had developed since the days of Cheng Ho to the point where the barbarians, or the Arab traders of the region, no longer came to Canton to obtain the products of the Middle Kingdom. Instead, the great junk fleets of Amoy and Canton now carried Chinese produce into all parts of the archipelago."—Fairbank, "Tributary Trade," p. 142.

As mentioned in n. 6 above, there is evidence that some Chinese merchants did

extralegal business in Central Asia as well, but the amount of this trade is unknown.

78. Western thoroughbreds *(arghumaq,* Chinese *a-lu-ku-ma)* were highly prized, whereas the Mongolian "Tatar horses" *(Ta-ta ma)* were of comparatively little value and were also close at hand in large supply. See the values placed by the Board of Rites upon *arghumaq* horses, camels, and Tatar horses, in *Ming shih,* 332:4r10-4v2, and Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 264.

The Yung-lo Emperor's interest in *arghumaq* horses had certainly been one of the reasons for Ming overland expeditions as far afield as Isfahan and Shiraz. Grousset suggests that a larger motive was the re-establishment of the former trade relations between the khanates of Chaghadai and Khubilai, which had been interrupted with the collapse of the Mongolian empire.—René Grousset, *L'empire des steppes: Attila, Gengis-Khan, Tamerlan* (Paris, 1939), p. 540.

Luxury items imported into Central Asia from China included chinaware, silk, musk, jewels, and spices. See Barthold, *Ulugbek,* p. 119, and *Four Studies,* II, 111-112; also Clavijo, p. 208, and Le Strange, pp. 288-289.

79. See *Ming shih,* 332:18r8-18v6, and Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 247-248.

80. "Rare birds and strange beasts" *(chen ch'in ch'i shou—Ming shih,* 332:5v4, and Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 266) is an allusion to the Chinese classic known as the Book of History *(Shu ching),* where it is said: "A *prince* should not do what is unprofitable to the injury of what is profitable. . . . He should not value strange things . . . *Even* dogs and horses which are not native to his country he will not keep; fine birds and strange animals *[chen ch'in ch'i shou]* he will not nourish in his kingdom. When he does not look on foreign things as precious, foreigners will come to him . . ."—James Legge, tr., *The Chinese Classics* (Hong Kong, 1960), III, 349.

81. See, e.g., *Ming shih,* 332:5v7-6r3, and Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches,* II, 266: in 1490 the court officials urged the emperor not to accept some useless rarities as tribute from Samarkand, but the emperor accepted the gifts anyway.

82. Amiot, *Mémoires,* XIV, 38. Amiot gives the date as "La vingt-troisieme *[sic]* année de *Tcheng-hoa* (en 1482)," but the twenty-third year of Ch'eng-hua corresponds to 1487. Unfortunately, the Chinese text upon which Amiot's translation is based has remained in manuscript and is unavailable (see Abel-Rémusat, II, 249-250).

83. See Zlatkin's argument that the Mongols depended on trade with China and that trade therefore became the Mongols' chief condition for peace.—Il'ia Iakovlevich Zlatkin, *Istoriia Dzhungarskogo khanstva, 1635–1758* (Moscow, 1964), esp. pp. 41-69.

84. Cf. *ibid.,* pp. 223-224. The names of Muslim merchants appear in Chinese sources particularly as Oyirad "tribute" envoys.

85. An amusing illustration of this belief in China's dependence on Central Asian commerce is provided by Sayfī Chelebi: "It is from Kashgar that jade stone comes . . . Most of it is shipped to China, because . . . without jade, which keeps off lightning, China would be devastated."—Sayfī Chelebi, "Kitāb-i tawārīkh-i pādshāhān-i wilāyat-i Hind wa Sind wa Khiṭāy wa Khutan wa Dara wa Darwāz wa Kashmīr wa wilāyat-i 'Ajam wa Kāshghar wa Qalmāq wa Chīn wa Māchīn" (MS, completed July-August 1580). This defective title is given in Edgar Blochet, *Catalogue de la collection de manuscrits orientaux arabes, persans, et turcs formée par M. Charles Schefer et acquise par l'état* (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1900), p. 189; cf. Edgar Blochet, *Catalogue des manuscrits turcs,* Vol. 2 (Paris: Bibliothèque Nationale, 1933), p. 176. Since the original Turkish MS (Bibliothèque Nationale, Suppl. Turc 1136) is not at my disposal, I have translated the above passage from p. 299 of Schefer's French translation—Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī, *Histoire de l'Asie Centrale (Afghanistan, Boukhara, Khiva, Khoqand) Depuis les dernières années du règne de Nadir Châh (1153), jusqu'en 1233 de l'Hégire (1740–1818),* tr. and ed., with appendices, by Charles Schefer: Pt. 1, *Texte persan* (with Turkish title *Afghân ve Kâbil ve Bukhârâ ve Khiyvaq ve Khôqand khanlarınıñ aḥvâl ve ḥikâyât-i gharâbet iştimâlları) ;* Pt. 2, *Traduction française* (Paris, 1876).

The idea of Chinese dependence on Central Asian trade survived into the Ch'ing period (1644–1911). For example, in the eighteenth century the Afghans tried to put pressure on China by cutting off commercial relations: "Meanwhile the Afghans sought to turn the Muslims against the Chinese; they wrote to the Kirghiz and prevailed on them and on all the Sarts not to go for trade to Kulja."—Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, *Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh* (Alma-Ata, 1961, 1962, and 1964), I, 461. Kokand took similar steps against China in the early nineteenth century: "The padshah of China established for the governor *(wālī)* of Kokand a stipend *('ulūfa)* which they were to give [him] every year from the treasury, and if any of the children of Sarīm Saq Khoja, either with an army or alone, wanted to come in the direction of the dominion of Kashgar, [the governor of Kokand] would block [him] . . . Every two or three years an envoy goes [to China]. Having received the royal gift, he comes [back to Kokand]. Once in the time of 'Ālim Khan the pension *(mawājib)* did not arrive. [In response] 'Ālim Khan for three years blocked the caravans which went from Bukhara and Kokand. He did not allow [them] to go to Kashgar, so that he received the three years' worth in a lump sum [from the padshah of China]. After that he re-established good relations."—Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī, *Texte persan,* p. 96, lines 9-11 and 16-18; *ibid., Traduction,* pp. 217-218.

86. Muḥammad himself is reported as saying, "I am a prophet [even] in China" (Schefer, "Trois chapitres," p. 31), and Temür's last words expressed his regret in having neglected the conquest of such infidel countries as China and drawn his sword against Muslim princes (Sayyid 'Alī Akbar Khiṭāyī, in Schefer, "Trois chapitres," Persian text, p. 68, lines 12-13; French tr., p. 44).

On the level of theory, Islam was at least potentially at war with all its non-Muslim neighbors (see Armand Abel, "Dār al-ḥarb," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* [Leiden and London, 1960–], II, 126; also Emile Tyan, "Djihād," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* II, 538-540). The Koran, 9:5, itself says: ". . . slay the idolators wherever ye find them, and take them (captive), and besiege them, and prepare for them each ambush. But if they repent and establish worship and pay the poor-due, then leave their way free. Lo! Allah is Forgiving, Merciful."—Mohammed Marmaduke Pickthall, tr., *The Meaning of the Glorious Koran* (New York, 1953), pp. 145-146. Cf., however, Frants Buhl, "Fasste Muḥammed seine Verkündigung als eine universelle, auch für Nichtaraber bestimmte Religion auf?" *Islamica,* 2.1:135-149 (April 1926), in which Buhl argues that Muḥammad had not intended Islam as a universal religion but did contribute indirectly to later ideas of expansion.

87. Sayyid 'Alī Akbar Khiṭāyī's observations of the late fifteenth-early sixteenth century convey China's insularity as seen through Muslim eyes: "[The Chinese] do not know any realm *(mamlakat)* other than China" (Schefer, "Trois chapitres," Persian

text, p. 70, line 13; French tr., p. 47). "Because the Chinese fancy that from east to west all is under the command of the emperor *(khāqān)* of China, [for them] apart from their realm there is not [another] realm in the world" *(ibid.,* Persian text, p. 71, lines 13-14; French tr., p. 48). "Because they believe [that] our people [are] wild and boorish, they do not hope for politeness, nor respect, nor honor, nor law from us; and apart from their own realms they do not know of a city [anywhere] in the world" *(ibid.,* Persian text, p. 74, lines 4-7; French tr., pp. 51-52). Busbecq's Turkish dervish assumed that the Chinese avoided prolonged contact with foreigners so as to preserve Chinese customs from foreign influence (Busbecq, p. 195, and Forster, p. 207).

The extent of China's real ignorance of the world during the late Ming is unclear, but at least some geographical knowledge extending west of Central Asia appears to have been available. For example, Cheng Ho's expeditions had returned with concrete geographical observations, and the Ming court possessed an overland itinerary from China to Constantinople, which Emil Bretschneider translated in "Chinese Intercourse with the Countries of Central and Western Asia in the Fifteenth Century," *The China Review or Notes and Queries on the Far East,* 5.4:227-241 (February 1877).

88. To Central Asians living on the borders of China, the emperor probably seemed paramount among rulers despite the diminution of imperial prestige during the disorders of dynastic change. To Central Asians living elsewhere, other rulers would have seemed pre-eminent, since at midseventeenth century the Russians had begun to make themselves felt on the periphery of Central Asia, the Moghul empire in India was near the height of its strength, while the Ottoman empire was a major West Asian power, holding the much-respected Crimean khanate as a vassal.

Even in the first half of the eighteenth century, when the Ch'ing dynasty had gained much greater prestige, Kazakhs and Oyirad living just outside the Ch'ing borders did not necessarily regard the emperor as the greatest of all monarchs. Valikhanov (1,227) relates the following anecdote:

"[The Oyirad chief] Galdan [Tsering (d. 1745)] asked Ablai [the khan of the Kazakh Middle Horde (d. 1781)], while the latter was his prisoner, 'Which sovereigns are above the others?'

" 'Kondaker [the Crimean khan], the Russian White Tsar, Izhen-khan [the emperor of China], Galdan, then myself.'

" '*Men,men* [Right, right]!' Galdan was saying.

" 'You rule a small people but are worthy of a great people,' said Ablai."

89. These notions apparently date from the Ming period. The Timurid envoy Ghiyāth al-Dīn Naqqāsh reports that the Yung-lo Emperor had had a mosque constructed in Peking for the Muslims.—'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 280, lines 15-16; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 329, lines 7-8; *ibid.,* French tr., p. 411. Certain Chinese customs may have added weight to the notion that the emperor was a Muslim. For example, Ghiyāth al-Dīn also reports that each year the Yung-lo Emperor "went into a building in which there was no image or idol *(hīch ṣūrat wa but)* and said, 'I am worshipping the Divinity of Heaven (*Khudā'i-i Āsmān*).' "—'Abd al-Razzāq, Vol. 2, Pt. 1, p. 281, lines 21-22; Quatremère, Persian text, p. 331, lines 4-5; *ibid.,* French tr., pp. 413-414. For the Ching-t'ai (1450-1457) Emperor represented as a Muslim, see Sayyid 'Alī Akbar Khiṭāyī, in Schefer, "Trois chapitres," Persian text, p. 82, line 16– p. 83, line 12; *ibid.,* French tr., pp. 64-66; and also in Schefer, "Notice," p. 30, where the Persian text is not

supplied. Cf. Schefer, "Trois chapitres," p. 65n1 (in reference to the same emperor, his temple name being Ching Ti; the date 1552 must therefore be an error). For an unnamed Chinese emperor of the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, see Schefer's introduction to Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī, p. v. See also the fantastic account summarized in Blochet, *Introduction,* pp. 74-80.

A rumor of the Yung-lo Emperor's conversion to Christianity is reported in Clavijo, p. 211, and Le Strange, p. 292. There were even those in Central Asia who believed that China was a Christian country, and a possible explanation for this belief is given by Iosafa Barbaro in Ramusio, fol. 107r, "Di Messer Iosafa Barbaro Gentil'hvomo Venetiano Il viaggio della Tana, & nella Persia." Barbaro says that he believes the religion of the Chinese (Cataini) to be pagan, although many people from Central Asia east of the Oxus (Zagatai) and from other nations, who come from China, say that the Chinese are Christians. The reason for the misunderstanding, he finds, is that the Chinese have statues in their temples as do the Christians in the West. Barbaro also points to similarities in Chinese and Venetian dress. Cf. Iosafa Barbaro, *Travels to Tana and Persia,* tr. William Thomas, ed. Stanley of Alderley (New York, n.d.), pp. 77-78.

90. The Moghuls (originally Mongols) of Moghulistan in Central Asia must not be confused with the Moghuls of India. See Muḥammad Ḥaydar Dūghlāt.

91. *Ta Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu* (Taipei, 1964): *Shih Tsu Chang Huang-ti shih-lu,* 26: 10r5-7: Shun-chih 3.v.16 (cycl. 58)/ 28.vi.1646.

92. *Ch'in-cheng p'ing-ting Shuo-mo fang-lüeh,* ed. Wen-ta *et al.* (Peking: Wu ying tien, 1708), 29:11v2-12r6: the throne first received notice of Hami's submission on K'ang-hsi 35.ix.3 (cycl. 53)/28.ix.1696.

93. *Ibid.,* 1:31v7-32v5: on K'ang-hsi 18.vii.12 (cycl. 41)/17.viii.1679 the court learned that Galdan had invaded Turfan. Cf. Zlatkin, p. 252.

94. Eastern Turkestan's modern history is known from Ch'ing, Islamic, and European works. The best of these, for volume and chronological detail, are the Ch'ing compilations, which are mainly official documentaries. Their biases are understood, and the context in which they were written is relatively well known. For Ch'ing dealings with Eastern Turkestan down to 1765, the most important of these official publications is the *Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Chun-ka-erh fang-lüeh,* ed. Fu-heng *et al.* (preface 1770): *Ch'ien-pien,* 54 *chüan; Cheng-pien,* 85 *chüan; Hsü-pien,* 32 *chüan;* also published in Manchu as *Jun Gar-i ba-be necihiyeme toktobuha bodogon-i bithe* (preface 1770): *Julergi banjibun,* 54 *debtelin; Jingkini banjibun,* 85 *debtelin; Sirame banjibun,* 32 *debtelin.* For the Ch'ing administration of Eastern Turkestan, there is Sung-yün, ed., *Ch'in-ting Hsin-chiang chih-lüeh* (preface 1821); and for the troubles with Jahāngīr Khoja the best source is the *Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Hui-chiang chiao-ch'in ni-i fang-lüeh,* ed. Ts'ao Chen-yung *et al.* (preface 1830). The events from 1855 to the pacification and final reorganization of Sinkiang are covered by the *Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Shan Kan Hsin-chiang Hui-fei fang-lüeh,* ed. I-hsin *et al.* (preface 1896).

The best known of the Islamic sources is the "Tadhkira-i 'azīzān" (in some recensions entitled "Tadhkira-i khwājagān"), written ca. 1768 by Muḥammad Ṣādiq Kāshgharī. Two epitomized translations of this work have been published: Robert Barkley Shaw, tr., "The History of the Khōjas of Eastern-Turkistan Summarised from the 'Tazkira-i-Khwājagān' of Muḥammad Ṣādiq Kāshgharī," ed. Ney Elias (supplement to *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal,* Vol. 66, Pt. 1; Calcutta, 1897); and Martin Hartmann,

"Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam: Das Ende der Caghataiden und die Herrschaft der Choğas in Kašgarien," *Der Islamische Orient: Berichte und Forschungen,* Pts. 6-10, pp. 195-374 (Berlin, 1905). Two important twentieth-century works are Mullā Mūsā b. Mullā 'Īsā Sayrāmī, *Ta'rīkh-i amniyya (Taarikh-i emenie: Istoriia vladetelei Kashgarii)* ed. Nikolai Nikolaevich Pantusov (Kazan, 1905); and Muḥammad Amīn Beg Boghra, *Sharqī Türkestān ta'rīkhī* (Srinagar, 1940). Some idea of the range of Eastern Turki material can be derived from Abdulladzhan Muginovich Muginov, *Opisanie uigurskikh rukopisei Instituta narodov Azii* (Moscow, 1962).

The most important Western sources have been written by travelers to Eastern Turkestan during the nineteenth century. See, for example, the accounts given in Valikhanov, and also the important volume edited by Thomas Douglas Forsyth, *Report of a Mission to Yarkund in 1873, Under Command of Sir T. D. Forsyth, K.C.S.I., C.B., Bengal Civil Service, With Historical and Geographical Information Regarding the Possessions of the Ameer of Yarkund* (Calcutta, 1875). See also Aleksei Nikolaevich Kuropatkin, *Kashgaria: Eastern or Chinese Turkestan,* tr. Walter E. Gowan (Calcutta, 1882).

Principal studies on the modern history of Eastern Turkestan by twentieth-century scholars are Lazar' Isaevich Duman, *Agrarnaia politika Tsinskogo (manchzhurskogo) pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziane v kontse XVIII veka* (Moscow and Leningrad, 1936); Tseng Wen-wu, *Chung-kuo ching-ying Hsi-yü shih* (Shanghai, 1936); and Saguchi Tōru, *Jūhachi-jūkyūseiki Higashi Torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1963); also a series of articles by Haneda Akira (see the list in Saguchi, pp. 708-709); and three articles by V. S. Kuznetsov which appeared in 1961: "O reaktsionnoi sushchnosti dvizheniia Dzhangira," *Izvestiia Akademii nauk Kazakhskoi SSR: Seriia istorii, arkheologii i etnografii,* No. 1(15):70-91; "K voprosu o politike Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Vostochnom Turkestane vo vtoroi chetverti XIX v.," *ibid.,* No. 2(16):54-64; and "Ekonomicheskaia politika Tsinskogo pravitel'stva v Sin'tsziane v pervoi polovine XIX veka," *ibid.,* No. 3 (17):78-89. For an English summary of Kuznetsov's three articles, see "Tsin Administration in Sinkiang in the First Half of the Nineteenth Century," *Central Asian Review,* 10.3:271-284 (1962).

Another work that should be mentioned, although it deals with the subject of Islam in China rather than the history of Eastern Turkestan as such, is Tazaka Kōdō, *Chūgoku ni okeru Kaikyō no denrai to sono kōtō* (Tokyo, 1964).

95. Testimony varies as to the identity of the Six, Seven, and Eight Cities. Valikhanov (II, 225, 325, 335, and 441) identifies the Six Cities (Altishahr) as Kashgar, Yangi Hissar, Yarkand, Khotan, Aksu, and Ush Turfan (on pp. 225 and 355 he omits the first element, Ush, but the city is not to be confused with the famous Turfan of Uighuristan). The following concur: Elias and Ross, "Introduction," p. 51n1; Tsing Yuan, "Yakub Beg (1820–1877) and the Moslem Rebellion in Chinese Turkestan," *Central Asiatic Journal,* 6.2:135 (June 1961); and Maurice Courant, *L'Asie Centrale aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles: Empire kalmouk ou empire mantchou?* (Lyon and Paris, 1912), p. 50n3. Barthold, "Alti Shahr," *Encyclopaedia of Islam,* p. 423, substitutes Kucha for Yangi Hissar. Kuropatkin, p. 123, substitutes Kucha for Khotan, and on p. 106 identifies the Seven Cities as the same list (i.e., Kashgar, Yangi Hissar, Yarkand, Aksu, and Kucha), with Khotan and Karashahr added and Ush Turfan deleted. Henry Walter Bellew, "History of Káshghar," in Forsyth, p. 185, substitutes Ush Turfan and Maralbashi for Kucha and Karashahr. Duman, p. 9n1, lists six districts: Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Aksu-

Ush, Kucha, and Karashahr. Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī, writing ca. 1818, lists the Seven Cities as "Kashgar, Yarkand, Khotan, Aksu, Ili, and two others."—*Texte persan,* p. 95, lines 6-8. In *ibid., Traduction,* p. 212, Schefer finds in the phrase *wa du-yi dīgar* (and two others) the supposed name of a city, "Doy," which in a long note (pp. 212n2-215) he tries to identify with the Turfan of Uighuristan; unless Schefer's Persian MS differs from his printed *Texte persan,* "Doy" is simply an error in translation. Note that Ili is outside Eastern Turkestan altogether.

The Eight Cities, established after the Ch'ing conquest of 1759, are listed in Sung-yün, ed., *Hsi-ch'ui tsung-t'ung shih-lüeh* (preface 1809), 10:21r2-4, as Kashgar, Yangi Hissar, Yarkand, Khotan, Aksu, Ush (Turfan), Kucha, and Karashahr, a list which is sometimes subdivided into the Western Four Cities (Hsi Ssu-ch'eng)—Kashgar, Yangi Hissar, Yarkand, and Khotan—and the Eastern Four Cities (Tung Ssu-ch'eng)—Aksu, Ush Turfan, Kucha, and Karashahr (cf. Tseng Wen-wu, p. 270). Camille Imbault-Huart, ed. and tr., *Recueil de documents sur l'Asie Centrale* (Paris, 1881), pp. 42n1 and 56n2, substitutes Pijan for Karashahr as one of the Eastern Four Cities.

Valikhanov, III, 425, explains that Kashgaria was generally known among neighboring Asian peoples as Altishahr (Six Cities), a name which, as Hartmann, p. 278n3, indicates, seems to date back at least as far as the composition of Muḥammad Ṣādiq Kāshgharī's "Tadhkira-i 'azīzān" (ca. 1768). How specific the name "Six Cities" was in fact is doubtful. "Eight Cities," on the other hand, appears to be a Ch'ing designation arising specifically from the establishment of the eight major cities mentioned in *Hsi-ch'ui tsung-t'ung shih-lüeh,* 10:21r2-4, after the conquest of 1759.

96. For a historical discussion of Uighuristan, see Elias and Ross, "Introduction," pp. 99-114, sec. 5, "The Eastern Khanate, or Uighuristan." Note that the area of the northeastern Turki dialect ("Kutscha-Turfan-Dialekt") shown in the "Schematische Übersichtskarte über das osttürkische Sprachgebiet" in Gunnar Jarring, *Studien zu einer osttürkischen Lautlehre* (Lund and Leipzig, 1933), p. 2, is still differentiated from the southwestern area of Eastern Turkestan (Kashgaria, or Altishahr), and that the northeastern area roughly corresponds to Elias's Uighuristan.

The proximity of Uighuristan to China and confusion over the fact that the character *Hui* had been used historically for both "Uighur" and "Muslim" has contributed to the Chinese notion in modern times that all the Turks of Eastern Turkestan were Uighurs. " 'Hui-hu [Uighur]' is an old name of the T'ang period. Although they were non-Muslim, they may still be called the 'Hui' tribes. Islam came in by way of the West and appropriated the name, that is, 'Hui.' The distinction is easily lost. This shows how wickedly cunning it is to snatch a country by means of religion."—T'ao Pao-lien, *Hsin-mao shih-hsing chi* (preface 1895), 6:5v8-9; Taipei reprint (1957), 6:10, lines 8-9.

It is well known that non-Muslim Uighurs have survived in twentieth-century China, in particular the Yellow Uighurs of Kansu, and in this connection the short descriptive sketch in Sergei Efimovich Malov, *Iazyk zheltykh uigurov: Slovar' i grammatika* (Alma-Ata, 1957), pp. 3-7, is worthy of note. Li Fu-t'ung, *Hui-hu shih* (Taipei, 1963), a historical monograph on the Uighurs, contains numerous errors and should be consulted with great caution.

How long non-Muslim Uighurs and Uighur culture survived in Uighuristan proper (as opposed to the Uighur areas in Kansu) is not precisely known, but the contents of that section of the *Hua I i-yü* called *Kao-ch'ang kuan lai-wen* (British Museum Mon.

114, n.d.) indicate that by the beginning of the sixteenth century the vertical Uighur script had not yet given way in Uighuristan to the Arabic alphabet. A Uighur (Kao-ch'ang) department of the College of Translators (Ssu-i kuan) was maintained by the Ch'ing government into the eighteenth century, but dealing with the Uighurs of Kansu may have been the department's only function. See Paul Pelliot, "Le Ḥōja et le Sayyid Ḥusain de l'Histoire des Ming," *T'oung pao,* 38.2-5:81-292 (1948), esp. p. 238. See also the forthcoming series of articles by Louis Ligeti of which the first installment is "Un vocabulaire sino-ouigour des Ming: Le *Kao-tch'ang-kouan yi-chou* du Bureau des Traducteurs," *Acta orientalia Academiae scientiarum Hungaricae,* 19.2:117-199 (1966).

Although Islam finally prevailed in Uighuristan, the name Uighur never died out completely, and, according to a letter from the prince of Hami to T'ao Mo written during the last decade of the nineteenth century, oral tradition held that the prince's tribe were largely descendants of the "Uighur Muslims."—T'ao Pao-lien (1895), 6:6r4; (1957), 6:11, line 4. At a meeting held in the U.S.S.R. in 1921 the name Uighur was revived to serve as a common designation for the native non-nomadic Turkish population of all areas of Sinkiang, not just the old Uighuristan. The place of the 1921 meeting is given as Tashkent in *Bol'shaia sovetskaia entsiklopediia,* Vol. 44, 2nd ed. (completed 1956), p. 59a; S. P. Tolstov *et al.,* eds., *Narody Srednei Azii i Kazakhstana* (Moscow, 1962–1963), II, 489; and Owen Lattimore *et al., Pivot of Asia: Sinkiang and the Inner Asian Frontiers of China and Russia* (Boston, 1950), p. 125. L. V. Oshanin, "Antropologicheskii sostav naseleniia Sin'tsziana i etnogenez uigurskogo naroda," *Akademiia nauk Kirgizskoi SSR: Trudy Instituta istorii,* Vol. 5 (Frunze, 1959), p. 41, gives the meeting place as Alma-Ata, citing as his source an unpublished dissertation by A. P. Savitskii, "Sin'tszian kak platsdarm inostrannoi interventsii v Srednei Azii" (Institut vostokovedeniia AN UzSSR; Tashkent, 1950). As Omeljan Pritsak points out in "Das Neuuigurische," in *Philologiae turcicae fundamenta,* Vol. 1, ed. Jean Deny *et al.* (Wiesbaden, 1959), p. 525, the Uighur empire (ca. 760-840) once stretched as far as Kashgaria. But the idea that the Kashgarians and the inhabitants of Uighuristan were one and the same nationality—let alone that they were all Uighurs—is an innovation stemming largely from the needs of twentieth-century nationalism.

97. Ethnological diversity prevented the kind of political and cultural cohesion in Uighuristan which might have served as a greater counterpoise to China's commercial and political attraction. As T'ao Pao-lien, 6:3v1-2, points out with reference to Hami: "The chiefs [of the different peoples of the city] were independent: the prince, being weak, could not control them." Later T'ao goes on to say (6:5v5-8): "I should like to observe that the various tribes in each of the cities of the Western Regions lived mixed together. Frequently, each tribe would set up a chieftain—a city having several chieftains independent of one another. A subject [of one of these chieftains] bearing tribute [to the Chinese court] would, with slight regard for propriety, represent his fellow-tribesman as khan, and [the ruler of] another tribe as subject. Things became highly confused and difficult to distinguish. The Muslim population respected the *ākhūnd (a-hun)*—religious leaders—more than they did the officials. This is because, between the Yüan [1234–1368] and the Ming [1368–1644], the religion of Muḥammad came into great vogue. The religious leaders of each city, like boisterous guests overshadowing the host, appeared to have ruling powers greater than those of the khans. When the khan's faction submitted a memorial [to the Chinese court], it was in the name of the descendants of the Yüan. When the religious faction presented tribute, it was in the name of a Muslim prince. To say that the Western Regions in the declining years of the Ming were under the control of Muslim chieftains is definitely incorrect, but to say that they were all under the control of the Mongols is also untrue. It was only after the Mongols ceased to be strong that most of them underwent the change and became Muslim peoples."

For a discussion of the ethnological composition of Hami during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, see Pelliot, pp. 130-134. For a historical sketch of Hami drawn from Chinese sources, see Camille Imbault-Huart, "Le pays de 'Hami ou Khamil: Description, histoire, d'après les auteurs chinois," *Bulletin du Comité des Travaux historiques et scientifiques* (Paris, 1892), pp. 1-75+map.

98. Gunnar Jarring, *An Eastern Turki-English Dialect Dictionary* (Lund, 1964), pp. 110 and 316.

99. For the khojas' descent from the Prophet, see *Ch'in-ting Hsi-yü t'ung-wen chih* (Tokyo, 1961–1963), I, 663-699; cf. the translation in Imbault-Huart, *Recueil,* pp. 64-67. Cf. also the genealogy given by Elias in Shaw, pp. 8-9 and 11. For the khojas' religious chain of succession, see Hartmann, pp. 307-313. Descent from the house of Chinggis Khan through the female line is claimed for some of the children of Khoja Āfāq (d. 1694) by Mīr Khāl al-Dīn Kātib ibn-i Mawlānā Qāḍī Shāh Kūchak al-Yārkandī in his "Hidāyat nāma" (British Museum MS Oriental 8162, completed ca. 1700), fol.26r6-10. The same author also claims in his "Tadhkirat al-Hidāyat" (British Museum MS Oriental 8162), fol. 226r14-15, that the Moghuls (of Eastern Turkestan) had given over to the khojas the "Moghul imperial rule, nay the visible and invisible royal throne" *(ḥukūmat-i shahryārī-i Mughūliyya balki masnad-i pādshāhī-i ẓāhir wa bāṭin).* There is another recension of the "Tadhkirat al-Hidāyat" in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, under the India Institute shelfmark MS. Ind. Inst. Pers. 122, fols. 47v-65v, this being MS 2495 of A. F. L. Beeston, *Catalogue of the Persian, Turkish, Hindustani, and Pushtu Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library,* Pt. 3: *Additional Persian Manuscripts* (Oxford, 1954). Bellew ("History of Káshghar," pp. 175–178) has drawn upon both the "Tadhkirat al-Hidāyat" and the "Hidāyat nāma" but refers to both under the title "Tadhkirat al-Hidāyat," thus leading Beeston into the mistaken assumption that his MS 2495 and Bellew's "Tadhkirat al-Hidāyat" are different works.

100. *Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Chun-ka-erh fang-lüeh, Cheng-pien,* 33:5v5-7v2 and 39:26v4-28v7.

101. *Ibid.,* 48:6r1-6v4: Ch'ien-lung 23.i.3 (cycl. 27).

102. *Ibid.,* 81:1r2-8v4: Ch'ien-lung 24.x.23 (cycl. 37). The Manchu army also announced the submission of Badakhshan. Bolor, the (Oyirad) Zunghar tribes, the Kazakh, the Burut (Kirghiz), Tashkent, Andijan, Uriyangkhai, and the Muslims of Eastern Turkestan were now all considered subjects of the Manchu emperor.

103. Valikhanov, I, 428 and 460.

104. *Ibid.,* I, 461-462.

105. On the Ch'ing administration and development of Eastern Turkestan during this period, see Saguchi, chaps. 3 and 4, esp. pp. 103-239.

106. Local unrest had already broken the peace in Kashgaria in 1760 (see *ibid.,* pp. 164-167), 1765 (pp. 167-180), and 1815 (pp. 422-426).

107. *Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Hui-chiang chiao-ch'in ni-i fang-lüeh,* 49:24r3-28r6: Tao-kuang 7.viii.10 (cycl. 20)/30.ix.1827. Cf. summary account in Wei Yüan, *Sheng wu chi,* ed. Yang Chia-le (Taipei, 1962), p. 127, line 16–p. 128, line 4, and Imbault-Huart, *Recueil,* pp. 41-44.

108. The news reached the emperor on Tao-kuang 8.i.22 (cycl. 59)/7.iii.1828 (*Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Hui-chiang chiao-ch'in ni-i fang-lüeh,* 57:14r4-18v4).

109. See the report of "some military Mandarins who accompanied this famous and distant expedition" (against Jahāngīr) in Joseph Gabet and Régis-Evariste Huc, *Huc and Gabet: Travels in Tartary, Thibet, and China, 1844–1846,* tr. William Hazlitt, ed. Paul Pelliot (London, 1928), I, 327-329.

110. For a short history of Kokand, see Vladimir Petrovich Nalivkin, *Kratkaia istoriia Kokandskogo khanstva* (Kazan, 1886), and the translation by Auguste Dozon, *Histoire du khanat de Khokand* (Paris, 1889).

111. Muḥammad 'Abd al-Karīm 'Alawī Munshī, *Ta'rīkh-i Aḥmad* (written sometime after 1847), in Mīr 'Abd al-Karīm Bukhārī, *Traduction,* pp. 281-283 (I do not have access to the text of the *Ta'rīkh-i Aḥmad* itself). Muḥammad 'Abd al-Karīm makes a special point of the fact that the emperor of China used to refer to the Kokandian ruler as "my son." See especially the narrative of the *qāḍī al-quḍāt* (chief justice) of Kokand who had gone to China as Kokand's ambassador (*ibid.,* pp. 282-283).

112. Metaphoric family ties of this sort expressed a kind of political equality among rulers, in which the "son" or "younger brother" acknowledged the greater power (as opposed to the juridical authority) of the "father" or "elder brother"—i.e., the "son" or "younger brother" was a less powerful ally and not a subject. Cf. Suzuki Chūsei's treatment of these family ties on pp. 185-186 and 190-191, above.

The Manchus, originating in Inner Asia and familiar with Inner Asian institutions, were in a position to flatter Kokand at the empire's expense under the very noses of Chinese traditionalists at court. In other words, Manchu politics were supple enough to permit one policy in maintaining Manchu rule in China (strict court ritual and preservation of the proper relationships with barbarians) and another, contradictory policy in maintaining stability on the frontier (appeasement of Kokand).

Two interesting illustrations of the difference between the ruler-subject relationship and relationships based on metaphoric family ties are given in John Frederick Baddeley, *Russia, Mongolia, China* (London, 1919). In 1634 a Russian envoy named Iakov Tukhachevskii was told by one of the Altin Khan's representatives, "The Altin Tsar [i.e., khan], His Majesty's [i.e., the tsar's] younger brother, rejoices to receive the Tsar's gifts." When Tukhachevskii heard "that derogatory expression," he ordered his interpreter "*to bark at them,*" asking, "Whence did that fellow get that insulting phrase?" (Baddeley, II, 98). In 1659 the succeeding Altin Khan told another Russian envoy, Stepan Aleksandrov (Grechanin), that he would not become the tsar's subject but that he would be willing to make an alliance binding himself to obey the tsar's commands "as a younger brother, out of deference, obeys an elder, or a son his father." Grechanin refused to entertain any "comparison to a younger and an older brother, which he considered derogatory to the Tsar's Majesty; and threatened, if the Khan insisted on it, to break off all negotiations. As to the second comparison, of son and father, which had been brought in after the other, Grechanin said nothing . . . " but "he undertook to make a faithful report . . . on his return" (Baddeley, II, 172).

113. For Kokandian activities in Kashgaria, see Saguchi, chap. 6, esp. pp. 363-404; cf. the English translation of this chapter, "The Eastern Trade of the Khoqand Khanate," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko,* 24:47-114 (1965), esp. pp. 66-111.

114. See Saguchi, p. 468.

115. Valikhanov, II, 323-324. The Kokandians reached the Kashgarian guard posts ca. Tao-kuang 10.viii.10 (cycl. 32)/26.ix.1830.—*Ta Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu, Hsüan Tsung Ch'eng Huang-ti shih-lu,* 173:4r8-9. Reports on the size of the invading force range from 70,000 men (*ibid.,* 177:2r4) to as few as 7000 or 8000 men (181:27v6). Cf. Saguchi, pp. 469-474.

116. Valikhanov, II, 325. Cf. Saguchi, pp. 488-490.

117. See Saguchi, pp. 499-502.

118. See *ibid.,* chap. 4, esp. pp. 239-248.

119. *Ta Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu, Hsüan Tsung Ch'eng Huang-ti shih-lu,* 445:4v1-5r3: Tao-kuang 27.viii.3 (cycl. 46)/11.ix.1847. *Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Shan Kan Hsin-chiang Hui-fei fang-lüeh,* 1:1r2-2r2: Hsien-feng 5.viii.3 (cycl. 30)/13.ix.1855. *Ibid.,* 7:15v1-16v3: Hsien-feng 7.ix.8 (cycl. 23)/25.x.1857. *Ta Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu, Mu Tsung I Huang-ti shih-lu,* 33:14v9-16r8: T'ung-chih 1.vii.3 (cycl. 21)/29.vii.1862.

120. For the Tungan rebellion, see the works of Chu Wen-djang (Chu Wen-chang), especially "The Immediate Cause of the Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China in 1862," *Central Asiatic Journal,* 3.4:309-316 (1958); "Tso Tsung-t'ang's Role in the Recovery of Sinkiang," *Tsing Hua Journal,* new ser., 1.3:136-167 (September 1958); "T'an yu-kuan Hsi-pei Hui luan ti liang-ko wen-t'i chien p'ing Ma Hsiao-shih *Hsi-pei Hui-tsu ko-ming chien shih," ibid.,* new ser., 5.1:125-141 (July 1965); and *The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China, 1862–1878: A Study of Government Minority Policy* (Central Asiatic Studies, Vol. 5; The Hague and Paris, 1966).

For a readable account of the events in Sinkiang during this period, see Demetrius Charles Boulger, *The Life of Yakoob Beg, Athalik Ghazi and Badaulet, Ameer of Kashgar* (London, 1878).

121. Panagiṓtēs Potagós, *Perílēpsis periēgéseōn,* Vol. 1 (Athens, 1883), pp. 145-188. Cf. the French translation published at the author's expense, *Dix années de voyages dans l'Asie Centrale et l'Afrique Equatoriale,* tr. Adolphe Meyer, Jules Blancard, and Laurent Labadie, ed. Emile Burnouf (Paris, 1885), I, 82-105. Cf. also the brief notice of Potagós's travels in *Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society and Monthly Record of Geography,* 2.6:386-387 (June 1880).

Prior to Potagós's arrival, Ya'qūb Beg had cooperated with the Ch'ing forces against the Tungans *(Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Shan Kan Hsin-chiang Hui-fei fang-lüeh,* 242:14r6-22r1). But by the time that Potagós met Ya'qūb Beg, the emir had already unmistakably shown the Ch'ing government his true colors as a "rebel." See Kuropatkin, pp. 177-178.

Potagós wanted to enter Ch'ing territory from the territory held by Ya'qūb Beg. "Since you are not willing to listen to us and are determined to finish your voyage," Potagós reports Ya'qūb Beg as saying, "wait . . . at Turfan for the arrival of the Chinese embassy from Hami, which I am expecting, and if within ten days it has not come, you may leave . . ."—Potagós, *Perílēpsis,* p. 152, and *Dix années,* pp. 85-86. Potagós crossed the desert to meet this embassy, passing on the way animals that had been dead for two

years, which "were preserved dry, like mummies, embalmed by the salt of the desert and the heat. I saw such mummies of Chinese who had died on the desert from Karashahr to Toksun a decade previous to my crossing, when they fled the ferocious murdering of the insurgent Kashgarians (Giarlík) and Tungans (Tourgán)."—Potagós, *Perílēpsis,* p. 162, and *Dix années,* p. 91. Not only did the expected Ch'ing embassy come to Ya'qūb Beg's "rebel" emirate, but it acceded to Potagós's request on the strength of a passport that the "rebel" had issued him (Potagós, *Perílēpsis,* pp. 163-164, and *Dix années,* pp. 91-92).

Once inside Ch'ing territory, Potagós met with an amusing example of Manchu willingness to make minor concessions. "After a little [while] the [Ch'ing] lieutenant-governor *(hypokybernḗtēs)* arrived with an interpreter, saying that I was going to present myself before the governor *(Kybernḗtēs)* and that I should reverence him in the Chinese manner. Since I did not understand him, I asked the interpreter to show me by example. Not wanting to give an example, he put his hand behind my head, pushing it down; he said that [I], on my knees, should touch the ground three times with my forehead and then remain kneeling before the governor. 'Eh! Tatar,' I told him, pulling my head back, 'this head does not bow except by the sword. If the *ta-jen (Ntarḗn)* wants me to see him, I am willing to greet him as [I would] our own king.' The lieutenant-governor, seeing my agitation, asked its cause and, learning [what it was], he said, 'So be it.' 'And how do you greet [your] king?' he asked me. I showed him, bowing my head and keeping my hands lowered on each side. 'It that all?' he asked in astonishment. 'And what more is required for an expression of respect?' I answered him.

"Presenting themselves before the governor, they all fell down upon the ground like camels, the lieutenant-governor and I alone remaining standing."—Potagós, *Perílēpsis,* pp. 182-183, and *Dix années,* pp. 101-102.

Later it became known that Ya'qūb Beg had had the Ch'ing embassy executed (Potagós, *Perílēpsis,* pp. 210-211, and *Dix années,* p. 117).

122. *Ch'in-ting p'ing-ting Shan Kan Hsin-chiang Hui-fei fang-lüeh,* 318:13v2-29r3 (esp. pp. 27v2-29r3): given under the date Kuang-hsü 10.ix.29 (cycl. 7)/16.xi.1884. The corresponding entry in *Ta Ch'ing li-ch'ao shih-lu (Te Tsung Ching Huang-ti shih-lu,* 194:27r3-28r2) is dated Kuang-hsü 10.ix.30 (cycl. 8)/17.xi.1884. *Kuang-hsü ch'ao Tung-hua lu,* comp. Chu Shou-p'eng, punctuated ed. by Chang Ching-lu *et al.* (Shanghai, 1958), Vol. 2, p. 1838, item 3, enters the imperial edict *(yü)* converting Sinkiang into a province under the date Kuang-hsü 10.x.1 (cycl. 9)/18.xi.1884. The eighteenth of November, being the latest of the three dates, is surely closer to the date when the edict was issued and may in fact be the date of the edict itself. See H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, *Present Day Political Organization of China,* tr. Andrei T. Beltchenko and Edward E. Moran (Taipei reprint, n.d.), pp. 397 and 439-441. Liu Chin-t'ang was appointed the first governor of Sinkiang.

III

AN OYIROD LETTER IN THE BRITISH MUSEUM

When Sir Aurel Stein and his Central Asian expedition visited the delta region of the Etsin Gol[1] in 1914, they acquired a letter written in the Oyirod language, composed presumably by one of the «Old» Torghud[2] of Etsin Gol. Stein has reproduced the letter under the catalogue number E. G. 021.f, in Volume III of his *Innermost Asia,*[3] Plate CXXVI («Paper Documents in Uighur and Mongol from Khara-Khoto, Etsin-Gol and Turfan Sites»), and in Volume II, page 1049, the letter is described: «Letter MS. Western

[1] The name «Etsin» in Etsin Gol (Etsin River) seems to be derived ultimately from a Hsi-Hsia 西夏 (Tangut) word. See P. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo,* 2 vols. (Paris, Adrien-Maisonneuve 1959—1963), Vol. 2, pp. 637—638. In the Sino-Mongolian inscription of 1362, the Mongolian form of the word is *Isin-a* — see F. W. Cleaves, *The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of* 1362 *in Memory of Prince Hindu: Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies,* Vol. 12. Nos. 1 and 2 (June, 1949), p. 66, [37], also p. 55, n. 154. In the Ch'ing period, the form *Eǰinei* appears to be standard — see, e.g., W. Fuchs, *Der Jesuiten-Atlas der Kanghsi-Zeit,* 2 vols. (*Monumenta Serica Monograph Series,* IV; Peking, Fu-jen University 1943), p. 149; *Ch'in-ting Hsi-yü t'ung-wen chih* 欽定西域同文志, 4 vols. (*Tōyō bunko sōkan* 東洋文庫叢刊, Vol. 16; Tokyo, Tōyō bunko 1961—1964), Vol. 2, p. 962; and P. Pelliot, *Notes critiques d'histoire kalmouke,* 2 vols. (*Oeuvres posthumes de Paul Pelliot* VI; Paris, Adrien-Maisonneuve 1960), Vol. 1, p. 26.

[2] The Old Torghud (*Xuučin Toryuud*) are those whose leaders were descended from Xō Örlöq, the prince who led the Torghud emigration to the Volga in the early seventeenth century. The majority of these returned to Zungharia with Ubaši Xān in 1771. The Old Torghud of Etsin Gol come from a group of Xō Örlöq's descendants who found their return from Tibet to the Volga blocked by the Zunghars in the early eighteenth century and therefore asked to be incorporated into the Ch'ing empire. The Ch'ing government then settled them in the Etsin Gol region. In other words, they were not among those who returned to Zungharia with Ubaši Xān. The New Torghud are those whose leaders were descended from Eǰinei Tayiši. They remained in Zungharia until after the Ch'ing conquest of 1755, and then «fearing punishment they fled to the Volga» under the leadership of Šereng. In 1771 they returned to Zungharia with Ubaši Xān. See *Hsi-ch'ui tsung-t'ung shih-lüeh* 西陲總統事畧 (preface 1809), 11 : 1r—4v (2v9 for the phrase quoted), and Pelliot, *Notes critiques,* Vol. 1, pp. 25—26, 28, 34; and Vol. 2 (*Tableaux généalogiques*), Tableau III: *Généalogie des Turghut.*

[3] Sir Aurel Stein, K.C.I.E., *Innermost Asia: Detailed Report of Explorations in Central Asia, Kan-su and Eastern Īrān,* 4 vols. (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1928).

Mongol (Qalmaq) text. 6 ll. complete, beautifully written on soft white paper. 20.7×26 cm. Folded into a slip 3.7 cm. broad.» The letter is now preserved in the British Museum.

Written Oyirod has received little attention in Mongolian studies. A brief introduction to the study of the language can be found in T. A. Bertagaev, *Kalmyckiĭ yazyk* in *Mladopis'mennye yazyki narodov SSSR* (Akademiya nauk SSR, Institut yazykoznaniya; Moscow and Leningrad, Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR 1959), pages 497—501; P. Aalto, *Schrift-Oiratisch* in *Mongolistik* (*Handbuch der Orientalistik*, Erste Abteilung, Fünfter Band, Zweiter Abschnitt; Leiden and Köln, E. J. Brill 1964), pages 185—199; and B. Ch. Todaeva, *Kalmyckiĭ yazyk* in *Yazyki narodov SSSR*, Vol. 5: *Mongol'skie, tunguso-man'čžurskie i paleoaziatskie yazyki* (Leningrad, Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1968, pages 34—52.) In the United States A. Bormanshinov and G. Zagadinow are working on *A Bibliographical Guide to Kalmyk Studies*, and a considerable amount of material is now being published in Elista, capital of the Kalmuk ASSR in the Soviet Union, but little has been done anywhere in the world in the way of published texts and translations.

Notable as works dealing specifically with written Oyirod texts are the following: B. Jülg, ed. and tr., *Märchen des Siddhi-kûr* (Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus 1866);[4] K. Th. Golstunskiĭ, ed. and tr., *Mongolo-oĭratskie zakony 1640 goda, dopolnitel'nye ukazy Galdanъ-xunъ-taĭdžiya i zakony, sostavlennye dlya volžskixъ kalmykovъ pri kalmyckomъ xaně Dondukъ-Daši* (Saint Petersburg, Tipografiya Imperatorskoĭ Akademii naukъ 1880;[5] A. M. Pozdneev, comp., *Kalmyckiya narodnyya skazki* (Saint Petersburg, Litografiya A. Ikonnikova 1886), *Kalmyckiya narodnyya skazki sobrannyya vъ Kalmyckixъ stepyaxъ Astraxanskoĭ gubernii i vъ podlinnomъ kalmyckomъ tekstě*, Vol. I (Saint Petersburg, Tipografiya Imperatorskoĭ Akademii naukъ 1892), and *Kalmyckaya xrestomatiya dlya čteniya vъ staršixъ klassaxъ kalmyckixъ narodnyxъ školъ* (Saint Petersburg, Tipografiya Imperatorskoĭ Akademii naukъ 1892);[6] W. Kotwicz, *Kalmyckiya zagadki i poslovicy* (*Izdaniya Fakulteta vostočnyxъ yazykovъ Imperatorskago S.-Peterburgskago universiteta*, No. 16; Saint Petersburg, Tipografiya Imperatorskoĭ akademii naukъ 1905); E. Haenisch, *Kalmükische Fragmente*: *Ural-Altaische Jahrbücher*, Vol. 25 (1953), Nos. 3 and 4, pages 283—294, and *Kapitel XVII von Jalavāhana aus dem kalmükischen Text des Altan Gerel* in *Asiatica*: *Festschrift Friedrich Weller* (Leipzig, Otto Harrassowitz 1954), pages 198—213;[7] G. Kara, *Le colophon de l'Altan gerel oïrat*: *Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae*, Vol. 10 (1960), No. 3, pages 255—261; Rinčyen and Čimid, eds., *Version oïrate des chansons de Guesser*: *Tod üsgiĭn Geser* (*Corpus scriptorum Mongolorum Instituti linguae et litterarum Comiteti scientiarum et educationis Altae Reipublicae Populi Mongol*[*ic*]*i*, Tomus IX, Fasc. 1; Ulan Bator, Sinžlex Uxaan, Deed Bolovsrolyn Xüreelengiĭn xevlel 1960) and Rinčyen and Ž. Coloo, eds., *Biography of Caya Pandita in Oirat Characters* (*Corpus scriptorum Mongolorum*, Tomus V, Fasc. 2—3; Ulan Bator, Šinžlex Uxaany Akadyemiĭn xevlel 1967);[8] N. Poppe, *An Oyrat Vajracchedikā Fragment*

[4] For a bibliography of translations from the *Siditü kegür*, see B. Ya. Vladimircov's translation, *Volšebnyĭ mertvec*: *Mongol'sko-oĭratskie skazki* (Moscow, Izdatel'stvo vostočnoĭ literatury 1958), pp. 151—153, and also L. Lőrincz, *Les «Contes du Cadavre Ensorcelé» dans la littérature et le folklore mongols* (cited below in full in the present paper), pp. 213—215. Note also Golstunskiĭ's edition of the text cited in note 5 below.

[5] Golstunskiĭ also published *Ubaši Xunъ-Taĭdžiĭnъ tūdži, narodnaya Kalmyckaya poèma Džangara i Sidditu kyurÿĭnъ-tūli* (St. Petersburg, Litografiya A. Ikonnikova 1864), to which I have not had access.

[6] These are the only Oyirod texts published by Pozdneev which I have been able to examine personally. His other Oyirod publications include *Pamyatniki istoričeskoĭ literatury Astraxanskixъ kalmykovъ* (St. Petersburg 1885); *Kalmyckiya skazki*: *Zapiski vostočnago otděleniya Imperatorskago russkago arxeologičeskago obščestva*, Vol. 3 (1888), pp. 307—364, Vol. 4 (1889), pp. 321—374, Vol. 6 (1891), pp. 1—68, Vol. 7 (1892), pp. 1—38, Vol. 9 (1895), pp. 1—58, Vol. 10 (1896), pp. 139—185; *Skazanie o xoždenii vъ Tibetskuyu stranu Malo-Dörbötskago Bāza-Bakši* (St. Petersburg 1897); *Kalmyckaya xrestomatiya* (St. Petersburg 1907 — a second edition of his *Kalmyckaya xrestomatiya* of 1892). How many of the above actually contain texts in the written Oyirod language I have been unable to ascertain, but Pozdneev's *Pamyatniki istoričeskoĭ literatury Astraxanskixъ kalmykovъ* and his *Kalmyckaya xrestomatiya* contain the Oyirod text of the so-called *Skazanie o dèrbèn oïratax* of Bātur Ubaši Tümen, for which see L. S. Pučkovskiĭ, *Mongol'skie, buryat-mongol'skie i oïratskie rukopisi i ksilografy Instituta vostokovedeniya*, I: *Istoriya, pravo* (Moscow and Leningrad, Izdatel'stvo Akademii nauk SSSR 1957), pp. 142—144. According to I. Ya. Zlatkin, *Istoriya Džungarskogo xanstva* (1635—1758) (Moscow, Izdatel'stvo «Nauka» 1964), p. 13, the *Skazanie* . . . of Bātur Ubaši Tümen has been translated into Russian by Yu. Lytkin in *Astraxanskie gubernskie vědomosti*, 1859, Nos. 43, 47, 49, 50; 1860, Nos. 11, 12.

[7] Also E. Haenisch, ed., *Altan Gerel*: *Die westmongolische Fassung des Goldglanzsutra nach einer Handschrift der Kgl. Bibliothek zu Kopenhagen*, T. 1: Text (Leipzig, Asia Major 1929), to which I have not had access.

[8] Notwithstanding its title, this volume contains the *Sarayin gerel* of Radnabhadra (the biography referred to in the title), the history of Гabang Šes rab (here entitled *Dörbön Oyirodiyin töüke*), and a letter of Dawā či Xān. Furthermore, although it is designated as Tomus V, Fasc. 2—3, of the *Corpus scriptorum Mongolorum* series, it is not to be confused with Radnabhadr-a, *Rabǰamba Cay-a Bandida-yin tuyuǰi*: *Saran-u gerel kemegdekü ene metü bolai*, ed. Rinčyen (*Corpus scriptorum Mongolorum*, Tomus V, Fasc. 2: Ulan Bator, Erdem šinžilgeeniĭ xevlel 1959), which also contains the *Olon nomin ündüsün üzügiyin ilyal orošiboi*. It appears that the Soviet scholar T. A.

from Turfan: *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (September, 1962), pages 170—178; L. Lőrincz, *Fragments d'une version oirate du Cadavre Ensorcelé*: *Acta Orientalia*, Vol. 17 (1964), No. 3, pages 293—321, and *Les «Contes du Cadavre Ensorcelé» dans la littérature et le folklore mongols*: *Acta Orientalia*, Vol. 20 (1967), No. 2, pages 203—238; and J. R. Krueger, *Remarks on the Oirat Vajracchedikā in Vienna* in *Kalmyk-Oirat Symposium*, ed. A. Bormanshinov and J. R. Krueger (*Kalmyk Monograph Series*, Number Two; Philadelphia, The Society for the Promotion of Kalmyk Culture 1966), pages 223—227, and *The Arthasiddhi Avadāna-Tale in Oirat-Mongolian*: *The Mongolia Society Bulletin*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring, 1967), pages 29—33. This short list is by no means complete,[9] but it will serve to give some idea of the state of our studies on the Oyirod written language.

Since no one, to my knowledge, has yet published a specimen of Oyirod private correspondence, I have undertaken to translate Stein's Oyirod letter in the British Museum. The transcription system employed is that used by N. N. Poppe in his *Geserica*: *Untersuchung der sprachlichen Eigentümlichkeiten der mongolischen Version des Gesserkhan*: *Asia Major*, Vol. 3 (1926), Fasc. 1, pages 1—32, and Fasc. 2, pages 167—193, and elaborated more explicitly in his *Ob otnošenii oĭratskoĭ pis'mennosti k kalmyckomu yazyku* in *Kalmyk-Oirat Symposium*, pages 191—210.[10] I should like to express my thanks to Mr. Poppe for answering a number of my questions about written Oyirod, with special reference to the present Oyirod letter, in a letter of July 20, 1959. I also take this opportunity to thank Father A. Mostaert for discussing the Oyirod letter with me in the same year. All mistakes are of course my own.

The letter is not old and probably dates from the late nineteenth or early twentieth century (prior to 1914). It reads as follows:

Transcription

1. §: *Günggeceren-ni bičiq*
2. *blama-du bariulyaba. mini kereqtei sayin geqsen χoyor*
3. *moriyimini. γalzuu čino zuuǰi. öün-dü em dom*
4. *χayirlaχuyigi medöülenei. χayirlaǰi angχarbala. ene*
5. *örtõni bičiq zõkü kümũr χayirlaǰi ilgeküyigi*
6. *medöülenei. ene učir örgübö.*

Translation

§: Letter of Günggeceren[11]
To [you,] Lama, [I] have had [my messenger] present [this letter]. A rabid wolf has bitten[12] two of my horses which I consider [both] necessary and

Burdukova has made a draft translation of Гabang Šes rab's history, and it is to be hoped that this translation will soon appear in print — see Zlatkin, *Istoriya Džungarskogo xanstva*, p. 13, n. 21.

[9] In the body of this paper I have listed only those works that I have been able to consult myself. Works that I have not seen but that have been cited in the literature at my disposal are mentioned in notes 5—7 above. There must be many omissions. P. Aalto, for example, on p. 188 of his article *Schrift-Oiratisch* cited above, mentions a Kalmuk chrestomathy by Choncho (Xonxo?) published in 1926 that I have not yet been able to trace.

[10] Mr. Poppe writes *č* before *i* but *c* before all other vowels and writes *ǰ* before *i* but *z* before all other vowels. This may at first glance seem unnecessary, since these are simply consistent pronunciation shifts before *i*, like the shift in pronunciation of *s* to *š* before *i* in written Mongolian (where we transcribe *si*, not *ši*, except when *š* is designated by two dots written to the right of the letter). But the Oyirod «clear script» (*todo bičiq*, *todo üzüq*, *todo Mongγol bičiq*) has, over the course of time, demonstrated a tendency to distinguish between *c* and *č*, *z* and *ǰ*. In his letter to me of July 20, 1959, Mr. Poppe reasons as follows: «. . . in some manuscripts the initial *č* (before *i*) is written as , whereas *c* (before other vowels) is rendered with another letter, namely . Likewise, *ǰ* before *i* is often written as , but before other vowels it is . Thus, there is definitely a tendency to distinguish between *c* and *č*, between *ǰ* and *z*. Therefore, in my articles I write *zaχa* «edge» but *ǰil* «year», *čiloun* «stone» but *cayān* «white». Your remark that such a method would substitute a phonological transcription for transliteration is justified. It would, but what do we do in Written Mongolian? Do we not write *olan* «many» but *ulus* «people», *öngge* «color» but *ünür* «smell,» *tala* «plain» but *dalu* «scapula»? We do, although in Mongolian *writing* there is no distinction between *o* and *u*, *ö* and *ü*, *t* and *d*, etc. Therefore, in my opinion, nothing remains but to distinguish between *c* and *č*, *z* and *ǰ*.»

The *c* ~ *č* and *z* ~ *ǰ* alternations are not exactly analogous to the alternations *o* ~ *u*, *ö* ~ *ü*, and *t* ~ *d*, but there are two good reasons for using the Poppe system. First is the reason that Mr. Poppe gives: the Oyirod themselves have a tendency to distinguish between *č* before *i* and *c* before other vowels and between *ǰ* before *i* and *z* before other vowels. Second, and perhaps more important, is the desirability of having a standard system of transcription for written Oyirod. The Poppe system already has some currency, and it is in line with the standard system for transcribing written Mongolian. It seems reasonable therefore to perpetuate its use.

[11] The name of the writer of the letter, *Günggeceren*, is composed of two elements: *güngge* (< Tibetan *kun-dga*, «great merriment») and *ceren* (< Tibetan *che-riṅ*, «long life»).

[12] In *zuuǰi*, the ending *-ǰi* is the praeteritum imperfecti, a finite verb ending (< *-ǰu'ui* < *-ǰuγui*). Cf. written Mongolian *-ǰuqui*, which is based on an early misreading

good. Therefore I beg you to grant [me some] medicine.[13] If [you] are willing to grant [it],[14] I beg you to be so kind as to send[15] [it to me] by this postal messenger.[16] [On] this account [I] have presented [my letter].

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of *-ǰuyui*. According to G. J. Ramstedt, *Kalmückisches Wörterbuch* (*Lexica Societatis Fenno-Ugricae*, III; Helsinki, Suomalais-Ugrilainen Seura 1935), p. XVIII, this form rarely serves as the predicate of a sentence («Selten als prädikat des satzes»). Poppe, *Geserica*, p. 172, appears to confirm Ramstedt's observation: «Im Gesserkhan finden wir das Praeteritum imperfecti nur mehreremal.»

[13] An honorific expression, literally, «In [respect of] this, [I] cause [you] to know [the fact of] granting [me] medicine [and magic] cure.» The phrase *χayirlaχuyigi* (< *χayirla-* + *-χu* [nomen futuri] + *-yigi* [accusativus]) *medöülenei* (< *mede-* + *-ül-* [causativus] + *-e-* [union vowel] + *-nei* [praesens imperfecti]) is an normal formula for making a request. Compare note 15 below.

The basic meaning of *χayirla-* (~ *χayirala-*) is «to love,» but the acquired meaning, «to grant,» with a direct object, is well attested in the dictionaries. J. E. Kowalewski, *Dictionnaire mongol-russe-français*, 3 vols. (Kazan, Imprimerie de l'Université, 1844—1849), Vol. 2, p. 714*a*, gives *sün kiged bal üčüken qayirala* («donne moi un peu de lait et de miel»). A. Pozdneev, *Kalmycko-russkiĭ slovar'* (St. Petersburg, Tipografiya Imperatorskoĭ Akademii naukъ 1911), p. 74, gives *Dalai bLamayin Gegen Ayuuki-du χān colo χayiralaǰi* («Dalai lama požaloval Ayuke titul xana»). Ramstedt, *Kalmückisches Wörterbuch*, p. 180*b*, gives *jū χārlwā* («was gab er?»). A. Mostaert, *Dictionnaire ordos*, 2nd ed. (New York and London, Johnson Reprint Corporation 1968), p. 346*b*, gives *t'eŋger sonīĭ borōō χārlaDži wān* («le ciel nous donne une bonne pluie»).

[14] An honorific expression, literally, «If, granting, [you] attend [to my request].»

[15] An honorific expression similar to the one discussed in note 13 above, literally, «[I] cause [you] to know [the fact of] granting [very literally, «loving»] and sending [to me].»

[16] Literally, «by this letter-carrying man of the post station.» In *kümūr* we have an instrumental form of *kümü(n)*, in which the final *-n* is dropped and the instrumental case is formed by lengthening the final vowel and adding *-r*. See Poppe, *Geserica*, p. 23: «Im Gesserkhan finden sich die gewöhnlichen Suffixe *-ber*, *-iyer* und auch *-Vr* (langer Vokal + *r*), welches einem mundartlichen Einfluß zuzuschreiben ist.» In earlier texts we would expect to find *kümēr* (see, e.g., Pozdneev, *Kalmyckaya xrestomatiya* [1892], p. 34, line 5, and Rinčyen and Coloo, eds., *Biography of Caya Pandita*, p. 98, line 10). Historically, the instrumentalis in *-Vr* would seem to be derived ultimately from *-γar/-ger*. Thus, **kümü* + *ger* > **kümü'er* > *kümūr* (~ *kümēr*).

For the form *kümü* without the final *-n* attested in written Mongolian, see F. W. Cleaves, *The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of* 1338 *in Memory of J̌igüntei*: *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 14, Nos. 1 and 2 (June, 1951), p. 53, [4], and p. 76, n. 26: «The form *kümü* «man» without the final *-n* is extremely rare.» Notwithstanding its rarity in written Mongolian, *kümü* seems to be relatively common in written Oyirod. The form *kümü* is attested, for example, in Golstunskiĭ, ed. and tr., *Mongolo-oĭratskie zakony 1640 goda*, p. 3, lines 4 and 11; p. 4, lines 1, 2, 3 and 4; p. 10, lines 7 and 10; p. 26, line 2; and p. 30, line 10; and in Pozdneev, *Kalmyckaya xrestomatiya* (1892), p. 21, line 10.

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

E.G. 021. f.

Central Asian Sufism and Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching

The New Teaching (Hsin-chiao 新教) of Ma Ming-hsin 馬明心 and the Chinese Muslim rebellions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that the New Teaching inspired -- long a mysterious topic in Chinese history -- are part of the history of an Islamic mystical brotherhood that originated in Transoxania and that played a dramatic role all over Muslim Asia.

* * *

In 1761 a Muslim named Ma Ming-hsin returned to China from a long period of travel and study in the Arab countries and Central Asia. His teaching spread like wildfire among the Muslims of northwest China, and in no more than twenty years the province of Kansu was ablaze not only with the fire of the New Teaching but with the flames of outright rebellion.

In 1781 the Chinese New Teaching leader Su Ssu-shih-san 蘇四十三 led the Salars of central Kansu in revolt against the Ch'ing government. After four months of fighting, the Ch'ing put down the New Teaching insurrection with the help of the Muslims of the so-called Old Teaching (Lao-chiao 老教 or Chiu-chiao 舊教), only to face a second New Teaching revolt in southern Kansu three years later, in 1784. After about

three months of fighting, the Ch'ing overpowered the New Teaching rebels and, in an effort to stabilize the Muslim communities of northwest China, outlawed the New Teaching and issued a series of decrees designed to keep Muslim affairs under control.

The Kansu provincial authorities prohibited the conversion of non-Muslims to Islam, forbade Muslims to go outside their own villages for prayer, barred preachers from coming in from the outside to teach, prohibited Muslims from adopting non-Muslim babies,[1] brought to a halt the construction of new mosques, and enjoined the Muslims not to bring "false suit" against one another. As a result of these measures, peace and quiet were restored in the Chinese northwest, and if matters had ended there, the New Teaching rebellions would have been no more than another minor episode in China's long history.

But matters did not end there. The Ch'ing dynasty's Muslim policy, directed primarily against the New Teaching, was in effect repressive to all Muslims and was regarded as such by the Shensi and Kansu Muslim community. The New Teaching went underground but continued to proselytize, and because the New Teaching was the Ch'ing government's foremost Muslim enemy, as political disaffection among the Islamic community increased, the leaders of the New Teaching began to emerge as the leaders of more and more of northwest China's Muslims. Wang Shu-huai's interesting monograph on the Panthay rebellion[2] does not mention the New Teaching, but there are some grounds for supposing that New Teaching missionaries carried their doctrine to the Muslim communities of southwest China before the outbreak of the Panthay revolt in 1856, and at least one of the principal Panthay leaders, Tu Wen-hsiu 杜文秀, may have been a New Teaching adherent.

In Shensi and Kansu the New Teaching was certainly very much alive. Ma Ming-hsin had been followed by a line of successors of whom the fifth was Ma Hua-lung 馬化隆 (隆, 龍). This shaykh established the New Teaching's base of operations in the stronghold of Chin-chi-p'u 金積堡, south of Ninghsia in northeastern Kansu. It is not certain whether the New Teaching had any connection with the famous shaykh and rebel T'o-ming 妥明, who was soon to leave northwest China, carry his teaching to northern Sinkiang, and later lead a Muslim revolt there against the Ch'ing, but missionaries did carry the New Teaching to Peking, Tientsin, various places in Heilungkiang, Kirin, Shansi, and Hupeh.

In the meantime, the Taiping, Nien, and Panthay rebellions were beleaguering the Ch'ing dynasty in the China interior, and the Europeans and Americans were applying pressure along the coast. To add to these difficulties, in 1862 the long-standing tension between Muslims and non-Muslims in northwest China finally boiled over into anti-Ch'ing rebellion in eastern Shensi. Ma Hua-lung, the New Teaching leader, had not started the revolt, but he soon made himself its central figure, and on this occasion, adherents both of the New Teaching and of the Old Teaching followed him into a fullscale military effort against the Manchu dynasty. Religious war spread quickly through the Muslim population of Shensi and Kansu, and before long there were sympathetic reverberations among the Chinese Muslims of Ili in Sinkiang. In 1864 a Muslim insurrection blazed up in Kucha, and soon virtually all the Muslims of Sinkiang were up in arms. As a result, Buzurg Khan, the last of Kashgar's Naqshbandī Khojas (Ho-cho 和卓), accompanied by his lieutenant Ya'qūb Beg, entered southern Sinkiang from Kokand in 1865 and established an independent Muslim state in the Tarim basin. In 1871 the Russians invaded northern Sinkiang and occupied the whole region of Ili.

These Muslim disturbances had major repercussions for Ch'ing-dynasty rule. They taxed the empire's resources, and they damaged the dynasty's prestige. The Muslim rebels' example also encouraged insurrectionary activities among the Mongols of Outer Mongolia. Moreover, in 1872 Chinese Muslims invaded Mongolia and took Khobdo and Uliasutai, and many Mongols used the occasion to mutiny and to attack and rob the Chinese merchants who had become an important factor in the Khalkha Mongols' discontent with Ch'ing rule. Finally, in 1873, with great effort and at vast expense, the Ch'ing forces under the command of Tso Tsung-t'ang 左宗棠 managed to crush the Shensi-Kansu rebellion that the New Teaching shaykh Ma Hua-lung had led, and Tso then went on to quell the rebellion in southern Sinkiang at the end of 1877, but the Russians refused to withdraw from the Ili valley and precipitated the Ili crisis. China never did repossess all her territory on her northwestern frontier.

The reconquest of Sinkiang was good for China -- in that China is the richer for it today -- but it was bad for the Ch'ing dynasty. The rebellions had weakened the empire, and the Ch'ing government had had to concentrate its resources on restoring control in the northwest while neglecting modernization and up-to-date coastal defense. Partly for this reason, China lost the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-1895, after which the Western powers and Japan began their scramble for concessions. As a final calamity, in the spring of 1895 another Muslim revolt flared up among the Salars of Kansu, once again rooted in differences between the Old and the New Teachings. As usual, the hostilities soon developed into a conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the enfeebled Ch'ing government was not able to restore order until June of 1896. By now the dynasty had faced too many humiliations. Ch'ing rule survived for only fifteen more

years, and in 1911 the dynasty fell; the last of the Ch'ing line was forced to abdicate early in 1912. There can be no doubt that China's Muslims had played a part in shortening the Manchu dynasty's life.

The New Teaching, particularly in northwest China, has survived into the second half of th· twentieth century and is probably still alive today.[3]

Given the important role of the New Teaching in China's modern history, it is reasonable to ask (1) who the New Teaching Muslims were and (2) whether the stormy history of Islam in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century China was in any way related to events elsewhere in the Islamic world.

(1) Identity of the New Teaching. The names of the Old and the New Teachings are well attested. The Old Teaching was a Sufi ṭarīqa, a "way"[4] or school of Islamic mysticism, known generally as the Naqshbandiyya, or Khwājagān (i.e., the Khojas). In Central Asia and China, this ṭarīqa also went by the name Khafiyya (commonly pronounced Khufiyya) because one of its distinguishing features was its practice of the silent "remembrance" (dhikr) of God, called dhikr-i khafī. By contrast, the New Teaching that Ma Ming-hsin brought to China in the eighteenth century was known as the Jahriyya, because its most salient distinguishing feature was its vocal remembrance of God, called dhikr-i jahrī. In Central Asia, at least, the term Jahriyya had three different connotations:

(a) Loosely, the term was applicable to all schools of Sufism that practiced the vocal dhikr.

(b) More specifically, the name Jahriyya designated the Sufi ṭarīqa founded by Aḥmad Yasawī (d. 1166), known also by the names Yasawiyya and Sulṭāniyya. During the course of the sixteenth century, this ṭarīqa, famous for its "sawing remembrance" (dhikr-i arra), came to be closely associated with the Naqshbandiyya, and Yasawī shaykhs commonly affiliated

themselves with both the Yasawiyya and the Naqshbandiyya simultaneously.

(c) The term Jahriyya was also applied to a sub-group within the Naqshbandiyya proper who practiced a vocal dhikr in addition or in preference to the Naqshbandiyya's customary silent one. This sub-group can be traced back to Khoja Mahmūd Anjīr Faghnawī, who introduced the "dhikr of those who act publicly" (dhikr-i ʿalāniyya) into the ṭarīqa in ca. 1315. In the sixteenth century, probably in part because of the religious patronage of the Yasawiyya-affiliated Uzbeks, the Jahriyya sub-group gained prominence within the Naqshbandiyya in Transoxania.

The sources clearly distinguish Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching from other mystical brotherhoods in China that practiced the dhikr-i jahrī -- the Qādiriyya, Kubrawiyya, Shaṭṭāriyya, Shādhiliyya, and Suhrawardiyya.[5] These jahrī brotherhoods had long coexisted in peace with the Naqshbandiyya-Khafiyya. The introduction of Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching into China immediately provoked a violent reaction from the Naqshbandiyya-Khafiyya and did not provoke a similar reaction from the other brotherhoods, which suggests that Ma Ming-hsin and the leadership of the Naqshbandiyya-Khafiyya were competing for the loyalties of the same religious constituency, namely those Muslims of northwest China who had Naqshbandī affiliations.

The question of whether Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching was a branch of the Yasawiyya or a branch of the Naqshbandiyya-Jahriyya sub-group is to some extent of minor significance, because by Ma Ming-hsin's time the Yasawiyya in Central Asia, although still a distinct ṭarīqa, was nevertheless closely intertwined with the Naqshbandiyya through double affiliation.

Some evidence, although circumstantial, would seem to suggest that Ma Ming-hsin belonged to the Naqshbandiyya-Jahriyya sub-group. First is the implication of the names themselves: the opposition is always given as

between "Old Teaching" and "New Teaching" or between "Khafiyya" and "Jahriyya." Since schools of Sufism were generally named for their titular founders, one might expect to find "Naqshbandiyya" (named for Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband, d. 1389) opposed to "Yasawiyya" (named for Aḥmad Yasawī), but none of the available sources designate the rival Old and New Teachings in this way. This would seem to indicate that they were competing within the same ṭarīqa. Moreover, if Muḥammad Tawādu' is correct in asserting that Ma Ming-hsin and Ma Lai-ch'ih 馬來遲 had been companions and fellow-students in Bukhara and that Ma Ming-hsin was initiated into his Sufism in the Yemen,[6] these two facts would serve as further evidence that Ma Ming-hsin belonged to the Naqshbandiyya-Jahriyya sub-group, because Ma Lai-ch'ih, who had died in 1753, before Ma Ming-hsin introduced his New Teaching into China, had been the greatest of all the missionaries of the Naqshbandiyya-Khafiyya (Old Teaching) in the Chinese northwest, and because there is no evidence that the Yasawiyya were established in the Yemen in the eighteenth century, whereas by that time the Naqshbandiyya were already widespread.[7]

In any case, it is clear that Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching was interconnected with the Naqshbandiyya.

(2) Relationship of the Muslim Rebellions in the Ch'ing Empire to Islamic History in General. The rebellious activities of the Naqshbandiyya-linked Old and New Teachings in China highlight an important Naqshbandī characteristic -- political involvement. The precursors of Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband had had a long history of association with the holders of political power going back to the time of Sultan Sanjar of the Seljuk empire in the twelfth century, and perhaps even as far back as the great mystic and martyr al-Ḥallāj in the tenth century.[8] After developing in

Central Asia under the guidance of Khoja Aḥrār (d. 1490), the Naqshbandiyya became virtually a political power in their own right in Transoxania in the second half of the fifteenth century. The Naqshbandiyya were instrumental in fatally weakening the Timurid empire and in bringing about the Uzbek invasion in 1500. It was also about this time that the Naqshbandiyya began to spread beyond Central Asia, and branches of the ṭarīqa made their way into India, Southeast Asia, Turkey, the Balkans, northeastern Africa, the Arabian peninsula, Syria, Kurdistan, the Caucasus, the Crimea, Kazan, Bashkurdistan, Siberia, Sinkiang, northeastern Tibet, and China.

(a) India. The Naqshbandiyya in India had strong connections with the ruling Mughal house from its very beginning, inasmuch as the emperor Babur (d. 1530) was a Naqshbandī disciple. Under Akbar the Great (d. 1605), who adopted a policy of religious toleration (ṣulḥ-i kull), and under Akbar's successors Jahāngīr (d. 1627) and Shāh Jahān (d. 1657), who to some extent continued this policy of toleration, orthodox Muslims began to take alarm. The Naqshbandiyya soon put themselves at the head of this wave of orthodox sentiment and generated what has been called "The Naqshbandī Reaction."[9] When Shāh Jahān died, the Naqshbandiyya were instrumental in putting the more orthodox of his sons, Awrangzeb, on the Mughal throne.

After Awrangzeb's death in 1707, Mughal power disintegrated, and the Muslim minority in India faced the transfer of political power to non-Muslim hands. As a result, Naqshbandī tactics shifted from a policy of trying to influence the throne to one of trying to win over powerful Muslim governors and of marshalling popular support at large among the Indian Muslim community. The leading Naqshbandī of the time, Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi, is understood to have helped in forming a military alliance with the Afghans that crushingly defeated the Hindu Marāthas at the battle of Panipat in 1761. Shāh Walī Allāh's revivalist teaching extended far beyond India's borders, and Bernard Lewis even credits this Naqshbandī influence from India with having "revitalized Arab religion and the Arabic religious sciences."[10]

Sayyid Aḥmad Barēlwī, a Naqshbandī and continuator of the movement that Shāh Walī Allāh had started, launched a jihād, or holy war, against the Sikhs in 1826 and invited the rulers of Herat and Bukhara to intervene, but the Central Asian rulers showed no interest in joining this Indian struggle. The Sikhs defeated and killed Sayyid Aḥmad in 1831, and in the same year a British force crushed the Muslim insurrection in Bengal that was led by Sayyid Aḥmad's disciple Tītū Mīr. Sayyid Aḥmad's movement of Mujāhids (Holy Warriors), an offshoot of the Naqshbandiyya, continued to survive in the northwest frontier area, where it made trouble for the British after their annexation of the Punjab and eventually made common cause with the Indian Mutiny in 1857. Despite British attempts to suppress the Mujāhids, they remained active in the northwest frontier area until after the First World War.

(b) The West. The Naqshbandiyya had spread into the Ottoman empire in the fifteenth century, establishing many Sufi hostels but staying out of the political limelight. By minding their manners, the Naqshbandiyya won two Ottoman sultans as disciples, ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd I (d. 1789) and Muṣṭafā IV (d. 1808), and in 1826, with the suppression of the Janissaries and their affiliated ṭarīqa of the Bektāshiyya, the Ottoman government turned over the Bektāshiyya's properties to the Naqshbandiyya for safekeeping.

Mawlānā Khālid (d. 1826), who had been initiated into the Indian branch of the Naqshbandiyya, propagated the ṭarīqa among the Kurds, a fact which was later to have an effect on the development of Kurdish national

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consciousness, and his influence spread among the Turks, Arabs, and Bosnians of the Ottoman empire. Naqshbandī and other tarīqa leaders originally also supported the Turkish nationalist movement, and the Naqshbandiyya were represented in the First Grand National Assembly, but when the Assembly voted for the abolition of the Caliphate, the disestablishment of the Islamic institution, and the proclamation of Turkey as a secular republic, orthodox sentiment was outraged. In 1925 the Kurdistan Naqshbandī leader Shaykh Sa'īd announced that the time had come to put an end to the godless Republic and to restore the Caliphate. The ensuing struggle soon ended in a victory for the Republic, which promptly condemned Shaykh Sa'īd and forty others to death, outlawed the Naqshbandiyya and all Sufi "ways" in Turkey, and, before the year 1925 was out, closed down their hostels and shrines. In 1930 an incident that occurred near Izmir in western Anatolia resulted in the death of Turkey's leading Naqshbandī, Shaykh Muḥammad As'ad, and the execution of many other Naqshbandī shaykhs whom the government found politically dangerous.

Naqshbandī shaykhs have since continued to be involved in Kurdish politics in Turkey and Iran and in open rebellions in Iraq, and there are indications that Naqshbandī initiates are connected with the present-day anti-secularist movement in the Turkish Republic. The present role of the tarīqa in these countries is uncertain, but it is clear that the Naqshbandiyya is still very much alive in the Middle East.

(c) The Caucasus. The Naqshbandiyya played a dramatic part in political upheavals in Daghestan in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Shaykh Manṣūr, who led the Chechen resistance to the Russians from 1785 to 1791, seems to have been a Naqshbandī,[11] and Mawlānā Khālid had considerable influence in Daghestan. In the early nineteenth century the Naqshbandī

imam Ghāzī Muhammad started a campaign against Russian influence and the inroads of customary law on the law of Islam. He carried his message to the mountaineers of Daghestan, using armed force when necessary, only to have his army of 8,000 defeated in 1830 by the forces of the pro-Russian Avar queen. Nothing daunted, Ghāzī Muhammad put together a new army in 1831 and defeated the Russian forces in central Daghestan. In 1832 he invaded the Chechen-Ingush territories and pushed into the central Caucasus, but this time the Russian army defeated him and killed him. In 1834 the succeeding Naqshbandī imam renewed the struggle but was killed not long thereafter.

His successor was the famous Naqshbandī imam named Shāmil, who carried on an armed struggle against the Russians for a quarter of a century, until 1859, at times confining Russian power to the coastal areas and southernmost regions of Daghestan. Offshoots of the Naqshbandiyya still survive in the Caucasus today.

(d) Southeast Asia. The Naqshbandiyya established themselves in Southeast Asia probably sometime in the seventeenth century, entering the Indonesian archipelago partly by way of the Malay peninsula and partly by way of the sea trade from India's west coast. Sufi brotherhoods, the Naqshbandiyya included, were important in spreading Islam at the expense of the Indonesian Sivaitic religions during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. As for politics, it is unknown what role, if any, the Naqshbandiyya played in the nineteenth century in the Java War, in the Muslim reaction to the extension of Siamese control at the north of the Malay peninsula, or in the Acheh War in Sumatra, but in the second half of the century, with increasing numbers of Southeast Asians making the pilgrimage to Mecca, the political importance of the Naqshbandiyya increased.

A growing community of Malayan and Indonesian residents in Mecca initiated many pilgrims into the tarīqa, and these, on their return to Southeast Asia, spread both the Naqshbandiyya and Middle Eastern ideas of pan-Islamism among their compatriots, especially in Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and the Straits Settlements. Ismail Simaboer, the first Naqshbandī shaykh of Minangkabau, who had brought an Ottoman flag back with him from Mecca to Indonesia shortly before 1850, has been seen as the main source of this new Meccan influence in Sumatra,[12] and, according to at least one scholar, the growth of the Naqshbandiyya in western Java during the 1880's was almost certainly connected with the anti-Dutch movements that culminated in the killing of all the European men in Tjilegon in 1888.[13]

Naqshbandī activities in Southeast Asia in the twentieth century have yet to be investigated, but it is thought that in recent years shaykhs of the ṭarīqa have provided leadership in the Indonesian anti-communist movement.

(e) Western Central Asia. In Transoxania, the home of the Naqshbandiyya, Naqshbandī khojas steadily acquired more and more wealth and exercised increasing political influence over the Uzbek khans. The richest and most powerful of the Naqshbandī khojas in Transoxania proper were the Jūybārī shaykhs of Bukhara, but other Naqshbandī families also, such as the family of the Makhdūm-i A'ẓam (d. 1542) of Dehbid and the family of Muḥammad Pārsā (d. 1460/1), were enormously powerful, and initiates of the ṭarīqa exercised great political influence throughout Central Asia.

In the second half of the sixteenth century Khoja Isḥāq Walī, a son of the Makhdūm-i A'ẓam, made serious trouble for 'Abd Allāh Khan II,[14] and in the early seventeenth century the Makhdūm-i A'ẓam's family was instrumental in putting Imām Qulï on the Ashtarkhanid throne.[15] In Balkh,

at the end of the seventeenth century, a descendant of Muḥammad Pārsā named Ṣāliḥ Khwāja became the leading figure in a rebellion that made him ruler of the city.[16] In the early eighteenth century, when 'Ubayd Allāh Khan II tried to curb the growing power of the Jūybārī shaykhs by taxing their vast landed properties, he was quickly overthrown. The khan was killed, and his palace was looted.

In the late eighteenth century, there was trouble in Transoxania over a Naqshbandī named Ṣūfī Islām, who practiced a vocal dhikr and had an affiliation with the Yasawiyya. Ṣūfī Islām was forced to leave Transoxania for Afghanistan, where he established his own branch ṭarīqa with its main hostel at Karrukh. It is unknown whether there is any connection between the reasons behind Ṣūfī Islām's expulsion from Transoxania and the causes of the roughly contemporary Khafiyya-Jahriyya conflict in China, but the similarity is worthy of note.[17]

About the middle of the nineteenth century, as Russian pressure began to make itself felt in Central Asia, the importance of the Naqshbandiyya increased. Naqshbandī initiates were to be met with everywhere, and when the Hungarian orientalist Arminius Vámbéry made his daring journey to Khiva, Bukhara, and Samarkand in 1863, he did so disguised as a Naqshbandī pilgrim. After the Russian conquest of western Turkestan, the establishment of Russian protectorates over Bukhara and Khiva, and the annexation of Kokand in the second half of the nineteenth century, the Naqshbandiyya remained strong, and Naqshbandī initiates were active in various forms of resistance to Russian authority, beginning at least as early as the revolt of 1868 in the Cis-Ural steppes.[18]

The political role of the Naqshbandiyya in the uprising of Darwīsh Khan Torä in 1885 and in the cholera riot of 1892 remains to be studied,

but the Naqshbandī leader Ismā'īl Khan Torä was arrested on suspicion of stirring up rebellion in 1895, and in 1898 a Naqshbandī named Dukchi Ishān led a violent armed revolt against Russian authority in Ferghana, after which the Naqshbandī Qalandars were forbidden to carry on public preaching. Although it is unknown to what extent the Naqshbandiyya were involved in the Turkestan rebellion of 1916, Naqshbandī shaykhs were unquestionably active in the Basmachi movement of the 1920's, and the Vaisovite movement, which had been founded in Kazan in 1862 and which allied itself with the Bolsheviks in 1917, was an outgrowth of the Naqshbandiyya. Naqshbandī shaykhs have been politically active in twentieth-century Afghanistan. Naqshbandī activities in the Soviet Union are, of course, secret and unknown, but the ṭarīqa's survival there is certain.

(f) Sinkiang. The Naqshbandiyya's most dramatic political involvements were in Sinkiang, where the ṭarīqa must have had connections at least as early as the mid-fifteenth century, and where it became solidly established in the sixteenth century, with adherents residing as far east as Kansu in China.[19] For the next two and a half centuries, two lines of the Makhdūm-i A'ẓam's descendants, known as the White Mountain and Black Mountain khojas, struggled for supremacy in the Tarim basin.[20] The struggle between these two branches of the Naqshbandiyya hastened the collapse of the Moghul dynasty of the house of Chaghadai, and the White Mountain khojas actively helped the Zunghars conquer Eastern Turkestan in 1679 and performed the same service for the Ch'ing empire in 1755. Having eliminated the Black Mountain line, the White Mountain khojas rebelled against their Ch'ing overlords in 1756 and proclaimed an independent Islamic state under khoja rule, but in 1759 the Ch'ing army subjugated Sinkiang, and thenceforth the khojas of the White Mountain line were forced to live as exiles in Ferghana.

In 1765 an anti-Ch'ing rebellion erupted in Ush Turfan in anticipation of a White Mountain khoja restoration, but the restoration never materialized, and the Ch'ing army soon restored order. Things then remained quiet in Sinkiang until 1815, when a certain Ḍiyā' al-Dīn, who may have been a remnant of the Black Mountain Naqshbandiyya,[21] raised a short-lived revolt with backing from the Kirghiz.

In 1820, a White Mountain khoja named Jahāngīr, who had been living in exile in Kokand, invaded Sinkiang at the head of a Kirghiz army. The Ch'ing garrison forces drove him back immediately, but before long Jahāngīr reappeared, and he continued to threaten Ch'ing control of the Tarim basin until his capture in 1828. In 1830 Jahāngīr's brother Khoja Muḥammad Yūsuf invaded Sinkiang with backing from the khan of Kokand and then withdrew, taking with him an enormous booty.

In 1847 seven White Mountain khojas, with the support of much of the Kashgarian population, invaded the Tarim basin from Kokand and put the Ch'ing army to considerable effort and expense to expel them. In 1855 and 1856 the khojas made raids on the Sinkiang border forces, and in 1857 Walī Khan Turä, one of the seven khojas of 1847, invaded Kashgaria again, throwing the region into turmoil for several months. There was a Muslim revolt in Kashgar in 1861, and in 1862 some so-called Andijanis, who were certainly khoja military forces, attacked the Sinkiang frontier posts.

The ṭarīqa affiliations of T'o-ming, mentioned above, and of Rāshid al-Dīn Khan Khoja, who rebelled in Kucha in 1864, are uncertain, as are the affiliations of the other Sinkiang rebels of the time, but with the appearance of the White Mountain khoja Buzurg Khan and the Kokandi adventurer Ya'qūb Beg in 1865, Kashgaria came under a rule that was tied

to the Naqshbandiyya. Although Ya'qūb Beg deposed Buzurg Khan shortly thereafter, there is no evidence to suggest that this was in any sense a repudiation of Naqshbandī influence. It is unknown what political involvements, if any, the Naqshbandiyya have had in Sinkiang after the collapse of Ya'qūb Beg's rebel kingdom in 1877.

* * *

One remarkable fact about the politically active ṭarīqa to which Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband gave his name is that, like all Sufi brotherhoods, it had no over-all organization. The only lines of authority were between shaykh and disciple. There were always, at any given time, many leading shaykhs, so that although Naqshbandī activities in various parts of the Islamic world may appear to have been interconnected, they were in fact never part of any common plan or coordinated effort.

But neither were they mere coincidence. In the fifteenth century, Khoja Aḥrār had deemed it "necessary to associate with emperors and to bring them under control and by means of this work to fulfill the purpose of the Muslims,"[22] and from his time on, Naqshbandī shaykhs preached a combination of religious reformation and political activism. When, in the late eighteenth century, Muslims began to feel that Islam's position in the world was weakening and that Christian, Hindu, and Chinese powers were growing stronger, the revivalist message of the Naqshbandī shaykhs fell on receptive ears.

By the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the dangers to the Muslim world were even more apparent. Not only did European and other alien forces threaten the Islamic community from without, but religious innovation and non-Muslim custom threatened Islam from within. For the

needed. Some Muslims turned to nationalist and modernizing movements to put new life into the peoples of Islam. Other, more conservative Muslims regarded these new movements as a betrayal of Islam's very spirit. Conservative and pan-Islamist elements of the Islamic community preferred the shaykhs of the Naqshbandiyya, who, with their revivalist message, their political activism, and their wide popular appeal as men of God, stoutly defended traditional, orthodox Islam by the pen, by conspiracy, and by the sword, from Russia to Indonesia and from the Mediterranean to the China Sea.

* * *

The New Teaching in China was not without peculiarities of its own, but its adherents' political activities, which arose in response to conditions within China, must also be viewed in the light of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Islamic history as a whole.

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NOTES:

1. See Josef Trippner, "Die Salaren, ihre ersten Glaubensstreitigkeiten und ihr Aufstand 1781," Central Asiatic Journal, Vol. 9, No. 4 (December 1964), p. 276. Did the Kansu Muslims really adopt non-Muslim children? If so, the practice of adoption is a noteworthy example of ʿāda (customary law) in conflict with the sharīʿa (the revealed Holy Law of Islam), and it would be interesting to know the legal devices by which it was justified. Adoption is forbidden by the Koran. See Joseph Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 14, n. 1, and 166-167.
2. Wang Shu-huai 王樹槐, Hsien-T'ung Yün-nan Hui-min shih-pien 咸同雲南回民事變 (Chung-yang yen-chiu-yüan Chin-tai-shih yen-chiu-so chuan-k'an 中央研究院近代史研究所專刊 No. 23; Nan-kang: Academia Sinica, 1968).
3. For the twentieth-century fate of the Jahriyya, see J. Trippner, "Islamische Gruppen und Gräberkult in Nordwest-China," Die Welt des Islams, N.S., Vol. 7 (1961), pp. 165-168. Further information on Chinese Islam in the Republican period will be forthcoming from Barbara Linne Pillsbury of Columbia University, a visiting scholar at the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, who is currently doing anthropological research on Islam in China.
4. The Arabic term ṭarīqa ("way"), denoting a religious school or discipline, invites comparison with the Chinese tao 道.
5. See, e.g., Khāl al-Dīn Kātib b. Shāh Kūchak Yārkandī, "Hidāyat nāma" (British Museum, London) MS Oriental 8162, fol. 1r; Muḥammad Ṣadīq

Yārkandī, "Majmūʿat al-muḥaqqiqīn" (Staatsbibliothek, Marburg/Lahn) MS Orient. Oct. 1680, p. 18, and MS Orient. Oct. 1719, p. 192, and (India Office Library, London) MSS Turki 7, fol. 5r; C.A.M.C. d'Ollone et al., Recherches sur les Musulmans chinois (Paris: Ernest Leroux, 1911), p. 276; J. Trippner, "Islamische Gruppen," pp. 147-165.

6. Muḥammad Tawādu', Al-Sīn wa'l-Islām (Cairo: Al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn, 1945), p. 115.
7. K. Smirnov, "Dervishi i ikh politicheskoe znachenie," Izvestiia Shtaba Kavkazskogo voennogo okruga, No. 31 (1911), p. 76, lists the Yemen as one of the places where the Naqshbandiyya was ensconced. Note, however, that this is an early twentieth-century article. Hamid Algar informs me that the Naqshbandiyya had a brief career in the Yemen in the eighteenth century as a southward extension of the important branch of the ṭarīqa formed in Mecca by Khoja Aḥmad Yakdast.
8. It is clear that al-Ḥallāj was executed because of the political overtones of his activities in Baghdad, but it remains to be established to what extent the implication of political involvement was present in the symbolism of the gibbet. Marijan Molé, "Autour du Daré Mansour: L'Apprentissage mystique de Bahā' al-Dīn Naqshband," Revue des études islamiques, Vol. 27 (1959), Cahier 1, pp. 35-66, traces Naqshbandī tradition back to al-Ḥallāj and the gibbet on which he was martyred. Molé's notion of al-Ḥallāj as a link in Naqshbandī tradition is, however, inadequately substantiated.
9. See Aziz Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), Chapter 7, pp. 182-190.
10. Bernard Lewis, The Middle East and the West (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 99.

11. See Alexandre Bennigsen and Chantal Lemercier-Quelquejay, Islam in the Soviet Union (New York and Washington: Praeger, 1967), pp. 9 and 73.

12. See B. J. O. Schrieke, "Bijdrage tot de Bibliografie van de huidige godsdienstige beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust," Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 59, No. 3 (1920), pp. 263, n. 5, and 266-267.

13. See Anthony Reid, "Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia," The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2 (February 1967), pp. 273, n. 23, and 280, n. 59.

14. This can be seen clearly from the accounts in Muḥammad 'Iwaḍ, "Ḍiyā' al-qulūb" (Houghton Library, Cambridge, Massachusetts) uncatalogued MS. See, e.g., fols. 27v-29v and 140r-141v. Shāh Maḥmūd Choras, "Anīs al-ṭālibīn" (Bodleian Library, Oxford) MS 2494, fol. 88r (margin), indicates that Khoja Isḥāq knew in advance that 'Abd Allāh's son and successor 'Abd al-Mu'min Khan would be killed, and the "Ḍiyā' al-qulūb," fols. 33r-34v, shows that the khoja supported the Ashtarkhanid contender Bāqī Muḥammad and opposed the last of the Shibanids, Pīr Muḥammad II.

15. See Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, Ta'rīkh-i Muqīm Khānī, tr. A. A. Semenov under the title Mukim-khanskaia istoriia (Tashkent: AN UzSSR, 1956), pp. 81-82. See also Semenov's introduction, p. 14, with reference to the dervish origin of Yār Beg Khan, founder of a dynasty of rulers of Badakhshan, and to the khojas of Chadak, who exercised temporal power in Ferghana. Faḍl 'Alī Beg Surkhafsar (and Sang Muḥammad Badakhshī), Ta'rīkh-i Badakhshān, ed. A. N. Boldyrev (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1959), p. 2, says that the grandfather of Yār (or Yārī) Beg Khan was Mīr Zāhid Khan of the illustrious Alid house of Dehbid. Dehbid was the home of the Makhdūm-i A'ẓam, but

religious or political connections between Yār Beg Khan and the Makhdūm-i A'ẓam's family have yet to be established. The religious affiliations of the Chadak khojas also need detailed research.

16. See Muḥammad Yūsuf Munshī, op. cit., pp. 160-165.

17. Hamid Algar, who is the source of this information, has visited Ṣūfī Islām's hostel at Karrukh and says that Ṣūfī Islām's ṭarīqa is still active in western and northwestern Afghanistan.

18. K. Smirnov, op. cit., Izvestiia Shtaba Kavkazskogo voennogo okruga, No. 32 (1911), p. 17, blames Naqshbandī propagandists from Khiva.

19. See Abū'l-Baqā b. Khwāja Bahā' al-Dīn b. Makhdūm-i A'ẓam, "Jāmi' al-maqāmāt" (Bodleian Library, Oxford) MS 2493, fol. 25v; (Staatsbibliothek, Marburg/Lahn) MS Orient. Oct. 1562, p. 66, where the followers of the Makhdūm-i A'ẓam are represented as being spread from Mecca to the borders of China; and Muḥammad 'Iwaḍ, "Ḍiyā'al-qulūb," fol. 118v, attests a follower of Khoja Isḥāq Walī living in Kan-chou.

20. The Shensi Muslim revolt of Mi-la-yin 米喇印 and Ting Kuo-tung 丁國棟 in 1648-1649 may well have had something to do with the White Mountain Naqshbandiyya, since it occurred soon after the visit to Su-chou (ca. 1640) of Khoja Muḥammad Yūsuf (d. 1652/3), the founder of the White Mountain branch in northwest China. Su-chou played a major part in keeping the revolt alive, and the insurgents maintained an alliance with Hami, where the Naqshbandiyya was firmly established. For biographical details about Muḥammad Yūsuf, see "Ḥaḍrat Sayyid Āfāq Khwājam-ning tadhkira-lärï" (Lunds Universitetsbibliotek, Jarring Collection) uncatalogued MS, fols. 11r-37v.

21. Chokan Chingisovich Valikhanov, Sobranie sochinenii v piati tomakh, Vol. 2 (Alma-Ata: AN KazSSR, 1962), p. 316.

22. Fakhr al-Dīn 'Alī b. al-Ḥusayn al-Wā'iẓ Kāshifī, Rashaḥāt-i 'ayn al-ḥayāt (Tashkent: Litografiia Arifdzhanova, 1911), p. 315; (India Office Library, London) MS I.O. 705, fol. 249v, and MS I.O. 2225, fol. 277r; (British Museum, London) MS Oriental 212, fol. 174v.

Confrontations between Muslim missionaries and nomad unbelievers in the late sixteenth century

Notes on four passages from the 'Ḍiyā' al-Qulūb'

A dominant theme in Inner Asian history is the interaction between sedentary and nomadic societies. It is now fairly generally agreed that the pastoral nomadism of the Eurasian steppe was born out of sedentary society in western Asia sometime about 2000 B.C., and by the twentieth century it is evident that Turco-Mongolian nomadism has returned to its mother. Other Inner Asian nomadisms--in Iran, Afghanistan, and Tibet--may have undergone relatively minor changes since the expansion of the Romanov and Ch'ing empires, but the present-day societies of the Turks and Mongols who carry on transhumant livestock raising in China, the Soviet Union, and the Mongolian People's Republic are fundamentally different from the pastoral nomadic societies of the Middle Ages.

Whether the sedentary empires' possession of firearms and cannons, when all is said and done, was the essential cause lying behind the nomad's loss of his long-held military superiority over city-dwellers and farmers and his increasing integration with sedentary society is a subject that must await discussion elsewhere, but the nomads do appear to have begun to lose their advantage before one can account for this loss in terms of a more advanced military technology. Certainly one important factor in the tightening integration of a nomad-sedentary continuum was the spread of Islam and Buddhism into the steppe.

The high point of Turco-Mongolian nomadic power was in the thirteenth century, when Chinggis Khan, Ögödei, Möngke, and Khubilai sent out devastating campaigns that overran much of the sedentary Eurasian world. However, this burst of nomad energy was also the beginning of nomadism's political decline. By uniting "all those who lived in felt tents" and exposing them (directly or indirectly) to the influences of settled culture--despite such reassertions of nomadic individuality as the Talas khuriltai of 1269, the wars of Arigh Böke and Khaidu, and the split between coexisters and nomad traditionalists after the murder of Tarmashirin in 1334--the Mongols exposed the last existing reservoirs of "raw" Turko-Mongolian nomads to the "cooking," in greater or lesser degree, of settled civilizations.

Religion was the hottest fire of this cooking process, and as the

religions of the sedentary cultures--Buddhism and Islam--burned their way into the steppe, they carried with them a variety of "civilizing" influences. The cultural cleavage that developed between the eastern and western halves of the Eurasian steppe is particularly striking. In the east, where the Mongolian language predominated, shamanic beliefs and practices continued to hold sway over the nomads' religious lives for at least a century after the expulsion of the Mongols from China in 1368. Neither Chinese popular religion nor neo-Confucian philosophy, so inextricably bound up with the conditions of Chinese life, were exportable to the Mongolian steppe, and the Chinese did not proselytize outside China. Tibetan Buddhism, on the other hand, had been proselytizing, and Tibetan missionary efforts in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries unquestionably made their mark on the Mongols in East Asia. The sources do not force us to conclude that Tibetan Buddhism was ever totally extinguished among the Mongols after the fall of the Yüan, but Buddhist influence, if any, cannot have had real depth in Mongolian society prior to the missionary work of the dGe-lugs-pa in the late sixteenth century. When the dGe-lugs-pa came from settled society into the steppe, they brought with them more sedentary imports than simply their Buddhist religious philosophy.

In the west, where the Mongolian-speaking upper strata (probably only a tiny minority of the nomad population) were quickly assimilated into the Turkic-speaking majority, the nomad population as a whole underwent a full-scale conversion to Islam--the so-called Mongol painting in Iran being the last visual evidences of the nomad aristocracy's patronage of shamanism. Muslim missionary efforts had long been under way among the western nomads, whose first peripheral contacts with Islam date from the first Islamic century. Beginning in the ninth century A.D., the Abbasids' use of Turkish slaves, followed by the Turkish slaves' use of the Abbasids, must have resulted in some penetration of Muslim influence into the steppe, deepened as time went on by the activities of ghazis and Sufis, especially those of the Yasawiyya in Turkistān. The Mongolian conquests of the thirteenth century and the adoption of Islam by Berke, Ghazan, Mubārak Shāh, Baraq, Talīqu, Tarmashirin, Ozbeg, and Tughluq Temür brought the process of formal Islamicization to its virtual completion. Islam served as a bridge between nomadic and sedentary societies and hastened compromise and interpenetration between the two, gradually altering the patterns of the nomad's world.

The learned ulema--sophisticated but interested in matters seemingly irrelevant to life as the nomad saw it--were not suited to carry the Prophet's message to the unlettered herdsmen and warriors of the Inner Asian pastures. Sufis, however, excited the nomads and made them understand. Two related Sufi tarikats, the Yasawiyya and the Naqshbandiyya, who had a common origin in the teaching of Abū Yūsuf Hamadānī (d. 1140), were particularly active among the nomads on the outskirts of sedentary Central Asia. The Yasawiyya had been proselytizing among the Turks since the twelfth century. They enjoyed pride of place among the Uzbeks and wielded influence among the Moghuls who controlled Jetisu and Eastern Turkestan. In the fifteenth century the Naqshbandiyya, who had previously devoted most of their energies to Central Asia's settled populations, mounted missions of their own to the nomads, and their relationship with the Uzbeks of Abū'l-Knayr Khan played a role in the destruction of Timurid rule. While the Naqshbandiyya strengthened Islam in the steppe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, these Sufis also reoriented the nomads, involving them more and more in sedentary affairs, and changing the character of their culture.

Among most of the Turkic-speaking nomads of the western steppe, shamanism had survived past 1500 only as an essentially unacknowledged underlayer, but among the Kirghiz who pastured in the mountains on the fringes of the steppe, shamans seem to have practiced their mediation between men and spirits openly at least until the Naqshbandī missionary efforts of the late sixteenth century--precisely the period when the dGe-lugs-pa began their reforming and proselytizing efforts among the Mongols to the east.

Four passages in a Persian-language source that can be dated to the beginning of the seventeenth century mention Muslim missionary work in the late 1500's undertaken against what appears to have been shamanism, although one cannot rule out the possibility that in the first and fourth passages Islam's adversary may have been Buddhism imported from Tibet.

The source in question is the "Ḍiyā' al-qulūb" ("Shining of the Hearts"), begun in A.H. 1012 = A.D. 1603.[1] V.A. Romodin[2] writes that "The name of the author is unknown" and that "In the Soviet Union it [i.e., the "Ḍiyā' al-qulūb"] has been known down to the present time in [only] a single copy," namely MS A 1615 (Institut narodov Azii AN SSSR, Leningrad). But the author's name has for some time been known to be Muḥammad 'Iwaḍ, and a second copy of the work is preserved in the Uzbek Academy of Sciences in Tashkent (MS Inventory No. 71).[3] If Romodin intends to cast doubt on Muḥammad 'Iwaḍ's authorship, he does not say

say so explicitly. In any case, we know nothing about Muḥammad ʿIwaḍ other than what he himself tells us in his "Ḍiyāʾ al-qulūb," and it is unknown whether he bears any relationship to the nineteenth-century historian Mullā ʿIwaḍ Muḥammad b. Mullā Rūzī Muḥammad ʿAṭṭār of Kokand.[4]

Another, as yet uncatalogued recension of the "Ḍiyā al-qulūb" is preserved in the Houghton Library of Harvard University. On fols. 58v, 74r, 76v, 97v, 99v, 128v, 132r, and 138v of this manuscript the author gives his name as Muḥammad ʿIwaḍ, and on fol. 134r he refers to himself as ʿIwaḍ Muḥammad. The copy is clearly written, undated, and, like the Tashkent and Leningrad recensions, incomplete. The author writes (fol. 2v) of the division of his book into six sections, but section two of the Harvard manuscript ends abruptly (fol. 142v), and sections three through six are missing. The language of the work is not the elegant Central Asian Persian of such writers as Jāmī but the Persian of an uneducated Central Asian Turk, repetitious in expression, prolix, and of small vocabulary, falling into the linguistic category that Soviet scholars class retrospectively as Tajik.

It is to be hoped that a collated text of the "Ḍiyāʾ al-qulūb" will some day be established, for the work is of considerable historical value, not because much, if any, of the material related in it can be believed literally, but because it affords the reader a detailed insight into the conditions and attitudes of late sixteenth-century Central Asia, and insight especially into the activities of the Naqshbandiyya, who played important religious and political roles at that time in Central Asian life. The "Ḍiyāʾ al-qulūb," a collection of episodes in the life of Khoja Isḥāq Walī (d. ca. 1600),[5] who was the progenitor of the Black Mountain (Qarataghlīq) Naqshbandiyya of Eastern Turkestan, is one of the principal sources of the widely cited "Tadhkira-yi ʿAzīzān" (and its shorter version, the "Tadhkira-yi Khwājagān") of Muḥammad Ṣādiq Kāshgharī.[6] The episodes are not arranged in chronological order, and Muḥammad Ṣādiq carries this defect over into his "Tadhkira-yi ʿAzīzān."

(1) The first four passages from the "Ḍiyāʾ al-qulūb,"[7] in which Naqshbandī missionary work among nomad unbelievers is mentioned, occurs on fol. 4v of the Harvard manuscript, where it says that proof of Khoja Isḥāq's greatness is the fact that he went to the country (wilāyat) of the Kirghiz and Qalmaq (Mongols in general, not specifically the Kalmuks or Oirats) and destroyed eighteen idol sanctuaries (but khāna) and converted 180,000 idol-worshipping infidels (kāfir-i but parast)

into Muslims. The corresponding passage from the Leningrad manuscript is translated into Russian in Romodin's Materialy,[8] but Romodin makes no mention of a subsequent parallel in the "Ḍiyāʾ al-qulūb" (Harvard MS, fol. 96r), which says, "And this Mullā Ḥikmatī [one of Isḥāq's disciples], after Ḥaḍrat-i Īshān [Isḥāq] came from the country (wilāyat) of Kashgar to the country of Samarkand [i.e., late in Isḥāq's career], converted 18,000 idol-worshipping infidels into Muslims and destroyed eight idol sanctuaries." Here, the work of conversion was done by Isḥāq's disciple, not by the master himself, and the numbers of converts and destroyed sanctuaries bear a suspicious resemblance to those mentioned earlier.

(2) The second passage mentioning nomad unbelievers (Harvard MS, fols. 22v-23v) describes an encounter with the Kirghiz in which a Kirghiz rider suddenly galloped up to Isḥāq and informed him that the ruler of that district, whose name is given as Yolum (or Yulum) Qīrqīz, intended to kill Isḥāq. The Sufi master refused to hide, saying that God's will would be done, and soon the Kirghiz soldiers appeared, drew their swords, and approached Isḥāq. Although Isḥāq's companions were seized with fear and began to weep, Isḥāq, entrusting himself to God, showed no emotion. At this point, the two front feet of Yolum Qīrqīz's horse suddenly broke, with the result that Yolum was thrown from his saddle and killed by the fall. On witnessing this miracle, Yolum's 400 soldiers dismounted, threw away their idols (buthā), and adopted Islam. The Russian translation of this passage in Romodin, Materialy, pp. 180-181, is essentially identical, except that the Kirghiz chief's name is given as Lulum.

(3) The third passage (Harvard MS, fols. 74v-76v) tells how Isḥāq sent his disciple Khoja Hāshim b. Khoja Ḥusayn to an ailing Kirghiz chief called Seryoq Qīrqīz, who had with him about 400 families (khāna wār). A crowd of people were trying to cure him by shamanic ritual, offering food to a silver idol hanging from a tree, with about 1,000 lesser idols of stone or wood around it. "And this was the idol sanctuary (but khāna) of the Kirghiz, and the name of that idol which they had made of silver was Talbīsa-yi Ḥaqīr [Contemptible Fraud]." After a fierce argument, Hāshim forced the Kirghiz to bring all their idols to Isḥāq, who made the Kirghiz admit that Talbīsa-yi Ḥaqīr could not heal their sick chief and who made them promise that they would believe in God if He cured Seryoq's affliction. Isḥāq and his disciples then prayed fervently, and after a while the sick man suddenly sneezed and, standing up, gave voice to the Muslims' famous

profession of faith: "I bear witness that there is no deity but God, and I bear witness that Muḥammad is His servant and His prophet." The Kirghiz thus became Muslims, smashed their idols, including Talbīsa-yi Ḥaqīr, and shared out its silver among the Sufis. The translation in Romodin's Materialy, pp. 182-184, conforms essentially to the account in the Harvard manuscript, except that only four families are said to have been with Seryoq (transcribed Serĭuk), and the Kirghiz idol sanctuary is said to have contained 2,000 idols besides Talbīsa-yi Ḥaqīr. Instead of Ḥaqīr, the Leningrad manuscript has JQR, so that Romodin has been forced to leave it unexplained.

(4) The fourth of the passages in the "Ḍiyā' al-qulūb" to be touched upon here (Harvard MS, fols. 134r-135r) deals with Mongols, probably Oirats (Qalīmāq~Qalmāq in the text), rather than Kirghiz and is therefore not mentioned in Romodin's Materialy. According to this story, one day when Isḥāq was in the country of the Mongols he sent four of his disciples to summon the Mongols. The Mongols, however, had built a fire and were worshipping it when these four disciples came upon them, and on being summoned to Isḥāq by the four missionaries, the Mongols merely smiled and said sarcastically, "If you are his vicars (khalīfa) and what Ḥaḍrat-i Īshān [Isḥāq] says is right and true, we will throw you into this fire. You will not burn but will arise from the fire alive and well." The Mongols then threw the four Sufis into the fire, but at this point Isḥāq himself arrived and uttered a cry, so that by God's order a strong wind arose from Isḥāq's direction and drove the fire toward the Mongols. "And it burned many people of those Qalmaqs, and some 1,000 families (khāna wār) became Muslims." Not so much as a thread of the four disciples' clothes was yellowed by the fire. (A note of caution here is that opposition to fire-worship is an old theme in Iranian Muslim lands.)

NOTES

1. An earlier "Diyā' al-qulūb" appears also to have existed, because a book with this title is mentioned in an uncatalogued waqfnāma of A.H. 966 = A.D. 1559, preserved in the Houghton Library of

Harvard University. This fact was noticed by A.Z.V. Togan (A.Z. Validov), whose papers were kindly shown to me by his daughter Ĭsenbike Arıcanlı.

2. See V.A. Romodin, ed., Materialy po istorii kirgizov i Kirgizii, Vypusk I (Moscow: Nauka, 1973), pp. 177-179.

3. See A.A. Semenov, ed., Sobranie vostochnykh rukopisei Akademii nauk Uzbekskoi SSR, Vol. 3 (Tashkent), No. 2604, p. 331; and N.D. Miklukho-Maklai, ed., Persidskie i tadzhikskie rukopisi Instituta narodov Azii AN SSSR (Kratkii alfavitnyi katalog), Part I (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), No. 56*, p. 625, where the author's name is given as Muḥammad Iwaḍ.

4. See C.A. Storey, Persian Literature: A Bio-Bibliographical Survey, Vol. 1, Part 1 (London: Luzac, 1970), No. 535, p.390; and Storey, Persidskaia literatura: Bio-bibliograficheskii obzor, tr. and rev., Iu. E. Bregel' (Moscow: Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1972), Part 1, No.355, pp.487-88; No.363(18), p.503; Part 2, No.1058, pp.1193-95.

5. The date of Isḥāq's death is uncertain. In the Bodleian Library's MS of Shāh Maḥmūd b. Mīrzā Fāḍil Choras, "Anīs al-ṭālibīn" (Indian Institute MS Pers. 45), fol. 93r, the author writes, "They have said that the noble age of Ḥaḍrat-i 'Azīzān [Isḥāq] was ninety-four years. The date of Ḥaḍrat-i 'Āzīzāns' death this humble slave [the author, Shāh Maḥmūd Choras] has found [as the chronogram] "The Resurrection Became Evident' (qiyāmat qāyim shud = A.H. 1006 = A.D. 1597/8). But [only] God knows exactly." In the top margin of fol. 88r an episode, dated A.H. 1006, is given showing Isḥāq to have been alive at the death of 'Abd al-Mu'min b. 'Abd Allāh Khan (d. 1598), and in the left-hand margin it is written, "After two years, in the thousand and second [year = A.D. 1593/4], he [Isḥāq] returned from the Samarkand of witness [life] to the Egypt of absence [death]." The date here, A.H. 1002, is clearly inconsistent with the aforementioned episode, but the phrase "after two years" would seem to place Isḥāq's death in A.H. 1008 = A.D. 1599/1600. This conjecture is supported by an episode in the "Diyā' al-qulūb," in which Isḥāq is represented as being alive at the death of Pīr Muḥammad b. Sulaymān, which occurred at the end of A.H. 1007 = June/July, A.D. 1599--see "Diyā' al-qulūb" (Harvard MS), fols. 33r-34v.

6. Completed ca. 1768. For epitomized translations, see R.B. Shaw, tr., "The History of the Khōjas of Eastern-Turkistan," ed. Ney Elias, supplement to Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. 46, Pt. 1 (Calcutta, 1897), and M. Hartmann, "Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam;

Das Ende der Caghataiden und die Herrschaft der Choğas in Kašgarien," in his Der islamische Orient: Berichte und Forschungen, Pts. 6-10 (Berlin, 1905), pp. 195-374.

7. Here I gratefully acknowledge the help and advice of Mr. Manoutchehr Mohandessi, who read through the entire Harvard MS with me in the summer of 1972. The errors in this paper are my own.

8. Romodin, op. cit., p. 179. In Romodin's mention on p. 178 of "18 Kirghiz and Kazakh sanctuaries," the word Kazakh must be an error for Qalmaq.

VI

The Naqshbandiyya and the dhikr-i arra

One of the most distinctive features of the Naqshbandiyya is their silent *dhikr*, which has caused them to be known as the Khufiyya (Silent school, properly Khafiyya) and has been the subject of repeated controversies throughout their history.

Nowhere has controversy over the *dhikr* been more acute than in China, where it became a cause for bloodshed and rebellion in the eighteenth century. In 1671 a celebrated Naqshbandī *murshid*, Khoja Āfāq, preached at Sining in northeastern Tibet and obtained the adherence of a Chinese Muslim, whose son, Ma Lai-ch'ih 馬來遲 (1673-1753), spread the Naqshbandī tarikat in northwest China and northeastern Tibet in the first half of the eighteenth century, making it by far the then most important mystical brotherhood in those regions. Later in the century, another Chinese Muslim, Ma Ming-hsin 馬明心 (d. 1781), who seems also to have been initiated into the Naqshbandiyya earlier in his life, energetically spread a tarikat called the Jahriyya (Vocal school) in many of the same places, producing a dispute over whether the *dhikr* should be vocal or silent.

The dispute between the factions (*pang-k'o* 邦克 < Persian *bāng*, "calling [to prayer]"?; also called *men-huan* 門宦 < ?) led to fighting, and the fighting led to suppression by the Ch'ing government. After crushing a second revolt in 1784 led by the adherents of Ma Ming-hsin's Jahriyya, or "New Teaching" (Hsin-chiao 新教), the Ch'ing instituted what was virtually an anti-Muslim policy, in which the main sufferers were the followers of Ma Ming-hsin. A corresponding uproar occurred at about the same time in Transoxiana, where a Naqshbandī named

Ṣūfī Islām tried to introduce a vocal *dhikr* among the members of his tarikat. In consequence, the Naqshbandī advocates of silence forced him to move with his followers to Afghanistan.

Meanwhile in China a certain Mu Pa-pa 穆 巴 巴, a successor of Ma Ming-hsin, had initiated a man known as the "Grand Master of the Shipyard" (Ch'uan-ch'ang T'ai-yeh 船 廠 太 爺) who was exiled to Kirin province because of his involvement in the upheavals that Ma Ming-hsin's vocal *dhikr* had sparked. Mu also initiated the Grand Master's son Ma erh 馬 二 and his grandson Ma Hua-lung 馬 化 龍 (d. 1871). Before Mu Pa-pa died, he is said to have made Ma Hua-lung his direct successor, and in the 1860's Ma Hua-lung was the principal leader of a rebellion against the Ch'ing empire. At the same time, a Sufi from Shensi named T'o-ming 妥 明, who was evidently connected with Ma Hua-lung, also rebelled against the Ch'ing.

Contemporaneous or nearly contemporaneous eighteenth- and nineteenth-century upheavals were led by members of the Naqshbandiyya in Sinkiang (at Ush Turfan in 1765; by Jahāngīr in 1820-1828; the Seven Khojas in 1847; Walī Khan in 1857; Rāshidīn Khan Khoja at Kucha, 'Abd ar-Raḥmān Ḥaḍrat at Yarkand, the Āfāqiyya at Kashgar, and Mu'aẓẓam Khan in Ili, all in 1864), in India (influence of Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi at the time of the Afghan invasion in 1761; Sayyid Aḥmad Barēlwī in 1826; Tītū Mīr in 1831; common cause of the Mujāhids with the Indian Mutiny in 1857), and elsewhere;[1] so the nature of the relationship between Ma Ming-hsin's Jahriyya and the Naqshbandiyya is of considerable interest.

Inasmuch as I intend to develop this topic elsewhere, I shall limit myself here to the suggestion that Ma Ming-hsin probably traced his *isnād* back primarily to Aḥmad Yasawī (d. 1166) and secondarily to Bahā'

1. See my paper, "Central Asian Sufism and Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching," in *Proceedings of the Fourth East Asian Altaistic Conference, December 26-31, 1971, Taipei, China*, ed. Ch'en Chieh-hsien (Tainan: Department of History, National Ch'engkung University, 1975), pp. 75-96.

ad-Dīn Muḥammad of Kashgar in the thirteenth century.[2] Ma Ming-hsin may well have transmitted both initiations, Yasawī and Naqshbandī, to his disciples. But one cannot exclude the possibility that Ma Ming-hsin, and therefore his Jahriyya also, belonged to that small sub-group of the Naqshbandiyya who practiced a vocal *dhikr*.

Central Asian sources contain many references to a tarikat known as the Jahriyya - the name borne by Ma Ming-hsin's tarikat in China. These Jahriyya are generally understood to be the same as the Yasawiyya, one of whose most distinctive features is the *dhikr-i arra*, or "sawing remembrance." The identification Jahriyya = Yasawiyya may usually be correct, but one cannot always identify the Jahriyya with the Yasawiyya precisely.[3] Nor was the *dhikr-i arra* an exclusive property of the Yasawiyya. M. F. Köprülü cites a passage from the "Risāla-yi Bāburiyya," written by the famous sixteenth-century Naqshbandī khoja Aḥmad Kāsānī, known as the Makhdūm-i A'ẓam, which says: "The lords of the Naqshbandiyya have preferred the silent *(khufī)* remembrance, but some of them, if necessary, also perform the vocal *(jahrī)* remembrance, just as when Khoja Aḥmad Yasawī was appointed to set out for Turkestan, he saw that the inhabitants of that place did not take to the silent remembrance; so he immediately took up the way of the vocal remembrance, and

2. See Muḥammad b. 'Alī as-Sanūsī, *As-salsabīl al-mu'īn fī 'ṭ-ṭarā'iq al-arba'īn* (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-Lubnānī, 1968), p. 92. I am indebted to Hamid Algar for this reference, correcting my remark in Fletcher, "Central Asian Sufism," p. 81, where I doubted the existence of the Yasawiyya in the Yemen.

3. See A. A. Semenov, ed., *Sobranie vostochnykh rukopisei Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. 3 (Tashkent: AN UzSSR, 1955), pp. 361-362, MS No. 2686, where the Jahriyya and Yasawiyya are represented as separate (but not necessarily unconnected). I have not been able to consult the MS described.

thus the *dhikr-i arra* was created."[4]

That the Makhdūm-i A'ẓam himself disapproved of the vocal *dhikr* - at least as practiced by the shaykhs of the Jahriyya - may be seen in a passage from the "Jāmi' al-maqāmāt" of Abū'l-Baqā b. Khwāja Bahā' ad-Dīn b. Makhdūm-i A'ẓam (Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS 2493), vols. 67v-68r:

67v12 نقل کرد درویش که یکبار در بدایت ملازمت بانحضرت در موضعی
13 رسیدم که انجا یکی از مشایخ جهریّه باجمعی از مریدان خود انگیز ذکر کرده بودند
14 مانیز بطریق رابطه که بانحضرت داشتیم متوجّه شویم واحضار انحضرت
68r1 میکردم که ناگاه ان شیخ با مریدان ازگفتن ذکر باز ایستادند وچنان شدند که
2 هیچکس از ایسان نتوانستند که نفسی بیرون آرند واین واقعه موافق آن قولست که
3 حضرت خوجهٔ[5] جهان خوجه عبد الخالق غجدوانی قدس اللّٰه روحه العزیز فرمودند[6] که
4 هیچکس از طریقهای دیگر[7] با فند های کمینهٔ این طریقهٔ علیّه مقاومت نتوانند کرد

[The following] was related by[8] a dervish:

Once, at the beginning of [my] attendance upon the Ḥaḍrat [i.e., the Makhdūm-i A'ẓam], I came to a place where one of the shaykhs of the Jahriyya had begun the *dhikr* with a group of his disciples. We also commenced in the manner of the relationship that we held toward the

4. M. F. Köprülü, *Türk edebiyatında ilk mutasavvıflar* (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Basımevi, 1966), p. 100, n.55.

5. This spelling of خواجه is not uncommon in Central Asian sources.

6. Written فرمودند.

7. Text has دیگر از.

8. Passive only to reflect the word order of the original. Each of these accounts, which make up a substantial proportion of the MS, begins with the words *naql kard*.

Ḥaḍrat [i.e., performing a silent *dhikr*]. And I invoked the Ḥaḍrat, when suddenly that shaykh [of the Jahriyya] and [his] disciples ceased saying the *dhikr* and became so that not one of them could utter a word. And this occurrence conforms to the remark that Ḥaḍrat-i Khōja-yi Jahān Khōja Abd al-Khāliq-i Ghijduwānī[9] (may God bless his dear soul) made, that no one from other tarakats can withstand the smallest device *(fand)*[10] of this exalted tarikat [= the Naqshbandiyya].

But fols. 119v-120r of the same work contain another passage showing that for all the Makhdūm-i A'ẓam's disapproval of the Jahriyya's vocal *dhikr*, the *dhikr-i arra* lay hidden, so to speak, in silent form under that Naqshbandī's hat:

119v13 نقل کرد آن یار غار
14 ومحرم اسرار مولانای بابای حجره دار که در زمانی که بملازمت انحضرت امدم
120r1 شرف استان بوسئ ایشان مشرّف گشتم همیشه حاضرو ناظر احوال خود می
2 بودم که مبادا خلاف رضای انحضرت عملی ازمن بوجود آید و هم وقت ترسان
3 و لرزان می بودم که خدمت ملازمت اینچنین پادشاهی باین استعداد ضعیف
4 چون توانم کردن که ناگاه باقئ مبارک از سر شفقت بمن انعام فرمودند ومحرم
5 اسرار خود گردانیدند هر باریکه آن تاقی را بر سر خود می نهادم از درون آواز ذکر
6 ارّه می آمد تا یکهفته احوال بدین منوال میگذشت بعد از ان بناپر احترام انحضرت
7 آن تاقی را در کوشه گذاشتم عنایت نموده گفتند که آن تاقی را از برای آن ندا
8 ده ایم که در خانه گذاری و بعد از انکه آن تاقی را پوشیدم در من

9. Died 1200; establisher of the Khwājagān's silent *dhikr*.

10. I am indebted to Manoutchehr Mohandessi for the proper identification of this term.

اطمینانی و آرا

می پدید آمد [9]

[The following] was related by that friend of the cave[11] and confident of secrets, Mawlānā Bābā-yi Ḥujradār:

At the time when I came to pay my respects to the Ḥaḍrat, I had the honor of kissing his threshold. I was always ready and watchful of my conduct lest any act displeasing to the Ḥaḍrat come from me. And at the same time I was afraid and trembling about how I, with this weak aptitude, could be in attendance upon such royalty, when suddenly, from kindness, he bestowed [his] blessing *tāqī*[12] upon me and made [me] his confidant of secrets. Every time I put that *tāqī* upon my head, from within [the *tāqī*] came the sound of the *dhikr-i arra*. For one week the situation continued in this way. Thereafter, out of respect for the Ḥaḍrat, I put the *tāqī* away in a corner. He showed favor and said, "We have not given [you] that *tāqī* to put away at home." And after I put on that *tāqī*, peace and tranquillity appeared within me.

This latter passage from the "Jāmi' al-maqāmāt" suggests:

(1) That textual references to the *dhikr-i arra* do not necessarily reflect the presence of the Yasawiyya.

(2) That a silent *dhikr-i arra*, and possibly also a spoken one, may have been transmitted through the Khwājagān-Naqshbandī *silsila* from as far back as the time of Aḥmad Yasawī and 'Abd al-Khāliq Ghijduwānī in the twelfth century.

(3) That the Makhdūm-i A'ẓam, who was the spiritual ancestor of the Naqshbandiyya in China, might have transmitted the *dhikr-i arra*, silent or vocal, through his grandson Muḥammad Yūsuf and his great-grandson Khoja Āfāq, to the Chinese Naqshbandiyya, making them all the more susceptible later on, in the eighteenth century, to Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching of the vocal *dhikr* of the Jahriyya.

11. The Prophet Muḥammad is said to have taught the silent *dhikr* to Abū Bakr while they were hiding from their enemies in a cave.

12. I.e., Arabic *ṭāqī*, the Sufi's mitre.

ADDENDA ET CORRIGENDA

(TUBA I, 1977)

*

EKLEMELER VE DÜZELTMELER

E. Birnbaum, pp. 1-64

p. 20 para. 2 line 2: for *yemek* read *yimek*.
p. 27 n. 35 line 4: for ment read men.
p. 28 n. 39: مَشَايحُوْنْ read مَشَايِخُوْنْ
p. 39 line 5 from bottom: after *ḫoşnūd* add 99a 1.
p. 41 line 6: read اَلْمَيَا
p. 42 last line: after *bilmeyince* add 'not knowing'.
p. 43 line 8: after *rā* add *and zā*.
line 10: after 'after' add جنازه *cenāze* 36b 8 'corpse, funeral'.
p. 46 line 11: for 8a 3 read 80a 3 and add عَقِلْلُو *ᶜaḳïl lú* 80a 5 'intelligent'.
p. 48 line 11: after *ḫūlan!* add 86a 10.
p. 52 line 1: after *sūsuzïn* add 48b 2.
line 3 from bottom: after buy add land for.
p. 54 line 6: for thing read things.
p. 55 line 3: after *istemek* add 81b 3-4.
p. 58 para (vii) line 4: after recite add religious.
p. 60 line 19: after *coḳ* add يَشَيا

J. Fletcher, pp. 113-119

p. 113, 3rd para. first line: "the factions" should read "the two factions".
p. 114 line 9: "erh" should read "Erh".
p. 115 line 1: *ad-Dīn Muḥammad* should read *"ad-Dīn Naqshband (d. 1389)*. Ma was probably initiated into the Naqshbandiyya in China first, then later into the Yasawiyya in the Yemen, where the Yasawiyya had been introduced by a certain Jamāl ad-Dīn Muḥammad".
note 2, line 1: *"al-muᶜīn"* should read *"al-maᶜīn"*.
p. 116 line 9: " شوبم " should read " شدبم ".
line 10: " ناكاه " should read " ناگاه ".
line 12: " ايسان " should read " ايشان ".
line 2 from the bottom: "these accounts" should read "the accounts of this type".
p. 117 line 5: *"Abd"* should read *"ᶜAbd"*.
line 6 : *"tarakats"* should read *"tarikats"*.
p. 118 line 3: "confident" should read "confidant".
line 10: "blessing" should read "blessed".

P. Zieme, pp. 149-156

p. 49 Leban: Leben

Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire

Turks and Mongols made conquests of varying durations in the lands of Eurasia's sedentary civilizations: China, India, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. Historians have suggested that in each of these settled regions, Turkish and Mongolian political traditions left their mark.

It is contended, for example, that in Rus' the Tatar yoke crushed the comparatively free feudalistic society of Kiev and nurtured in its stead the despotic centralism of Muscovy. Similar arguments have been made for China, where the Jurchens and Mongols can be seen to have converted the budding proto-capitalism of Sung into the retrogressive despotisms of Ming and Ch'ing. In India, after the collapse of Mauryan rule in the late third century B.C., no real empire emerged at all until Turkish invaders laid a groundwork for political unification in the Delhi sultanate, and the Mughals, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, completed the job. Similarly, in the Middle East, the Ottoman Empire and to some degree the Safavid brought Turkish and, it could be claimed, Mongolian traditions into the stuff of everyday political life.

To weigh the truth in these assertions, one must begin by trying to find specific Turkish and Mongolian traditions that continued to function in the agricultural civilizations' political environments after the conquest phases were past.

One such political tradition, and a central one, although no scholar has yet systematically studied it, is the Turco-Mongolian monarchic tradition of the grand khan — the supra-tribal nomad emperor whose authority entailed kingship over a multi-tribal nomadic people, combined with a highly personal command over that people's collective military forces. Under the grand khan's rule, all authority was concentrated in him — not in his office or in any government of officials who acted in his name, but in his person. When he died, the bonds of authority were dissolved, and his realm fell apart.

That such temporary, fragile, and repeatedly fragmented political

structures as those of the Turco-Mongolian steppe should have contributed to the formation of such enduring, centralized despotisms in the agricultural civilizations may at first seem paradoxical. But in an agricultural environment the nomadic traditions governing the recruitment of the elites that supported the throne were able to restructure imperial politics without being subject to the volatile, recurrently decentralizing conditions of the steppe. Agricultural resources cushioned and prolonged the centralized phase inherent in the steppe nomadic monarchy so that sociopolitical disruption was kept to a minimum. Transplantation of the nomadic grand khan in the soil of a settled empire made for the best (or worst) of both worlds: the centralized personalist power of the nomadic polity at its height and the massive stability of the agrarian socioeconomic order.

Monarchy of the Turco-Mongolian grand khan type arose naturally from the nomadic social organization that adaptation to the steppe had produced early in the long era of steppe nomadic cavalry, beginning in about the fifth century B.C. with the emergence of the mounted archer and ending in the eighteenth century A.D., when the great empires of Russia and China devoured the nomads and brought the era to a close. Steppe life favored the rise of the personalist and absolutist grand khan rather than other types of rulers because supra-tribal leadership was not essential to the proper functioning of pastoral life. Pasture scheduling could be managed at the tribal level, and raiding could also be carried out under the leadership of the tribal chiefs without help from a supra-tribal ruler. Being nomadic, and consequently mobile, individual tribal groups could move away on their own. The grand khan could not subject his tribes to discipline without offering them a benefit great enough to win their voluntary compliance. Essentially, this benefit boiled down to booty, the spoils of war — war which the tribes could not wage on a worthwhile scale without a supra-tribal leader. Social organization above the tribal level therefore came to be predicated on warfare.

The cohesion of pastoral nomadic society in Inner Asia was cyclical. Some scholars have viewed the nomads there as feudal, unbridled, ungovernable tribes living free in the steppe and subject only intermittently and briefly to joint ventures under a unified leadership. Others have seen nomadic society as imperial, centralized, and despotic — nations-at-arms in the iron grip of an iron-willed commander's military discipline. Both views are true. The nomadic social cycle began and ended with tribes in disunity, diffusing their military energies in internecine skirmishes. But once integrated into the grand khan's regime, the tribesmen became cogs

in a military machine, soldiers in an all-pervasive army — an army of everybody, for there were no civilians. Tribal autonomy withered, and society itself became an army, a unitary host that directed its martial energies outward to the defeat and despoliation of external victims. Being the ruler of a nation-at-arms, the grand khan's authority was that of a supreme military commander.

Tribes surrendered their independence in return for a share of the spoils, be it conquered peoples, lands, or luxuries. To obtain such booty, it was necessary to wage war. To wage war, it was necessary for the tribes to choose a supra-tribal leader and to subject themselves to his military authority. The first war was therefore ordinarily an internal war fought within the people or nation (a group of tribes associated with one another by a tradition of subjection to a given royal house) to choose a common ruler from among the eligible candidates — namely, a war of succession. So the first distributions of booty were ordinarily redistributions of wealth among the nation's component tribes. Once united under a grand khan, the nation proceeded to external wars. Indeed protracted peace was impossible, because, without war, booty distributions would cease, and the tribes would cease to cohere with one another as a unified nation. When the grand khan died, the nation became unglued. It could remain unglued indefinitely. To glue it back together again, a new ruler had to be found. The selection of a successor recommenced the cycle.

The grand khan maintained his position by the distribution of booty. At the beginning he usually obtained this booty in the course of his struggle against rival candidates for the grand khanship. After defeating his rivals, he had to obtain the necessary booty by leading his nation in external war. War was society's cohesive principle. War united. Peace permitted peoples to disintegrate. It follows from this that the main qualification for the grand khan's position was talent for military leadership. To this must be added birthright, for each nomadic nation had a royal clan from which its grand khan was traditionally required to be chosen.

And what better way for a nomadic nation to choose the best qualified scion of their royal clan than to see which son, brother, uncle, grandson, or nephew of a deceased ruler would win the grand khanship in an internal war? The spectacle of a new grand khan reconquering his own people after his predecessor's death was a common one, indeed almost a regular occurrence in steppe nomadic history. In the very process of winning, the successful candidate would resubjugate all the tribes to the grand khan's authority, reintegrating them and making them collectively strong. The succession war was the integrating war that society needed in order to

continue to cohere. The winner would *ipso facto* be the candidate with the greatest military talent and therefore the best suited to enrich his people by leading them successfully in battle. He would be the grand khan. Everybody would acknowledge him.

Succession by struggle, involving the physical destruction of unsuccessful candidates, was hard on the family life of the royal clan and undoubtedly produced some interesting neuroses among its male members, but it periodically reintegrated the peoples of the steppe, among whom centrifugal tendencies, encouraged by nomadic mobility, always posed the danger that a people would disintegrate back into tribes.

Typically the succession struggle, after much political maneuvering, began with an acclamation ceremony — the most famous examples being the Mongolian tribal councils, or *khuriltai* — at which tribal chiefs supporting a given candidate would acclaim him grand khan. Meanwhile other acclamation ceremonies did the same for other candidates. The struggle also commonly ended with an acclamation ceremony, at which representatives of all the tribes acknowledged the winner as grand khan and promised to obey him. Sometimes such tribal councils were more than ceremonies of acclamation, and occasionally they may even have served a genuinely electoral function, but a cursory glance at the conditions surrounding these ceremonies in Turkish and Mongolian history will dispel the notion that this was their normal role.[1]

The name given to the principle of succession that the most talented male member of the royal clan should inherit the throne, commonly by murder and war, is tanistry. Although steppe conditions favored tanistry, the custom was not unique to the nomadic peoples of the steppe. Various sub-Saharan African realms practiced it. So did the Thai and other kingdoms in Southeast Asia, both Buddhist and Muslim; the Celts, from whom the English word tanistry comes, practiced it, too.

Among the Turks and the Mongols tanistry worked so well that no regular, ascriptive, and automatic succession principle, such as primogeniture or levirate (in the wider sense of the term), ever replaced it on anything more than a temporary basis. Despite the tendentious claims of Juwaynī, whose purpose was to legitimize the accession of the house of Tolui (Chinggis Khan's youngest son), the youngest son's customary inheritance of the paternal hearth was only a matter of property, not a

[1] Cf. Yanai Watari, "Mōko no kokkai sunawachi 'kurirutai' ni tsuite," in his *Mōkoshi kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1930), pp. 361–449, which portrays the *khuriltai* as an electoral system.

succession principle for the grand khanship or even for the tribal cheftaincy. "Ultimogeniture" is a figment of the sedentary scholar's imagination. Occasionally the youngest brother of a deceased grand khan, or else a grand khan's widow, managed to act as caretaker or "regent" for a restricted period of time, but such caretakers exercised meaningful authority only in rare intervals of unanimity. Occasionally also a tribal chief usurped the grand khan's power and ruled in his name, but this was only a variant of the nomad monarchy; its function was essentially the same.

There were some exceptions to the succession-struggle pattern. In the first half of the sixteenth century, for example, the Uzbeks followed a principle of succession based on seniority within the royal clan (levirate). But the Uzbeks were then living in Central Asia rather than the steppe, and they were not effectively integrated under their grand khan's authority until the second half of the sixteenth century, at which time their seniority principle ceased to obtain. More strikingly, the Hsiung-nu, during their great period of strength in the second and first centuries B.C., followed a comparatively automatic succession principle without the telltale troubled accessions (fratricide, succession wars) indicative of tanistry — indicative, that is, of a people choosing the best military leader of royal birth to unify their tribes into a nation-at-arms. But this was because the Hsiung-nu ruler obtained his "booty" peacefully from the Chinese government, in consequence of the early Han dynasty's *ho-ch'in* policy; so a peaceful system of succession served the Hsiung-nu best.[2]

Tanistry conditioned nomadic politics in two ways: it politicized society, and it personalized monarchy. Unlike succession struggles in agrarian societies, which usually left most of the population to plant and harvest without being directly involved, nomadic succession struggles tended to involve everybody. There were no "non-political" governmental functionaries to hold the realm together while military or other specialized elites determined the succession. Everybody was a warrior. Everybody was involved. Tribal chiefs had to decide which candidate to support, but everybody stood to win by his tribe's making the right choice or to lose by its making the wrong one. Most important was predicting the outcome of the succession struggle and attaching one's tribe to the winning candidate. A tribal chief who backed a losing candidate could forfeit his position or his life, but his whole tribe would suffer; so a chief

[2] See T. J. Barfield, "The Hsiung-nu: Chinese Frontier Policy from the Nomadic Perspective," *Journal of Asian Studies* (forthcoming).

could not fail to be influenced by his tribesmen's opinions. Military success depended also on the warriors' morale.

The relationship between the tribe and the grand khan largely determined allocations of booty, pasture, power, and honor. Because the khan might fall sick and die or be killed at any time, the political status quo, being suspended from his person, was inherently ready to collapse. So the nomads had always to be sniffing the political breezes and to be ready to choose, form coalitions, and, at every level of society, to act. When, as most commonly happened, agreement or murder or localized skirmishes resolved the succession without an all-out war, the potentialities were nevertheless the same and still concerned everyone directly. Nomadic society was therefore more politicized at a deeper social level than the societies of the great agrarian empires northwest and south of the Eurasian steppe.

The personal nature of the Turco-Mongolian monarchy was also an outgrowth of tanistry and its accompanying succession wars. Each candidate for the grand khanship had to forge a coalition of supporters behind him; so the loyalty of these supporters went to the candidate himself rather than to the office of grand khan to which he aspired. Once a candidate triumphed, the tribal chiefs, including representatives of such defeated tribes as had managed to survive despite their having backed a losing claimant, all acknowledged the grand khan's authority, but here again it was the grand khan's personal authority that they acknowledged, because the office of grand khan itself, apart from him, had no effective existence. If he died, the grand khanship disappeared, pending the sometimes lengthy resolution that tanistry demanded. The grand khan, in other words, was not just the occupant of an ongoing institution like the thrones of the agrarian empires. He could not delegate his military function to officers of an army separable from society at large. The ruler's physical being provided the monarchy with its very existence. An active, personal, military leader was essential to the cohesion of his people. His person — indeed his personality — was the linchpin of society.

The grand khan's personal relationships with the tribal chiefs were crucial, and the deterioration of these bonds could lead to mutiny and social dissolution. The grand khan had to earn and re-earn the tribal chiefs' loyalty. It was not enough to win the grand khanship in an all-out war of succession. Even less was it adequate to win it by default, agreement, mere fratricide, or skirmish. To retain the loyalty of the tribal chiefs, and even of his immediate supporters, the grand khan had to continue to provide them with booty and this meant leading them in war. Otherwise, they drifted off on their own.

In difficult circumstances the grand khan could keep his tribal chiefs behind him by providing them with leadership to defend them against the onslaughts of an enemy nation. No tribe could stand alone against a multi-tribal enemy. But soon, if the grand khan failed to mount a counter-offensive and the onslaughts continued, they would erode the grand khan's authority; his tribal chiefs would then desert him and disperse, fleeing in different directions with their tribes. Ideally, however, the grand khan provided his chiefs from the outset with booty won by offensive war. As soon as he had finished his struggle for the succession he immediately began to lead them in external wars so as to be able to continue his distributions of booty. This gave the tribes a reason to continue to follow him. External war increased his power and united his tribes. A wise ruler abhorred peace and was always on the lookout for a pretext for war: hence the importance of vengeance in tribal culture.

Such were the nomadic realities, but this pattern was also translated from the steppe, where the pattern made sense, to agricultural empires, where it did not. Internecine war did minimal damage to a nomadic economy. To an agricultural economy, on the other hand, it was destructive, sometimes disastrous. Rus', the Balkans and Asia Minor, Iran, India, and China had no need of a grand khan — a military ruler, concentrating all authority in his person rather than his office, who in each generation murdered his brothers and fought his way to the throne, then went to war against external foes. Yet the Turks and the Mongols transplanted their nomadic monarchical tradition at various times in each of these agrarian societies, and in one form or another this legacy from the steppe persisted in each of them for an extended duration.

For this short paper, a brief account of the grand khanship's career in only one agrarian society, the Ottoman Empire, must suffice as an example. Once one has discovered the presence of the nomadic grand khanship on an agrarian throne one can more easily understand the changes in a settled society's politics that are to be seen following a Turkish or Mongolian conquest. The tendencies most closely associated with the introduction of the Turco-Mongolian monarchy into agrarian settings are: sharp increases in troubled accessions, elevation of the throne relative to other organs of government, a more active role played by the emperor personally, further concentrations of centralized power, and wars of expansion.

It is striking how long these characteristics of nomadic origin lasted in

the agricultural world despite the great differences between the agrarian empires and the politics of the steppe, differences both of ecology and of tradition. Unlike steppe polities, the agrarian empires were not of necessity so constituted as to dissolve upon an emperor's death. The structures of the empires tended to remain intact. But under Turkish or Mongolian rulers, the succession struggles that occurred in the agrarian empires at the end of each reign succeeded nevertheless in rekindling over and over again the Turco-Mongolian version of Ibn Khaldūn's *'aṣabiyya,* namely, the solidarity and enthusiasm of each new emperor's personal supporters, who formed the nucleus of his regime, enabling him to remain the all-powerful master of his government. It took many generations for the imperial bureaucracies' myriads of tiny siphons to siphon off their emperors' personal power.

When at last the indigenous statecraft of the agricultural societies succeeded in taming the steppe monarchy, assimilating the grand khanship and converting it into the emperorship of a bureaucratic empire, this success always came at the end of a lengthy process that can be analyzed into three main phases hinging primarily on changes in the recruitment of the ruling — principally military — elites. The first phase entailed the predication of the ruler's power primarily on nomadic tribal elites. The second phase entailed its predication on surrogate nomads recruited primarily from the agricultural population. The third and last phase, which dissolved grand khanship altogether and replaced it with a bureaucratic institutional monarchy, entailed the recruitment of civil and military personnel primarily from established beneficiaries of the political status quo or at least in accordance with regularized selection procedures in which the ruler had no active personal role.

In the Ottoman Empire, the first phase — in which the ruler relied primarily on nomadic tribal elites — is to be seen in the Ottoman beylik (late thirteenth century to 1396) and early sultanate (1396 to mid-fifteenth century), a recently post-nomadic Turkish polity of the steppe type.[3] The bey's authority was based primarily on Turkish groups, although the military successes of Osman (1280–1324) and his son Orhan (1324–1359) attracted adventurers from other Anatolian cultural strata, including agrarian elements from the Byzantine Empire. As early as the first half of

[3] See Omeljan Pritsak, "Two Migratory Movements in [the] Eurasian Steppe in the 9th–11th Centuries," in *Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth International Congress of Orientalists: New Delhi, 4–10th January, 1964,* vol. 2 (New Delhi, 1968), pp. 157–63, which places the ancestors of the Ottoman polity in the nomadic historical context of the Eurasian steppe.

the fourteenth century Orhan took the first steps in what would gradually become under his successors a policy of full denomadization. He diversified his recruitment, hiring Christian mercenaries and Muslims on salary, and it was probably he, sometime in the 1350s, who founded an infantry corps composed of slaves, known as the Janissaries. The early beys also obtained military allies from outside the tribal sphere by intermarrying with Christian princely houses. Orhan developed the rudiments of a non-tribal regular army and instituted a civil administration with a governmental treasury separate from the private purse of the ruler. To a number of civil posts he appointed officials who had no kinship ties with the dynasty.

Murat I (1360–1389)[4] made considerable use of troops provided by client Christian rulers and sent the tribal forces off to raid on the periphery while he built up a salaried standing army at the center. He also assigned the revenues of tracts of conquered lands to the semi-nomadic tribal chiefs as payment in return for service and as expense money for the maintenance of their fighting men. The long-term results of this policy were that a class of land-revenue-based Turkish military magnates would gradually emerge, reconstituting the tribal system from a nomadic to an agrarian land-based soldiery. The tribes would gradually cease to be nomads and later, as time went on, would disband.

Reliance on a bureaucratically organized standing army supplemented by levies recruited through landholding military magnates and by reinforcements from client rulers might soon have shorn the Ottoman monarchy of much of its personal character, transforming it into something along the lines of a late-Byzantine-style emperorship. But this was not Murat's intention. Murat's purpose, like that of his father Orhan, was merely to stabilize a part of his manpower resources as a hedge against the unreliability of his tribal semi-nomads. It was not consciously to denomadize his polity. Nor was it to depersonalize his own military authority. Even in his recruitment of more regular, bureaucratic military forces, Murat, a Turk nurtured in the steppe monarchic tradition, sought men who would behave much as nomads did — that is, be loyal specifically to his person, as the original tribal nomads had been, but be less autonomous, less mobile, and more reliable.

To serve him as surrogate nomads for the limited military purposes that

[4] Parenthetical dates following the Ottoman rulers' names indicate retrospectively defined reigns. A sultan's real power, indeed the identity of the sultan, could not be definitively established until the succession struggle was over.

he had in mind, Murat recruited military slaves by purchase, capture, and the regularized "gathering" (*devşirme*) of Christian youths, whom he used to staff his Janissary corps. Slaves were a natural choice. Muslim rulers had been using them as their personal military retainers since Abbasid times.[5] Bayezit I (1389–1402) continued in his father's footsteps and somewhat expanded the *devşirme,* but he used the slaves thus obtained more extensively, in both civil and military positions. Indeed the Ottomans' later bureaucratization of government and denomadization of politics might have begun earlier, had not Bayezit's successes attracted the notice of Tamerlane, who smashed the Ottoman polity in 1402, returning it more or less to the structural conditions of the original fourteenth-century beylik. (Both Bayezit and Tamerlane were Turkic-speaking non-Chinggisid Muslim rulers, whose realms had originated in the empire of the Mongols,[6] and whose power was predicated on a compromise between agrarian and pastoral tribal interests. Tamerlane's notice of Bayezit was only natural.)

From 1403 until 1423 the Ottomans expended most of their energies *à la nomade* on succession struggles, but when Murat II (1423–1451) destroyed his brothers and achieved undisputed power he re-expanded the *devşirme* and began to use his personal slaves in important positions of leadership, once again reducing the role played by the military magnates of nomadic origin. To the extent possible, he tried to staff his government with functionaries who would play no role in the politics of succession. To provide tighter continuity he trained all his sons in statecraft and military science.

Throughout the period of the beylik and the early sultanate, the Ottoman polity, like other polities of the steppe type, was characterized by the succession struggles of tanistry. Ottoman succession disputes were essentially the same as those that occurred among the nomads in the steppe: they were often protracted wide-ranging struggles rather than merely short localized contests. Orhan succeeded easily on the basis of the preeminent personal military command that he had built up under his father's aegis, but it was not until about two years of struggle after

[5] For the origins of military slavery in Islam, see Daniel Pipes, "From Mawla to Mamluk: The Origins of Islamic Military Slavery" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1978).

[6] See Rudi P. Lindner, "Ottoman Government and Nomad Society, 1261–1501" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1976), p. 32, where a possible direct link with the Mongols is suggested. Whatever the precise direct or indirect links between the Mongols and Osman, the latter came to power in the Mongolian-dominated Anatolian Seljuk world.

Orhan's death in 1360 that his son Murat I managed to knock out his other son Halil as a contender for the throne. Murat's son Bayezit I seized the throne with such swiftness in 1389 that he was able to have his brother Yakup assassinated without recourse to war, but following Tamerlane's victories the succession struggles among Bayezit's sons (including the "False Mustafa") returned to the more usual steppe pattern. The struggles lasted from 1403 to 1420, only to erupt again in 1421 at the death of Mehmet I and continue until the triumph of Murat II in 1423. Murat II tried to bypass tanistry and to resolve his sons' succession question himself by abdicating in favor of Mehmet II in 1444, but the Janissaries' revolt in favor of Osman showed that the ruler could not so summarily change the nature of his monarchy. When Mehmet II (1451–1481) did finally succeed at his father's death in 1451, his accession accorded with Murat's written testament and resulted from Murat's considerable efforts on Mehmet's behalf, but the underlying realities of the situation are revealed in the fact that Mehmet found it necessary nevertheless to have his brother Küçük Ahmet killed. Although this first phase was marked by the Ottoman rulers' increasing reliance on personal slaves, in the succession struggles the slaves functioned as surrogate nomads, as is first to be seen in Murat's slaves' support of Bayezit I in 1389 and as is clearly demonstrated in the Janissaries' support of Osman against Mehmet II half a century later.

Throughout the first phase the centripetal force that held the Ottoman polity together was the traditional nomadic one — organization for conquest and for the distribution of its manifold spoils. When the Ottomans were not consuming their energies in their struggles for succession they were directing them outward in expansive war.

The second phase in the Ottoman monarchy's transition from a grand khanship to a bureaucratic institutional emperorship came with the conquest of Constantinople in 1453. The city itself was symbolic of legitimacy in the Roman imperial tradition so that the Ottoman ruler, originally *bey* (the tribal Turkish prince), and then *sulṭān* (sub-caliphal Islamic military ruler) since 1396, now adorned himself with the symbols of Caesar. With the victories against the Egyptian Mamluks in 1516–17, the Ottoman monarchy would also become "servitor of the two holy sanctuaries" of Mecca and Medina and holder of the Abbasid caliphal tradition. These powerful symbols not only deepened the Ottoman rulers' legitimacy in their subjects' eyes, but influenced the Ottomans themselves to view their monarchy as a kingship more along Byzantine and caliphal lines. Possession of Constantinople provided the Ottomans with a symbol of the

realm that directly affected the pattern of tanistry: seizure of the capital in battles for the throne became tantamount in most eyes to victory. This helped limit the recurrent struggles for succession, shortening them and reducing their dissolutive effect. Organs of government, increasingly staffed by persons minimally if at all involved in the succession struggles, began to provide non-political continuity so that the succession struggles did not dismember the polity at the end of each reign. Moreover, the Ottomans' increasingly centralized and bureaucratically-administered exploitation of their conquered agrarian resources began to provide the monarchy with far more and far stabler resources than those ordinarily available to nomadic grand khans.

Furthering his transition from nomad grand khan to agrarian bureaucratic emperor, Mehmet II modified the personal character of his rule, the better to master his huge agricultural domain. The ideal of a nomadic chief was a leader who rubbed shoulders with his commanders and whose power derived from the personal bonds between him and them. Depersonalization of the monarchy would mean the denomadization of politics; so Mehmet vigorously advanced the incipient tendencies in this direction that had already been noticeable under Murat I, Bayezit I, and Murat II. To remove the elite of nomadic tribal extraction from their position as the foundation of his power, Mehmet greatly increased the number of his surrogate nomads — his personal slaves recruited from the Balkan Christian population — and, toppling Turkish military magnates from their high positions of power, he appointed his slaves in their stead. Upon this new foundation of power Mehmet ceased to rub shoulders with his commanders and used pomp and ceremony to put distance between himself and his government, elevating his monarchic station far above all those officers and officials on whom his power rested. He eliminated many of the main Turkish military magnates, confiscated their properties, and distributed these spoils to his personal slaves. He instituted policies to circumscribe the nomads, hem them in, and gradually transform them into less and less transhumant husbandmen. Even in the army he saw to it that the Turks of nomadic tribal origin played a less and less central role. But despite all these changes, Mehmet's surrogate nomads, like his real ones, nonetheless required their share of the spoils of war; so the Ottoman campaigns of expansion had to continue. Like its Turkish forebears of the steppe, the Ottoman Empire still functioned as an army whose soldiers chose and followed their leader for his distributions of booty.

Despite the shift of the sultan's power base from the nomad tribal elite

to surrogate nomads (slaves) of agrarian extraction, steppe-style politics continued throughout the second phase, namely, the reigns of Mehmet's son Bayezit II (1481–1512), his grandson Selim I (1512–1520) and much of the reign of his great grandson Süleyman I the Magnificent (1520–1566). The slaves' functional similarity to nomads may be seen, for example, in the fact that when Bayezit II triumphed in the race for possession of Constantinople he was forced to reward the Janissaries by allowing them to kill the leading Turkish magnates and loot their homes. The Janissaries had become an autonomous corporate group, like a nomad tribe. Bayezit gave them gratuities in honor of his accession and raised their salaries — a greater share of the "booty" from the Ottomans' conquered lands — and once he was securely enthroned, to counterbalance their power as if playing off rival tribes against each other, Bayezit tried to restore the strength of the Turkish military magnates. Like nomads once again, when Bayezit failed to wage sufficient wars of conquest, the Janissaries forced him to abdicate so as to ensure the succession of his most warlike son Selim.

Selim I did not repeat his father's errors but played the role of grand khan to the hilt, keeping his Janissaries, like a nomad tribe, subordinate by continued campaigns of conquest. He too gave the Janissaries gratuities and increased their pay, and he greatly increased the number of Janissaries while he and they and his Turkish forces of tribal origin doubled the size of the empire.

The tanistry of the second phase was similar to that of the first except that it was less disruptive. Having witnessed the failure of his father's efforts to eradicate the struggles for succession, Mehmet II made accessional fratricide a written administrative law (*kanun*) so as to limit the disruptive effects of tanistry by regularizing it. Being law, succession struggles ceased to bring the integrity of the realm into question.

Mehmet II favored his son Cem, whom the Turkish military magnates also favored, but tanistry was too much a part of Ottoman political tradition for the sultan to abrogate his own *kanun*, and when he died his other son Bayezit II, whom the slave corps favored, defeated Cem and was proclaimed sultan — a clear triumph of the surrogate nomads over the forces of genuinely nomadic origin. When the Janissaries forced Bayezit to abdicate, this, too, was a form of tanistry inasmuch as the issue boiled down to who Bayezit's successor would be. Selim, whose accession was another clear triumph for the surrogate nomads, eliminated his brothers Ahmet and Korkut and may also have had his father Bayezit poisoned. He even killed off his nephews. But for all his adherence to the grand khan

image, in the end Selim was unwilling to leave the succession to the outcome of a struggle between his sons. Previous attempts to eliminate the succession struggles had failed; so Selim took the single course that still remained untried. He himself killed all his sons, leaving only his own candidate for the succession.

This was Süleyman, whose accession without a struggle, without even the formation of a personally constructed party of supporters around himself such as had characterized the unopposed accession of Orhan in 1360, occasioned a subtle but important shift in the nature of his monarchy. Wasting no time and energy in struggling for the throne, Süleyman was able to build directly on his father's achievement and thus to extend the conquests of the empire far beyond all precedent. To some degree this expansion was necessary, as in times past, in order to keep his surrogate nomads and his Turkish military forces under his control; so the sultan personally led the army. But Süleyman's inheritance of a government that his father, not he, had staffed further depersonalized the Ottoman monarchy, adding to the bureaucratic nature of his regime. The monarchy thus passed into the third phase of its transition from grand khan to agrarian bureaucratic emperor.

The third phase was characterized by an army paid from agrarian resources and led as often as not by commanders other than the sultan himself. Increasingly the grand vizier replaced the ruler in the conduct of civil and military government day to day, and the sultan's role became increasingly depersonalized and symbolic. Others could rule in his name. As the sultan's slaves — his surrogate nomads — gradually transformed themselves into a self-perpetuating class of hereditary landholders, the cohesion of the empire ceased to be predicated on expansion. In the second phase, the slaves, like the nomads in the first, had been dependent on the ruler's person for their enrichment, but, unlike nomads, they lacked autonomy and mobility and were therefore a more reliable power base for the sultan. As the slaves, like the nomads in the second phase, became transformed in the third phase into landed proprietors, they ceased to be dependent upon the ruler and his wars. As they used their increasing power to admit their sons and grandsons to their profession, they ceased to be slaves in any meaningful sense. The recruitment of new slaves became a threat to their position, so that the *devşirme* was at length discontinued.

Various factors combined to change the character of the Ottoman monarchy: the empire's size and the vast agrarian resources at the government's disposal, the level of bureaucratization that proved necessary to

administer such an agrarian realm, denomadization and the reduction of the military role played by elements of Turkish tribal origin, the growing influence of the ulema, Islamic law, and Muslim institutions. But not least of these factors was the shift in the pattern of recruitment so that the sultan's power rested no longer on personal retainers, be they nomad or slave, but on established self-perpetuating strata of the agrarian status quo.

That Selim II (1566–1574) recognized the changes in the nature of the Ottoman monarchy is to be seen in the fact that he abandoned the practice, observed since the reign of Murat II, of schooling the princes in statecraft and military science. The princes, in a word, were being prepared less to rule and more merely to reign. To the extent to which they did personally wield their authority, more and more they wielded it to play off the leading power groups against each other — mainly the Turkish magnates and urban Muslim classes against the powerful and increasingly hereditary class of "slaves."

Selim II went in person to the army at Belgrade and paid gratuities to the Janissaries in honor of his accession. Murat III (1574–1595) sent the army on various campaigns, and in 1596 Mehmet III (1595–1603) took personal command of the army in Europe for a while. Murat IV (1623–1640) personally led campaigns into the Caucasus and Azerbaijan and against the Safavids in Iraq and tried through terror, executions, and confiscations of property to restore something of the Ottoman monarchy's personal nature. But the elite on whom the monarchy's power rested no longer needed expansion and conquest.

To blame the successors of Süleyman I for the Ottomans' failure to maintain the empire's earlier momentum of expansion is to place the problem at the point where, in large measure, it lay. But the explanation is to be found not so much in the personalities or lack of vigor of these men themselves as in the changed nature of their monarchy's role.

The tanistry of the third phase was played out mainly within the palace, occasioning much harem intrigue, in which the sultans' mothers, wives, sisters, and daughters played a large part, giving rise, with some justice, to the label "sultanate of the women." The revolt of another "False Mustafa" in 1555 and the armed struggle between Süleyman's sons Selim II and Bayezit, ending with the latter's defeat in 1560, were reminiscent of the succession struggles of earlier Ottoman history, but Süleyman's payment to the Safavid ruler for killing the fugitive Bayezit and Bayezit's four sons in Iran in 1562 is more characteristic of the machinations of the third phase. When Süleyman died in 1566, only Selim remained. The succes-

sion struggle had occurred in Süleyman's lifetime. Selim designated Murat III as his successor, and Murat, taking no chances, killed all his five brothers. When Mehmet III succeeded, he killed his nineteen brothers and more than twenty of his sisters (deeds that may reveal his recognition of the palace women's power).

But Mehmet's son Ahmet I (1603–1617) allowed his baby brother Mustafa to live. When Ahmet died of typhus, palace politics brought about Mustafa's accession, breaking the tradition that the only eligible candidates were the preceding ruler's son. Thereafter various instances of fratricide, assassination, and dethronement occurred, the last act being Murat IV's murder of his four half-brothers. Murat, however, spared his full brother İbrahim, and İbrahim's peaceful accession in 1640 marks the definitive end of Ottoman tanistry.

The grand khan had become an emperor.

VIII

THE BIOGRAPHY OF KHWUSH KIPÄK BEG (d. 1781) IN THE *WAI-FAN MENG-KU HUI-PU WANG KUNG PIAO CHUAN*

Chapter 117, folios 1r—2r, of the *Ch'in-ting wai-fan Meng-ku Hui-pu wang kung piao chuan* 欽定外藩蒙古回部王公表傳[1] (*Imperially commissioned genealogical tables and biographies of the princes of the Mongols and Muslims of the outer entourage*;[2] Peking: Wu-ying Tien 武英殿, 1795) contains the biography of a man whose name is given as *Ho-shih-k'o* 和什克 (Manchu version *Xošik*; Mongolian version *Qošiγ*) and a short notice concerning the succession

[1] Manchu *Xesei toqtobuχa tulergi Mongyo Xoyise ayiman-i wang gung-sai iletun ulabun* 117:1r—4v; Mongolian *J̌arliγ-iyar toγtaγaysan γadayadu Mongγol Qotong ayimaγ-un wang güng-üd-ün iledkel šastir* 117: 1r—5v.

[2] The *wai-fan* are not to be confused with the *Wai Meng-ku*, or «Outer Mongols.» Both Inner and Outer Mongolia were «outer» as contrasted with the Mongols enrolled in the eight-banner system. Historically, the term *wai-fan* (outer entourage or outer retainers of the dynasty) is paired with and contrasted to *nei-fan* 內藩 (the «inner entourage» — originally, in medieval China, the nobility who served the emperor at the seat of government). See Morohashi Tetsuji 諸橋轍次, comp., *Dai Kan-Wa jiten* 大漢和辭典 (Tokyo: Taishūkan Shoten 大修館書店, 1955—60), vol. 1, p. 1056a (1418: 455), and vol. 3, p. 335b—c (5750: 477). *Fan*, the second element of these two expressions, the root meaning of which is an «(enclosing) hedge,» carries the connotation of «protecting» — see J. K. Fairbank, «A preliminary framework,» pp. 7 and 9—10, and L. S. Yang, «Historical notes on the Chinese world order,» p. 21, both in J. K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese world order: traditional China's foreign relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968).

There has been a tendency to translate *fan* as «feudatory» or «vassal» or «fief», thus making an analogy between the socio-political system of the Chinese world order and the feudalism of medieval Europe. Paul Pelliot, for example, translated *wai-fan* in the title of the book in question as «*vassaux*» — see his *Notes critiques d'histoire Kalmouke* (Ouevres posthumes de Paul Pelliot, VI; Paris: Librairie d'Amérique et d'Orient, 1960), [vol. 1] Texte, p. 65, n. 69. But the difference between European vassalage and the status of the Ch'ing *wai-fan* is enormous. From the standpoint of political organization, the central point about feudalism was its limitation of central power. The lord's authority over his vassal was limited by contract. The central point about the Ch'ing world order, on the other hand, was that the emperor's authority was theoretically absolute. In practice, the *wai-fan* may have been essentially autonomous, but no theory, law, or contractual instrument placed a limit on the emperor's power over them.

Note that *wai-fan* is here translated simply as *tulergi* in Manchu and *yadayadu* in Mongolian, namely «outer.»

of his son, whose name is rendered *I-pa-la-i-mu* 伊巴喇伊木 (Manchu and Mongolian *Ibarayim*). The son's name is easily identifiable as *Ibrāhīm*.

The father's appellation is a mutilated form of *Khwush Kipāk* (Good Bran), in which the final syllable *-pāk* has evidently been mistaken for the Turkish title *beg* (a title which the man in question did in fact possess) and has thus been deleted in transcription. The *-i-* would therefore have been heard — and eliminated — as a vowel serving merely to ease the pronunciation of what the transcriber misunderstood as a cluster of three consonants (**šḳb*) in the full form of the name.

Details of Khwush Kipäk Beg's life are known from two sources: Ch'ing records, of which the piece translated below is the fullest biographical account, and an indigenous Altishahr tradition found in the «Tadhkira-yi ʿazīzān», also, in some recensions, called «Tadhkira-yi khwājagān» and other titles (completed in A.H. 1183 = A.D. 1768—9), of Muḥammad Ṣādiq Kāshgharī.[3] This work contains the correct form of Khwush Kipäk's name. Martin Hartmann has made an epitomized translation[4] of Muḥammad Ṣādiq's work into German. A translation of Khwush Kipäk Beg's biography in the *Wai-fan Meng-ku Hui-pu wang kung piao chuan* is given below.

Translation

Biography of Khwush K[ipäk], Prince of the Sixth Degree Assisting the Dynasty
(Fu-kuo Kung 輔國公)

([A member of the] Muslim nobility resident in the Capital, [Peking])

Khwush K[ipäk] was a Khotani. He had originally been the *ḥākim beg* (*a-ch'i-mu po-k'o* 阿奇木伯克) of Kashgar, subject to the Zunghars. When the imperial army pacified Zungharia and sent Burhān ad-Dīn (*Pu-la-ni-tun* 布拉呢敦)[5] back [to Kashgar] from Ili, Khwush K[ipäk] and all the [other]

[3] See M. A. Salakhetdinova, «Sochinenie Mukhammed-Sadyka Kashgari 'Tazkira-i-khodzhagan' kak istochnik po istorii Kirgizov,» *Izvestiia Akademii Nauk Kirgizskoi SSR* (*Istoriia*), *Seriia obshchestvennykh nauk*, vol. 1, no. 1 (1959), pp. 93—125.

[4] «Ein Heiligenstaat im Islam: Das Ende der Caghataiden und die Herrschaft der Choğas in Kašgarien,» in Martin Hartmann, *Der islamische Orient: Berichte und Forschungen*, VI—X (Berlin: Wolf Peiser, 1905), pp. 195—374. See also the much more abridged English translation by R. B. Shaw, «The history of the khōjas of Eastern-Turkistan summarised from the Tazkira-i-Khwājagān of Muḥammad Ṣādiq Kāshgharī,» ed. N. Elias, *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal*, vol. 66, pt. 1 (1897), Supplement, pp. i—vi, 1—67.

[5] Namely Qīlīch Burhān ad-Dīn b. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Yaḥyā b. Hidāyat Allāh (Khwāja-yi Āfāq) b. Muḥammad Yūsuf b. Muḥammad Amīn b. Aḥmad (the Makhdūm-i Aʿẓam) Khwājagī Kāsānī, known in Chinese sources as the «Elder Khoja.»

begs [of the city at first] refused to admit him, but when they heard that [one of] our armies had come they went out and welcomed him in. Later, when Burhān ad-Dīn plotted rebellion with Khwāja-yi Jahān (*Huo-chi-chan* 霍集占),[6] his younger brother, Khwush K[ipäk] fled to the Kirghiz (here called Burut: *Pu-lu-t'e* 布嚕特) and put himself under the protection of Ming Ilqa[7] (*Ming I-le-ha* 明伊勒哈), chief of the Atbash *otoq* (*A-t'e-pa-shih o-t'o-k'o* 阿特巴什鄂拓克).[8]

In Ch'ien-lung 23 (= 1758), while Khwāja-yi Jahān was fighting the imperial army on the Qara Usu[9] (*K'a-la Wu-su* 喀喇烏蘇), Buǰantai (*Pu-chan-t'ai* 布占泰), an imperial body-guard (*shih-wei* 侍衛, Manchu *xiya*, Mongolian *kiy-a*), went to enlist troops among the Kirghiz, but when [Buǰantai] reached Ming Ilqa's pastures and showed him the summons, [Ming Ilqa] refused to comply. [But] in the twenty-fourth year (= 1759), when the imperial army broke through the siege on the Qara Usu and Buǰantai again went to the Kirghiz, Khwush K[ipäk] accompanied Ming Ilqa to Aksu, where he saw Chao-hui 兆惠, general warden of the marches (*ting-pien chiang-chün* 定邊將軍) and asked to make his submission [to the Ch'ing dynasty].

When Chao-hui asked about invasion routes, Khwush K[ipäk] told [him] that the [two] brothers Khwāja-yi Jahān [and Burhān ad-Dīn] were on good terms with Ärdänä Beg (here in Mongolian form, *Erdeni: O-erh-te-ni Po-k'o* 額爾德尼伯克) of Kokand and that when the imperial army closed in

[6] Namely Yaḥyā, known in Chinese sources as the «Younger Khoja.»

[7] Manchu text: *Ming'ilχa* / Mongolian text: *Ming'ilq-a* — written as one word. But, in both Manchu and Mongolian, the *i* of the second element is preceded by the aleph that indicates an initial *i*. The name, in Turkish, means «thousand (herds of?) horses.» *Ilqa* is registered in Sh. Kibirov and Iu. Tsunvazo, eds., *Uigursko-russkii slovar'* (Alma-Ata: AN KazSSR, 1961), p. 83b, and E. N. Nadzhip, comp., *Uigursko-russkii slovar'* (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1968), p. 177b.

[8] Or Atbaši (Horsehead) *otoq* (< Mongolian *otoγ*, «tribe»), but Atbaš is more likely because the Chinese character *shih* 什 and the *-ši* of the Manchu and Mongolian texts (as opposed to *-si*) tend to be used to transcribe final *-š*. Turkish permits both forms — with and without the second element (*i*) of the construct. The Atbash river valley, a favorite pasture of the Kirghiz in Ch. Ch. Valikhanov's day, lies in the heart of the T'ien Shan, north of Kashgar. See Ch. Ch. Valikhanov, *Sobranie sochineniia v piati tomakh*, vol. 2 (Alma-Ata: AN KazSSR, 1962), p. 194. I have not found Atbash attested as a Kirghiz clan name.

[9] Khwāja-yi Jahān's forces surrounded the camp of the Ch'ing commander Chao-hui outside Yarkand on the Qara Usu («Black Water,» a southern arm of the Yarkand River) until Ch'ing relief forces broke the siege early in 1759.

Note that *Qara Usu* is here in its Mongolian form, as opposed to Turkish *Qara Su*. Similarly, Ch'ing sources give a corresponding northern arm of the river as *Ulān Usu* (Red Water), i.e., in Mongolian form. See, e.g., Wei Yüan 魏源, *Sheng-wu chi* 聖武記 (Taipei: Shih-chieh shu-chü 世界書局, 1962), p. 111, who ascribes these words to *Hui-yii* 回語, i.e., Altishahr Turkish.

on them [the brothers] might escape to [Kokand]. West of Kashgar, [Khwush Kipäk explained,] there were three roads, and he recommended that [Chao-hui] occupy them in advance. Chaoi-hui, in accordance [with what Khwush Kipäk had told him], sent a message to Kokand [ordering the Kokandis] not to aid the rebels.

By that time Fu-te 富德, the junior general warden of the marches (*ting-pien yu-fu chiang-chün* 定邊右副將軍), was encamped at Khotan (*Ho-t'ien* 和闐);[10] so Chao-hui proposed that the army should advance along [two] separate routes: one [force] would invade Kashgar from Aksu, and the other would invade Yarkand from Khotan. Once again Khwush K[ipäk] drew a map, informing [Chao-hui] that, west of Kashgar, [there was one route] from Opal (here Mongolized as *Opol=O-p'o-le* 鄂坡勒) to the Minjur (*Min-chu-erh* 敏珠爾; Manchu and Mongolian *Minǰur*)[11] pass [of] Kokand and [another] from Üstü[n] Artush (*Yü-ssu-t'u A-la-t'u-shih* 玉斯圖阿喇圖什)[12] to the Adïgene (*O-te-ko-ne* 額德格訥) [Kirghiz] and other such tribes [of] Andijan (*An-chi-yen* 安集延, Manchu and Mongolian *Anǰiyan*),[13] and [so Khwush Kipäk] recommended that orders be sent out [to the inhabitants along these two routes] to prevent the rebels from escaping. Chao-hui followed his advice exactly and sent the force against Kashgar [in the summer of 1760] using Khwush K[ipäk] as its guide. Khwāja-yi Jahān [who had joined forces

[10] Khotan was properly the name of a district, the main city of which was Ilchi ~ Älchi, also referred to as Khotan (Ho-t'ien).

[11] «Minjur» may be Ming Yul (or Ming Yol). I could not find a name corresponding to «Minjur» in D. M. Farquhar, G. Jarring, and E. Norin, comps., *Memoir on maps*, vol. 2: *Index of geographical names*, in *Sven Hedin Central Asia atlas* (Reports from the scientific expedition to the north-western provinces of China under the leadership of Dr. Sven Hedin — The Sino-Swedish expedition — Publication 49: I. Geography, 3; Stockholm: Statens Etnografiska Museum, 1966); nor in *Ho-hsi Hsin-chiang wu-shih-wan fen i ti-t'u chi* 河西新疆五十萬分一地圖集 (Kuo-li Chung-yang Ta-hsüeh 國立中央大學 Li-k'o Yen-chiu-so 理科研究所, Ti-li-hsüeh pu 地理學部; Chungking: Kuo-li Chung-yang Ta-hsüej 國立中央大學, Ti-li hsi 地理系, 1943); nor in M. A. Stein, *Innermost Asia: detailed report of explorations in Central Asia, Kan-su and eastern Īrān* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1928), vol. 4.

[12] Both Üstün (Upper) Artush (~ Artïsh ~ Artuj) and Astïn (Lower) ~ Altïn (Golden) Artush lie north of Kashgar.

[13] Reflecting the spoken Turkish form *Ändjān*. See, e.g., G. Jarring, comp., *An Eastern Turki-English dialect dictionary* (Lunds Universitets årsskrift, N. F. Avd. 1, vol. 56, no. 4; Lund: CWK Gleerup, 1964), p. 23, and E. D. Ross and R. O. Wingate, *Dialogues in the Eastern Turki dialect on subjects of interest to travellers* (James Forlong Fund, vol. 11; London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1934), p. 20.

Ming Yul lies on a possible route from Opal (~ Upal) Bazar to Kokand by way of Irkeshtam, although the main route from Kashgar to Irkeshtam as mapped in the early twentieth century ran well north of Opal Bazar. The Adïgene and other Kirghiz tribes pastured between Üstün Artush and Andijan.

with Burhān ad-Dīn at Yarkand] abandoned the city and fled, and Yarkand and Kashgar were pacified.

Chao-hui requested [imperial consent] to have Khwush K[ipäk] serve as acting (*shu* 署) *ḥākim beg* of Yarkand, and, inasmuch as his [i.e., Khwush Kipäk's] father's younger brother Sulaymān (*Su-lai-man* 素賚瞞) had formerly been *shang beg*[14] of Yarkand, [Chao-hui also] requested [imperial consent] to let [Sulaymān] remain in [that] office. [The emperor] allowed these [appointments to be made].

In the twenty-fifth year (= 1760) Khwush K[ipäk] went for an audience [with the emperor, who] commanded that he should remain in the capital [Peking], granted [him the title of] prince of the sixth degree assisting the dynasty, and bestowed [upon him] the two-eyed peacock feather. Khwush K[ipäk] made out a report detailing the properties that he possessed in the cities and towns of Khotan, Qara Qash (*Ha-la Ha-shih* 哈喇哈什), Yarkand, and Sha-ku-tse-li 沙古則里[15] (Manchu *Šaguzeli*, Mongolian *Šaguceli*), and [the emperor] ordered that [these properties] should be exchanged for their

[14] The office of *shang* (< Mongolian *šang* ~ *sang*, «treasury» < Chinese *ts'ang* 倉, «granary») *beg* (or *begi*) had been inherited from the Zunghar administration of Altishahr. It is attested, e.g., in Muḥammad Ṣādiq Kāshgharī, «Tadhkira-yi khwājagān» (British Museum, MS Oriental 9662), fol. 84v, line 11, and is listed in Valikhanov, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 611. The relationship between the functions of the *shang beg* in the Zunghar period and those of the *khāz(i)nächi* (≪ Arabic *khazīna*, «treasury,» + Turkish agent suffix *-či*) ~ *qāz(i)nächi* ~ *ghāz(i)nächi beg(i)* awaits study.

Saguchi Tōru 佐口透, *Jūhachi-jūkyūseiki Higashi Torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū* 18—19 世紀東 TO-RU-KI-SU-TA-N 社會史所究 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa-Kōbunkan 吉川弘文館, 1963), pp. 111—112, mentions two Chinese etymologies of *shang*, namely *shang* 賞 (to reward or give to [an inferior]) and *hsiang* 餉 (military pay or provisions), and he recommends the latter. *Shang* 賞 is out of the question in that, from the Zunghars' point of view, no «rewards» or gifts to inferiors are involved here. (The *shang begi* managed revenues for, not from, the Zunghar conquerors.) *Hsiang* 餉 is an unlikely borrowing for the nomadic Zunghars to have made from Chinese military practices and an unlikely etymology on phonological grounds.

As is clear from the sources that Saguchi cites, *shang* is a Mongolian (Kalmuk) word. *Šang* ~ *sang* is registered in A. Pozdneev, comp., *Kalmytsko-russkii slovar'* (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia Imperatorskoi Akademii Nauk, 1911), p. 144a, meaning «riches» (*sang*), and p. 162a, meaning «treasury» (*šang*), and in G. J. Ramstedt, comp., *Kalmückisches Wörterbuch* (Lexica Societatis Fenno-Ugricae, vol. 3; Helsinki: Suomalais-Ugrilainen Seura, 1935), p. 312b, where «schatzkammer» is given for *sang*, and p. 349a, where only the extended meanings «staatsmacht, krone, regierung» are given for *šang*. A. Mostaert, comp., *Dictionnaire Ordos*, 2nd ed. (New York: Johnson Reprint, 1968), p. 559b, registers *sang* («trésor»), with the correct etymology (from *ts'ang* 倉), and, p. 606b, identifies *šang* («trésor») with the Mongolian *sang* derived from *ts'ang*.

[15] I could not find anything corresponding to this name in Farquhar, Jarring, and Norin, *Memoir on maps*; or in *Ho-hsi Hsin-chiang wu-shih-wan fen i ti-t'u chi*; or in Stein, *Innermost Asia*.

value and [the equivalent] preserved in Khotan to support his [Khwush Kipäk's] relatives.

In the forty-sixth year (= 1781) [Khwush Kipäk] died, and Ibrāhīm, his son, inherited [his father's title of prince of the sixth degree assisting the dynasty].

*

Ibrāhīm, the first successor [in Khwush Kipäk's line in the Ch'ing *wai-fan* (outer entourage) nobility], was Khwush K[ipäk]'s eldest son. In the forty-sixth year (= 1781) he inherited [the title of] prince of the sixth degree assisting the dynasty. In the forty-eighth year (= 1783) [the emperor] ordered that, after Ibrāhīm vacated his position [i.e., after his death], if he had distinguished himself, his son should be accorded the same rank, but that if he had not distinguished himself, the rank should be diminished, and [Ibrāhīm's son] should succeed as hereditary noble (*tayiji*) of the third class (*san-teng t'ai-chi* 三等台吉). In the fifty-third year (= 1788) [the emperor] ordered that [Khwush Kipäk's descendants] should succeed as prince of the sixth degree assisting the dynasty, with right of perpetual inheritance.

IX

The Mongols: Ecological and Social Perspectives

FOR all that has been written about the Mongols of the twelfth to fourteenth centuries, some fundamental questions continue to intrigue us. What set them in motion? Why did they wreak so much more destruction than the other nomad conquerors who had preceded them? Why did they become Muslims in Muslim lands but not—apart from a few individuals—Confucianists or Taoists or Chinese Buddhists in China, or Christians in Rus'? Why did they stop when and where they did? Why did their empire disintegrate so quickly?

There are, of course, many other interesting questions about the Mongols—concerning, for example, their military techniques and strategy, the nature and objectives of their rule, or the effects of their conquests and dominion upon world history—but the five questions that I have posed at the outset are of particular importance if one wants to understand the Mongols' behavior in the Middle East. My purpose in this paper is to suggest some partial answers. What follows is a flight of the imagination, going beyond my sources. I shall write in the indicative, hoping thus to provoke discussion, but my spirit is properly that of the subjunctive or the interrogative.

To begin, it will be helpful to have a look at the ecological and

social setting from which the Mongols first arose as a world power in the early thirteenth century.

ECOLOGY

For the purposes of this essay, and without losing sight of the fact that in reality the differences between the environments to which the Eurasian steppe nomads have adapted are virtually infinite, I should like to distinguish between two pastoral habitats, which for the sake of convenience, I shall refer to as deserts and steppes. The desert habitat is characteristic of Central Asia (a region that includes, roughly, present-day Afghanistan, Soviet Central Asia—which does not include Kazakhstan—and Sinkiang south of the T'ien Shan mountains) and of the Middle East. The steppe habitat covers a wide zone running from Europe to Manchuria along roughly the fiftieth parallel north latitude, its main regions being the south Russian steppe, Kazakhstan, Zungharia, much of Amdo (present-day Tsinghai province), and Mongolia north and south of the Gobi.

Steppes are much less arid than the deserts of the Middle East and consist mainly of extensive prairies and mountain slopes in which towns and farming settlements are—or were, before early modern times—negligible. Typically, they were unsettled grasslands, far removed from the villages and fields of sedentary agriculture.

It is impossible to identify linguistic or ethnological groups like the Turks or the Mongols with any specific type of nomadism. Within the broad and complex variety of environments in which they have lived in different times and places, various Turkish-speaking and Mongolian-speaking populations have adapted themselves to the entire spectrum from intensive cultivation to strict steppe pastoralism, a spectrum in which the sharp nomad-peasant dichotomy disappears. Turks and Mongols have been nomads, seminomads (practicing various forms of transhumance but with some fixed places of abode), and cultivators.

In the twelfth century, the Mongghols (whence our word Mongol) were not a linguistic or an ethnological group but simply the dominant tribe of one of the tribal confederations that inhabited

the Mongolian steppes. Probably neither the Mongghol tribe itself nor the other tribes in the confederation to which the Mongghols gave their name consisted entirely of ethnological Mongols or of people whose first language was Mongolian.

Nor were the ethnological Mongols and native Mongolian speakers confined to the Mongghol confederation. The other three main confederations in Mongolia—the Tatar, the Naiman, and the Kereyid—also contained Mongols in the ethnological and linguistic meaning of the term. Mongols (in these senses) probably constituted a majority of the Mongolian (in the regional sense) population, but the proportion of these to those who were, ethnologically or linguistically, Turks is unknown. The *Secret History of the Mongols* speaks of people of "nine tongues,"[1] presumably both dialects and languages.

For members of the Mongghol tribe, members of the Mongghol confederation, and for the Mongolian (in the regional sense) population in general, the pastoral habitat was the steppe, and the ecology was steppe pastoral nomadism and hunting. Adaptation to the steppe environment required the entire population to move on seasonal migrations in search of "water and grass," as the Chinese historians put it. The nomads had no villages, no fixed houses, although their migration routes were for the most part fixed. Such a life was hard and uncertain. The livestock of a camping group, most of the animal wealth of a tribe, even most of the herds of an entire confederation, could be lost virtually overnight to disease or starvation.

Aside from its unceasing migration, pastoral nomadism may have more in common with agrarian sedentarism than is commonly acknowledged. Even the steppe nomads practiced some cultivation, sowing crops in suitable places and coming back later to harvest them. But migration produces its own cultural and social dynamics and leads, therefore, to qualitative differences between the cultures and societies based on these two ecologies.

Animal husbandry and migration encourage two of the main characteristics that have distinguished the Eurasian steppe nomads

[1] F. W. Cleaves, tr., *The Secret History of the Mongols* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1982), p. 178.

throughout history: their initiative and their quick adaptability. To be constantly on the move, camping in strange places, was to force oneself to adapt constantly—and fast. Pastoral nomads had to adapt their culture to regular and seasonal changes of environment in times of peace and to abrupt and radical changes of environment in times of war. A kind of "natural selection" accustomed the nomads to revel in a feeling of freedom. They liked to move and were able to do so.

Migration meant leadership, constant readiness to meet unforeseeable dangers, and being ever ready to fight. Leaders were accustomed to keeping their people and their herds in motion along their regular migration routes, a talent that helped them keep armies and herds of captives in motion too. Migration promoted martial qualities, the equestrian archer, the coordinated hunt in times of peace, the tactical army in times of war. When the men were on campaign, they could leave the herding to their women and children: pastoralism was not labor-intensive. The nomads were not obliged to defend any fields of crops or fixed dwellings, and they could, if they chose, easily sustain war in their own territory. In the steppe environment, war was not so destructive as it was in the sedentary world.

When it came to fighting, everybody was involved. The distinction between soldier and herdsman did not exist. War and raiding—and the "vengeance" (*ös*) that justified them—were the glory of the tribe and of the nation. The Mongolian culture of the thirteenth century was a warriorist culture that esteemed heroes most.

Ecologically, no social organization was needed above the level of the tribe. Any would-be supratribal ruler had to bring to heel a highly mobile population, who could simply decamp and ignore his claims to authority. Tribal chiefs were not eager to forfeit their autonomy so that a confederal potentate might rule and tax their tribes. Unlike agrarian societies, which could amass wealth and store it, steppe society rested on animal wealth, which had to be pastured extensively and could not be concentrated in a governmental center of power. Nor, for the same reason, could a supratribal ruler maintain a standing army at his beck and call.

SOCIETY

The tribes' obedience could not be held indefinitely by force. It had to be bought. To buy the obedience of the tribes, he who would be ruler must give them something that they could not obtain by themselves. Self-defense was not enough to induce them to enter into a durable supratribal polity. Temporary alliances would suffice for that, and often the best defense was simply to disperse.

Wealth was another matter. But here too, to rob wealth from other nomads a supratribal polity was not essential. Nomadic wealth was pastoral wealth, and it might be necessary to seize the animals of a neighboring tribe if one's own capital of livestock dropped below the minimum number (about twenty to forty animals for each unit family), but plundering other nomads was not a durable means for enriching the membership of a tribe. Raiding meant reprisals, and in any case the spoils could not be stored. Stolen animals had to be distributed for pasturing, and if the tribe was already rich, they added to its pastoral obligations without providing any diversification of resources.

To extort wealth from an agrarian society, however, steppe nomads needed a supratribal polity. True, a tribe might raid a farming village or a town, obtaining animals in times of need or, in times of plenty, obtaining wealth of a kind that the steppe economy did not produce. But villages and towns were usually defended by a government, so that raiding, in the normal course of events, could be only an occasional expedient.

Long-term extortion of agrarian wealth was beyond the powers of a single tribe, but even here the ability to carry on peaceful trade, exchanging pastoral surpluses for agrarian produce and urban products, muted the tribes' willingness to give up any of their autonomy for the sake of supratribal entanglements. It was in the case of China, where the steppe-sown dichotomy was sharper than anywhere else in the Eurasian steppe, and where the agrarian government usually monopolized or greatly restricted external trade, that the tribes' desire to extort was strongest.

Three alternative policies were available to the steppe nomads for the continuing acquisition of China's agrarian wealth: invasion, threat of invasion, and outright dependence. A fourth policy, com-

monly practiced by the desert nomads of Central Asia and the Middle East, namely conquest and dominion, was impractical for the nomads of the steppe because of the geographical separation of the steppe from the world of ther sown. In fact, it was not until the Mongols themselves conquered and ruled China in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries that a fully nomadic steppe-based empire—as opposed to kingdoms of what the anthropologist T. J. Barfield has referred to as "Manchurian" dynasties—first implemented a conquest and dominion policy in East Asia.[2]

For outright dependence on the Chinese state, no supratribal polity was required, although it was helpful in securing better terms from the Chinese government, but for invasions or the ability to pose a credible threat of invasion, tribal coordination was essential.

The logic of the foregoing analysis is that the main purpose of the tribe was to exploit the pastoral habitat and that the main purpose of the supratribal polity was to extort wealth from agrarian societies.

THE TRIBE

The tribe was the basic unit of society. It had its own traditions, institutions, customs, beliefs, and myths of common ancestry. These, if the tribe was of mixed linguistic or ethnological origin, promoted unity and the idea of a shared identity. All members of the tribe, including the common people (*haran*), were, by tradition, considered descendants of a single ancestor. Especially close was the fictive kinship ascribed to the leading families, who were usually regarded as nobles. The leading or noble families bore surnames that purported to designate clans (*obogh*) and subclans (*yasun*) in the tribal kinship system (whether commoners also belonged to *obogh*

[2] Much of the thinking that underlies the present paper has been profoundly influenced by half a decade of conversations with T. J. Barfield, who developed the concept of "Manchurian" conquest states and is preparing a book-length study of the "Manchurian" factor in the relationship between steppe and sown in East Asia. He has talked me out of various errors—one being the idea that the cohesion of steppe tribal confederations (as opposed to steppe "empires," a distinction that I shall develop in the course of the present essay) required war. In this connection, see his "Hsiung-nu Imperial Confederacy: Organization and Foreign Policy," *JAS* 40.1 (Nov. 1981): 45-61. The works of Radloff, Barthold, Vladimirtsov, and Owen Lattimore are essential background. Discussions with F. W. Cleaves, O. Pritsak, and Chin-fu Hung have also taught me a great deal, but none of these can be blamed for the inadequacies of this essay.

and *yasun* is unknown), and dominant among these was the chiefly lineage, from whom the tribal chief (*noyan* and, I suspect, *beki* as well as other titles) was customarily chosen.

Choice of the tribal chief was, in a manner of speaking, electoral, being governed by the principle of tanistry,[3] a central element in the dynamics of Turkish, Mongolian, and Manchurian politics that historians of Asia have too often overlooked. Put briefly, the principle of tanistry held that the tribe should be led by the best qualified member of the chiefly house. At the chief's death, in other words, the succession did not pass automatically, in accordance with any principle of seniority such as primogeniture, but rather was supposed to go to the most competent of the eligible heirs. By custom, a father's personal property passed, at his death, by "ultimogeniture" to his youngest son by his principal wife. Chieftaincy did not.

The existence of two mutually contradictory traditions of succession—patrilineal and lateral—constantly reinforced this element of choice. By patrilineal tradition, the succession was expected to pass from father to son. By lateral tradition, the chieftaincy was expected to pass to the chiefly house's senior male. By the lateral tradition, in other words, at a chief's demise, the succession was to pass to his next eldest brother and so on down to the youngest brother before passing on to the next generation, namely the eldest chief's sons. Needless to say, such a contradictory system could justify any choice that the leading members of the tribe might make.

Unless the tribe was very large, most tribal interests were usually best served by a timely resolution of the succession question, and the tribal leaders must ordinarily have managed to keep disruptions to a minimum. But in a large tribe, rival candidates for the chieftaincy, each closely backed by his own retinue of personal supporters (*nökör*), might occasionally split the tribe, either temporarily or permanently. In a succession struggle, the rival candidates and

[3] I take liberties with a Celtic institution, following a suggestion of Jeanette Mirsky, who "gave" it to me during a chat at Princeton in 1972. Some useful reading is suggested in Jack Goody, ed., *Succession to High Office* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966), editor's introduction, p. 54, n. 15. My development of the concept is to be found in "Turco-Mongolian Monarchic Tradition in the Ottoman Empire," in *Eucharisterion: Essays Presented to Omeljan Pritsak*, ed. Ihor Ševčenko and Frank E. Sysyn, *Harvard Ukranian Studies* 3-4 (1979-80), Part 1, pp. 236-51.

their *nökör* competed for the support of the tribe's leading men and formed factions that could either compromise or fight. Nor were the rivals limited to the backing of members of their own tribe. If a tribe were part of a confederation, a given candidate might win the backing of the confederal ruler or other powerful elements within the confederation. Tribes or leading tribal families also commonly had special relationships with tribal (or even non-tribal) elements outside the confederation and sometimes even beyond the edges of the steppe. These too could be called upon for support or for asylum in the event that a given candidate met defeat.[4]

Not just members of the chiefly lineage but also leaders of the tribe's noble clans not infrequently surrounded themselves with *nökör* and held a potential for usurping the chieftaincy or breaking away, taking their *haran* with them, and forming a new tribe. Commoners themselves, however, followed the leaders of one or another of the noble clans and rarely formed secessionist factions on their own initiative.

Another important figure in tribal politics was the shaman (*böge*). The nomads' need to know the unknowable under quickly changing conditions and their need to deal with the whims of fortune and the forces of nature lent power to the shaman's role. The shaman commonly belonged to a kind of shamanic "guild," which provided links with other tribes that could benefit the chief and the tribal membership—links that bolstered the shaman's influence within the tribe. Being in touch with the supernatural world, the shaman's support for a given candidate for the chieftaincy might carry weight if the shaman decided to involve himself in the succession choice. Shamans chose auspicious days for battle, healed the physically sick and the emotionally disturbed, enabled childless women to conceive, warded off evil, and the like. Their roles probably ranged from that of *nökör* of the tribal chief to one of rivalling him for authority. Sometimes the shaman might himself become the tribal chief, combining both roles in one person.

Once the succession had been established, the chief's main

[4] For a fascinating study of tribal politics, see Beatrice F. Manz, "Politics and Control Under Tamerlane," Ph.D, diss. (Harvard University, 1983); also her article, "The Ulus Chaghatay before and after Temür's Rise to Power: The Transformation from Tribal Confederation to Army of Conquest," *Central Asiatic Journal* 27.1–2 (1983): 79–100.

responsibilities were to provide leadership, assign pasture, and determine the routes of migration. His authority was both counterbalanced and confirmed by the tribe's other leading men, who may be regarded as a tribal council, and also by the shaman. The tribe's organizational structure would seem to have been a compromise between, on the one hand, the authority of the chiefly and noble clans, each of which retained control over its own commoners, and, on the other, the requirements of grazing and migration. In most tribes of any size there were probably at least two administrative levels of tribal subdivisions between the level of the tribal chief and that of the individual tenthold.

THE SUPRATRIBAL POLITY: NATION, CONFEDERATION, EMPIRE

To some degree the supratribal polity was a macrocosm of the tribe. Its traditions and institutions, its beliefs, practices, and myths of common origin were derived for the most part from tribal prototypes. Like the tribe, the supratribal polity found reinforcement in political alliances, matrimonial ties, and traditional rivalries and enmities both inside and outside itself. Like the tribe, it promoted the idea of a common ethnicity and social identity.

It had a royal lineage (the Mongols called theirs *altan urugh*—"golden lineage"), from whom the supratribal ruler was expected to be chosen by tanistry, and the choice would be justified by one of the two opposing traditions of succession, patrilineal or lateral. A ruling tribe (the Mongghol tribe, for example) dominated the polity and gave it its name. The ruler's clan (Borjigid, in the case of Chinggis Khan), to which the royal lineage belonged, headed the fictively related clans that composed the tribe. The other component tribes, each headed by a chiefly lineage, were referred to—by the Mongols, at least—as "submitted" (*il*), whereas tribes outside the polity were spoken of as "unsubmitted" (*bulgha*). Outside groups and non-tribal population could be incorporated into the polity in one of at least three main ways: as a component tribe under its own indigenous leaders; as "shares" of booty that were distributed among the component tribes; or as non-tribal military forces under the command of the ruler or one of the polity's other leading figures.

Like the tribal chiefs and nobles, the supratribal ruler and all contestants for his office had personal retinues of *nökör* who served their master as his eyes and ears and hands—as military commanders, administrators, secret or public agents, and specialists of all kinds who formed the nucleus of what could become, if need be, an extended imperial administration. *Nökör* directed their master's personal guard-cum-household, being, as it were, his slaves and companions. They derived their power and authority exclusively from his person and might be recruited from any social origin, nomadic or sedentary, noble, commoner, or slave. But if they were noblemen, they were not likely to be tribal chiefs (although Chinggis Khan himself, after reaching a certain level of power, deviated from this pattern), inasmuch as the possession of an autonomous basis of power would make for an unreliable *nökör*.

Like the tribe, the supratribal polity had its shaman, whose role might be anything from the ruler's *nökör* to his competitor for power.

Among the early Aryan (Indo-Iranian) peoples of the steppe, from whom the Turks and the Mongols ultimately derived much of their culture, the leadership role of the priest had rivalled that of the warrior. Eventually kingship was assigned to the warriors, but the priests, in compensation, were accorded the higher ritual status and were influential in the legitimation of kingship; so they retained the ability to pose ideological challenges to kingly power. A parallel is to be found among the early Arabian tribes, for whom the role of the *kāhin* (shaman or soothsayer) stood, to some degree, in opposition to the authority of the *sayyid* (tribal chief). The *kāhin* approved tribal decisions and legitimated the sayyid's authority.

At the supratribal level among the steppe Turks and Mongols, the paramount shaman stood in a similar position to legitimate the ruler or challenge his authority. Even the most powerful supratribal ruler might find himself limited or even threatened by a paramount shaman backed up by the intertribal shamanic "guild."

Given the mobility of nomadic life, the inessential character of supratribal social organization, and the fissiparousness of steppe politics, supratribal polities—being based on segmentary opposition[5]—were unstable and frequently dissolved altogether. So there

[5] See the presentation of this idea by E. E. Evants-Pritchard in *The Nuer* (London: Oxford University Press, 1940).

could be long periods when the largest effective unit was the tribe. But even in such periods of lapse, traditions of supratribal society persisted, and tribesmen thought of themselves as belonging to "nations" (*ulus*) that had existed in the past and might at any time be reconstructed under a new or an old name. *Ulus*, the root meaning of which was "people," could designate a tribe or, more likely, a supratribal "nation," even though such a nation might be nothing more than an idea in people's minds. *Ulus* could also designate an existing supratribal polity—either a loosely organized "confederation" or a tightly organized "empire." Supratribal society slipped back and forth between supratribal anarchy (a "nation" of purely imaginary existence) and supratribal polity, which in turn fluctuated between loose confederacy and (more rarely) tight autocracy.

Steppe empires came into existence only through the efforts of individual aspirants for the office of supratribal ruler, who, so to speak, conquered the tribes of the supratribal society and then, to keep them united, had no choice but to keep them busy with lucrative wars.

From the rise of the Hsiung-nu at the end of the third century B.C., the East Asian steppe tribal confederations had shown a growing trend toward empire, and the Mongols were its culmination. In the Hsiung-nu confederation, the tribes had forfeited very little of their autonomy—just enough to seem united for the sake of extorting wealth from the Chinese—and in warfare each person had kept whatever plunder he seized. Among the Hsien-pi, who came to the fore in the third century A.D., the ruler had held the right to distribute the booty to the participants. With the rise of the Turks in the sixth century, the ruler's authority had been tighter, with pretensions to absolutism, and his role had been more fully martial. The Khitans, a "Manchurian" empire in Barfield's sense of the term, had carried this trend still farther in the tenth century, introducing a tight military organization and setting a precedent of absolutist centralism that must still have cast its shadow over the Mongolian steppes in the late twelfth century.

THE KHAN

A confederation might be formed on the initiative of the tribes so as to win concessions from China, and, if so, the supratribal ruler

might be little more than a nominal sovereign. But the formation of a steppe "empire," in which the supratribal ruler truly ruled, required a steppe "emperor" backed by capable *nökör* and supported by a powerful coalition of tribal chiefs.

As our present-day experience recedes from the time when individuals as such played the leading parts in history, historians have increasingly tended to downplay the historical roles of individuals, trying to see them and their actions as merely the products of deeper social and economic forces. It is now sometimes difficult even to imagine a historical setting in which society and politics were so structured as to put immense power to initiate into the hands of individual persons, whose personalities and eccentricities thus played a major part in determining the course of history. But in the twelfth-century Mongolian steppes, the population was small—probably no more than about a million or so people.[6] Political structures were fragile, and rule was highly personal.

Being the ruler's creation, a steppe empire—as opposed to a confederation—depended for its existence upon his person. When he died, it ran a risk of collapse. If he failed to meet the expectations of the tribes, who looked forward to sharing in the wealth that he would extort, the empire might dissolve back into a confederation. The continuation of an empire therefore depended heavily upon the ruler's person, much less upon his office. Nor was the office of supratribal ruler reinforced by a single title to remind people of its existence at times when it lay vacant. Appellations like *kha* or *khan*—sometimes preceded by such qualifiers as *ong* (Chinese *wang*, "king"), *gür* ("universal"), or *chinggis* (perhaps a shamanic word)[7] —and *khahan* or *khaghan* or *kha'an* and also other words like, for example, *tayang* (Chinese *t'ai-wang*, "great king") were not necessarily employed strictly as titles but commonly rather as the epithets or sobriquets of individual rulers. "Khan" is a convenient generic term for the supratribal ruler, but it should not be thought that the tribes of every steppe "nation" thought of themselves as being necessarily ruled by one.

[6] See N. Ts. Munkuev, "Zametki o drevnikh mongolakh," in *Tataro-mongoly v Azii i Evrope*, 2nd. ed. (Moscow: Nauka, 1977), pp. 394–95; A. M. Khazanov, "Notes on the Emergence of the Mongolian State under Genghis Khan," *Production pastorale et société: Bulletin de l'équipe écologie et anthropologie des sociétés et pastorales*, Supplément à MSH-Informations (N° 5 Automne 1979): 14–15. Cf. J. M. Smith, Jr., "Mongol Manpower and Persian Population," *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 18.3 (1975): 287.

[7] In several of his lectures at Harvard, F. W. Cleaves has suggested that this was a shamanic word (which, as he has pointed out, does not exclude an etymology from the Turkish *tinggis*, "sea"). T'ang Ch'i, who attended some of these lectures, has amplified Cleaves's suggestion in his "'Ch'eng-chi-ssu' shih-i" *Kuo-li cheng-chih ta-hsüeh hsüeh-pao* 36 (1977): 149–97.

The steppe khan was surrounded by no pomp, ceremony, or mystery to clothe his kingship in a nimbus of the divine in the way that Iranian, Roman, or Chinese emperors were revealed. His purpose was down-to-earth: to obtain and distribute wealth. Great emphasis was placed on the quality of generosity. (Ögödei, for example, as portrayed in the Persian sources, seems profligate to modern readers, but generosity was essential to popularity—and thus to an empire's cohesion—in the context of pastoral society.) Even more basic was the quality of warrior and leader of men. As the head of a confederation, the ruler might not have to fight, but as autocrat of a steppe empire, the essential qualities were martial ones. An "imperial" khan had to lead his subjects to success on the field of battle and in the extortion of wealth from sedentary governments.

In a steppe empire—as opposed to a confederation—the bond between the khan and the tribal chief was the bond between leader and follower, between general and regimental commander—but between the two men as persons not as offices. So personal was this bond—upon which the integrity of the steppe empire was based—that at the khan's death, unless his successor recreated the empire on a similar personal basis, the empire soon dissolved.

Being himself the general, the khan of an empire could not delegate his military function to a military specialist. Military and civilian were not divided. The army was society. In his capacity as general, as "imperial" autocrat, the khan's authority was theoretically absolute. This meant that his jurisdiction to the extent to which he could make it do so, extended directly to everybody and was not limited to a contractually defined set of obligations that the khan had a right to demand only of the tribal chiefs.

Autocracy is, of course, an ideal rather than a system—unlike confederacy or bureaucracy or oligarchy. No single person was ever equal to the task of being a thoroughgoing autocrat. Delegation of authority has always been unavoidable, and as autocrats succeeded

one another on the thrones of empires, the amount of delegated authority tended to increase so that bureaucrats or oligarchs gradually drained away the autocrat's power. In agrarian empires, dynastic founders most closely approached the autocratic ideal, and their successors distanced themselves from it more and more, unless, as usurpers, they refounded their dynasty and repersonalized the substance of their authority.

But in steppe empires the underlying potential for continuing autocracy was greater. If the empire survived from generation to generation at all, it was because each successor tried not to be a successor in the agrarian empires' sense but rather a refounder. Without a refounder, who—ordinarily by struggle—brought his own personal retainers, administrators, and allies with him rather than inheriting those of his predecessor, it was unlikely that the empire would long endure. A steppe empire ruled by an autocrat had good chances for survival, but a steppe empire ruled by an oligarchy—in which the monarch's personal power did not dominate—was in danger of reversion to a confederation or even to a "nation" without a supratribal polity. The inessential nature of the supratribal polity saw to this fragility, as did also the custom of tanistry. Chinggis Khan, Ögödei, and Möngke probably came as close to being true autocrats as any rulers in history.

SUCCESSION

At the tribal level, succession to the chieftaincy was a relatively straightforward matter. The tribal members were all agreed that their tribe had to have a chief. The only question was who. But at the supratribal level, the problem was more difficult. If it was the ruler of a confederation who had died, the tribes had to decide whether they wanted the confederation to continue and, if so, on what terms, and then also which of the eligible candidates for the khanship would make the best choice. If it was the ruler of a steppe empire who had died, it was up to one of the eligible candidates for the succession to establish his authority and forge the nomads once again into a united empire. In such a context, succession struggles were likely to be violent and protracted.

In a confederation, the tribal chiefs might meet and accept a successor to the khanship designated by his father, the late khan. Similarly, a confederation might peacefully endorse a lateral succession, passing the khanship on to the senior male of the nation's ruling lineage. Occasionally a tribal chief or other leader not of the khanly line might seize supratribal power and rule *de facto* in the name of a puppet khan—the best known examples (long after the time in question) being Tamerlane, who ruled as *amîr*, and Esen, who held the title of *tayishi*.[8] A confederal council might even, by common consent, choose one of the tribal chiefs to reign over them, thus bringing a new ruling lineage into being. In rare circumstances a freebooter from outside the "national" establishment altogether might conquer enough tribes to usurp the confederal "throne."

But for the most part, successions to supratribal rule functioned as a choice, made by compromise, default, murder (usually fratricide), skirmish, or all-out tribal war, from among several candidates belonging to a generally acknowledged khanly lineage—a limitation to avoid what might otherwise become a debilitatingly open-ended struggle. Following a khan's death, his brothers and sons and sometimes also his uncles and nephews, were candidates to succeed him, and usually some form of struggle was involved.

Nor was the succession struggle necessarily delayed until after the old khan had died. Foreseeing the upcoming choice, a khan's sons normally started to factionalize and jockey for position before their father's death, and the nature of the struggle might range from political maneuverings to parricide. A famous later example of this—although historians seem not to have recognized it as a function of the institution of tanistry that Turks, Mongols, and Jurchens (or Manchus) shared—was the trouble that the K'ang-hsi emperor of the Ch'ing dynasty had with his sons.[9] Not uncommonly, the father himself played an active part in his sons' upcoming tanistry struggle by transferring the command of military forces or weighting the odds in other ways in favor of the candidate of his choice. Carrying this principle to its logical conclusion, as Selim the Grim of the

[8] For *tayishi*, see Henry Serruys, "The Office of *Tayisi* in Mongolia in the Fifteenth Century," HJAS 37.2 (Dec. 1977): 353–80.

[9] See, e.g., Silas H. L. Wu, *Passage to Power: K'ang-hsi and His Heir Apparent* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1979).

Ottoman empire did by killing off all his sons except the one whom he wanted to succeed, was probably very rare.

When a khan died, the concept of a regency might reinforce the integrity of a steppe empire fragmented by a struggle for succession, but more than one person was eligible to serve as regent: the deceased ruler's principal widow, also his youngest son by his principal wife (by "ultimogeniture" the inheritor—called *odchigin*, lord of the "fire," namely the tenthold—of his personal property), also the senior male (*akha*—literally "elder brother") of the ruling lineage. What is more, such regents were themselves usually committed to one or another of the parties of the succession struggle-if not, in the case of the *odchigin* or the *akha*, a candidate himself—so the empire's stability under such circumstances might be no more than a semblance.

To formalize their submission to a candidate for the succession and declare rival factions to be rebels, a candidate's supporters convened an assembly (*khuriltai*)—also used to plan campaigns—at which they acclaimed him sovereign. Sometimes these assemblies were genuinely plenary and consisted of representatives of all the steppe nation's tribes. In such circumstances they may occasionally have been electoral. But the convening of a *khuriltai* without its outcome being a foregone conclusion was probably rare. Much more commonly they were merely acclamation ceremonies for a given candidate, acting in the steppe nation's name.

Legitimist historians, coming from sedentary civilizations in which the pattern of succession followed a more automatic course, write of "usurpations" and tend to date the reign of a given khan from the time of the *khuriltai* that acclaimed him. But this fails to take account of the lapse in supratribal government that occurred while the outcome of the steppe succession struggle was being decided. The overthrow of a sitting ruler by an eligible member of the ruling lineage was not "usurpation" in the steppe nomads' eyes. A reign's real beginning dated from the winning contestant's definitive triumph over the last of his serious rivals.

The succession period was a fateful time in the life of any steppe empire because of the potential that it held for dissolution. It might occasion a change in the tribal composition, gaining tribes or losing them or parts of them to other empires or confederations. Sometimes

an empire or confederation might split—on relatively amicable terms—into a compound confederation, with, for example, eastern and western realms under two brothers, one of whom would be nominally subordinate to the other.

But in view of the recurrent disintegrations that succession struggles brought about, and in view of the weakness of the regency as an integrating institution, it is remarkable how well the continuity of tribal empires was preserved. Indeed, to some degree, succession struggles—participation in a common enterprise—reinforced the continuance of ecologically unnecessary supratribal polities. Only when all the members of a given tribe fought for a losing candidate was there any likelihood that the victor might break up a tribe or that a tribe might, in consequence of the succession, secede from the empire, but this must have been extremely rare. Usually each tribe was divided in its support of candidates for the khanship. Temporarily, the tribe would divide. One faction would support one candidate. Other factions would support others. When one of the candidates achieved victory, he might then reward the leader of the faction that had supported him by making him the tribal chief.

In the absence of any generally acknowledged supratribal ruler, participation in the electoral process constituted membership in the supratribal polity, no matter whether the election was held by tribal compact or by civil war. The recurrent, difficult, and often protracted and violent electoral process politicized tribal society down to the level of the *haran*, whose sentiments the tribal chiefs and nobles could not avoid taking into account. During this process, the integrity of the supratribal polity continued through the medium of the succession struggle itself. (The sources, it should be noted, do not present such struggles in this light. The majority of the sources—the Persian histories and the more voluminous but less exploited material in Chinese—are pro-Toluyid and might therefore be expected to emphasize tanistry and the legitimacy of struggles for succession, but they were written not by nomads but by sedentary historians and therefore reflect the legitimist conceptions with which these historians and agrarian societies generally were imbued.)

The succession dispute at the supratribal level was not just internal but sometimes became an extraimperial or an extraconfederal affair. Candidates for the khanship usually called upon temporary

or long-standing relationships with tribes or other powers outside the polity and, if successful, ordinarily reciprocated in turn by according support or refuge to their external allies.

Whereas succession within a tribal confederation was usually peaceful, succession to a steppe empire usually entailed civil war. In fact, a strong potential for succession war was always present even in the most harmonious confederations too, because every candidate for supratribal rule probably at least dreamed of making himself a steppe autocrat, breaking the autonomy of the tribes, and leading his united nation in glorious and lucrative war.

When steppe empires were built, they were built by men with such ambitions, and tribes submitted in hopes of sharing in the fruits of victory. So to rule an empire successfully—rather than merely reign over a confederation—a khan had to possess a keen eye for war and politics, the personality to command a following, and the ability to conquer his own people and subjugate them to his absolute rule. The best way to find a ruler with such qualities was to see who prevailed in a civil war of succession.

CONSOLIDATION OF A STEPPE EMPIRE

Before setting out upon the campaigns that would justify his existence, the would-be steppe autocrat had first to create his autocracy. Steppe autocracies were the fruit of civil wars. The phase of the nation's victories and plunder had to be preceded by a phase in which the violence was turned inward. Intertribal steppe war was not so destructive was warfare was in agrarian societies, but during a succession struggle, the tribes' collective energies were neutralized, and the nation was vulnerable to predation from outside.

A succession struggle was, by its very nature, one of the high points of tribal autonomy, but as a given candidate for the khanship began to win out, the pendulum would start to swing in the other direction. Uncommitted elements would go over to him. The more he won, the more factions would rally to his banners. Supporters of rival candidates, having been proclaimed rebels by his *khuriltai*, could now be legitimately despoiled and the booty distributed among his supporters. Booty and privileges thus began to be distributed to the members of the winning faction from the outset,

but even factions on the losing side or sides would eventually be consoled once the consolidation phase was ended and the energies of the united nation began to be turned outward and there was outside plunder to be shared.

The crucial moment arrived when the khan finally overcame all his rivals. The tribal chiefs probably always felt some degree of ambivalence about the virtues of an absolutist empire. A strong ruler meant weak chiefs, and strong chiefs meant a weak ruler; so the chiefs would try to force the khan to play the tribes off against one another, thus increasing tribal autonomy. But if the khan was strong beyond a certain point, candidates for tribal chieftaincies would need his support. A supratribal autocrat could even appoint the chiefs of the tribes under his rule.

Not uncommonly, when opportunity presented itself, tribal chiefs rebelled, but it was customary for the khan to take a more or less tolerant view of such circumstances, understanding that a chief's popularity with his tribesmen often required him to try to maintain as much autonomy as possible for his tribe.

Once a khan's rivals had been eliminated, he could start organizing his people for external war and forge his steppe nation into an autocracy by absorbing the other tribes and confederations on the steppes. At this point, when the tribes' energies began to be directed outward, the ruler's position became more secure and, with luck, his task somewhat easier. External tribes, seeing a powerful war machine in the making, would sometimes voluntarily surrender. A leader who won battles won followers. A leader who lost battles lost followers. Everyone wanted to be on the winning side. Everyone wanted a share of the spoils.

Two important and time-honored devices were available to the builder of a great steppe empire that would help him bind his nation's tribes to his will and incorporate within his realm the other peoples of the steppes. One was structural and the other ideological.

The structural device was decimal military organization, which steppe rulers had used, off and on, from as far back as the time of the Hsiung-nu confederation. Decimal organization did not replace the tribes. Not even Chinggis Khan was ever powerful enough to have done that. The tribes and tribal chiefs continued to exist, but, under the decimal organization, it was possible for the ruler's

military commands to bypass the channels of tribal and intratribal authority. This was a mighty weapon in a steppe ruler's hands and could enormously increase his power.

Decimal organization also facilitated the incorporation of outside forces. In 1203, after defeating the powerful ruler of the Kereyid confederation, Chinggis Khan divided his followers into commands of thousands (*mingghan*), hundreds (*jaghun*) and tens (*harban*). Three years later, having brought all the steppe nomads except the "forest people" under his authority, he added three commands of ten thousands (*tümen*): left, right, and center.[10] In 1203–1206 the tens may in fact each have comprised ten men, and the hundreds one hundred, but the higher the number of the command, the less likely that it remained (or even began) at full strength.[11] In general, a commander of a thousand or of ten thousand was likely to have been a tribal chief, and the size of his command would have reflected the importance of the man or the strength of his tribe rather than the actual number of warriors under his command. This can be seen, for example, in the discrepancy between the Turco-Mongolian *dhāt* and *sawār* rank systems of the Mughals under Akbar, which is visible in the full light of history because of descriptions by Abu'l-Faḍl, Badā'ūni, and others.[12]

The ideological device for consolidating a khan's control was belief in Tenggeri or Tengri (scribally, Tngri), the universal victory-granting sky god, which—like horse nomadism, fire worship, exposure of the dead, the etymologies (perhaps) of all the Turco-Mongolian terms for chiefs and rulers, and, I suspect (although diffusionists may ascribe them to Egypt and anti-diffusionists to independent invention in each of the major civilizations), the concept of universal dominion and also monotheism itself—came from the early Aryans, some of whom eventually migrated into Iran and India and some of whom remained in the steppes.

The idea of a universal supreme god—of which Semitic monotheism is only one form—contains within it the potentiality of a single universal realm on earth and the potentiality that the supreme god may destine a single ruler to establish his dominion over that entire universal realm.[13] If such a ruler were seen as a conquering warrior, as he was in the tradition of the steppes, the guiding ideology would hold no bias against violence and slaughter, nor would it insist upon any institutional limits to the absoluteness of his autocracy. The ruler's purpose would be to establish Tenggeri's order in the world, and if the tribes—inside or outside the ruler's nation—believed that he had received Tenggeri's destiny, they would rally to his banner.

(Possession of Tenggeri's mandate was demonstrated by success in battle, and in this respect it differed from the European idea of the divine right of kings, which adhered even to unsuccessful monarchs.)

Tenggeri did not bestow his mandate in every generation; so an ambitious ruler's claim to have received it was likely to be received with skepticism. Legitimation of such a claim was one of the possible roles of the shaman. The shaman could confirm the khan's claim to have received Tenggeri's mandate, or, more convincingly, Tenggeri could confer his mandate upon the khan, using the shaman as

[10] See Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao, *The Military Establishment of the Yüan Dynasty* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 9–11 and the bibliography cited in n. 44 on p. 130.

[11] Cf. Smith, p. 287, who argues that "the lists of Mongol *tümens* of whatever sort, nomad or sedentary, are at once counts of soldiers, estimates of manpower and military potential, and indicators of the size of the general population."

[12] See I. H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Mughul Empire* (Karachi: University of Karachi, 1966), Chapter 5: "The Manṣabdārī System," pp. 88–113.

[13] For some fascinating discussions of the Tenggeri belief and its socio-political implications, see Mori Masao, "The T'u-chüeh Concept of Sovereign," *Acta Asiatica* 41 (1981): 47–75; J. J. Saunders, "The Nomad as Empire-Builder: A Comparison of the Arab and Mongol Conquests," in his *Muslims and Mongols*, ed. G.W. Rice (Christchurch: University of Canterbury, 1977), pp. 36–66 (esp. 42–45); Jean-Paul Roux, "La religion des Turcs de l'Orkhon des VII[e] et VIII[e] siècles," *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 161.1 (Jan.–Mar. 1962): 1–24, and 161.2 (Apr.–June, 1962): 199–231; his "Tängri. Essai sur le ciel-dieu des peuples altaïques," *Revue de l'histoire des religions* 149.1 (Jan.–Mar. 1956): 49–82, and 149.2 (Apr.–June, 1956): 197–230, and 150.1 (July–Sept. 1956): pp. 27–54, and 150.2, (Oct.–Dec. 1956): 173–212; N. Pallisen, 'Die alte Religion der Mongolen und der Kultus Tschingis-Chans," *Numen* 3.3 (Sept. 1956): 178–229; Osman Turan, "The Ideal of World Domination among the Medieval Turks," *Studia Islamica* 4 (1955): 77–90; and Wladyslaw Kotwicz, "Les Mongols, promoteurs de l'idée de paix universelle au début du XIII[e] siècle," *Rocznik Orientalistyczny* 16 (1950); 428–434.

My working hypothesis is that the idea of a single universal god and a related concept of universal dominion stemmed from the early Aryans and remained in the steppe with those who remained there (Scythians, etc.). Those who entered Iran and India carried it with them, whence it reached the Near East (Jews, Christians, Muslims), Greece (Alexander), and the Romans (one God, one world, one religion, one empire). The "son of Heaven" and "mandate of Heaven" concepts would have reached China either from the steppe nomads or from Iran or India (Asoka).

an intermediary. In such a case, the role of the shaman would be that of priest. He would inform the khan (and everybody else) of Tenggeri's choice. As priest, the shaman was a powerful figure who might, at some later date, question the ruler's legitimacy and challenge his power. If the shaman were sufficiently docile, he would continue to be an asset to the khan, but if not, the khan would have to eliminate him and become both priest and emperor himself. The universal ruler had no need of any intermediary between him and the supreme god from whom his universal dominion derived.

But in the long run, neither victory in a war of succession, nor the incorporation of other steppe tribes and confederations, nor the establishment of a decimal military organization, nor Tenggeri's mandate for universal conquest and dominion could preserve the steppe autocrat's power and the integrity of his realm unless he used his power and his people to seize the wealth of the settled agrarian world. For the sake of mere extortion, a confederation with a nominal ruler would suffice. But if the tribes were to remain under the discipline of a steppe autocrat, he must raid and invade. The price of autocracy was that the autocrat could not stop. He must continue to enrich and engage his subjects by continuing war.

Now to the questions with which we began.

WHAT SET THE MONGOLS IN MOTION?

What set any of the steppe nomads in motion? Ch'i-ch'ing Hsiao has published an elegant article listing seven basic reasons that have been adduced to explain why the pastoral nomads repeatedly invaded China over the course of history.[14] Briefly, they are: (1) the nomads' greedy and predatory nature; (2) climatic change (desiccation); (3) overpopulation of the steppe; (4) interruptions of trade on the part of the Chinese (pastoral surpluses could not be sold); (5) a need to supplement the low-level productivity of the fluctuating pastoral economy by plundering the surpluses of the more stable agrarian economy; (6) to build a supratribal polity; (7) nomad

[14] "Pei-Ya yu-mu min-tsu nan ch'in ko-chung yüan-yin ti chien-t'ao," *Shih-huo yüeh-k'an* 1.12 (Mar. 1972): 609–19.

psychology—a desire to feel equal to the Chinese and a belief in the divine destiny of their own steppe kings to conquer the world.

All of these reasons (which are to a considerable degree interrelated) may have been variously applicable to the sudden eruption of the Mongols into East, Southeast, and Central Asia, Europe, and the Middle East in the thirteenth century. But the reason that I regard as central and develop in this paper is the sixth.

The dynamics that I attribute to the Mongolian ecology and society of the twelfth century make the Mongols' sudden invasions seem nothing less than the natural thing. What else was to have been expected from a society with a warriorist culture whose entire population was perpetually on the move, whose economy was highly fragile, and whose wider society was not only highly fragile but dependent upon the extortion of agrarian wealth for its very existence? A society whose custom promoted succession to kingship by struggle, whose history had tended steadily toward absolutism and empire, and whose empires (in contradistinction to confederations) were predicated upon war for their continued cohesion? Whose empires, if ever they conquered all the steppes, had only one course remaining open to them—expansion into the sedentary world?

If I am correct about these things, the real question is not what set the Mongols in motion but why had such vast conquests never occurred before? Historians do not, by and large, enjoy explaining why a certain conjuncture of events did *not* occur at times other than when it did or why the full potentiality of any historical situation was not always realized, and I intend to leave aside that question for later consideration. Yet it would not be amiss to suggest briefly some of the reasons why I think the Mongols' martial potentiality *was* realized under Chinggis Khan and his first two successors, Ögödei and Möngke. (Güyüg, for reasons that I shall mention below, I do not regard as having fully attained the succession.)

First, climatic change may have played some part if Gareth Jenkins is right that there was a "steep decline in the mean annual temperature in Mongolia in the years 1175–1260," adversely affecting "the extent and height of steppe grasses crucial for both flocks and game," so that the Mongols' "enthusiasm for the task of conquest may well have been fueled by a climatic defeat at their

backs.''[15] This suggesion is climatic, but it should be distinguished from Hsiao's second reason because the change here is one of temperature, not aridity. On the other hand, any climatic reduction of pasture would have brought Hsiao's third and fifth reasons into play, providing a motive for his sixth.

Second, Chinggis Khan's personality must have played a central role, especially in view of the personal nature of the bonds that tied a candidate for the khanship and his supporters together, that linked the general to his officers, and that invested all supratribal rulers and leaders with their measure of authority. Chinggis Khan must have been a leader of extraordinary talent, capable of iron discipline and the ability to inspire loyalty, and superior in these respects to other steppe leaders of his time.

He must also have been possessed by an infectious sense of his own Tenggeri-sent destiny. Kököchü, alias Teb Tenggeri,[16] the Mongghols' paramount shaman, who probably invented the title of ''Chinggis Khan,'' bestowed this title and confirmed Chinggis Khan's acclamation at the *khuriltai* of 1206. ''God has spoken with me,'' Kököchü proclaimed, ''and has said: 'I have given all the face of the earth to Temüjin and his children and named him Chinggis Khan. Bid him administer justice in such and such a fashion.'''[17]

But Chinggis Khan could never rest secure in his mandate while such a shaman-turned-priest lived. What Tenggeri had given through Kököchü, Tenggeri might also revoke through the same intermediary. The conqueror's best course of action would be to do away with him altogether, communicate with Tenggeri himself directly, and thus, becoming priest and emperor, monopolize both religion and empire. Chinggis Khan's fear of Kököchü is well attested in the *Secret History*. That he had grounds for fear is shown by

[15] ''A Note on Climatic Cycles and the Rise of Chinggis Khan,'' *Central Asiatic Journal* 18.4 (1974): 217-26.

[16] ''Tenggeri'' here probably means nothing more than ''Lord,'' in ''Lord Teb'' or ''Lord Cunning,'' as F. W. Cleaves has argued in his ''Teb Tenggeri,'' *Ural-altaische Jahrbücher*, 39.3-4 (1967): 248-60. Note the objections of Igor de Rachewiltz, ''The Secret History of the Mongols: Chapter Ten,'' *Papers on Far Eastern History* 26 (Sept. 1982): 75-76, but there is no proof that Teb Tenggeri was not a posthumous appellation, and usage of a cognate term in Turkish is not conclusive for Mongolian usage in any given instance.

[17] 'Alā' ad-Dīn Juwaynī, *The History of the World-Conqueror*, tr., J. A. Boyle, 2 vols. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1958), 1:39. I have changed the spelling from Boyle's ''Chingiz-Khan'' to conform with the Mongolian orthography.

the fact that Kököchü poisoned Chinggis Khan's mind against his brother Khasar, that Kököchü assembled a large number of people in his own service, and that he openly humiliated Chinggis Khan's youngest brother Tëmuge.

When Kököchü had been killed, Chinggis Khan was careful to make the point that the shaman had lost his life because he had tried to make trouble between the khan and his brothers and was therefore ''no longer loved by Tenggeri.''[18] But even in Chinggis Khan's grandsons' generation, the Mongols still invoked Teb Tenggeri's name as the intermediary who had first revealed Tenggeri's mandate to Chinggis Khan—the mandate that the conqueror's successors believed themselves to have inherited—as is to be seen in Hülegü's letter of 1262 to Louis IX of France:

> God . . . hath in these last days spoken to our grandfather Chinggis Khan through Teb Tenggeri (a name which is understood to mean prophet of god), his kinsman, miraculously revealing future events of the times [and] calling him, announcing through the said Teb Tenggeri: ''I alone am god almighty in the highest and have . . . set thee over the nations and . . . the kingdoms to be made ruler and king of the entire earth, to root out, and to pull down, to thrown down, and to destroy, to build and to plant.''[19]

As Chinggis Khan attached his ''golden tether'' (*altan arghamji*) to the necks of the peoples that he subdued, he and the Mongols and surely many of those whom he conquered believed that it was by divine destiny that he did so.

Third, chance must not be omitted from the equation. It was by chance that in Chinggis Khan's youth the Mongghol confederation had disintegrated so that the followers whom he won were even more personally attached to him than they would have been if he had merely been a contestant for an established khanship, fighting it out among his brothers. Not being of the senior ruling lineage, he was in a position to become, in effect, a dynastic founder, the creator of a steppe autocracy with the stamp of his own personality upon it, and keep the support of his brothers in the bargain. It was by chance that his father had died early in Chinggis Khan's life so that the conqueror could begin to build his following straight-

[18] See *Secret History*, p. 182.

[19] See Paul Meyvaert, ''An Unknown Letter of Hulagu, Il-Khan of Persia, to King Louis IX of France,'' *Viator* 11 (1980): 245-259, esp. 252.

away without having to wait for his father's death, perhaps at an advanced age, before starting his career. (Tamerlane subsequently enjoyed similar advantages.)

It was by chance that Chinggis Khan contracted no dread ailment and that no well or badly aimed arrow happened to kill him. It was by chance, despite his unsteppelike predilection for pitched battles, that he never sustained a prestige-destroying defeat. It was in some measure by chance, therefore, that Chinggis Khan's pendulum of empire-building swung as far as it did, to the conquest and consolidation of the steppe, by which time the power of any steppe emperor would have been almost invincible, given the military technology of the time—so long as he kept moving.

Fourth, although every ruler probably tried to designate which of his sons should inherit the khanship, Chinggis Khan succeeded in doing so. Jochi and Chaghadai, Chinggis Khan's two eldest sons, had quarreled over the spoils of war, and Jochi was already behaving insubordinately to his father during the khan's lifetime, but Chinggis Khan nevertheless managed to obtain a commitment from his four sons by his principal wife concerning the succession. So great was Chinggis Khan's prestige, so ably had he adjusted the political scene, and so acceptable was Ögödei, Chinggis Khan's third son and choice for the succession, that the Mongols followed his choice (of designated patrilineal rather than lateral succession) and acclaimed Ögödei ruler at the *khuriltai* in 1229. So tanistry, nemesis of steppe empires, did not, at Chinggis Khan's death, bring civil war to destroy what he had made. Had it done so, Chinggis Khan's name would be known to historians but not to history, as may be seen from the example of Tamerlane, who conquered more territory than Chinggis Khan but lost most of it, after his death, to tanistry.

This is not to say that tanistry did not make itself felt at all. Ögödei may well have done away with his youngest brother Tolui, who had held 101,000 of the 129,000 men that had comprised the Mongols' army at the time of the interregnum. (Ögödei himself had held no more than 4,000.) Juwaynī reports that Tolui died of drink,[20] but the drink that he died of—to judge by the *Secret History*, Rashīd ad-Dīn, and the *Yüan shih*[21]—was poisoned. The only question is who ordered the poison, the shamans on their own initiative or on the orders of Ögödei?

[20] The *History of the World-Conqueror*, 2:549 (esp. n. 5).

[21] *Secret History*, pp. 211–14; Rashīn ad-Dīn, *The Successors of Genghis Khan*, tr., J. A. Boyle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), pp. 167–68; *Yüan shih* (Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1976), 10.2887. See also F. W. Cleaves, "The Expression *jöb ese bol-* in the *Secret History of the Mongols*," *HJAS* 11.3–4 (Dec. 1948): 317–19, esp. n. 18.

Fifth, Ögödei was a good choice. Beginning with him, the ruler's title was upgraded from *khan* to *khaghan* (or *kha'an*—rendered as *qā'ān* by Juwaynī and Rashīd ad-Dīn). Perforce he had inherited many of his commanders and retainers and, unlike his father, had not been able to choose them all on the basis of personal relationships, but Ögödei succeeded nonetheless in enlarging what his father had built. (There was, of course, no turning back.)

Chinggis Khan had divided the territory of his realm into four "nations" (*ulus*), which he gave to his four sons, but Ögödei mounted new campaigns, knowing that the only way in which he could preserve the empire's unity was to direct the Mongols' energies outward and provide new spoils of conquest. He succeeded in maintaining the decimal military divisions, and a Sung envoy to the Mongols in 1236 spoke of these divisions as a "system of civilian households,"[22] showing that the decimal military system included the households of the military commands, not just the warriors themselves. The tribes, however, continued to exist independently of this decimal system, and the *Secret History* seems to indicate that Ögödei still distributed "pastures and waters" (*nuntugh usu*) to the tribe (*ulus irgen*) rather than assigning them on the basis of the decimal units.[23]

Sixth, Güyüg—Ögödei's son and choice for the succession—died before the impending succession war between himself and his cousin Batu (the eldest son of Jochi) could shatter the empire, and a timely compact between the Jochid and Toluyid houses reunited the Mongols for campaigns into China and the Middle East.

Ögödei, however talented he may have been in keeping the Mongols united, was no Chinggis Khan and was not able to overcome the custom of tanistry and deliver the succession into the

[22] See Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, p. 131, n. 61.

[23] See *Secret History*, p. 224. Cf. Hsiao, *Military Establishment*, pp. 10–11, who suggests that grazing land and water resources were assigned to the decimal units. The *Secret History* does say, however, that *nuntu'uchin* (pasture keepers?) were to be chosen from each of the thousands (*mingghad mingghad-acha*).

hands of his chosen heir. If the *Secret History* is to be believed, Chinggis Khan himself had already suggested the possibility that the succession struggle might be widened beyond Ögödei's family after the latter's death by asking rhetorically: "If Ögödei's descendants should be born [so lacking in the qualities of leadership that] if one were to wrap [them] in grass they would not be eaten by an ox or if one were to wrap [them] in fat they would not be eaten by a dog, will there not be born among my [other] descendants someone [who will be] good?"[24]

The maneuverings for succession lasted from Ögödei's death in 1241 until about 1252 or 1253. Chaghadai died in 1242. Chinggis Khan had expressed a preference for Köden, Ögödei's second son.[25] Ögödei had chosen his son Köchü, but Köchü had died; so Ögödei had designated Köchü's son Shiremün.[26]

Töregene, Ögödei's chief widow and regent, won over a considerable number of followers for her eldest son, Güyüg. Many, however, implacably opposed Güyüg because of his enmity with Batu, who was now *akha* and one of the most powerful figures in the empire. (This enmity had probably arisen in anticipation of the tanistry struggle that Chinggis Khan's grandsons could already foresee.) Temüge, Chinggis Khan's younger brother, was also an eligible contender, and it was he who first gathered an army around himself and made a bid for the throne. When it became clear that he could not succeed, he withdrew.

Determined that one of her sons should succeed instead of Shiremün, Töregene managed to delay matters for several years until, in 1246, she convened a *khuriltai* to acclaim Güyüg, whom she favored over Köden, the latter not being in good health. Batu sent his brothers to attend the *khuriltai*, and they apparently took part in the acclamation, but he did not attend it himself. Güyüg, realizing that the question of succession could not be settled until Batu was destroyed, set out against his cousin but died along the way in 1248, cutting short the succession struggle before its conclusion. Although the *Yüan shih* clearly reckons him an emperor, Juwaynī and Rashīd

[24] See *Secret History*, p. 197. I have taken liberties with the Cleaves translation only to underscore my interpretation of the passage's significance.

[25] See Rashīd ad-Dīn, *Successors*, p. 181.

[26] See Rashīd ad-Dīn, *Successors*, pp. 19, 180, and 201.

ad-Dīn withhold from Güyüg the title of *qā'ān* and place after his name the lesser title of khan, as they do also with Jochi, Chaghadai, Tolui, and Hülegü, none of whom was ever considered a *khaghan* by anyone.

Before the empire could disintegrate, Tolui's widow struck a bargain with Batu, who allowed her son Möngke to succeed. Batu's and Möngke's supporters convened their *khuriltai* in 1251, acclaimed Möngke, and won the advantage over the less organized supporters of Shiremün and other possible contenders. By the end of 1252 or early in 1253, after the elimination of several princes of the houses of Ögödei and Chaghadai, the struggle was over.

The price of this bargain was Batu's autonomy. The *ulus* of Jochi began to drift away from the empire, becoming, in effect, a separate confederation. For a time, at least, the Jochids continued to hold properties (called *t'ou-hsia* or *t'ou-hsiang*) in Toluyid China, and in one way or another some of Jochi's descendants continued to play a role in the succession struggles for the Toluyid throne, but increasingly it was the role of outsiders.

Thus, although not without difficulties, the empire cohered and continued to do the only thing that such an empire could do if it were to survive: push on and continue to conquer.

WHY DID THE MONGOLS WREAK SO MUCH DESTRUCTION?

At first glance, one might have expected the Turks and the Mongols to have followed a common pattern in the Middle East. Both peoples came from Mongolia. They spoke cognate languages, shared common elements of folklore, had practiced the same range of nomadic adaptations, and had both first viewed the sedentary world from the perspective of the nomad face to face with China.

In fact, the difference between the behavior of the Turks in the Middle East and that of the Mongols could hardly have been greater. The Turks came in gradually, in groups of limited size, over a substantial period of time, and entered into the Muslim culture and politics of the region as full-fledged members. In the process they did comparatively little damage.

Not so the Mongols. They came as an avalanche, a cyclone, massacred large numbers of people, and did such destruction that

the effect of their mayhem is arguably still perceptible. Much of the explanation for this contrast lies in the different conditions under which these two peoples made their entry.

The Turks had started westward mainly as refugees who had lost out to stronger nomads in struggles to control the East Asian steppes. They came in individual groups, and, before reaching the Middle East, they first tarried in Central Asia, where they encountered the desert pastoral habitat mentioned at the begining of this essay.

The deserts are arid and contain little vegetation; pasture is to be found mainly along the edges, where there is water, and in these more hospitable areas are to be found not just water but farms, villages, and towns.

In the desert habitat, nomads and settled peoples had frequent and repeated contacts. The desert constricted all agriculture, both pastoral and agrarian, so that wherever pasture was to be found, it was likely to be interspersed with towns and cultivated fields. The nomad, whose pastoralism would, under such conditions, require him seasonally to return to the same places, wanted peace with his sedentary counterpart so as to be annually welcomed back and so that exchanges, which occurred mainly in markets and eye-to-eye between the individual nomad and the merchant or farmer, could continue with a minimum of difficulty. Living as part of a relatively tight nomadic-sedentary continuum, which, using his military strength, he of course tried to control, the desert nomad understood agrarian cultivation and urban society. In response to his habitat, he developed a distinct pattern of interaction with his sedentary neighbors, one that stressed control.

Long before the arrival of the Turks and the Mongols in the Middle East, bedouin tribes had ruled settled populations in accordance with this desert pattern (control) as a matter of course. Subsequently, with the rise of Islam, the Arab conquests had brought the Arabs' form of this desert pattern, along with their religion, to western Central Asia, going eastward until they reached the desert's limits and the beginning of the steppe. The Turks, coming slowly and in groups of limited size, thus met with a cultural environment, already prepared by previous nomads, that offered them the role of ruler in a relatively peaceful nomadic-sedentary world, and they encountered Islam, a universal religion open to nomad tribesmen, which could facilitate their transition into full membership in that world.

By the time the Turkish-speaking nomads had filtered through Central Asia into the Middle East, they were already at least nominally Muslim and so shared some important common interests with sedentary Muslim society. They had fallen heir to the desert pattern of control that the Arab conquests had bequeathed to them. They had spent enough time in the vicinity of settled populations to understand sedentary society, and they regarded themselves to some degree as its protectors.

But this transformation had taken them a good deal of time. In the steppes, their perspective had been radically different. The steppe habitat also partook of a nomadic-sedentary continuum, but it was a far looser one than in the desert. Steppe nomads lived apart from settled peoples, and friendly contacts between them were less the rule. Nomad and farmer or townsman were not usually acquaintances. Geography did not force steppe pastoralists and settled folk together in seasonal reunions. It separated them. At the eastern end of the steppe zone, where the lines between nomad and sedentary were most sharply drawn, Mongolia and China confronted one another through much of history as worlds apart.[27]

The ordinary steppe nomad had little or no motive to develop an understanding of agrarian agriculture or of urban society, and he did not view his fortunes as tied to their prosperity. The steppe pastoralist's political ideology did not equip him to try to govern the agrarian world; so he left the settled peoples to their own political devices.

For him, raiding was as important as trading. The main peaceful contacts between pastoralist and agrarian, apart from trade, occurred at the governmental rather than the individual level. Here, the supratribal ruler performed the only function for which the steppe nomad needed him (apart from his role as the organizer of predatory campaigns): to conclude agreements with settled govern-

[27] Note, however, that the current PRC position considers Mongolia to have been part of China until the 20th century. Such a claim seems particularly bizarre with regard to the Hsiung-nu, but see Lin Kan, *Hsiung-nu shih* (Hohhot: Nei Meng-ku jen-min ch'u-pan-she, 1979).

ments on terms of extortion. The settled government delivered wealth (commonly cloaked as return gifts and concessions in return for the face-saving device of nomad tribute), and in return the nomad withheld his raids. But when the steppe pastoralist did invade the settled world, he looted and destroyed as much as his heart desired so as to remind the agrarians of the wisdom of rendering peaceably the wealth that he wanted.

The Mongols were no less adaptable than the Turks. The legacy of the Khitans (who had ruled Manchuria, much of the Mongolian steppe, and a small part of north China) and the influence of the Jurchens (who ruled Manchuria and all of north China and who understood the steppe) had probably opened the Mongols' eyes at least slightly to the possibility of conquest and exploitation as opposed to the mere extortion of agrarian wealth from the sidelines of the steppe. Khitan, Jurchen, and Uighur advice and the contact with Muslim merchants from Central Asia, who could point to the example of Turkish-speaking nomads ruling settled populations, must also have prepared the way for the Mongols' adaptation to the desert pattern of interaction with the sedentary world.

But the Mongols simply came too fast. Unlike the Turks, they entered the desert habitat suddenly, en masse, in centrally-planned campaigns, phases of a concerted and temporally compact effort. There was no time for them to acculturate themselves to the desert habitat; so they carried with them, directly into the middle East, attitudes nurtured in the East Asian steppe: disdain for peasants, who like the animals that the Mongols herded, lived directly off what grew from the soil. (The Mongols were not the only ones who have compared the agrarian population to *ra'āyā*, "herds.") With the steppe extortion pattern in mind, the Mongols did violence with a will and used terror, reinforced by their ideology of universal dominion, to induce their victims to surrender peaceably.[28]

Once inside Central Asia, the Mongols embraced Islam and came to understand settled society no less quickly than had the Turks, but by that time the Mongolian juggernaut had done its dreadful work, destroying cities that had resisted, massacring their people, and strewing death and destruction all along the path.

[28] See, e.g., Eric Voegelin, "The Mongol Orders of Submission to European Powers, 1245-1255," *Byzantion* 15 (1940-1941): 378-413.

J. J. Saunders was surely on the wrong track when he suggested that the Mongols wreaked their havoc out of some "blind unreasoning fear and hatred of urban civilisation."[29] Their havoc proceeded logically from the legacy of steppe wisdom about how nomads could best obtain what they wanted from the agrarian world. But in the Middle East, where the desert pattern of nomadic-sedentary interaction was the rule, the behavior of the Mongols must have seemed incomprehensible.

WHY DID THE MONGOLS CONVERT TO ISLAM BUT NOT TO OTHER RELIGIONS?

The Mongols' conversion en masse to Islam in the Qipchaq steppe, Central Asia, and the Middle East—and their failure to convert, except on an individual basis,[30] to Confucianism, Taoism, or Chinese popular Buddhism in China or to Eastern Orthodox Christianity in Rus'—can be attributed mainly to two factors: (1) the extent to which these religious traditions had already been adapted for nomadic consumption by the time that the Mongols first encountered them, and (2) the nature of the contacts between Mongols and the adherents of these religions.

In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, Confucianism, Taoism, and Chinese popular Buddhism were specific to Chinese culture and to the pale of Chinese agriculture. They were not proselytizing religions, and to the extent that each of them possessed its own vision of the ideal social order, each of these visions was utterly alien to the nomadic social ethos of the steppe. Although garrisoned in China, and therefore exposed to contacts of many kinds with the conquered Chinese population, the occupying Mongols could not but view the Chinese and their culture as remote from the standards and values that the Mongols' traditions had conditioned them to respect.

Christianity, on the other hand, was a proselytizing religion, and in its Nestorian form it had long ago been adapted to the nomads'

[29] *Muslims and Mongols*, p. 48.

[30] See, e.g., John W. Dardess, *Conquerors and Confucians* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), who speaks of a few Mongols as "Confucians," but the term (doubtful even here) is applicable only to Mongols of high rank.

culture and had won numerous adherents among Mongols in high places. But the Mongols had found it expedient to control Rus' from the Qipchaq steppe, where the indigenous Islamic culture in its Turkish-speaking steppe nomadic form quickly transformed them, so that the Mongols were neither exposed to sustained contact with Eastern Orthodoxy nor ideologically disposed to consider its merits.

Islam was different. By origin it was as much the religion of the nomad as of the townsman. Arab tribesmen had brought it as far east as Central Asia, and the Turks, coming from the eastern steppes had adapted the Islamic tradition in a way that made it attractive to the Mongols. By the time the Mongols reached the Qipchaq steppe, Islam was already widespread among the Turkish-speaking nomads. Similarly, in Central Asia and Iran, Islam had permeated the nomadic population and was not merely the religion of the Turkish rulers.

Islam reached the Mongols by way of proselytizing sufi shaykhs, who spoke to them in terms they understood, who presented the religion in ways designed to make it most acceptable, and who knew how to fit themselves into the role of the shaman. For the sufi it was comparatively easy to replace the Mongols' conception of the universal god as Tenggeri with the Semitic conception of him as Allāh.

In these respects, the Mongols' conversion to Islam invites comparison with their adoption of Tibetan Buddhism, which some of them embraced in the thirteenth century and (notwithstanding dGe-lugspa efforts to represent the proselytization of the Yellow church among the Mongols in the sixteenth century as a "second" introduction of Buddhism into Mongolia) probably never altogether relinquished thereafter. Tibetan nomads had already adapted Tibetan Buddhism for nomadic consumption, and the monks who propagated it among the Mongols understood the Mongols' pastoral culture and knew how to take the place of the shamans. To make things easier, Tibetan Buddhism has, at its popular level, much in common with Mongolian shamanism.

In the Qipchaq steppe, the Mongols were outnumbered and swallowed up by the Turkish-speaking Muslim majority and became, in effect, Qipchaqs. In Central Asia and the Middle East, Islam eased the transition from steppe conqueror to desert ruler for

the Mongols just as it had done for the Turks who had preceded them. The Middle Eastern Muslim tradition held a place for such conquerors at the top, and they did not need to abandon their nomadic traditions to occupy it. In the long run, however, in Central Asia and the Middle East, as also in the Qipchaq steppe, adoption of Islam went hand in hand with the cultural assimilation of the Mongols to the Turks.

WHY DID THE MONGOLS STOP WHEN AND WHERE THEY DID?

The Mongols came into Central Asia, into Rus', and into the Middle East like a series of avalanches. Ahead of them lay the fabulous wealth of India, the riches of western Europe, and Egypt rich in agricultural production and commerce. There is nothing to suggest that the Mongols, who had defeated the armies of the Jurchens' Chin empire (probably the strongest military forces, apart from the Mongols themselves, anywhere in the thirteenth-century world), viewed the Delhi sultanate or the European princes or the Mamluks as too strong to conquer. Yet the Mongols withdrew from their raids into India after destroying Lahore in 1241; they turned back from Europe a year later, before reaching Vienna; and they failed to punish the Mamluks for defeating them at 'Ayn Jālūt in 1260.

Why? The old wisdom, found, for example, in Grousset,[31] attributed the Mongols' halt to the politics of succession, but more recently, other explanations have been offered. I. H. Qureshi and S. M. Ikram attribute the Mongols' failure to mount a real invasion of India to the Delhi sultanate's military might and fortifications.[32] Denis Sinor, contradicting Plano Carpini's testimony that the Mongols evacuated Hungary because of Ögödei's death, asserts that their withdrawal in the spring of 1242 was "an operation for which no satisfactory explanation exists" and suggests instead that it "was motivated by Batu's logistical difficulties and his recognizance of the fact that the Hungarian pastures were insufficient

[31] *L'empire des steppes* (Paris: Payot, 1939), p. 333.

[32] I. H. Qureshi, *The Administration of the Sultanate of Delhi*, 4th ed. (Karachi: Pakistan Historical Society, 1958), pp. 136 and 140; S. M. Ikram, *Muslim Civilization in India* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 44–45, 59, and 63.

to provide for his army's needs.''[33] Saunders, who refers to the battle of 'Ayn Jālūt as ''merely a skirmish'' and acknowledges ''the troubles which followed the death in China of the Great Khan Möngke,'' nevertheless assigns the Hülegüids' failure to pursue their conquests in the Middle East to the Greek recapture of Constantinople in 1261 and Baybars's alliance with the Jochids.[34]

In the case of India, it has further been claimed: (1) that the Mongols withdrew from India in 1222 (having reached Multan) because of the heat, and (2) that when Chinggis Khan entered India again in 1224 he withdrew once more because a rhinoceros (or ''unicorn'')[35] was sighted and his Khitan adviser Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai persuaded him that this was a bad omen. (Given the beliefs of the time and the important role of the individual leader in the Mongols' political culture, the latter explanation is by no means an impossibility.)

Undoubtedly each of these arguments contains parts of the explanation, and the heat of India was certainly a factor, but arguments based on the strength of the potential victims or insufficiency of pasture or a hot climate do not make very satisfactory answers to the question of why the Mongols withdrew from such promising fields for plunder precisely when they did, namely in 1242 and 1260.

In view of the strength of the powers that the Mongols did subdue, the remaining defenders in India, Europe, and the Middle East do not seem too daunting—although, as Saunders points out, Hülegüid rivalry with the Jochids (intensified by Möngke's death) could to some degree have had a neutralizing effect on the Mongols' military potential in the Levant. The Europeans were so divided against themselves that Plano Carpini's primary reason for not wanting to bring an ambassador from Güyüg back to Europe was fear ''lest seeing the dissensions and wars which are rife among us, they might be all the more encouraged to attack us.''[36] The Mongols could not but have known this already. North India was raided in

[33] ''Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History,'' *Oriens Extremus* 19.1-2 (Dec. 1972): 181.

[34] ''The Mongol Defeat at Ain Jalut and the Restoration of the Greek Empire,'' in *Muslims and Mongols*, pp. 67-76.

[35] See Chun-chiang Yen, ''The *Chëh-tan* as Word, Art Motif and Legend,'' *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 89.3 (July-Sept. 1969): 589-91.

[36] ''History of the Mongols,'' tr. by a nun of Stanbrook Abbey, in *The Mongol Mission*, ed. Christopher Dawson (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955), p. 68.

1297, again in about 1300, 1303, 1304, 1305, and 1327, by the Chaghadayids, who although far weaker in this period than the united Mongols had been in 1241, carried out depredations in the Punjab and penetrated as far as Delhi.

Even if Sinor is correct about Hungarian geography, neither insufficiency of pasture nor a hot climate prevented the Mongols from mounting campaigns on horseback through the rice paddies of south China and Vietnam or on elephants into Burma, and lack of fodder did not deter them from launching naval expeditions against Japan and Indonesia, even if the real purpose of these expeditions may perhaps have been to get rid of the surrendered military forces of the Sung.

The old wisdom is best. The Mongols stopped where they were in India and Europe in 1242 because of Ögödei's death at the end of 1241. They stopped where they were in the Middle East in 1260 because of Möngke's death in August of 1259. The decease of a steppe emperor, as all the Mongols knew, was no small matter. The classic pattern of the steppe empire, as I have suggested above, was one so closely tied to the ruler's person that when he died, it stood in real danger of collapse. If it were to be preserved, the preservation would have to be based on political maneuvering, struggle, and probably civil war. All of these followed the deaths of Ögödei and Möngke. The Mongols had little choice but to break off their campaigns.

A corollary question, which I shall not pursue here, is why the Mongols, having stopped to deal with the problems of succession, did not resume their conquests and continue to expand. For this, geopolitical factors, the dynamics of steppe imperial politics, the small size of the ''Mongghol'' population, the heat of India and Southeast Asia, and other reasons, including those given by Qureshi, Ikram, Sinor, and Saunders, will help to provide an answer.

WHY DID THE MONGOLS' EMPIRE DISINTEGRATE SO QUICKLY

It should be apparent from all that has preceded that, as compared with what was to have been expected from a steppe autocracy, the Mongols' empire, which lasted through at least three generations, did not disintegrate quickly. The question should

rather be: how did it endure so long? (A question that I shall not discuss here.)

Factors for disintegration—such as mobility, tanistry, and the lack of any ecological necessity for the existence of a supratribal polity—have been developed at length throughout this essay. What I should like to stress here, as forces for the disintegration of the huge (a factor in itself) empire of the Mongols, is the importance of Chinggis Khan's division of his realm into four "nations," one for each of his four principal sons, and the importance of acculturation in each of these distinctive habitats.

The division, although following pastoral custom, was an interesting retrograde step for an autocrat who wanted to keep his empire united for posterity. At first, these divisions seem to have been little more than military administrative commands within a steppe autocracy in which all authority was vested in the person of the ruler. Settled populations belonged directly to the crown, and non-Mongolian realms that had been incorporated into the empire on the analogy of component "tribes" were directly ruled by the emperor. But at Ögödei's death, or perhaps even before, control of the settled populations and component "tribes" began gradually to pass to the possessors of the four fraternal "nations." At about the same time the original tribal entities also began to disappear, and new tribes came into being as constituents of the "nations," each of which eventually formed a supratribal polity in its own right.

In the early stages of their empire, the Mongols were a single people who established their rule over populations of several different cultures: But administrative—evolving into political—division into "nations" combined with the power of acculturation to turn them into several different peoples.

Jochi's "nation" received a territory that consisted mainly of steppe, inhabited by a Turkish-speaking Muslim population. The proximity of the steppe to Rus' and to the commercially important lower Volga, Khwārazm, and the Georgian and Armenian realms of the Caucasus enabled the Jochids to remain in the steppe, where they were quickly assimilated by the Turkish-speaking population and converted to Islam. Their geographical setting allowed them to exercise dominion over their sedentary possessions without giving up their lives as pastoral nomads.

Chaghadai's and Hülegü's "nations" (Chaghatay and the Il Khanate)—Hülegü received a territory that should, according to the terms of the original division, have belonged to the "nation" of Jochi[37]—received a mixture of deserts, oases, and pastures that would force the Chaghadayids and Hülegüids into a tightening pattern of nomadic-sedentary relations characteristic of the desert habitat and would assimilate them to the Turkish-speaking Muslim population of the two regions.

Ögödei's "nation" received sparsely inhabited pastures in which the Mongols, their language, their religion, and their culture could hold their own. So long as the empire was truly Mongolian and truly a steppe empire, the Ögödeyids could continue to dominate.

By "ultimogeniture" Tolui's "nation" received Mongolia, the paternal pastures, but the Toluyids' footholds in Korea and north China presented them with a choice: either to live in the steppe and exploit the agrarians' wealth in the traditional manner—by extortion—or to conquer and rule, shifting the center of their realm out of the steppe and into the sown. The latter alternative would mean reorganizing their polity and refounding their power on a different basis, fatal to the integrity of the empire as a whole.

The accession of Möngke accelerated the process by which the Mongols of the several "nations" were transformed into separate peoples because, in effect, it permitted the secession of Jochi's Qipchaq steppe from the empire and created an enmity between the Jochids and the Hülegüids over rights to the Middle East (Möngke's gift of Jochid patrimony to Hülegü)—not a rivalry between two lineages for succession to the throne of a common empire but an enmity between two separate realms for the possession of territory.

Meanwhile, a basic issue confronted the Mongols of the Hülegüid, Chaghadayid, and Toluyid "nations": should they adhere to their nomadic traditions and remain an empire—or at least a nation—of the steppe, or should they create a mixed society (fundamentally the "desert pattern" of exploiting the agrarian world)?

Politics tended to polarize around these two positions.[38] At Möngke's death, the nomadizers of the Toluyid realm based

[37] See Peter Jackson, "The Dissolution of the Mongol Empire," *Central Asiatic Journal* 22.3-4 (1978): 186-244. Jackson ignores tanistry.

[38] See the interesting treatment of this problem in N. Ts. Munkuev, "O dvukh tendent-

themselves in Mongolia and supported Arigh Böke for the succession over Khubilai, darling of the "cohabiters." When Khubilai prevailed, the nomadizers found a champion in Khaidu, the last serious contender of the Ögödeyid line, and thus merged the contest for empire-wide succession with an empire-wide struggle between cohabiters and nomadizers.

In the Hülegüid realm the issue was more muted. Adoption of Islam and the desert pattern that the Turks had already established eased almost all the Mongols into the position of cohabiters. But in Chaghatay the issue was as acute as it was in China, possibly more acute, because Chaghatay, like China, adjoined the steppes but, unlike China, was dominated by Turkish Muslim culture. To cohabit was to become a Turk and a Muslim. To nomadize meant staying in or returning to the steppe and remaining a Mongol and a believer in the universal sky-god Tenggeri—at least until the late fourteenth century, when the assimilative power of Turco-Muslim culture became too strong to resist. From the 1260s Chaghatay politics revolved around this question—to cohabit or nomadize? As in Mongolia, the nomadizers rallied to the support of Khaidu, and the issue remained alive until, toward the middle of the fourteenth century, the Chaghatay "nation" itself split permanently in two: a cohabiters' realm based in Mawarannahr (the Ulus Chaghatay) and a nation of nomadizers in Moghulistan.

Had the *khaghan* and the bulk of the Mongolian population remained "nomadizers" in the steppe and followed their traditional steppe pattern to exploit the agrarian world, their empire might have had a longer lease on life. But the bulk of the Mongols moved into the agrarian world, where, as "cohabiters," they pursued the "desert" pattern and were transformed into several peoples, several separate realms. Speaking different languages, putting their trust in different religions, and pursuing different aims in different habitats, they could no longer form a single polity. The steppe, which had been their center, became a periphery. The defeat of Arigh Böke and Khaidu and the triumph of Khubilai foreshadowed the empire's doom.

siiakh v politike pervykh mongol'skikh khanov v Kitae v pervoi polovine XIII v.," in *Trudy Buriatskogo kompleksnogo nauchno-issledovatel'skogo instituta* 8 (1962): 49–67.

X

Integrative History: Parallels and Interconnections in the Early Modern Period, 1500–1800*

THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

The question of China's includibility in early modern history presupposes another, more general and vexing question: *is* there an early modern history? Or are there only histories?

There is an early modern European history. During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries the Middle East, Central Asia, and India each has a history of its own. China in the late Ming and early Ch'ing certainly has a history, and one with a continuity that far outweighs the limited number of discontinuities that appear as a result of the change in dynasty. But do the histories of these several areas, not to mention sub-Saharan Africa and the Western Hemisphere, have anything in common? Are there any interconnections, continuities, general trends, common to and linking them all? If not, then the term "early modern" is largely meaningless except for Europe, and the "early modern period" has no history, only histories.

* Although Mr. Fletcher did not write this for publication as it stood, the ideas presented in it remained central to his scholarship, and he hoped to revise and publish it before he died. (Editors)

As you have already guessed (who would write a paper to say that China is *not* part of early modern history?), I suspect that early modern history does exist and that China is part of it.

INTERCONNECTIONS AND CONTINUITIES

At the outset I must introduce two terms that will help us examine the question before us. The first of these is *interconnection*, which I use to denote historical phenomena in which there is contact linking two or more societies, as, for example, the spread of an idea, institution, or religion, or the carrying on of a significant amount of trade between societies. The second is *horizontal continuity*, which denotes an economic, social, or cultural historical phenomenon experienced by two or more societies between which there is not necessarily any communication. An example of a historical continuity might be population loss as the result of outbreaks of a single disease in, say, two societies which are wholly isolated from one another. But to be a horizontal continuity, the population loss experienced by the two societies must result from the same ultimate source. If one loss is from cholera and the other from bubonic plague, then they do not constitute a horizontal continuity but are simply two parallel events.

Horizontal continuities are to be distinguished from vertical continuities, which are the survival of institutions, patterns, and the like through time, as, for example, the persistence of the institution of emperor in Chinese history. It should further be understood that the discovery of an interconnection between two societies does not necessarily imply the presence of a horizontal continuity, and vice versa. Now back to our problem with history.

No one would deny that in the technologized world of the 1970s with its quick communications and its generalized political polarities, what goes on in, say, Vietnam, Rhodesia, or Palestine affects the lives of people in China, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and the United States. Similarly, it is clear that from at least the middle of the nineteenth century, when the Technological Age began to interweave the historical destinies of the various quarters of the globe, the world *grosso modo* has been one, touched almost everywhere by European, American, and later Japanese commercial initiatives, colonialism, imperialism, ideas of nationalism and

of several forms of socialism. But what about the early modern period—the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? Is there any general history there?

The early modern world is not easy for the historian to integrate, mainly because the historical work that has been done, especially for the non-Western world, has tended to emphasize political and diplomatic history and, more recently, institutional history. The period from roughly 1500 to about 1800 was a time when the world's states and societies were very much compartmentalized, and there was little long-range contact, let alone interpenetration, except for some European, first Portuguese then other, maritime trade. This trade was of great economic importance for the European countries that carried it on, but in that period it had as yet minimal impact on the African and Asian societies whose ports the European ships frequented. America was another matter, of course, for there the European impact had immediate and fundamental consequences. For this reason, the political and diplomatic history of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries is not much help in looking at the world as a whole. Similarly, institutional history is of limited use for our purpose because it emphasizes the organizational patterns characteristic of a given society, focusing our attention on cultural peculiarities and discontinuities between societies rather than on inter-societal continuities, in short, on the particular rather than the general.

To find the interconnections and horizontal continuities of early modern history, one must look underneath the surface of political and institutional history and examine developments in the economies, societies, and cultures of the early modern world. If we do this, it may appear that in the seventeenth century, for example, Japan, Tibet, Iran, Asia Minor, and the Iberian peninsula, all seemingly cut off from one another, were responding to some of the same, interrelated, or at least similar demographic, economic, and even social forces.

INTEGRATIVE HISTORY

Integrative history is the search for and description and explanation of such interrelated historical phenomena. Its methodology is conceptually simple, if not easy to put into practice: first one searches for historical parallelisms (roughly

contemporaneous similar developments in the world's various societies),[1] and then one determines whether they are causally interrelated. The value of the enterprise is elemental. Unless we possess some idea of what human societies have in common developmentally (the historian's work) as well as statically (sociology, anthropology, political science), the history field can have no skeleton. In fact, until modern times, there is no history, only histories. However beautiful the mosaic of specific studies that make up the "discipline" of history may be, without a *macrohistory*, a tentative general schema of the continuities or, at the least, parallelisms in history, the full significance of the historical peculiarities of a given society cannot be seen. In other words, to see the picture in the mosaic of microhistory, one must stand back from it.

In Western Europe and the United States, the kind of historical thinking that might develop such a tentative general schema, or macrohistory, is strikingly underdeveloped by comparison with the amount of microhistoriography that has gone into producing the books and articles that make up the mosaic. Toynbee's massive *Study of History* saw history as the rise and fall of certain types of societies but perceived no horizontal continuities fundamentally linking the world's economies, societies, and cultural lives. Jaspers' *Origin and Goal of History*, on the other hand, did make a search for parallelisms going back to the beginnings of civilization, but these remained merely parallelisms. In other words, Jaspers noted similarities, but he established no causal interrelationships. More recently, McNeill's *Rise of the West*, the best of the world histories, made an attempt to tie human history together, using the device of the "ecumene" (Afro-Eurasian civilized world), which McNeill saw as having had three "closures" (instances of contact), in 100 B.C.–A.D. 300, 1200–1400, and finally 1500–1650 (which opened communications between Afro-Eurasia and the Western Hemisphere). But McNeill's main focus is the rise, spread, and dominance of West European civilization, as his title implies, and, except for tracing cultural diffusions, he neither identifies nor examines common trends in late medieval or early modern world economic, social, or cultural history that might reveal horizontal continuities.

[1]For this use of the term, see Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, tr. Michael Bullock (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1953), esp. Chapter One: "The Axial Period," pp. 1-21, and Chapter Two: "Schema of World History," pp. 22-27.

The only systematic attempts to postulate world history on the basis of shared economic, social, and cultural phenomena (which are where history really lies) have been made by Marxist historians. Most of this has been highly tendentious, motivated by the desire to show that all societies have followed a unilinear pattern of development, with the result that Soviet Marxist historians in particular find themselves committed to such strange sights as the concept of "nomadic feudalism." A few Marxist historians have tried to escape this kind of intellectual straightjacket by arguing that there were exceptions,[2] and the alternative presented by Marx's "Oriental mode of production" has been considerably developed by Wittfogel, Tökei, and others.[3]

The fact remains, however, that the field of history, as it is cultivated at most European and American universities, produces a microhistorical, even parochial outlook, and from the point of view of the general (or integrative) historian, this has been made worse by the American universities' introduction of the area studies approach, in which historians talk to social scientists within their geographical specialty area but have little contact with other historians working on unrelated societies. Under these conditions, historians are alert to vertical continuities (the persistence of tradition, etc.) but blind to horizontal ones, and historians have tended to relinquish cross-area work to the sociologists and political scientists, who are not always the best equipped to carry it on.[4] The happy exception to this bleak picture is the French school of "conjuncturalist" historians, scholars like Braudel, P. and H.

[2]See, notably, S. E. Tolybekov, *Obshchestvenno-èkonomicheskii stroi kazakhov v XVII-XIX vekakh* (Alma-Ata: Kazakhskoe Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1959), and *Kochevoe obshchestvo kazakhov v XVII - nachale XX veka: Politiko-èkonomicheskii analiz* (Alma-Ata: Nauka KazSSR, 1971), who argues, essentially, that nomadic society was an exception.

[3]Wittfogel's *Oriental Despotism* is, of course, well known; Tökei Ferenc, *Az azsiai termelesi mod* (Budapest, 1965); G. F. Kim *et al.*, *Obshchee i osobennoe v istoricheskom razvitii stran Vostoka: Materialy diskussii ob obshchestvennykh formatsiiakh na Vostoke (Aziatskii sposob proizvodstva)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966). In the 1960s there was also some Chinese reconsideration of the "Asiatic mode."

[4]A notable exception for the early modern period is Gilbert F. Rozman of Princeton, whose work on eighteenth-century modernization in China, Japan, and Russia will contribute materially to our understanding of the subject discussed in this paper.

Chaunu, and Dermigny, whose work points to a less insular historiographical future.

History, for understandable reasons, has been divided into a number of geographical areas, and the practitioners in each of these find remarkably little to say to the practitioners in any of the others. Historians confer on questions of methodology, and students are required to have a touch of historiography and a smattering of social science, but historians, *as historians*, usually lack a common basis for the useful exchange of ideas. The only bases on which they are readily able to communicate with profit are on the theoretical bases provided by non-historians. Marxist historians of all areas can confer on the tailoring of historical data to fit the requirements of Marxist science, and non-Marxist historians can and often do reexamine the theories of, say, Weber in the light of current historical research. One can easily imagine a historian of Ch'ing China discussing the ideas of S. N. Eisenstadt, for example, with a historian of the Ottoman empire—every student of Ming-Ch'ing China should be required to read Norman Itzkowitz' concise *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition* (Studies in World Civilization; New York: Knopf, 1972). But, although historians do talk across area lines, to do so they normally need help from outside history, and even in the case of comparative history, with no social scientists involved, the result is not so much history (the dynamics of change through time) as it is social science (patterns of collective behavior).

If we want to gain a sufficient idea of history's gross morphology so that we can see the significance of the mosaic's individual pieces, social science theory and comparative history will not be enough. One must also have integrative history charting those sub-surface trends and developments that the world's societies have shared, because without it there is no general history until the mid-nineteenth century, only separate regional histories.

THE STARTING POINT OF GLOBAL HISTORY

This brings us to the question of the time limits within which integrative history is possible, and it is here that the significance of the early modern period appears. From the mid-nineteenth century, as has been mentioned above, the interconnected character of the histories of the various regions

of the globe is by and large generally conceded, and it is certain that future historians will have little trouble in finding horizontal continuities in the world of today. But how far back can history, as opposed to separate histories, be pushed? Even if we assume that much can be done to reconstruct the pre-modern history of sub-Saharan Africa and other areas where literary sources are either fragmentary or wholly nonexistent, there is no getting around the fact that, notwithstanding theories about Irish, Viking, Arab, and Chinese explorations, the civilizations of the New World were totally cut off from Afro-Eurasia until the end of the fifteenth century. It is not completely out of the question that, when more is known about such subjects as the history of climatic patterns,[5] it might just be possible to tie in a few aspects of pre-Columbian American history with developments in the Old World, but short of such intellectual gymnastics, global integrative history is not possible before the sixteenth century.

The period in which general history is to be sought, then, is what has been called the early modern period. At 1500 I see nothing but compartmentalized histories. By the second half of the nineteenth century everybody sees interconnections. When do these begin? And of what interconnections and horizontal continuities might such pre-nineteenth-century general history consist? The purpose of this paper is to propose a hypothetical "early modern history" in answer to these questions and then to suggest in particular the ways in which China's experience in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries may seem to fit in.

MACROHISTORY (PLANE'S-EYE-VIEW OF THE MOSAIC)

Imagine for a moment that we are on a plane trip. Our flight is around-the-world with no stopovers allowed, and the plane, flying above the temperate zone of the northern hemisphere only, maintains an altitude that carries us back in time.[6] The technology of such flights is still in its infancy; so it is impossible to go back and circle the globe on, say February 13,

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[5]See Fernald Braudel, *La Méditerranée et le monde méditerranéen a l'époque de Philippe II*, 2nd ed. (Paris: A. Colin, 1966), Vol. 1 pp. 245-252: "3. Le climat a-t-il changé depuis le XVIe siècle?"

[6]A device adapted, with modifications, from Robert Heilbroner and Peter Bernstein, *A Primer on Government Spending* (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), who use it to help explain macroeconomics and the concept of gross national product to their readers.

1573, or February 13, 1773. Instead we are forced to see the image of the world superimposed upon itself a thousand times, day after day, for the three centuries (sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth) of early modern history. Beyond this, we can see just enough more for us to be able to observe this period in the context of the periods that precede and follow it. It is possible, therefore, to see general patterns and to tell whether they fall roughly at the beginning, middle, or end of our period, but we are unable to distinguish specific dates, events, or locations.

As we circle the globe we notice that political history has been almost entirely swept away but that the configurations of institutional and cultural history (vertical continuities) remain. This is important, because terrains differ and cultures differ. A single horizontal continuity may not look quite the same in France as it does in Morocco; so our ability to distinguish cultural peculiarities will help us to understand the permutations that we observe in the broad shapes before us.

PARALLELISM I: POPULATION GROWTH

The first broad shape that we see is a marked rise in population that seems to have its beginnings in the fifteenth century and that increases more or less steadily through the sixteenth century everywhere except in those areas of the New World (especially Mexico) where the Spanish have gained a foothold. In Mexico the sixteenth century witnesses a rapid decline in the Indian population (because of diseases from Europe?),[7] but in North America the general trend is similar to that in the Old World,[8] and in South America losses in the Indian population are offset by the importation of African slaves. As Braudel has predicted,[9] we see a clear population growth in Castile, Italy, the Balkans, Anatolia, indeed the

[7]Findings of the "Berkeley school," P. Chaunu (1964), and Braudel (1967) cited in Pierre Guillaume and Jean-Pierre Poussou, *Démographie historique* (Collection U; Paris: A Colin, 1970), pp. 105-106, where doubts are expressed. See also Marcel R. Reinhard and André Armengaud, *Histoire générale de la population mondiale* (Paris: Montchrestien, 1961), p. 112. For a specific study of the Mixteca Alta region of Mexico, see Sherburne F. Cook and Woodrow Borah, *The Population of the Mixteca Alta 1520-1960* (Ibero-Americana, 50; Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968).

[8]In the sixteenth century, North America was, however, "practically empty" (*quasiment vide*). See Guillaume & Poussou, pp. 108-109.

[9]Braudel, *La Méditerranée* , 2nd ed., Vol 1, esp. pp. 299-300 and 368.

entire Mediterranean zone, including North Africa (about which there is as yet a lack of demographic information for the sixteenth century) and apparently even Syria and Egypt (about which qualified scholars have their doubts).[10]

It may be that we are even seeing a doubling of the Mediterranean population in the sixteenth century, with a rapid rate of increase in the period roughly 1450–1550 and a slower rate in roughly 1550–1650. This sixteenth-century population growth, visible also for Europe north of the Mediterranean,[11] makes an interesting contrast with Europe's preceding period of population stability, but nowhere is the sixteenth-century rise more striking than in Syria and Egypt, where it contrasts sharply with what, viewing the Middle Ages as a whole, can only be described as a protracted era of decline.[12] On the northern shores of the Mediterranean,

[10]See, e.g., T. H. Hollingsworth, *Historical Demography* (The Sources of History: Studies in the Uses of Historical Evidence; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 311. There is an interesting discussion in J. C. Russell, *Late Ancient and Medieval Population* (Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series, Vol. 48, Pt. 3; Philadelphia, 1958), pp. 129-131. On the other hand, Charles Issawi, "The Decline of Middle Eastern Trade, 1100-1850" in D. S. Richards, ed., *Islam and the Trade of Asia: A Colloquium* (Papers on Islamic History: II; Oxford and Philadelphia: Bruno Cassirer and University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), p. 245, seems to take it as generally accepted that there was an economic rally in northern Syria in the sixteenth century.

[11]See Guillaume & Poussou, pp. 111-115, and Reinhard & Armengaud, pp. 82-95.

[12] The Ph.D. thesis of Basim Musallam (Harvard, 1973) attributes this stability/decline in the Arab Middle East to the recurrence of epidemics and the generalized use of contraception (mainly coitus interruptus), which, he shows, was sanctioned by Islam. (Cf. the case of Japan, n. 29 below.) Musallam's work, therefore, has implications that will require revision of the theory of demographic transition in general, as applied to the cultural area covered by his thesis, and, in particular, of the "natural fertility" concept formulated by Louis Henry (although the contrast between the demographic experience of Europe and that of the Arab Middle East might be used to confirm the Henry concept for Europe—the question is difficult to approach because the Henry concept has recently been questioned, even for Europe, by Demeney, Livi-Bacci, Goubert, Eversley, and Hollingsworth).

If the Musallam thesis is correct, *and if* the population of Syria and Egypt did, along with the population of Europe, experience a marked rise in the sixteenth century, then it would appear that during that century, for as yet unexplained reasons, the Syrian and Egyptian populations were less anxious to limit the number of births, or else that there was a marked drop in the death rate.

population pressure, defined as "the ratio of the size of a population to the level of its resources,"[13] seems also to have increased, for in the sixteenth century we see large emigrations, of Jews, Italians, and others to North Africa and the Ottoman empire, of Spaniards to America, and of others redistributing themselves within Europe.[14]

The sixteenth-century population rise is followed by a setback everywhere in the seventeenth century, after which the population begins to grow again. In the New World, the population of Mexico is, of course, already in decline, but the seventeenth-century setback stands out in sharper relief in North America,[15] where the sixteenth century has been a period of growth. In Europe, the population regression hits city and countryside alike, except for certain major centers, notably London, Paris, Madrid, and Istanbul. In some places the setback is serious. The population of Denmark, for example, falls more than one-fifth between 1650 and 1660.[16] Bubonic plague in Spain and Italy and also the political and economic difficulties of these two countries may account for demographic contraction there,[17] but contraction in other areas is less easily explained. Our view of the Ottoman empire is clouded somewhat after the first decade of the seventeenth century by the Ottomans' political and administrative difficulties, but at some point the population growth seems to have been checked.

In the second half of the seventeenth century there is a recovery to be seen in both hemispheres, even in Mexico, where the population decline pulls out of its rapid drop (the development of antibodies?). In Europe, cities and towns recover more quickly than the surrounding countrysides, but the population begins a visible rise that continued, in both

For a quick sketch of the medieval economic decline in the Arab countries, see Charles Issawi, ed., *The Economic History of the Middle East 1800-1914* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 3-8.

[13]M. A. Cook, *Population Pressure in Rural Anatolia 1450-1600* (London Oriental Series, Vol. 27; London: Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 9.

[14]Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 380-383.

[15]Following Europe, perhaps, because North America's population growth is tied to agricultural colonization. See Guillaume & Poussou, pp. 108-109.

[16]A. Lassen (1965), cited in E. A. Wrigley, *Population and History* (World University Library; London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969), p. 63.

[17]Guillaume & Poussou, pp. 116-117.

Europe and the Americas, throughout the eighteenth century, although in eighteenth-century Europe it would appear that the countryside grows more quickly than the cities.[18] In South America, the importation of African slaves, which has increased throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, reaches its culmination in the eighteenth century, when some 7,000,000 slaves are imported, and is a factor in the population growth. Slaves are also a factor in North America.[19] In a few places, notably Normandy[20] and the Ottoman empire, plagues account for high mortality in the eighteenth century, but the general European pattern is clearly upward, and in the second half of the century even badly hit Asia Minor has overcome the plagues and is experiencing a rapid economic growth and a population rise. By contrast, however, the populations of Syria and Egypt do not recover and remain low until the nineteenth century.

Moving east, it is impossible to decide much about the broad shape in front of our eyes on the basis of the uncertain population conditions in Iraq because the region has become the Ottoman-Safavid battlefield. There seems to be an upswing in numbers at the beginning of our period, but, after that, all that can be said is the population *pressure* (as defined above) is probably high as a result of the degeneration of the irrigation systems, whereas population *figures* are certainly low and probably declining. To the north, on the other hand, in Muscovy, the population increases substantially in the sixteenth century,[21] although in the second half of the century population pressure in the heavily settled central and northwestern territories brings about a movement mainly to the east and south. The period of Muscovite-Russian expansion has begun. The figures are highly conjectural, and it is possible that the population continues to grow and that Muscovy does not witness the seventeenth-century demographic contraction, but on the face of it this would seem

[18]Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, p. 300.

[19]See Reinhard & Armengaud, pp. 203-204. The slave trade does not seem to have crippled the population resources of Africa in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

[20] See Michel Bouvet and Pierre Marie Bourdin, *A travers la Normandie des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles* (Cahier des annales de Normandie, No. 6; Caen: University of Caen, 1968).

[21]See Jerome Blum, *Lord and Peasant in Russia from the Ninth to the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), pp. 120-124.

unlikely, since epidemics hit Muscovy from 1655 on, and between 1659 and 1667 something like 700,000 or 800,000 people die of sickness. In any case, the population continues to rise markedly in the eighteenth century.[22]

Continuing eastward, we find mists over Iran, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, but a sixteenth-century population rise is by no means implausible. Safavid, Uzbek, and Mughal military maneuvering make the picture uncertain, but by the middle of the seventeenth century it is clear that in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries there has been a noticeable economic growth and prosperity in Iran. To the east, the number of Afghans appears to have been increasing, and in Transoxania the early years of the Ashtarkhanid dynasty witness relative stability, agricultural expansion, and economic growth. In Eastern Turkestan (the Tarim basin and Uighuristan) the urban and agricultural populations find increased strength vis-a-vis the nomads. With the middle of the seventeenth century, this rosy picture fades. Iran experiences a sharp drop in urban population resulting, as least in part, from wars and plagues. Like the Arab Middle East, the country fails to recover during the eighteenth century, with southern Iran suffering more than the northern part of the country. The same is true of Afghanistan (which, of course, does not exist as such in the seventeenth century) and Transoxania, where there are famines and civil chaos after 1650, with large cities like Samarkand suffering most heavily. Similarly, a seventeenth-century economic decline, which must have included a demographic regression, also strikes Eastern Turkestan, which is stricken with internal political upheavals at mid-century and is overrun by a nomad invasion in 1679. The Manchu (Ch'ing) invasion of 1758–1759 allows Sinkiang a measure of political stability and economic recovery (although not a sense of social and religious well being) after the initial shock, but western Central Asia, like Iran and the Arab Middle East, does not begin to recover from its seventeenth-century slump until the nineteenth century.

Looking north of Central Asia, to the steppe, we see the nomads, but they are in motion, in their usual fashion, and we

[22] See Guillaume & Poussou, p. 115, and Reinhard & Armengaud, pp. 149-150. For estimated deaths from the epidemics, see R. Mousnier, *Peasant Uprisings* (bibliographical details in n.38 below), p. 213.

are unable to judge the growth and decline of population by what we see. There are no census data, and there are only the most fragmentary historical records. The Kazakh, Oirat, and eastern Mongolian populations (both humans and livestock) seem to have been growing. The Kazakhs, formed at the end of the fifteenth century, spread into the Kazakh steppe. The Oirats expand into Tibet and Eastern Turkestan, conduct raids into the Kazakh steppe and against western Central Asia, and some of them, at the beginning of the seventeenth century, migrate as far west as the region of the Volga. The movements of the eastern Mongols are less dramatic, but here again it has been argued that there is a significant growth in the amount of livestock.[23] It is likely that this is paralleled by a growth in the human population. In any case, in the second half of the sixteenth century there is a Mongolian population movement toward the south and southwest and a search for more pasture, and the Mongols never recover from the disorders (accompanied by much loss of life) that begin in Outer Mongolia in the 1660s, nomad economic decline being the norm from then on.

South of Afghanistan and Eastern Turkestan lie the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and Tibet. India's population cannot be seen very clearly for the sixteenth century or even for the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but the demographic trend over the course of the period between 1500 and 1800 is unmistakably one of growth. Whether there is a dip in the curve during the seventeenth century we cannot be sure, but a breakdown in the Indian economy does appear to occur at roughly that time.[24] In Tibet, high up in the

[23] See I. Ia. Zlatkin, *Istoriia dzhungarskogo khanstva (1635-1758)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1964), esp. "1. Zapadnaia Mongoliia v vtoroi polovine XVI v.," pp. 99-116.

[24] Kingsley Davis, *The Population of India and Pakistan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), pp. 24-26, argues for a total population of 125,000,000 in 1600, rejects "a false notion of stagnation between 1600 and 1845," and assumes that the population of India remained at the 1600 figure (125,000,000) "for one and a half centuries more, after which a gradual enhancement of growth began, accelerating as 1870 approached." S. Chandrasekhar, *India's Population: Fact and Policy* (New York: Asia Press, 1946), p. 14, accepts the estimate of 100,000,000 for 1600 given by W. H. Moreland (1927) and the estimate given by Shirras (1931) of 130,000,000 for 1750. G. Findlay Shirras, "The Population Problem in India," *Economic Journal* 43 (1933) 61, estimates India's population in 1650 as 80,000,000, in 1750 as 130,000,000, and in 1850 as 190,000,000.

mountains, we see only that the number of monks has risen since the seventeenth century, and we are unable to tell about the population as a whole. An estimate in 1885 had the monks constituting twenty percent of the Tibetan population. A recent estimate for Central Tibet gives the monk population as fifteen percent of the whole. But we do not know what to make of these figures, and we are not able to assume, on the basis of the present evidence, that the proportion of monks to the Tibetan population as a whole has remained roughly stable for the period between the Fifth Dalai Lama's census of 1663 and the Chinese census of 1953.[25]

As we continue to fly eastward, we note with regret that populous Southeast Asia, lying in the tropics, is beyond our field of vision,[26] but we can see China, immense in territory, although its population is concentrated in the east. China's

If we accept Moreland's or Davis' figure for 1600 and Shirras' figures for 1650 and 1750, then the population curve is similar to that of Europe, with a dip in the seventeenth century. This is not a legitimate approach because the various estimates were arrived at on different bases. On the other hand, the fact of the matter is that we do not know anything about the Indian population of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Data do exist, however, in particular for northern India, and may be expected to yield approximate results when the methodology of historical demography is further developed and applied. Issawi, "The Decline of Middle Eastern Trade," p. 246, posits Indian economic "breakdown" for the latter part of the seventeenth century, or even the eighteenth.

[25]See R. A. Stein, *La civilisation tibétaine* (Collection SIGMA, 1; Paris: Dunod, 1962), p. 111, and Pedro Carrasco, *Land and Polity in Tibet* (American Ethnological Society; Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1959), p. 78. The long-term demographic trend for Tibet, like that of the Arab Middle East, appears to have been one of decline from the levels of the early Middle Ages (seventh century)—see W. D. Shakabpa, *Tibet: A Political History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 6. Another clue to Tibet's medieval population may be found in V. A. Bogoslovskii, *Ocherk istorii tibetskogo naroda (Stanovlenie klassovogo obshchestva)* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1962), p. 128.

Sufficient records exist for Tibet so that, with the application of the methods of historical demography, it will probably be possible to develop relatively good figures for Tibetan population during the period 1500-1800, and perhaps earlier. The data are at present difficult of access, however, because they are mostly in Tibet.

[26]But not beyond the vision of the historical demographer. Continental Southeast Asian countries, like Vietnam, for example, have data which will make historical population studies possible. Even for Indonesia, data exist from which inferences can be drawn concerning periods prior to the last quarter of the eighteenth century, when the Dutch began making estimates in Java. See Widjojo Nitisastro, *Population Trends in Indonesia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970), pp. 1 and 11-17.

population curve is strikingly like that of Europe for the entire period from 1500 to 1800. The Chinese population continues a fifteenth-century rise steadily throughout the sixteenth century, falls back severely in the second quarter of the seventeenth (no net gain in this century) and then rises in the eighteenth century at an accelerated pace.[27] Korea, although politically a separate entity, presents a similar picture, with a rise coming from the fifteenth century and continuing throughout the sixteenth century, a drop in the seventeenth century, then recovery, and sustained demographic growth continued throughout the eighteenth century and into modern times.[28]

[27]See Ping-ti Ho, *Studies on the Population of China, 1368-1953* (Harvard East Asian Studies 4; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 23 and 277-278. Ho's reasoning has been found acceptable by at least one economist, Dwight Perkins, *Agricultural Development in China 1368-1968* (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), who essentially follows him for the period we are reviewing.

[28]See Cho Pil-jay, "Growth of Korean Populations," *Korea Journal* (Aug. 1964) 2. The population "statistics" are, of course, as in the case of China, merely taxation data and therefore do not reflect the true population size. Underregistration, without question, continued throughout most of the Yi dynasty. This would seem particularly clear as regards the seventeenth century, after the Japanese invasions had destroyed the land taxation records, for reports indicate a phenomenal rise, the impossible jump from a population of 1,500,000 to one of 5,700,000, i.e., almost a quadrupling in one century.

In fact, however, there is very little room for doubt that Korea's population rise suffered a setback in the seventeenth century. In the fifteenth century, immediately following the establishment of Yi-dynasty rule, the government had resettled large numbers of people from the populous south into the sparsely populated north; more land had been brought under cultivation; and there had been a clear demographic increase. At the end of the sixteenth century, however, there began to be difficulties. The Japanese invaded Korea in 1592 and 1597, calling forth Chinese military intervention, with the result that between the Japanese invaders and the Chinese and Korean defenders the country was ravaged, and the economy was disrupted. An important military revolt shook the north in 1624, and the Manchus invaded Korea in 1627 and 1636. In 1671 famine and disease are said to have carried off more people than had died during the whole of the Japanese invasions. The government had no socially effective system to stave off famine, although Korea did have "ever-normal granaries" patterned after the Chinese model; so famine was endemic in the seventeenth century, producing both pestilence and disorder. For a sketch in English, see E. O. Reischauer and J. K. Fairbank, *A History of East Asian Civilization*, Vol. 1: *East Asia: The Great Tradition* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), esp. pp. 443-446. I am indebted to James K. Ash (Fort Lewis College), whose participation in my seminar on early modern history at Harvard University

Finally, across the sea in Japan only the most general outlines of the demographic curve are visible. The sixteenth century cannot be seen, but the Japanese population grows rapidly during the seventeenth century, levels off after the first quarter of the eighteenth century, and remains stable into the nineteenth, although the economy as a whole continues to expand.[29] The last word has probably not yet been said on Japan's demographic history of the seventeenth century, but on the face of it there seems to be no reason to predicate any dent in the upward curve. Population growth may have been retarded in the late sixteenth century by the ravages of Oda Nobunaga and Hideyoshi but the Tokugawa campaigns of 1614–1615 against Osaka and the Christian revolt of 1637–1638 in the Shimabara peninsula were too limited to have had any demographic effect. In other words, Japan's population curve somewhat resembles that of the Middle East in the eighteenth century in that it does not rise, but is atypical of the general Eurasian pattern for the seventeenth century in that it does not dip.

Viewed as a whole (impossible from our plane window, which is limited to the period from the sixteenth through the eighteenth century), the demographic curves of the globe's various populations would look quite unalike, except, perhaps, for a fairly universal rise in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Furthermore, even between 1500 and 1800 the various populations' *rates* of increase and decrease vary widely. China grows faster than Europe, and Europe

in 1970 introduced me to the problems and interest of Korean demographic and economic history.

[29]The population stability of the eighteenth century, which may be somewhat misleading (the first census was in 1721) because at this time the Japanese were still filling their southern and western territories, is generally explained as resulting partly from famines and epidemics and partly from active population limitation on the part of the Japanese themselves (abortion and infanticide)—see Guillaume and Poussou, pp. 110-111. Note the direct parallel between this explanation and the explanation for the demographic stability/decline in the Arab Middle East given by Musallam (see n. 12 above), who sees the recurrent epidemics of the Middle Ages coupled with widely practiced contraception as the primary limiting factors. (Islam approved of contraception, tolerated abortion, but condemned infanticide.) Dare I invoke the sterilizing effects of a hot Japanese bath? When do the baths become a widespread custom in Japan?

The principal study of Japan's population is Irene B. Taeuber, *The Population of Japan* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958). See esp. pp. 16-21.

grows faster than India. If population size is wealth, after the demographic shocks (or shock) of the seventeenth century, the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, everywhere except in Central America, where the poor get richer. But except in Central America and in Japan, the shapes of the various population curves in the sixteenth and first part of the seventeenth century are similar to a remarkable degree. And even Central America shares the seventeenth-century global dip in the curve.

PARALLELISM II: QUICKENING TEMPO

The second observation that we make from our plane window is difficult to describe, let alone measure, for we lack the scales or yardstick with which to quantify it in a meaningful way, but over the course of the three centuries in view we cannot help noticing an increased bustle, more noise, more motion, more buying and selling, more travel, more curiosity, a wider range of interests, more activity in all spheres of life. More historical "events" following on one another in more rapid succession. We sense an acceleration of pace which, if it were to be reduced to its lowest common denominator, we might sum up as a faster rate of historical change. (Is it simply that we know more about the period 1500–1800 than we know about earlier history and the acceleration that we think we see is more apparent than real? I do not think so.) Certainly there is more commercial activity than there was in the period immediately before 1500.

In the political and intellectual spheres, too, are there not more changes, more new ideas, more people questioning time-honored values and institutions? Not only is there *more* activity, more change. The tempo is also faster. The pace accelerates as it approaches the nineteenth century. Everywhere.

PARALLELISM III: GROWTH OF "REGIONAL" CITIES AND TOWNS

A kind of urbanization trend is also apparent, and we see a growth in the number, size, and importance of towns and medium-sized cities.

There have, of course, always been cities and many of them, functioning mainly as nexuses of trade routes or depots and watering- and provisioning-places along trade routes just

before or after an obstacle or some particularly long or difficult stretch—port cities on the coasts, oases in the deserts, portage points between river systems, caravanserais at the feet of mountain ranges on the approach to passes. Other cities have grown out of military garrisons situated in some strategic spot that dominates a region or controls access to one. Some cities, once strategically or economically well located with reference to conditions that are now obsolete, have nonetheless remained important because they are associated with the government and traditions of a cult, a culture, a state, or an empire. There are also centrally located cities and towns that function mainly as the centers of economic activity for surrounding regions. These might be referred to as "central place" cities, but I shall call them "regional" cities, since the term "regional" carries less specific overtones.[30]

In the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, long-distance trade continues, and European maritime trade increases. It is by no means certain, however, that the seafaring Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and English merchants of early modern Europe—except perhaps those trading after about the middle of the eighteenth century—are carrying on trade of greater commercial value or that they are more active, not to speak of being economically sophisticated, than the Arab and Italian merchants of the later Middle Ages. The important thing is not the substitution of one set of long-distance traders for another, because at least until after 1700 European maritime trade is probably of no greater economic importance to Africa and Asia than the trade of the Arabs and Italians was in the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth centuries. The important thing is the difference in the amount of *regional short-distance trade*, not just in the coastal cities but inland and everywhere. Regional markets have begun to grow. Fairs, held at regular intervals, become more important and take on an increasingly urban character. More partnerships are formed, more businesses opened.[31]

[30]An idea of the development of "central place" theory may be had from Brian J. L. Berry and Allen Pred, *Central Place Studies: A Bibliography of Theory and Applications* (Philadelphia: Regional Science Research Institute, 1965). The article that has brought home the relevance of this subject to students of China is William Skinner, "Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China," *Journal of Asian Studies* 14, nos. 1-3 (November 1964-May 1965).

[31]A difficult question to study, even in the more limited area of commercial activity. Of the major civilizations, Europe, with its fuller historical sources, provides the happiest hunting grounds, and Indian commerce, except for maritime trade, is probably the most difficult to research. As regards the Near East, Abraham Udovitch has pointed out that probably for the entire medieval period, "such questions as the volume and velocity of goods exchanged, relationship between exports and imports, total sum of monetary resources, etc. . . . will of necessity remain unanswerable, or at best vaguely answerable simply because of the lack of sufficient and suitable documentary and other sources from which we can draw the requisite data"—A. L. Udovitch, "Commercial Techniques in Early Medieval Islamic Trade," in D. S. Richards, ed., *Islam and the Trade of Asia: A Colloquium* (Papers on Islamic History: II; Oxford and Philadelphia: Bruno Cassirer and the University of Pennsylvania Press, 1970), p. 37. How much better the possible source basis becomes through the availability of Ottoman records in the sixteenth and seventeenth and eighteenth centuries remains to be determined. The feasibility of quantifying commercial activity in late Ming and early Ch'ing China is also debatable because of the officially disesteemed and extra-legal (often illegal) character of much of Chinese commerce.

The old type of city, the city whose primary function is associated with long-distance trade, continues to exist, but during the three centuries in view such cities do not appear to multiply. Instead we see a growth in the number and size of cities and towns of the "regional" type—central market towns acting as the hub of *intraregional exchange*, cities serving as the economic (and cultural) centers of their surrounding agricultural districts, often in connection with the development of a local industry. Cities like these have, of course, as already mentioned, always existed, but after 1500, very gradually at first, but perceptibly, there begin to be proportionately more and more of them.

The trend can be seen collapsed, and therefore most clearly, in a region like Siberia which, at the beginning of our period, is settled, and sparsely so, only by comparatively primitive forest peoples. Here, at 1500, trade is for the most part north-south trade, mainly furs, grain and other Siberian foods and certain crude manufactures in return for the animals and animal products of the steppe nomads to the south and in return for a few more sophisticated manufactures from China, Central Asia, and perhaps also India. At first the trade is carried on between the forest peoples and the nomads directly, but by the early seventeenth century long-distance traders from Central Asia known as "Bukhariots" (although they are not necessarily from Bukhara) seem to have gained a near monopoly, carrying on a kind of triangle between the

sown (China, the Muslim khanates, and Muscovy), the steppe, and the forest.

By the 1670s, however, the Muscovites, in developing the fur trade, have expanded through Siberia and have established well-defined east-west trade routes, which they have supported by building fortified towns at strategic points along the way. Not content to deal with Chinese, Central Asian, and nomad markets through Bukhariot middle-men, the Muscovites begin opening trade routes of their own and gradually squeeze out the Bukhariots, but one of the main reasons why it is possible for them to do so is the fact that the handicraft, agricultural, and livestock-raising economy of Siberia has developed to such an extent that local Siberian consumption has less demand for the commodities that the Bukhariots have been bringing. In the meantime the number of Slavs moving into Siberia, taking up residence in the new towns and founding others, and carrying on agriculture, light industry, and the like, has steadily increased; the source of furs has been diminishing and moving farther east; and political troubles have come to bar the way of developing the full potential of Sino-Russian trade.

Regional Siberian economies increasingly develop lives of their own without much dependence on long-distance trade, and foreign long-distance traders (Central Asians and nomads) stop coming to the Siberian cities altogether and do their business instead at periodic border markets, like the Iamysh fair. Treaties with China in 1689 and 1727 fail to open the way to a secure and flourishing Sino-Russian trade, and at the turn of the century the caravan trade is, in any case, largely in the hands of the *gosti* (official merchants of the tsar), thus lying outside the regional Siberian economies, but by the mid-eighteenth century the Russian demographic presence in Siberia is so pervasive, so many new lands have been opened by the plough, so many new towns have been built, and so much economic development (mining in particular) has taken place, that the Siberian cities have become principally regional economic centers, and their life's blood no longer consists of long-distance trade. Even if the fur supply gives out altogether, even if the disappointing Kiakhta trade dries up, the Siberian cities will continue to thrive, either because they are the centers of a local industry or simply because they are the focal points of a surrounding regional economy. Major seventeenth-century trans-shipment points like Tiumen',

Tobol'sk, Tomsk, Krasnoiarsk, and Irkutsk, which connect the flow of Siberian trade with European Russia, are still as important as ever, but their functions are no longer essentially limited to long-distance trade.[32] Trans-shipment points, like Verkhotur'e, that have not developed a regional importance have lapsed into comparative oblivion. But what is mainly noticeable about the eighteenth-century Siberian map is that now it is dotted with towns that exist primarily as regional centers of their surrounding economic areas, not merely as service and junction points along a trade route leading to Moscow. What is also noticeable is that it is in these cities that all the "important" people have taken up residence.

In many respects, of course, the pattern of urban development in Siberia in the period 1500–1800 is atypical of the trend in other areas of the world where the population is less sparse and less primitive in the sixteenth century, and where there is no such wave of immigration. But, with this proviso well in mind, we may nonetheless find the case of Siberia useful as a microcosm of the process that we see taking place from our plane window: an increase in the number, size, and importance of "regional" centers.

In Europe,[33] India, and China the process is more difficult to discern than in Siberia, where there are no true cities or towns at all in the sixteenth century and where there are many thriving ones in the eighteenth century. In more civilized and heavily settled parts of the world, the major sixteenth-century cities are still on the eighteenth-century

[32]For urban and general economic growth in Siberia in the period under review, see A. P. Okladnikov, *et al.*, eds., *Istoriia Sibiri s drevneishykh vremen do nashykh dnei*, Vol. 1 (Leningrad: Nauka, 1968), Ch. 8, and Vol. 2 (1968), Pts. 1-2. For western Siberia, see O. N. Vilkov, *Remeslo i torgovlia zapadnoi Sibiri v XVII veke* (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), and for Trans-Baikalia, see V. A. Aleksandrov, *Rossiia na dal'nevostochnykh rubezhakh (vtoraia polovina XVII v.)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1969). See also O. N. Vilkov, "Problema vserossiiskogo rynka i sibirskaia torgovlia i promyshlennost' XVII v.," in A. P. Okladnikov, *et al.*, eds., *Itogi i zadachi izucheniia istorii Sibiri dosovetskogo perioda* (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1971), pp. 76-101. Lenin's notion of an "all-Russia" or "national" market beginning in the seventeenth century seems overdrawn.

[33] The main point of departure for study of the growth of European cities in the late Middle Ages and early modern period is Roger Mols, S.J., *Introduction à la démographie historique des villes d'Europe du XIVe au XVIIIe siècle*, 3 vols. (University of Louvain, Recueil de travaux d'histoire et de philologie, Series 4, Fasc. 1-3; Louvain, 1954-1956).

map, and the regional centers that have grown to prominence in the eighteenth century are also to be found—they are small then, but they *are* to be found—on the sixteenth century map. But from the vantage point of our plane window the fact that the list of city names is much the same does not mislead us, because there has been a shift in function, a shift in weight. Paris is still Paris. Delhi is still Delhi. But they are different. In the period 1500–1800 they grow more important. The high and mighty who once lived in the country have moved into the city, and the city plays a much more important role in the life of the country. New cities, like Fatehpur Sikri, that fail to find a regional importance fail to grow; others, like Madrid, that succeed, grow apace. This phenomenon is to be distinguished from the decline, during our period, of cities that depend on long-distance trade patterns that are changing, like Venice and Novgorod, and from the growth of others, like Seville, Goa, and Canton, that find new long-distance trade patterns to enrich them.

Another observation as we fly: just as it was with the population rise in our demographic overview, the seventeenth century is a time of crises for the world's cities and for the growth of "regional" cities and towns in particular. But after the seventeenth-century crises are ended, especially in the eighteenth century, the regional centers recover at a more rapid rate than other urban centers, with the exception of a very few fortunate ports and political capitals nourished by a heavy flow of trade or one of the heavy-handed absolutisms of the eighteenth century.

PARALLELISM IV: RISE OF THE URBAN COMMERCIAL CLASSES (RENASCENCES)

We have already noted that cities have always existed, and it follows that city-dwellers have always existed too. In medieval times city inhabitants were government and religious officials, garrison soldiers, a limited number of menials, a tiny substratum of prostitutes, thieves, and beggars, but mainly *merchants and artisans.* All of these social groups continue to inhabit cities in the sixteenth through the eighteenth century and probably in about the same proportions, although two new groups begin to make their appearance in unprecedented numbers: the social and cultural elites (aristocrats) and the poor, laborers or would-be-laborers—in other words, both ends of the social scale.

As we examine the terrain below us from our plane window, we note not only the influx of these two groups into the cities, accompanying the cities' increased regional trade and industrial activity, but the fact that the merchants and artisans, far from being dominated and overpowered by the arrival of the traditional elites, find themselves in an increased position of strength. As our time period progresses, the sharp distinctions that once separated the urban commercial classes from the traditional social and cultural aristocracies gradually become blurred. There are more financial understandings, more business deals, more alliances, more overlappings of function between aristocrats and merchants, between aristocratic families and merchant families.

In cultural life also this is to be seen. Artists and writers who once had to satisfy the traditional esthetic requirements of a more rural cultural elite must now satisfy the city-dweller, with the urban man's tastes and concerns. Urban patrons of high culture are nothing new, as can be seen in the Italian cities, in Herat, and in China and Japan prior to 1500, and the Italian Renaissance of the fifteenth century is noteworthy even for *merchant* patronage of the visual arts, but with the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the urban character of the arts is more apparent.

Islamic attitudes toward the fashioning of images make the urban influences on the visual arts difficult to compare during the period in view. It is possible, for example, that the growth of genre painting in Europe in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries or, say, in Korea, is to be compared with the fact that Awrangzeb terminates Mughal patronage of painting altogether in 1659, for Awrangzeb is responding to urban Muslim sentiment, spearheaded by the Naqshbandiyya, which holds that infidel practices at court have gone too far. In the performing arts and in literary and intellectual history, however, the picture is clearer. As patrons, as appreciators, and as creators, the urban commercial classes begin playing a cultural role that they have not played before, and their tastes and their support leave a distinctive mark.

Take, for example, the seventeenth century. In Japan, *Kabuki* begins to entertain the spectator, and Saikaku's literary portraits of city life in Osaka sum up the spirit of the age. In

China, the so-called "novel" comes out into the open; popularizations of classical literary and philosophical works begin to appear; intellectuals like Ku Yen-wu look with new eyes at the traditional Neo-Confucianism that has dominated Chinese thinking for five centuries; and there are fresh developments in social thought. In Muslim India, the seventeenth century sees the development of vernacular literatures (Ghawwasi in Urdu, Sultan Ba Hu in Punjabi are pertinent examples) at the expense of Arabic and Persian; genres like the *tadhkira*, increasingly popular in Central Asia also at this time, reflect the interests and tastes of the commercial classes. In Central Asia, the decline of Chaghatay literature is to be seen, as least in part, as the decline of *belles-lettres* at court and the popularization (vulgarization) of literature. For Arabic and Persian literature and thought, the seventeenth century is also a low point. The significance of this fact, however, is unclear. In the Ottoman empire the seventeenth century sees the development of pure prose writing (the travels of Evliya Celebi and the histories of Katip Çelebi and Peçevi) and popular literature catering to the tastes of a readership that has not been steeped in the traditional education of Ottoman high culture.

In Europe, and especially in Europe, the seventeenth century is a watershed in intellectual history. It has been said that "in a very real sense the modern world as we know it is a seventeenth-century creation; modern science, modern philosophy, and the modern state. . . all emerged during this age. And these three great developments are, in turn, manifestations of an underlying common core. This core is the new sense of power, the power of man to shape his own society, his own destiny."[34] This power is the *dynamism and restlessness* of the urban commercial classes who have finally come into their own and whose minds are less the captives of traditional culture than were the minds of the older traditional elites. Their presence is certainly to be found in literature, and the now abated controversy over the authorship of Shakespeare's plays shows how loathe we are to believe our eyes. Lope de Vega and Molière are harder to deny. In intellectual history, Hobbes, Pascal, Spinoza, and

[34]Carl J. Friedrich and Charles Blitzer, *The Age of Power* (The Development of Western Civilization; Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 1.

Locke also reflect the impact of the rising urban classes. It is a time of secular social thought.

But these men and their remarkable intellectual achievements are only the topmost and most glittering layer of a trend which, as we see from our plane window, is much deeper. Great writings represent high culture. There is almost invariably some relationship between the high culture and the popular culture of an age, and there is here, but the real substance of what we see below us lies in the domain of *popular culture*, a subject less easily studied and therefore less visible to the historian's eye than intellectual and literary history. Of more importance for our trend are the public entertainments—Punch and Judy in England, Karagöz shadow plays in Turkey, *K'un-ch'u* "opera" in China, puppet shows in Japan—and popular books and booklets, often popularizations and adaptations of "classical" works made for an urban readership, not for the literate intellectual elite but for the semiliterate townsmen. Note also the increased use of printing and advances in movable type in Europe and East Asia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and in the Ottoman empire in the early eighteenth century. Also the development of *han'gul* in Korea. In the seventeenth century are there not more popular entertainments and writings, more written, more published, more read, and do they not help in the awakening and self-awareness of the urban commercial classes who consume them?

PARALLELISM V: RELIGIOUS REVIVAL AND MISSIONARY MOVEMENTS (REFORMATIONS)

As we fly along, another congruence of global historical behavior, a quite astonishing one, meets our gaze. The urban classes reexamine the religions and religious values of their societies. Everywhere reform movements have come earlier, but in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries they fully saturate society, often creating great social upheavals, and they become linked with vast and truly far-flung missionary movements and activities, commonly moving hand in hand with trade and carrying as an ingredient the values of the urban commercial classes. The new urban man is not content with the decayed spiritual content of his religious institution. He believes more firmly than did his medieval forerunner in the validity of his own perceptions. He wants personal rather than vicarious religious experience. He is not content with the

religious forms, no matter how theologically sophisticated or rich and grandiose they may have become. He wants to get back to the essence of his religion.

Reformation, Counter-Reformation—Eastern Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism—these distinctions have confused us. Now, from our vantage point in the sky, we can see that Pierre Chaunu was right when he insisted that the Reformation be seen as a whole, as Protestant *and* Catholic.[35] We should add Orthodox. Some make their reforms inside the Church; others break free. But all, although they respond in different ways, are responding to a common change that is in the air. In 1516 Erasmus establishes a new text of the Bible. The decline (through schisms) and corruption and worldliness of the Renaissance papacy produce a response. In 1517 Luther nails his ninety-five theses on the door in Wittenberg, translates the Bible into German, and insists on justification by faith, rejecting the priesthood as an intermediary between man and God. There is a renewed ingredient of mysticism. There are liturgical changes, masses in German and English. Zwingli, Calvin, and John Knox appear. Sects in hiding, like the Anabaptists, come out into the open. Within the Church, the Jesuit order is founded, and the Council of Trent makes reform official. Missionaries, accompanying maritime trade, carry Christianity to the New World, to India, to East Asia. Europe is seized by the Thirty Years War (1618–1648). The Russian ritual and liturgy are revised, and the Old Believers secede in 1667. Christianity spreads into Siberia. And what about the messianic movement of Sabbatai Sevi that runs through world Jewry in the seventeenth century from Europe to Persia and the Yemen?

In the Muslim world, central Islamic authority has utterly disappeared. In 1500 the political reemergence of Shi'ism, embodied in the Safawiyya, a Sufi (mystical) order, splits Islam in half. The worldliness and moral laxity of the high ulema at the princely courts offends the average man, and the intricate ins and outs of Islamic jurisprudence seem baffling and irrelevant to him. The traditional religious edifice does not answer his spiritual needs; so he turns instead to the Sufi order affiliated with his trade guild. Sufi mysticism

[35]See Pierre Chaunu, "Le XVIIe siècle religieux: Reflexions préalables," *Annales E.S.C.*, Année 22, No. 2 (March-April 1967), pp. 279-302.

provides a more satisfactory route for him to have direct experience of God. Pre-Islamic and heretical sects and currents, long underground, surface again under the protective coloration of Sufism. Sunnis (Ottomans and Uzbeks) fight Shi'ites (Safavids). At precisely the same time that Jesuit, Franciscan, and Dominican missionaries are coming on the trading ships of Europe to convert the heathen of Africa, India, China, and Southeast Asia to Christianity, marabouts and missionaries of the Qadiri, Naqshbandi,[36] Chishti, Shattari, Suhrawardi, and Shadhili orders, on trade caravans and trading ships, are arriving in those same quarters of the globe to convert the infidels to Islam (and they are making far more converts).

This is precisely the period when Buddhism, worldly and decayed in Tibet, is revived and undergoes great changes and reorganization as a result of the reform movement of the Yellow sect (dGe-lugs-pa). New texts are "discovered," and the strict monastic discipline and spirituality of religious life are reaffirmed. The Yellow reforms stimulate a new self-criticism and reorganization of the "unreformed" monastic communities under the leadership of the Red sect (Karma-pa). The contest between the Red and the Yellow is accompanied by an enormous missionary effort carried on by both sides. During the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Buddhism is spread throughout Mongolia, Zungharia (northern Sinkiang), Manchuria, and many places in northwest China. Tibet and Mongolia are racked by religious war. Is not this period—the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—also the time for the Rawshaniyya among the Afghans, the Mahdawiyya among Indian Muslims, the Sikh movement in northern India, and the "high tide" of the Bhakti movement among the Hindus of the entire subcontinent? And do these new movements not originate and develop among the urban commercial classes and spread hand-in-hand with trade?[37]

[36]I have in semi-final stages of preparation several articles and a monograph dealing with the Naqshbandiyya as a reform and missionary movement.

[37]Of particular interest for the study of the religious movements in India at this time are K. A. Antonova, *Ocherki obshchestvennykh otnoshenii i politicheskogo stroia mogol'skoi Indii vremen Akbara (1556-1605 gg.)* (Moscow: AN SSSR, 1952); A. A. Rizvi, *Muslim Revivalist Movements in Northern India in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Agra: Agra University, 1965); and Tapan Raychaudhuri, *Bengal under Akbar and*

Religion in China is not easy to compare with Christianity in Europe or Islam in the Middle East, but it would seem that in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries China witnesses developments that have much in common with contemporary reformations elsewhere. The re-examination of Confucian orthodoxy, notably by Wang Yang-ming, at least in its motives, has much that is similar to the new look of the European Reformation. The purposes of Yen Jo-chu have much in common with the critical scholarship of Erasmus. Other parallels are found in the growth of Chinese messianic Buddhism. The rebellion of the White Lotus (founded in the twelfth century) does not occur until the end of the eighteenth century, but has not the pot been boiling since the sixteenth century? The Hsu Hung-ju revolt of 1622 numbers something like a million rebels. Although the White Lotus sends out no foreign missions, the sect's missionary efforts among the huge population of China appear prodigious. We fly on.

PARALLELISM VI: RURAL UNREST

The next broad historical congruence that comes to view has already been noticed and imaginatively described by Roland Mousnier in his *Peasant Uprisings in Seventeenth-Century France, Russia, and China,*[38] so that there is little here we need do other than give our testimony that the rural upheavals he describes are occurring, that there are even more of them and in more countries than Mousnier reports, and that the heavy period of uprisings is not so much the seventeenth century as such as it is the last quarter of the sixteenth century and the first three-quarters of the seventeenth. In addition to the peasant revolts in England (the Revolution), there are revolts in Catalonia, Portugal, Naples, Holland, the Ukraine, Ireland, Switzerland, Germany, Bohemia, Japan, Mughal India, and Mexico. From our plane

Jahangir: An Introductory Study in Social History, 2nd impression (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1969).

Antonova, pp. 162–165, sees both the Bhakti movement and the Sikh movement as made up mainly of urban commercial-industrial elements until they become popular (peasant) movements in the seventeenth century, although the Sikhs continue to be dominated by artisans and merchants.

[38]First published as *Fureurs paysannes: les paysans dans les révoltes du XVIIe siècle (France, Russie, Chine)* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1967). English tr. by Brian Pearce (New York: Harper and Row, 1970; paperback ed. Harper Torchbooks, 1972).

we see also the Celali revolts (1595–1610) of the Ottoman empire, spreading south into Syria and as far east as Transcaucasia, Kurdistan, and Iran, and accompanied by revolts in the Balkans; uprisings in Georgia in 1615 and 1625 and Armenia in 1624–1625; an insurrection of some 30,000 persons in Gilan in 1629. There are surely more.

But peasant revolts are merely symptomatic of something more basic—peasant discontent. In some places peasants may revolt; in other places peasants equally aggrieved may simply flee from the fields, or practice passive resistance, or else suffer and do nothing. What is it that we are seeing from our plane window? Of what disease are the rebellions symptomatic? Mousnier seems inclined to the view that, if there is a common cause, it is the climate, which shifts, making times harder for the peasant all the way around the world, and this view appears to be fairly widely held.[39] Are there not other possibilities as well?

For the Mediterranean, Braudel speaks of a refeudalization by a rich aristocracy (*réaction seigneuriale*) to which new members are added, the importance of usury, and the investment of commercial money in land by rich merchants who set themselves up as landlords (*trahison de la bourgeoisie*), accompanied toward the end of the sixteenth century by mounting misery and banditry in the countryside, which develops into full-scale revolts in the seventeenth century.[40] Even the Ottoman empire follows this pattern. Is not a similar development to be seen in Russia during this period? The estates granted in return for service (*pomest'ia*) increasingly resemble the old hereditary estates (*votchiny*), and officers of state, including many "new men," are becoming a hereditary landed nobility. Serfdom grows. Usury grows. A money economy is developing, and the landowners—the tsar, the monasteries, the aristocracy—all engage in trade.[41] Are there not similar developments in the relationship between landed property and the Mughal government and aristocracy

[39]Maurice Pianzola, *Les Renaissances et les révoltes: 1500-1700, le temps de rois* (Les métamorphoses de l'humanité; Paris: Planète, 1966), for example, a daring book that tries to tie together world historical congruities on the basis of the European maritime expansion, takes for granted a global climatic change in the seventeenth century, referring to glacial movements (p. 46).

[40]See Braudel, *La Méditerranée,* 2nd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 49–94.

[41]See Mousnier, *Peasant Uprisings,* p. 164.

in India? Along the Ganges, even Portuguese merchants are buying up lands in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and ruling them as lords under Mughal dominion.[42] In all of Central Asia we see an increase in the amount of private landed property and the putting together of huge landholdings, bought with commercial profits and often veiled as *waqf* endowments in the hands of such powerful religious leaders as the Juybari shaykhs of Bukhara and the Kasani khojas of Eastern Turkestan. Also the growth of usury.

In China too, as the Ming dynasty nears its end, do we not see the development of increasing ties between the merchants, moneylenders, and the gentry? The rebellions that actually bring down the dynasty are in the north, where gentry-merchant ties seem weaker, but even here there are similarities to the *réaction seigneuriale*, and the annexation of peasant lands by the latifundia of the Ming princes and powerful families is often cited as one of the causes of generalized rural unrest. This configuration does not end at the Chinese border. In Korea the powerful landowning classes, aided by the destruction of the land tax records during the Japanese invasions of the 1590s, also amass large tax-free latifundia. Usury gains in importance, as in Europe and the Ottoman empire. Also Japan. The condition of the peasantry deteriorates.

Everywhere there seems to be heavier taxation on the peasants who actually pay. The rich, in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, find ways to escape, keeping their lands off the tax rolls. Perhaps it is increasing population pressure. Michael Cook maintains, in the abstract at least, that "a growth of usury and dispossession, and perhaps even a tendency to large landholding" could be explained as a natural consequence of increasing population pressure.[43] Perhaps the increased circulation of money has worsened the peasants' lot. Is there a general economic recession in the seventeenth century, or not? There seems to be a parallelism here, but what is it? We see clearly only the peasant revolts, the symptoms.

[42]See Raychaudhuri, *Bengal under Akbar and Jahangir*, p. 111.
[43]Cook, *Population Pressure*, p. 39.

PARALLELISM VII: DECLINE OF NOMADISM

What else do we see, all the way from Morocco to the Sea of Japan? Nomads. If we pass our gaze across that whole expanse, along the North African coast, through the Middle East and Russia, through the northern marches of the Mughal empire, Central Asia, the steppe, across north China to Manchuria and the sea, we see nomads the whole way, interacting with the settled civilizations. We see far more of them and find that they are far more important and powerful at 1500 than at the end of the eighteenth century, a fact that has been attributed to gunpowder. By mid-sixteenth century, when nomad cavalry has put the Safavids on the throne in Iran, has made the Uzbeks masters of Transoxania, and has given the Mughals a foothold in north India, the balance of military power has already begun to shift in favor of all those whose settled existences are protected by walled fortifications.

In the whole southern and eastern Mediterranean area, for example, nomads are able to move unhampered by sedentary governments only in parts of North Africa.[44] Sedentary Muscovy, once a possession of the nomad Golden Horde, takes over its remains, setting up the puppet Kasimov khanate in the fifteenth century, and taking Kazan in 1552 and Astrakhan in 1554. The only important segment of the Horde that escapes Muscovite control is the Crimean khanate, which survives by throwing in its lot in the 1580s with another great non-nomadic descendant of a once-nomadic tradition, the Ottoman empire. (The Crimea is not annexed to Russia until 1783.) Are the nomads being infected by sedentary culture? To be sure, the Altan Khan of the Tumed (r. 1543–1583) wins resounding victories against the Chinese, but he also builds a walled capital (Bayishing) and superintends agriculture. And what has become of the Uzbeks, once so fierce and nomadic? Not to speak of the Mughals. The Afghans are making the transition to agriculture (but then it has been argued that they were never true nomads anyway). The Safavids may have ridden to power on the backs of the Turkmens' horses, but by the second half of the sixteenth century the Turkmen is the Safavid stable boy.

There are a few areas that seem exceptional, notably the Arab countries, where, as a result of the weakened control of

[44]See Braudel, *La Méditerranée*, 2nd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 87-91, 161, and 165.

the Ottoman government, bedouins make trouble off and on in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but, seen as a whole, by mid-seventeenth century the day of the nomad is done. In 1666 the Altin Khan of western Khalikha begins building his own town,[45] and in 1667 he asks the Muscovites to build a town with a Muscovite agricultural population and says that he, using this town and its population, will put many peoples under the tsar's control.[46] The spreading use of money has made its appearance in the steppe. The Manchus, who understand the nomads very well, have utterly destroyed their power in East Asia by the end of the seventeenth century, and by this time the Zunghars (the Manchus' last adversaries) are no longer the "uncooked" and unreconstructed nomads of an earlier time. They have farms, orchards, and industries and an empire with towns and cities and are only too aware of the strengths of the Muscovites and Manchus.

The eighteenth-century states of Nadir Shah in Iran and Ahmad Durrani in Afghanistan are not nomadic.

Is the explanation of the decline of nomad power really to be found in firearms in the early sixteenth century? We have our doubts. Certainly the idea that European maritime trade replaces the trans-Asia caravan trade and thus undermines the power of the nomads (an idea based on the unlikely assumption that nomad power depends on long-distance trade) is not very persuasive. But an idea of Andrew Hess strikes us as provocative of thought: "Cannons, fire-arms, and galley fleets, together with all of the urban-based organizational techniques necessary to command and sustain complex military units, heralded an end to the long dominance of the mounted archer . . . . Not only did the large-scale use of these new weapons shift the technological balance . . . but the modern implements of war created extraordinary new financial requirements for imperial politics . . . . Here also neither small Central Asian polities nor steppe states based on a herding economy could compete . . . ."[47]

[45]See N. P. Shastina, *Russko-mongol'skie posol'skie otnosheniia XVII veka* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1958), p. 99.

[46]See Aleksandrov, *Rossiia na dal'nevostochnykh rubezhakh*, p. 75.

[47]Andrew C. Hess, "The Ottoman Conquest of Egypt (1517) and the Beginnings of the Sixteenth-Century World War," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 4, No. 1 (January 1973) 58.

But the nomad tradition, as distinct from the nomads themselves, may have survived as a power to be reckoned with. Perhaps it is not merely a coincidence that the great empires of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries emerge, at least in part, from Turco-Mongolian cultural origins: the Ottoman, Muscovy, the Safavids, the Mughals, and the Manchus. Omeljan Pritsak is fond of pointing out to his students the analogy between nomadic and seafaring peoples. Perhaps even the Hapsburgs deserve an honorary place on our list.

And other parallelisms? Are there not more?

UNHAPPY LANDINGS

Our plane now begins its descent, and we must reflect quickly on the implications of what we have seen, for there are certain things that we will not be forgiven for saying once our feet are on firm ground. Let us make an even wilder assumption than some of those that we have already been making. Let us assume that the parallelisms that we have seen are not merely parallelisms. Let us assume that they are horizontal continuities and that therefore there *is* an early modern history. How then do we see this early modern history?

We see it as needlepoint. The horizontal continuities (the weft of the web) run from left to right. From top to bottom run the various vertical continuities of successive societies (the warp). Light is shining toward us from behind the web. We note that each of the different translucent threads of the warp is made of a distinct and different kind of fiber, so that, if we run our eye along a yellow translucent thread of weft, for example, it looks green where it crosses the blue thread of the Ottoman system of land tenure, and it looks orange when it crosses the red thread of the system of monastic landed property in Tibet. If the web were even a touch more closely woven and if we could not see tiny bare segments of the weft between intersections, we would recognize no continuities at all in the series of differently colored cross-hatchings. Finally, to complicate the structure further and, more important, to create the pattern of the needlepoint itself, is the thicker and more brightly colored yarn of the historical interconnections running in all directions through the web: the lavender of Jesuit missionary

activity around the world (as distinct from the historical continuity that produces it), the puce of European maritime trade, the magenta of food crops from America, the silver of Spanish bullion, the chartreuse of shifting patterns of trade, the beige of coffee- and tea-drinking. The subtle translucent hues of the warp and the dazzling colors and patterns of the needlepoint yarn almost totally conceal the horizontal continuities of the weft. But without the weft we have no needlepoint at all. Only a bag of threads.

As we fasten our safety belts, we may as well hazard a certain order for what we have seen. We begin with population growth (parallelism I). It is hard to find the cause or causes of that. Could it be, as McNeill suggests,[48] that epidemics, the old levelers of population, had lost their effectiveness? Plagues and famines have continued into the twentieth century, but they do seem to have lost their power.[49] Certainly the sixteenth-century population rise comes too early even in Europe to be satisfactorily explained by the theory of demographic transition, which places the essential factor of declining mortality in the eighteenth century, in terms of a change of climate. Thus Braudel in his new broad study, *Civilisation matérielle et capitalisme*: "It is the synchronism that makes the problem . . . . For this unison, more or less perfect, one can imagine only a single general answer: changes of climate . . . [for in the eighteenth century] the world is still only an immense peasantry."[50] Then again, new crops, slight technological or other advances hardly apparent on the surface of history may have combined to give men a greater adaptability to their physical environment and thus may have brought on demographic growth. Perhaps the seventeenth-century dip on the global population graph comes as a direct result of the sixteenth-century rise: too many people for the existing socio-economic institutional framework. The population growth is a vast puzzle, but also one of enormous importance for the modernization of mankind.[51]

[48]William H. McNeill, *The Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), pp. 572–573.

[49]For this subject see L. Fabian Hirst, *The Conquest of Plague: A Study of the Evolution of Epidemiology* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953).

[50]Braudel, *Civilization matérielle et capitalisme*, Vol. 1 (Paris: A. Colin, 1967), p. 32. Quoted also in Guillaume & Poussou, p. 158.

[51]We have a long way to go in this subject. I suspect that most of the data of historical demography, i.e., that cited above under *Parallelism I*, are highly inexact. Even general questions of demographic rise or decline are very much open to dispute. Attempts to establish figures prior to the nineteenth century, the crudest example being Minami Ryozabur, *et al.*, eds., *Jinko daijiten: Population Encyclopaedia* (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1957), pp. 243-250, are not to be taken seriously.

In any case, more people could have meant more activity of every sort and the general speed-up of history (parallelism II). More economic activity could have led to "regional" urbanization (parallelism III) as well as to a growth in the great cities of the earlier types, and urbanization could have added to the power of self-assurance of the urban classes (parallelism IV) and thus to an assertion of their religious values (parallelism V). Domination of the countryside by a new urbanized *status quo* could have led to rural unrest (parallelism VI), and the enormous growth of urban power and the kinds of states that it produced could have redressed the age-old balance between steppe and sown (parallelism VII).

We do not mean to imply that all of the parallelisms that we have noted are new or unique to the period 1500–1800. When we see "more" economic activity, we do not necessarily see more, for example, than in the Roman empire or in Sung China. But the early modern period has a pattern that ties it together, suggesting that the lives and histories of the globe's peoples were more interrelated than historians have hitherto realized, and perhaps also in *ways* that historians have not yet perceived. This pattern distinguishes it from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. On our plane ride we have emphasized *continuities* in early modern times. With the nineteenth century continuities persist and increase, but by 1850 we are struck more by the great *discontinuity* of modern times: the phenomenal development of the West that soon enables it to dominate the globe.

The plane is approaching the runway. We make one last observation. Marion Levy sees modernization as increasing interdependency, within states and in the world at large. He does not believe that modernization is "as old as Eve" and does not see it as emerging "full-figured at all until sometime into the nineteenth century." As an "adult," he says, "Modernization is no more than 150 years old by anyone's estimate."[52] Can we not see the adolescence of this interdependency in early modern times?

[52]See Marion J. Levy, Jr., *Modernization: Latecomers and Survivors* (New York: Basic Books, 1972), p. 4.

XI

The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China

Joseph Fletcher believed that the discoveries summarized in this history of the Naqshbandiyya in China were among the most important he had ever made. He worked on this essay until he was too ill to work, and he left in its final version a page of notes introducing his interest in this topic and the process by which he came to discover its substance. The following is based largely on those notes.

Prof. Fletcher attributed his fascination with the Naqshbandiyya to a chain of teachers and colleagues, beginning with a preparatory school teacher at Groton, Mel Mansen, and including Stan Shaw, Richard N. Frye, Martin Dickson, Gunnar Jarring, and Omeljan Pritsak. Francis Cleaves encouraged him to follow mysteries, and John K. Fairbank discussed studying the Central Asian khojas so important in Ch'ing history. The specific problem of Sufism in China was suggested to him by Benjamin Schwartz. Prof. Fletcher had known since the mid-1960s that the controversy between New and Old Teachings in northwest China was a dispute over the *dhikr*, the Sufi remembrance of God, but the identity of the Khufiyya and Jahriyya, the two antagonistic Sufi solidarities of Kansu, remained a mystery. Did they belong to the Yasawiyya? To the Naqshbandiyya? To some other mystical order?

In the mid-1970s, Prof. Fletcher visited the home of the Rev. Claude Pickens, Jr., a Christian missionary who had specialized in the study of Islam in China. There he saw a letter to Rev. Pickens from Martin Taylor, another missionary, which recounted a *silsila* of the Jahriyya order of Kansu, specifying a link between northwest China and Yemen through the spiritual teachers of Ma Ming-hsin, the Jahriyya's founder. This not only confirmed Prof. Fletcher's notion that Islam in China was closely connected to Islam elsewhere, but also made that connection geographically concrete. It also provided the possibility of solving the difficult problem of antagonism between rival Sufi orders in northwest China from the 18th to the 20th centuries through discovering their different roots in other Muslim lands. So Prof. Fletcher searched Rev. Pickens' files and the Arabic account of Islam in China by Muḥammad Tawāḍuᶜ,

and the claim of a Yemeni connection became more believable and worthy of investigation.

Following leads suggested by the work of John Voll, Prof. Fletcher went to Egypt to find ᶜAbd al-Khāliq and az-Zayn, the two names in Taylor's *silsila*. There, in the Gezira Club and crumbling coffee houses, he "struggled through 18th century *tafāsir* [biographies of Sufi saints] with Muḥammad Shaᶜbān, [and] turned up Ibrāhīm al-Kūrānī," who may well have been a Naqshbandī and who seemed to be related to the two objects of his search. On the heels of al-Kūrānī, he went to Yemen where, in the old Naqshbandī center of Zabid, he was told by one al-Ḥaḍramī: "Naqshbandīs in Yemen used vocal *dhikr* from al-Kūrānī and silent *dhikr* from as-Sindī," who was the subject of Voll's research. Al-Ḥaḍramī also excerpted Ahdal's "An-nafas al-Yamānī" for Prof. Fletcher, demonstrating the importance of ᶜAbd al-Khāliq in Yemen and making the crucial connection with Ma Ming-hsin's Jahriyya in northwest China.

Returning to Egypt and the Dār al-Kutub, Prof. Fletcher was able to expand his evidentiary base for a Yemeni origin of Chinese Naqshbandism. Back in Cambridge, he reviewed the Chinese sources on the Jahriyya rebellions of 1781-84 with Hung Chin-fu, and then, in the early 1980s, was able to visit a number of mosques in northwest China to confirm the continued strength of both Khufiyya and Jahriyya and the Yemeni connections of both as passed down in the orders' oral traditions. At several points in his notes, Prof. Fletcher made clear that he intended to examine, in far greater detail than he does in this article, the problem of the violent confrontation between the two Sufi sub-orders in northwest China, a violence rendered ironic by its remarkable dissimilarity to the relations between advocates of vocal and silent *dhikr* in Arabia.

But we shall never know the results of his thinking on this vital issue, for it was at this stage of his research that Prof. Fletcher discovered his fatal cancer and the tragic need to write quickly. He found more Arabic material with Wasmaa Chorbachi and revised the present essay for the last time. The present version, based entirely on that final revision, thus represents Joseph Fletcher's last scholarly achievement. I have altered as little as possible the text and its interpretations, even to the exclusion of relevant material which has been published since Prof. Fletcher's death, in order to present his scholarship as he completed it. At many points, he inserted pages of hand-written notes in the original; this version melds those deemed indispensible into text and notes, eliminating those which do not contribute substantially to the argument.

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The Naqshbandiyya in Northwest China

INTRODUCTION

The syncretic power of Chinese civilization remade non-Chinese religions whenever they entered China, or so it is commonly thought. Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Manichaeism all acquired Chinese forms, and the scholarly literature also represents "Chinese Islam" as largely a sinicized corruption of the "real" Islam of the Middle East.[1] Over the course of the Ming and Ch'ing dynasties (1368-1912) this "Chinese Islam" is portrayed as having lost touch with Islam in its "purer" Middle Eastern forms. But the available evidence does not suggest the existence of a separate "Chinese Islam." The history of the Muslims of China is not a history isolated from other Muslims.

Islamic civilization in China did acquire a Chinese veneer, and adaptations to Chinese culture certainly occurred among most of China's Muslim peoples. But if Muslims absorbed Chinese influences in China--just as they did Indian influences in India, southeast Asian influences in southeast Asia, and sub-Saharan African influences in sub-Saharan Africa--the fact would not distinguish Islam's career in the Middle Kingdom from its history elsewhere. Nor would it suggest that China's Muslims were less orthodox in matters of belief or less orthopractic in the conduct of their daily lives than their coreligionists in the Muslim world at large. Cultural absorption in Islam is to be seen in all the Muslim-inhabited regions of which we have knowledge, beginning in Arabia itself, and in China, as elsewhere, Muslim populations offered a high degree of resistance to the lure of the surrounding non-Muslim culture.

Despite the late imperial ban on travel outside the empire and the xenophobia of official Confucianism, the Muslims of China probably never lost touch with Muslims in the central Islamic lands. Islamic movements in China were for the most part related to dominant currents elsewhere in Islam. In fact, the history of Islam in China cannot be understood apart from the context of Muslim history in general. Nothing illustrates this point more clearly than

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1 This point of view is represented by C. P. Dabry de Thiersant, *Le Mahométisme en Chine et dans le Turkestan orientale*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1878); Marshall Broomhall, *Islam in China: A Neglected Problem* (London, 1910); and, most recently, Raphael Israeli, *Muslims in China: A Study in Cultural Confrontation* (London and Atlantic Highlands, 1978).

the role in China of the Naqshbandiyya, a Sufi brotherhood pre-eminently distinguished for its efforts in promoting strict adherence to the Islamic law. Indeed, for eighteenth- and nineteenth-century China, one would almost say that the history of the Naqshbandiyya is the history of Islam. The fact that the Naqshbandiyya's role has remained for so long unperceived in Chinese history betrays the underdeveloped state of Islamic studies concerning the northeast quadrant of the Muslim world.

The Naqshbandiyya entered northwest China from two distinct and separate sources, first from Central Asia, as the Khufiyya, an unreformed movement of the 16th and 17th centuries, and then from the Yemen, as the reformed Jahriyya, in the 18th century. The following two sections deal with those origins.

EARLY HISTORY OF THE NAQSHBANDIYYA IN ALTISHAHR

In the late fourteenth or early fifteenth century A.D. the Naqshbandiyya entered Altishahr (the Tarim River basin) in what is now regarded as China but at that time lay outside the Chinese empire. The first Naqshbandīs there were probably traders from Mawarannahr (Central Asia west of the Pamirs). The early masters of the Naqshbandī mystical path (Arabic *ṭarīqa*, "path") found fertile ground for their teaching in the popular mysticism (Arabic *taṣawwuf*, Sufism) that was common to Altishahr's urban, agricultural, and nomad populations.

Popular mysticism in Altishahr was not significantly distinguishable from the popular mysticism of Mawarannahr, which dominated the religious culture in which Bahā' ad-Dīn Naqshband (d. 1389), the mystical path's titular founder, first made his contribution as a Sufi (Arabic *ṣūfī*, mystic) master. Many, perhaps most, of the masters of this Central Asian popular mysticism--the "*shaykhs* of the Turks"--were initiates of the Yasawī mystical path. But the Yasawiyya bore a relationship to the Naqshbandiyya in that the Yasawī path's founder, Aḥmad Yasawī (d. 1166), had been a disciple of Abū Yūsuf al-Hamadānī (d. 1140), founder of the mystical path of the Khwājagān ("Masters"). Bahā' ad-Dīn Naqshband had revitalized the Khwājagān, in the fourteenth century, and it was his revitalized Khwājagān that came to be known after him as the Naqshbandiyya.

In Altishahr, as in Mawarannahr, the Yasawiyya seems to have been the dominant mystical path in the fourteenth century, but in the fifteenth century the Naqshbandiyya quickly gained ground in Altishahr at the Yasawiyya's expense, reorienting the region's popular mysticism to Naqshbandī traditions. An example of this

kind of reorientation is to be found in the history of a saintly lineage of the city of Kusan (now called Kucha) whose prestige was derived from the fact that its ancestor Jamāl ad-Dīn Katakī and his son Arshad ad-Dīn had persuaded Tughluq Temür Khan (d. 1363), the first independent ruler of the eastern Moghuls, to embrace Islam sometime shortly after 1347. (The Moghuls referred to here were ruled by a dynasty descended from Chaghadai, Chinggis Khan's second son, and are not to be confused with the Mughals of India, who were Timurids.) Sometime, probably in the early fifteenth century, the Katakī family transformed itself into a line of Naqshbandī saints, and it may have been then that the Katakī leaders adopted the title of *khoja* (*khwāja*), a title borne by Bahā' ad-Dīn Naqshband's predecessors in the initiatic chain (*silsila*) stemming from Abū Yūsuf al-Hamadānī's disciple ᶜAbd al-Khāliq Ghijduwānī (d. 1220) and still commonly borne by Naqshbandīs after Naqshband's time.

Under the influence of his Katakī Naqshbandī master, the Moghul ruler Uways Khan (d. ca. 1429) did much to increase the mystical path's following and power among the Moghul nobility. The spread of the Naqshbandiyya was thus not restricted to the settled population but made rapid headway among the nomads who grazed their herds outside the agricultural concentrations of the Altishahr oases and over the expanses of the Moghulistan pastures.

By the middle of the fifteenth century, the Naqshbandiyya held pride of place among the religious leadership in the Tarim basin oasis cities and among the nomads, too. Altishahr Naqshbandīs strengthened their bonds with their fellow Naqshbandīs in Mawarannahr, and Altishahris went abroad to study in Bukhara and other centers of Naqshbandī teaching. Indeed, an Altishahri became the grand master of the axial Naqshbandī line in Mawarannahr itself. This was Saᶜd ad-Dīn Kāshgharī (d. 1456), predecessor of the famous Khoja Aḥrār (*Khwāja-yi Aḥrār*--"the Master of the Free"--d. 1490) and religious mentor of the renowned Naqshbandī mystical poet ᶜAbd ar-Raḥmān Jāmī (d. 1492).

It was during the fifteenth century that sharᶜism (a pre-eminent emphasis on the strict observance of the *sharīᶜa*--the Koranic law) first became evident as a main distinguishing characteristic of the Naqshbandiyya. In the time of the Timurid ruler Ulugh Beg (r. 1409-1449), the Naqshbandī path emerged as the bastion of sharᶜism against the un-Islamic practices of the Timurid government. Championing the *sharīᶜa* meant charting a politically active course; so the Naqshbandiyya rejected religious quietism and accelerated their missionary efforts in search of political support, particularly among the nomads, whose military

strength dominated Central Asia's politics. In the second half of the fifteenth century Khoja Aḥrār, the Naqshbandī grand master of the time, became so powerful that he mediated between Timurids and Moghuls, maintaining contact with the widely dispersed nomad groups through his disciples, who served as religious advisers to khans and tribal chiefs. The triumph of Twelver Shi'ism as the religion of the Safavid dynasty in Iran and the Safavid invasions of Central Asia in the early years of the sixteenth century raised another challenge to which the Naqshbandiyya also responded. The mystical path developed a pronounced Sunni emphasis--sharᶜist orthopraxy, political activism, propagation of the religion, and a strong Sunni orientation came to mark the Naqshbandiyya in a way that proved definitive in the mystical path's subsequent history.

The Naqshbandiyya of Mawarannahr communicated these emphases in some degree to the Naqshbandīs of Altishahr, and they in turn probably carried some reflection of them into China proper and northeastern Tibet as the mystical path spread eastward. Certainly political activism, propagation of Islam, and Sunnism remained as fully characteristic of the Naqshbandiyya in China as they were of the Naqshbandiyya in India, Indonesia, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. The sharᶜist emphasis, because of the fragmentary nature of the sources, is less easily established. Naqshbandī sources of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries do indicate, however, that the emphasis on "wonders" (*karāmāt*) worked by saintly masters--characteristic of popular Sufism at that time throughout the Muslim world--remained strong among the Altishahr Naqshbandīs to a degree that distinguishes them from the more influential and less "wonder"-oriented Indian Naqshbandiyya, whose history has fixed Naqshbandism's image in European and American scholarly writing. Two other general characteristics of popular mysticism, namely the veneration of saints (misleadingly called "saint worship" by non-Muslim writers) and the seeking of inspiration by visiting and meditating at saints' tombs (misleadingly referred to as "tomb worship"), were also prominent features of the Altishahr Naqshbandiyya.

One of Khoja Aḥrār's Altishahri pupils, Khoja Tāj ad-Dīn (d. ca. 1533), who belonged to the Katakī saintly lineage of Kucha, returned to Altishahr in the early sixteenth century and carried the mystical path farther east, beyond Altishahr, into Uighuristan (stretching roughly from the Turfan region to the western end of the Great Wall of China in Kansu province). A few local Naqshbandīs may already have dwelt in the Uighuristan cities and among the local nomad population, but Tāj ad-Dīn strengthened the path's position there before he died in a razzia that the Moghul khan

mounted into the Ming empire's northwestern frontier. In Altishahr two of Khoja Aḥrār's grandsons, Nūrā (d. post 1536) and Muḥammad Yūsuf (d. 1530), vied with one another for primacy, but Muḥammad Yūsuf died, and Nūrā went on to India. It was thus not until the closing years of the sixteenth century that a single line of grand masters came to dominate the Altishahr Naqshbandīs.

In western Central Asia the Naqshbandī *silsila* branched into two main lines after Khoja Aḥrār. The historically more important branch passed through the undated masters Muḥammad Zāhid, Darwīsh Muḥammad, and Khojagī Amgunagī to Bāqī Bi 'llāh (d. 1603), who carried the *silsila* into India and initiated Aḥmad Sirhindī (d. 1624), the celebrated *mujaddid* (renewer) of the second Islamic millennium and opponent of the Mughal government's policy of religious "peace."

The second main branch of the Naqshbandī *silsila* passed from Khoja Aḥrār through Muḥammad Qāḍī (d. 1516) to the influential Aḥmad Kāsānī (1461-1542), who is known to history as the Makhdūm-i Aᶜẓam ("the Supreme Teacher"), and who claimed descent from the Prophet Muḥammad in the twenty-second generation. Although it seems clear that the Makhdūm-i Aᶜẓam's influence penetrated Altishahr during his lifetime, and several charitable estates were deeded to him there in pious endowment (*waqf*), he never went to Altishahr in person. He viewed the Moghuls as infidels, which is understandable inasmuch as a Moghul raiding party in Ferghana beat him up during his early life, breaking his bones and leaving him for dead. He miraculously survived, however, and at some later stage in his life the Moghul ruler Saᶜīd Khan (d. 1533) sent rich presents to Kasan, the Makhdūm-i Aᶜẓam's native district in the Ferghana valley.

Among the Makhdūm-i Aᶜẓam's descendants (the Makhdūmzādas), his seventh (or, by some accounts, fourth) son Isḥāq Walī (d. 1599) later became one of the most influential men in Mawarannahr, rivalled among contemporary Naqshbandī masters only by the Jūybārī *shaykhs* of Bukhara, who also derived their *isnād* (list of legitimating authorities) from the Makhdūm-i Aᶜẓam, but by way of the latter's reclusive eldest son, Isḥāq's half-brother Muḥammad Amīn (d. 1597/8). Isḥāq obtained the patronage of several of the principal Uzbek sultans but won the enmity of the Uzbek ruler ᶜAbd Āllah Khan II (d. 1598), who feared the khoja's political and religious power.

Attempting to increase his personal following, Isḥāq deputed several of his disciples to Altishahr and then went there himself. He and his followers--the Isḥāqiyya, as they came to be called--worked many wonders to the astonishment of the Altishahr population and

established themselves at the head of the country's various Naqshbandī masters. The Isḥāqiyya also made further headway among those who still clung to Altishahr's earlier popular Sufism, a major element of which was the cult of the thirteenth century (?) saint Alp Ata, whose tomb stood in the region of Turfan. Alp Ata was probably a Yasawī, and if not, the Yasawiyya nonetheless seem later to have dominated the cult centered on his tomb. The Moghul Chaghadayid family, among whom Yasawī influence was still strong, had been adherents of Alp Ata's cult, so the Isḥāqiyya's successes against it carried political weight.

The late sixteenth century was a period of transition in Moghul history. The Chaghadayid house and most of the important Moghul nobles had, largely through the influence of Islamic civilization, been so thoroughly absorbed into settled society that they had lost most of their former nomadic character. Over the course of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries tribesmen loyal to the traditions of the earlier nomadic culture had gradually drifted away into the mountains and pastures, breaking loose from Moghul control. Ceasing to be ruled by the Moghul Chaghadayid house, they ceased to be Moghuls. Some were incorporated into the Kazakhs and lived increasingly within the Muslim fold while at the same time reaffirming their nomadic style of life. Others, probably only a tiny minority, were incorporated into the shamanist (later Buddhist) Oirat Mongols, forsaking Islam altogether. But most of these evaporating Moghuls established their transhumance in the Pamir and T'ien Shan mountains and came to be known as Kirghiz, although they formed not a single people but a congeries of independent Turkish-speaking groups.

The majority of the Kirghiz seem at first to have been shamanists, but Isḥāq and his disciples propagated Islam among them, working many wonders in the process, and induced a number of Kirghiz groups to give up their idols and become Muslims. It is uncertain how long and to what extent shamanism survived in the seventeenth century among the Kirghiz, but Islam was the dominant religion by the time Isḥāq had concluded his mission. As a result of his efforts, the Naqshbandiyya began to take hold among the Turkish-speaking nomad populations who ringed Altishahr. Similar efforts among the Mongolian-speaking non-Muslim Oirat tribes may also have met with some success,[2] but if so, it would appear that those Oirats who embraced Islam (called Qarayanchuqs or

2 Joseph Fletcher, "Confrontations between Muslim missionaries and nomad unbelievers in the late 16th century: Notes on four passages from the 'Ḍiyā' al-qulūb,'" *Tractata Altaica*, ed. by W. Heissig (Wiesbaden, 1976), pp. 167- 174.

Qarayunchuqs) gave up their affiliation with the Oirat tribes and were eventually absorbed into the Kirghiz.

For subsequent history, Isḥāq's most important achievement was the establishment of his influence among the settled Altishahr oasis population. His direct intervention in Moghul politics contributed to the ending of the career of the reigning ᶜAbd al-Karīm Khan (d. 1591) and placed Isḥāq's disciple Muḥammad Khan (d. 1609) upon the throne. Isḥāq seems to have aided his Moghul disciple when the Uzbeks sent an army against him in 1594. Isḥāq's influence over Muḥammad Khan became so strong that the Isḥāqiyya, rooted in both the trade guilds and the ruler's court at Yarkand, became the dominant network linking together Altishahr's various oases. The Isḥāqiyya's masterstroke--which established the Naqshbandiyya from then on as Altishahr's principal mystical path--was to name Muḥammad Khan grand master of the Isḥāqiyya at the end of his life, identifying him not only as Isḥāq's successor but also as *quṭb* ("mystical axis" or "pole of the universe") and *ghawth* ("mystical helper of the age"). The fact that the ruler was not just a Naqshbandī but the grand master himself gave the path a special position in Altishahr from which no other mystical path ever displaced it. This combination of Chaghadayid royalty with the grand mastership of the Naqshbandiyya probably contributed also, some decades later, to the Makhdūmzāda khojas' audacious seizure of the Moghul throne.

Across the mountains to the west, in Mawarannahr, the Isḥāqiyya's influence rapidly declined in the early seventeenth century; so Isḥāq's sons and grandsons shifted their base of operations into Altishahr, and the Isḥāqiyya became in effect the Naqshbandī path's Altishahr branch. After Muḥammad Khan, the Isḥāqī mastership reverted to Isḥāq's descendants, and the Isḥāqī Naqshbandī path became hereditary--a development similar to the hereditary tendency observable in other mystical paths of the period.

In Bukhara meanwhile, the Jūybārī *shaykhs* had acquired enormous wealth and prestige, like the Isḥāqiyya in Yarkand, and their influence had spread throughout Mawarannahr. They played central roles in the political and economic life of the region, and the Uzbek rulers commonly had to defer to their wishes. Among the Jūybāriyya the hereditary principle also prevailed, so that the Makhdūm-i Aᶜẓam's grandson Muḥammad Yūsuf (d. 1653)--the son of Muḥammad Amīn--found himself eclipsed by members of the Jūybārī saintly lineage, despite his own illustrious forebears. He therefore journeyed to Altishahr where, as a result of the Isḥāqiyya's efforts, the Makhdūmzāda family (descendants of the Makhdūm-i

Aᶜẓam) was held in the highest esteem of all, save for the Moghul Chaghadayid dynasty itself.

By the time of Muḥammad Yūsuf's arrival in Altishahr, sometime before the middle of the seventeenth century, the Isḥāqiyya had attained such power over the Moghul khans that the latter were beginning to chafe under Isḥāqī tutelage and were glad of an opportunity to support a rival Naqshbandī faction. Muḥammad Yūsuf's claim was a strong one in that he was the son of the Makhdūm-i Aᶜẓam's eldest son. The newcomer threw himself into the political fray, garnered much support, and traveled widely in Altishahr, going also into Uighuristan and into China proper, acquiring disciples everywhere. So successful was he that jealous partisans of the Isḥāqiyya poisoned his food, and he died, leaving his mission to his son Hidāyat Allāh (d. 1694), known to history as Khoja Āfāq (*Khwāja-yi Āfāq*--"the Master of the Horizons"). Khoja Āfāq's branch of the Naqshbandiyya came to be known as the Āfāqiyya.[3]

3 Sometime in about the early eighteenth century, the Isḥāqiyya came to be known as the *Qarataghlïq* (Black Mountain) faction, evidently because of the Isḥāqiyya's strength among the Kirghiz in the Qaratagh (Pamirs). For the sake of contrast, the Āfāqiyya came to be known as the *Aqtaghlïq* (White Mountain) faction--Aqtagh being the name of a mountain north of Artish in the T'ien Shan, where the Āfāqiyya enjoyed support among the Kirghiz population.

Another, probably later, tradition has it that the second element in these two names was not the Turki word *tagh*, "mountain," but a word of Arabic etymology, *ṭāqī*, which denotes the distinguishing "mitres" worn by the *shaykhs* of different mystical paths, so that the designations were "Black Mitre" and "White Mitre." This explanation is less likely than the one involving mountains, but see Joseph Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya and the *dhikr-i-arra*," *Journal of Turkish Studies*, Vol. 1 (1977), pp. 117-118, where it is established that the Makhdūm-i Aᶜẓam did in fact wear such a mitre. See also the "Addenda et corrigenda" to the above article, which the printer has badly garbled, in *Journal of Turkish Studies*,Vol. 2 (1978), p. 168.

What could be an echo of this idea is to be found in Chinese official sources, which distinguish between White Hat Muslims (*Po-mao Hui-tzu*) and Black Hat Muslims (*Hei-mao Hui-tzu*), but examination of the sources reveals that these Chinese designations cannot be correlated with the distinction between the Āfāqiyya and Isḥāqiyya in Altishahr. The Chinese usage involving "hats" may well be patterned also on a similar Chinese usage for distinguishing Buddhist orders in Tibet. Nineteenth-century Chinese material

With Muḥammad Yūsuf's death in 1653, the Isḥāqiyya regained their former ascendancy and forced Khoja Āfāq to flee, but the young khoja found outside support in the person of Galdan, ruler of the Zunghar confederation of the Oirat Mongols, who had recently been converted from shamanism to Tibetan Buddhism. When Galdan invaded Uighuristan and Altishahr in 1679, he made Khoja Āfāq his governor there and in doing so transferred the ascendancy in regional politics from the Isḥāqiyya to the partisans of Khoja Āfāq. Galdan's conquest effectively ended what remained of the power of the Moghul Chaghadayid house and shifted Altishahr's capital city from Yarkand (the old seat of the Moghul khans and the Isḥāqī khojas) to Kashgar, which became the center of Āfāqī power. As Zunghar clients, Khoja Āfāq and his descendants sat on the throne of Kashgar and even, according to some sources, adopted the title of khan, implying that the Āfāqī Makhdūmzādas had replaced the Moghul Chaghadayids as the legitimate ruling house of Altishahr.

These events are described mainly in Isḥāqī and Āfāqī sources of the eighteenth century, which stress factional politics between the two rival Makhdūmzāda branches and relate wonders worked by the rival khojas against one another and all those who challenged their power. To judge by these sources, the Koran and Rūmī's *Mathnawī* were important, as was the study of *ḥadīth*, but noticeably lacking are evidences of any awareness of currents of Islamic thought west or south of the confines of Central Asia. Those who visited India or went on the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina from Altishahr brought nothing back with them that has found its way into the historical record. Altishahr and Uighuristan seem to have been nothing more than backwaters of the Muslim intellectual world.

ENTRANCE OF THE NAQSHBANDIYYA INTO CHINA PROPER: MUḤAMMAD YŪSUF, KHOJA ĀFĀQ, AND MA LAI-CH'IH

Propagation of the religion, on the other hand, continued to be an important Naqshbandī goal, and the seventeenth century witnessed the acceleration of the path's eastward progress as Naqshbandīs, teaching and trading, moved on from the outermost fringes of the familiar Turco-Iranian Muslim world--Uighuristan

speaks of the *Hei-shan p'ai* (Black Mountain faction) and the *Po-shan p'ai* (White Mountain faction). Traditional Chinese historical writing refers to the Abbasids as the *Hei-i Ta-shih* (Black-clad Arabs) and to the Umayyads as the *Po-i Ta-shih* (White-clad Arabs).

being the very end of the culture area of the Muslim Middle East--into northwestern China proper and Tsinghai (northeastern Tibet). Naqshbandī contacts, through trade, with Muslim communities in northwest China proper probably go back to at least the second half of the fifteenth century, but such contacts would seem to have been scattered and individual, and there is no concrete evidence of any Chinese being initiated into the path so early. As late as the final decades of the sixteenth century some non-Muslim (all or mainly Buddhist) Uighurs were still living in Uighuristan, and a substantial proportion of the Hui (Chinese-speaking Muslim) population must have been of Central Asian origin. Naqshbandī influence was strong in Uighuristan by the end of the sixteenth century, and by the early seventeenth century Isḥāqī contacts with Huis in China proper are documented.[4] The name by which the Huis are designated in the Turkish and Persian sources of the time is "Tungan" or "Tungani," a word of uncertain etymology.[5]

The Ch'ing dynasty replaced the Ming on the Peking throne in 1644. In 1645-1649, two Muslims, named Mi-la-yin and Ting Kuo-tung, rebelled against the Ch'ing dynasty, evidently in connection with Ming loyalist elements in northwest China. The center of the revolt was Su-chou, and the rebels had ties with the Muslim governor of Hami (Qomul) in Uighuristan, where the Naqshbandiyya at that time were probably paramount. The Ch'ing army suppressed the rebellion and punished Hami by closing the Chia-yü pass, thus impeding the flow of trade (on which Hami largely subsisted) between Central Asia and the Chinese empire.

Muḥammad Yūsuf preached at Su-chou, where he appears to have won over the head of the Hui scholars (*ʿulamā' khalīfasī*), a man named Wafānīb Ākhūnd, and obtained the adherence of a certain Mullā Yūsuf Ākhūnd, who later attached himself to

4 See, e.g., Muḥammad ʿIwaḍ, "Ḍiyā' al-qulūb" (MS, Cambridge, MA, Houghton Library, uncatalogued), fols. 118v-119v.

5 See Nakada Yoshinobu, *Kaikai minzoku no shomondai* (Tōkyō: Ajia Keizai Kenkyūsho, 1971), pp. 13-14. The transcription of Tungan as "T'ung-kuang" is attested in T'ao Pao-lien, *Hsin-mao shih-hsing chi* (preface 1895; reprinted Taipei, 1957), 6:8v10. Marshall Broomhall, *Islam in China*, pp. xvi and 147, has given wide currency to an etymology derived from the Turkish *don- / Chaghatay **tong-*, meaning "to be converted." But how early and where is the Chaghatay form attested? The use of the adjectival *ī* in the form "Tunganī" would seem to indicate that "Tungan" is no longer felt as a participial form from as early as the seventeenth century. The Russian form *Dungan* and the Chinese transcription *Tung-kan* (i.e., the t/d alternation) also need to be explained.

Muḥammad Yūsuf's son, Khoja Āfāq.[6] From Su-chou, Muḥammad Yūsuf proceeded to the country of the Salars, a Turkish-speaking Muslim people of northwest China, and these are said to have committed themselves to him. He built a hospice (*khānaqah*) there and discoursed daily on Rūmī's *Mathnawī* for their benefit. After a six-month sojourn he departed, appointing a Hui to serve as head of the Salar scholars and giving him as symbols of investiture a copy of the *Mathnawī*, a prayer carpet, and a green and gold domed staff. "If you read the holy *Mathnawī* every Friday evening and Monday evening and daytime, and discourse upon it," he told his successor, "it will be as if I were giving the discourse."[7]

In 1671-1672 Khoja Āfāq, who is spoken of in Chinese sources as "Hidāyat Allāh (*Hsi-ta-yeh-t'ung-la-hei*), the twenty-fifth generation descendant of Muḥammad,"[8] visited the Kansu capital city of Lanchou, Ti-tao Subprefecture (now Lin-t'ao) in southern Kansu, Hsi-ning Guard in what is now the province of Tsinghai, and is said to have made a further appearance at Ho-chou, China's "Little

6 For Wafānīb Ākhūnd, see the anonymous hagiographical work, in Turkish, written at the request of Mullā Mīrzā Muḥammad Islām b. ʿAlī Ākhūnd by Ḥakīm Jān in 1919, entitled, "Ḥaḍrat Sayyid Āfāq Khwājam-ning TSRH-lari" (MS, Lunds Universitets-bibliotek, uncatalogued gift of Gunnar Jarring), fol. 14v. For Mullā Yūsuf Ākhūnd, see Ibn ʿAlī Khwāja Ākhūnd, "Siyar al-mukhliṣīn," in Persian, completed post-1725 (on fol. 195v the date A.H. 1283 = A.D. 1866/7 appears, being either the date of the copy by Mullā Ismāʿīl b. Qutlugh Muḥammad Kashgharī or perhaps the date of Ibn ʿAlī Khwāja Ākhūnd's recasting and supplementation of an earlier work; MS, Berkeley, CA, University of California, General Library, no. PK 6419.A282J2), fol. 34r, where the Hui scholars are referred to as the *'ulamā-yi Tunganiyyān*. Similarities between the account of Muḥammad Yūsuf in the Lund MS and the account of Khoja Āfāq in Ibn ʿAlī, "Siyar," raise the possibility that both may derive from a single account either about Muḥammad Yūsuf or about Khoja Āfāq, that has later been duplicated with reference to the son or the father.

7 Lund MS, fols. 16r-17r.

8 Joseph Trippner established Hidāyat Allāh's importance for China but does not identify him in his "Islamische Gruppen und Gräberkult in Nordwest-China," *Die Welt des Islams*, N.S., Vol. 7 (1961), pp. 142-171 (see pp. 148-153, 157-158), or his "Die Salaren, ihre ersten Glaubensstreitigkeiten und ihr Aufstand 1781," *Central Asiatic Journal*, Vol. 9, no. 4 (Dec. 1964), pp. 241-276 (see p. 264).

Mecca" (*Makka 's-ṣaghīra*),[9] now renamed Lin-hsia, in western central Kansu. Huis, Salars, northeastern Tibetan Muslims, and undoubtedly also Muslims of China's other ethnic groups came to hear the khoja preach. Among these Chinese Muslims, Khoja Āfāq won the commitment (*ināhat*) of the subsequent initiators of three Naqshbandī saintly lineages (*men-huan*)[10] that came eventually to dominate Muslim religious life in the Chinese northwest. Each of these saintly lineages traced its *isnād* to Khoja Āfāq and through him back to the axial *silsila* of the Naqshbandiyya.

An Āfāqī source says that Khoja Āfāq went to the "Manchu city" (*Manjur shahri*) among the Salars and served for a year as head of the path (*sajjāda nishīn*). All the Salars are said to have made their commitment to him, and he, like his father Muḥammad Yūsuf before him, devoted himself to teaching the *Mathnawī*. At the end of the year he appointed a certain Wiqāyat Allāh, known as the Altun bash Ākhūnd, to be his *khalīfa*, investing him with the khoja's own golden turban (*dastār paranjī*), a copy of the Koran, a *Mathnawī*, a green and gold domed staff, and a prayer carpet.[11] Neither Wiqāyat Allāh nor the Hui *khalīfa* whom Muḥammad Yūsuf had appointed among the Salars some years earlier seems to have pursued a career of note or to have founded a saintly lineage of his own.

Chinese sources[12] document the visit of Khoja Āfāq to Ti-tao and Hsi-ning and his imparting of mystical knowledge to his three principal successors in northwest China: (a) ᶜAbd ar-Raḥmān Ma I-ch'ing (1640-1719), known as Ma Wu T'ai-yeh, buried at Pi-chia-ch'ang outside Ho-chou; (b) Pai-shih-lo-li-ai-mi-ni (1648-1722)--Bashīr al-Amīn or perhaps Bashīr ᶜAlī Amīn--of Ti-tao, buried at K'ang-lo, which at that time was in Ti-tao Subprefecture; and (c) Ma T'ai-pa-pa (fl. ca. 1680-1690), culturally a Hui but of Central Asian Turkish origin, buried in the Mi-la-kou valley roughly half-way between Lan-chou and Hsi-ning.

9 For the epithet, see, e.g., Muḥammad Tawāḍuᶜ, *As-Ṣīn wa 'l-Islām* (Cairo, 1945), p. 117.

10 Literally, "door" (i.e., "house" or "family"--in other words, "hereditary") "officialdom." The term, which is purely Chinese, is registered in Chang Ch'i-yun *et al.*, comp., *Chung-wen ta-tz'u-tien*, vol. 35 (Taipei, 1968), p. 103b (15223).

11 Lund MS, fols. 39r-40r. Ibn ᶜAlī, "Siyar," fol 35r, gives the Altun bash Ākhūnd's name as Wiqāyat Allāh. The Lund MS, fol 40r, has 'FAYT Allāh, which must reflect a copyist's error.

12 See the accounts of Ma Tzu-k'uo and others cited by Trippner in his "Islamische Gruppen" and "Die Salaren," which form the basis of the following narration.

Khoja Āfāq also had other noteworthy contacts in China, the most important of these being Ch'i Ching-i (1656-1719), who established the Qādirī path in northwest China. Ch'i Ching-i went to Hsi-ning to study with Khoja Āfāq in 1672, but the khoja sent him home, saying, "Your teacher is on his way; just go back home quickly." The following year (1678) a twenty-ninth-generation descendant of Muḥammad, named Khoja ᶜAbd Allāh (d. 1689), made his appearance in south China, bringing with him the Qādirī path. When he visited Ho-chou, Ch'i became his student and eventually also his *khalīfa*. Thereafter the Qādiriyya took firm root in Chinese soil.

Of the three Naqshbandī saintly lineages to which Khoja Āfāq's preaching in northwest China gave birth, the line that Ma T'ai-pa-pa initiated made by far the greatest imprint on subsequent history. Ma T'ai-pa-pa himself did not found a saintly lineage (*men-huan*), pursuing a quiet and sedentary career as a teacher in Mi-la-kou. But he initiated and chose as his *khalīfa* a man of extraordinary energy named Abu 'l-Futūḥ Ma Lai-ch'ih (1673-1753), who founded the Naqshbandiyya's *Hua-ssu* (Flowery Mosque) saintly lineage.

Ma Lai-ch'ih was the son of an imperial degree-holder named Ma Chia-tsun (fl. ca. 1675) of Ho-chou, and Naqshbandī tradition links Ma Lai-ch'ih's birth with Khoja Āfāq's visit to the area. Although forty years old--so the account runs--Ma Chia-tsun had no son; so he asked Khoja Āfāq to intercede for him with God. In reply, the khoja told him to marry a daughter of the Ch'ang family of Ho-chou who had been betrothed eleven times, but all of her fiancés had died before the wedding. Ma would then be blessed, the khoja said, with a son whom he should name Abu 'l-Futūḥ. Ma did as he was bidden, and Khoja Āfāq appeared unexpectedly at the marriage ceremony and served as a witness. From this union Ma Lai-ch'ih was born, but immediately a fire destroyed Ma Chia-tsun's business, and he became so poverty-stricken that he was forced to take his son, when the latter reached the age of four, to the home of a friend in Mi-la-kou. Here the young Ma Lai-ch'ih attended a *madrasa* and studied with Ma T'ai-pa-pa. On his completion of the *madrasa* curriculum, Ma Lai-ch'ih went on deeper into Islamic religious studies under Ma T'ai-pa-pa's supervision.

When he had reached the age of eighteen he terminated his schooling with such distinction that, despite his youth, he was straightway given the position of *imām* (*chiao-chang*) at the nearby mosque of Hsi-ma-ying Wu-la-hsia-hui. Ma T'ai-pa-pa gave him his daughter in marriage and made him his successor in the Naqshbandī mystical path that he had received from Khoja Āfāq. This must have

been in about 1690. Thereafter Ma Lai-ch'ih is known to have changed his post twice, first to a mosque in east Ho-chou and subsequently to the congregation at San-chia-chi north of Ti-tao.

Next, Ma Lai-ch'ih undertook the pilgrimage, setting out on a three-year journey that took him across Altishahr to Arabia, where he studied for over a year in the Yemen, and then back eastward again to Bukhara, where he applied himself to the study of Sufism. But instead of returning to China, he again set out for Mecca and there attached himself to a teacher referred to in Chinese as Shaykh "A-chi-lai" (ʿAdhraʾī, Adhraʿī, or conceivably Azraqī?), and on this *shaykh*'s recommendation Ma Lai-ch'ih was accepted as a student by a famous teacher known as Mawlānā Makhdūm. Ma Lai-ch'ih is said to have attained the grade of *walī* ("saint") under Mawlānā Makhdūm's guidance, after which he returned to China.

The identity of Mawlānā Makhdūm, like the identity of the aforementioned Shaykh A-chi-lai, is a problem that remains to be solved.[13] It is not clear whether Mawlānā Makhdūm lived in Mecca, elsewhere in the Middle East, or somewhere in India on Ma Lai-ch'ih's homeward route. Ma Lai-ch'ih returned to China by sea, passing through Hong Kong (then a quiet port, over a century before its annexation by the British), and must surely have changed ships somewhere along the Indian coastline. Moreover, Chinese tradition has it that the Hua-ssu, Ma Lai-ch'ih's *men-huan*, derived its saintly origins from India, whence "a certain Muslim leader of Ho-chou" transmitted it to China.[14] But then again, Mawlānā Makhdūm may well have been one of the many Indian *shaykhs* living in Mecca, Medina, and other Middle Eastern centers of Islamic learning.

When Ma Lai-ch'ih took leave of Mawlānā Makhdūm, the latter gave him a *mawlūd* (Chinese *mao-lu-t'i*--a poetical genre commemorating the birth of a prophet, usually Muḥammad, or a saint), a volume called in Chinese *Ming-sha-le,* and a copy of the

[13] Makhdūm Muḥammad Hāshim (d. 1760), a Naqshbandī teacher of Thatta in Sind, would seem to have been too young to have been Ma Lai-ch'ih's Mawlānā Makhdūm, although he is an attractive choice because of his vigorous preaching against "dancing" and the emotional side of religion. He promoted instead the more sober mystical piety that is commonly associated with the Naqshbandiyya. Such an emphasis would be fully in keeping with the position of Ma Lai-ch'ih's followers in China during the latter half of the eighteenth century in their dispute with the followers of Ma Ming-hsin, to be discussed below. For Makhdūm Muḥammad Hāshim, see Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical Dimensions of Islam* (Chapel Hill, 1975), p. 397.

[14] Nakada, *Kaikai*, p. 97.

Koran (*Muṣḥaf*--in Chinese, *Mu-ssu-hai-fu*)[15] to help him in his missionary work. The authorship and title of the *mawlūd* cannot be determined without more information. It was a popular genre, closely associated with Sufi practice, and there were many of them that had great currency at the time.

The identity of the *Ming-sha-le* must also remain in question until more information is available, but there can be no harm in entering a guess. The Chinese form of the title dates from the eighteenth century and so does not stem from the more exact approach to transcribing Arabic and Persian characteristic of Huis in the twentieth century. The first syllable, *ming*, could also represent *min* or *mi* followed by *shadda* (doubling of the consonant); the second syllable, *sha*, could also represent *sa*; and the last syllable, *le*, could represent either *l* or *r*. The nasalized phoneme *ng* does not exist in Arabic; and technically speaking, it does not exist in Persian either, although, under the influence of Turkish, *ng* could have been heard or pronounced directly before a velar (*k* or *g*). But no velar follows *ming*; so it is not improbable that the syllable *ming* is used here for its meaning rather than for its phonetic value, the more so since neither *mis(h)s(h)ar/l* nor *min(g)s(h)ar/l* produces a likely Arabic or Persian word.

To complicate matters, two different characters for the *ming* of *Ming-sha-le* are found in the sources, and the two characters have opposite meanings. One means "bright(ness)" or "to understand." The other means "dark(ness)" or "to be stupid." Inasmuch as the latter character occurs in a proclamation from the Kansu provincial authorities forbidding possession of the *Ming-sha-le*,[16] the "dark(ness)" character is suspect as an unfriendly play on words.

If *sha-le* stands for *sharḥ* (commentary),[17] *Ming-sha-le* might, following Chinese word order, represent "Commentary on

[15] Editor's Note: Prof. Fletcher's source is not clear in the manuscript.

[16] Pai Shou-i, *Hui-hui min-tsu ti hsin-sheng* (Shanghai, 1951), p. 51.

[17] An imperial edict of June 20, 1747, to the Grand Council, based on information received from the local authorities, defined *Ming-sha-le* as meaning, in Chinese, "scriptural extract(s)" (*ching chieh-shu*). See *Ta-Ch'ing Kao-tsung (Ch'ien-lung) Huang-ti shih-lu*, 290: 24v (Taipei, 1964 edition, Vol. 6, p. 4222). Trippner, "Die Salaren," p. 263, basing himself on twentieth-century Chinese information, describes the *Ming-sha-le* as "einen kurzen Auszug aus dem Koran." Nakada Yoshinobu, "Chūgoku Kaimin shakai kakuju ni tsuite no ikkōsatsu," in *Enoki Hakushi kanreki kinen Tōyōshi ronsō* (Tōkyō, 1975), p. 400, n. 25, gives the reading *Ming-sha-erh*, but this is not to be found in either of the two *shih-lu* passages that Nakada cites.

'Brightness'," and in fact there is a commentary by roughly that name: the "Sharḥ-i 'Lamaᶜāt" ("Commentary on the 'Lamaᶜāt'") of Niẓām ad-Dīn Thanesarī (d. 1627), a *sharḥ* on the "Lamaᶜāt" ("Beams of Light") of Fakhr ad-Dīn Ibrāhīm ᶜIrāqī (d. 1289), which is in turn an abridged paraphrase in Persian of *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* (a summary of the teachings of twenty-eight prophets from Adam to Muḥammad, best known in English under the title of *Wisdom of the Prophets*), by the famous Spanish mystic Ibn al-ᶜArabī (d. 1240). *Fuṣūṣ al-ḥikam* was Ibn al-ᶜArabī's most influential and controversial work, and the "Lamaᶜāt" was probably its most influential paraphrase. Being an Indian, Thanesarī is likely to have been read in India, so his *sharḥ* on the "Lamaᶜāt" would have been a not-unlikely book for Mawlānā Makhdūm to have given to Ma Lai-ch'ih on the occasion of the latter's departure for China, assuming that Mawlānā Makhdūm was an Indian. Another possibility is that the *Ming-sha-le* is to be identified with another commentary on ᶜIrāqī's "Lamaᶜāt," namely the "Ashiᶜᶜat al-Lamaᶜāt" ("Beams of Light of the 'Beams of Light'"--that is, of the "Lamaᶜāt"), by the Naqshbandī poet Jāmī.[18]

Sometime prior to Ma Lai-ch'ih's return to China a dispute had arisen in Ho-chou over the manner in which the Ramaḍan fast should be broken, presumably at the end of each day. One school of thought, called the "Fore-Breakers" (*ch'ien-k'ai*), maintained that at the conclusion of the fast one might eat first and then afterwards go to the mosque for prayer. The other school, called the "After-Breakers" (*hou-k'ai*), held that one must pray first and eat after. The controversy took on increasing importance, spread beyond Ho-chou, and became a divisive issue among the Salars of the Hsün-hua district, in what was then part of Kansu but is now in Tsinghai. So Ma Lai-ch'ih's return is already to be seen against a background of religious controversy.

Ma Lai-ch'ih settled in the town of Bayan Rong (Pa-yen-jung-ko), about twenty-five miles northwest of Hsün-hua, in a district inhabited entirely by lamaist Buddhists. At first, his missionary efforts north of the Yellow River met with little success, but eventually he won over the district's "living Buddha" and twenty-

[18] Not to be confused with the "Ashiᶜᶜat al-lama'āt," in Persian by ᶜAbd al-Haqq Miskīn Dihlawī (d. 1642), which is a commentary on the *Mishkāt al-Maṣābīḥ* (1336) of Muḥammad b. ᶜAbd Allāh al-Khaṭīb at-Tabrīzī Walī ad-Dīn (d. 1342), an edition of the highly popular collection of *ḥadīth* traditions arranged according to subject matter by Abū Muḥammad al-Ḥusayn al-Baghawī (d. 1122 or 1117), entitled *Maṣābīḥ as-sunna*. Nor can one rule out Dihlawī's "Ashiᶜᶜat al-lama'āt."

eight tribes under the latter's spiritual guidance, inducing them to embrace Islam. According to at least one account,[19] so the story goes, Ma Lai-ch'ih's use of "wonders" played a vital part in converting these lamaist tribesmen. Ma rode over the waters of the Yellow River on his donkey without wetting the animal's feet. He gave satisfactory answers on the spot to the "living Buddha's" ten difficult theological questions, and he caused the rain to fall.

Next, Ma Lai-ch'ih carried his missionary work to the part of Hsün-hua district south of the Yellow River, where he sided with the "Fore-Breakers" and won the eight Salar tribes' adherence to the Naqshbandiyya. It was the custom for families to invite mullas to their homes upon important occasions, both happy and sad, to recite the Koran.[20] Such sessions lasted a long time and were expensive, because it was customary to pay the mulla a considerable fee, to say nothing of the costs of day-long entertainments and gifts. The *Ming-sha-le* was a shorter text than the Koran and took less time to recite; so when Ma Lai-ch'ih and his followers substituted it for the Koran on these occasions, the fees were lower.[21] This evidently added to the popularity of Ma Lai-ch'ih's branch of the Naqshbandiyya, but it also aroused animosity between Ma's followers and the traditional reciters of the Koran.

From Hsün-hua, Ma Lai-ch'ih moved further south, into the Pao-an district, and there converted several thousand Monguor (*T'u-jen*) families to Islam. Thereafter he proceeded east to Ho-chou, where he won a great following for the Naqshbandiyya. Here he was joined in 1705 by the son of a *shaykh* whom he had met in Hong Kong on his way home from the Middle East, and this man joined with Ma Lai-ch'ih and Ma's own son Ma Kuo-pao to form a trio of Naqshbandī preachers whose efforts spread the path far and wide in Kansu, and far beyond.

But factional antagonisms deepened in Kansu and, lacking any ultimate authority within the Muslim community, the disputants took their quarrel to the non-Muslim imperial authorities.[22] In 1731 Han Ha-chi (the latter element would seem to represent *Ḥājj* or *Ḥājjī*), who appears to have been the chief religious leader among

[19] Ma Tzu-k'uo, in Trippner, "Islamische Gruppen," pp. 154-155.

[20] Trippner, "Die Salaren," p. 263, speaks of "Gebete" (prayers), but the lengthy recitations would seem to refer to *tajwīd*.

[21] Impoverishment of the people by elaborate funerals had long been an issue for the Chinese state. See Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, *A History of Chinese Political Thought* (Princeton, 1978), p. 66.

[22] Nakada, *Kaikai*, p. 88.

the Salars of the Hsün-hua district,[23] and another Hsün-hua Muslim named Ma Huo-che (the latter element would seem to represent *Khwāja*) made accusations against one another to the Ch'ing authorities arising out of their dispute over the manner in which the fasting of Ramaḍan should be broken. "Our *chiao-men* ("religion") is one and the same," Han acknowledged, but the question of the breaking of the fast had become too divisive to leave unresolved.

However, there was not much that the Ch'ing authorities could do. The dispute grew more bitter and the accusations more grave. In 1747 a certain Ma Ying-huan of Ho-chou formally charged Ma Lai-ch'ih with "heterodoxy" (*hsieh-chiao*), a most serious charge in the Chinese context, carrying implications of rebellion against the imperial social order. "Heterodoxy" was, therefore, an accusation that the central Ch'ing government could not ignore. "Heterodoxy" was, on the other hand, a double-edged sword, dangerous for the accuser as well as the accused. Ma Lai-ch'ih died in 1753 and was buried a short distance outside Ho-chou's western walls in a domed shrine (*kung-pai*, from the Arabic *qubba*) called the "Flowery Mosque Shrine" (*Hua-ssu kung-pai*), a name that came to designate the Naqshbandī saintly lineage that succeeded him.

THE CH'ING CONQUEST OF SINKIANG

In Altishahr and Uighuristan, meanwhile, the Āfāqiyya had undergone serious reverses. During Khoja Āfāq's lifetime the Āfāqiyya had tried, with the help of some Kirghiz groups, to throw off Zunghar rule and establish a Muslim kingdom ruled by the khojas themselves. This proved impossible because of the Zunghars' greater military strength and because the Āfāqiyya suffered a crisis of leadership following Khoja Āfāq's death in 1694. The Iṣḥāqiyya regained their ascendancy at Yarkand and installed a puppet ruler from the politically defunct Moghul Chaghadayid house, but this restoration failed to reunite the country.

The Zunghars were able to reconsolidate their control sometime about the turn of the century and carried off the Iṣḥāqī grand master Dāniyāl and Khoja Āfāq's grandson Aḥmad, who had fathered two sons, Qïlïch Burhān ad-Dīn and Yaḥyā, the latter being known as Khoja Jahān (*Khwāja-yi Jahān*--"the Master of the

[23] Trippner, "Die Salaren," p. 264, n. 64, questions whether the Han Ha-chi of 1731 and the Han Ha-chi of 1747-1748 are the same man (both "Han" and "Ha-chi" are common names in the Hsün-hua district). Nakada, *Kaikai*, p. 81, says that Han Ha-chi's family had been *tsung-chang-chiao* of the Salars for generations.

World"), a title borne by other Naqshbandī masters in other times and places. The Zunghars held Burhān ad-Dīn, Yaḥyā, and Dāniyāl's eldest son Ya'qūb hostage. Only Ḥasan, another of Khoja Āfāq's sons, remained at large, harrassing the Zunghars. The Zunghars' grip eventually weakened again, and the Iṣḥāqiyya began to think of revolt. In 1725 adherents of the Iṣḥāqiyya poisoned Ḥasan in the Pamirs, and in 1753 Yūsuf, who had succeeded Yaʿqūb as the chief Iṣḥāqī, threw off his allegiance to the Zunghars and led Altishahr into rebellion.

By this time the Ch'ing empire had annexed Hami (1697) and most of Outer Mongolia and was at war with the Zunghars. In 1755 the Ch'ing army invaded Ili, the heart of the Zunghar realm, and the Ch'ing emperor now saw himself as the inheritor of all the territories that the Zunghars had possessed. Having taken possession of the Makhdūmzāda hostages in Ili, the Ch'ing outfitted a military expedition under the nominal command of Qïlïch Burhān ad-Dīn, known in Chinese sources as the Elder Khoja, to reconquer Altishahr from the Iṣḥāqiyya. The expedition was a success, and the Iṣḥāqī Makhdūmzādas were killed.

That same year, the Zunghars revolted against the Ch'ing, and in the ensuing confusion Yaḥyā, the Younger Khoja, fled from Ili and joined his elder brother in Altishahr. Together they repudiated Ch'ing claims to Altishahr, but in 1756 the Ch'ing returned to Ili in overwhelming strength. The reconquest, combined with a smallpox epidemic, emptied the region of much of its population. By controlling Zungharia, the Ch'ing possessed the keys to Altishahr.

The realities of the situation were not lost on the *begs* (local notables) of the eastern oases of Altishahr and the western oases of Uighuristan, most of whom quickly acknowledged their subjection to the Ch'ing emperor. But the Āfāqī khojas remained independent and refused to pay the taxes and tribute that would have signified Altishahr's incorporation into the Ch'ing empire. So the imperial forces invaded the country and in 1759 completed its annexation. Qïlïch Burhān ad-Dīn and Yaḥyā fled into Badakhshan and were killed by the Badakhshani king, Sulṭān Shāh I, who feared that a Ch'ing invasion might follow on their heels. After a short-lived revolt in 1765 in Ush Turfan, which the Ch'ing crushed, Altishahr, Uighuristan, and the rest of the territory of the former Zunghar realm--now collectively renamed Sinkiang ("New Dominion")--remained quiet for the rest of the century. Across the mountains in Mawarannahr the Āfāqī succession continued in the person of Samsaq, a son of Qïlïch Burhān ad-Dīn who had survived his father's flight from Altishahr.

In 1759 the Ch'ing empire completed its annexation of Sinkiang and by this act set itself the task of finding a place for Islam--and substantial Muslim communities--within the Confucian ideological firmament. As a result of this annexation the Ch'ing had suddenly acquired a lot of Muslims to deal with and began to notice them.

THE "GENERAL ORTHODOX REVIVAL" OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The eighteenth century witnessed the rise of a geographically widespread and intellectually interrelated tide of reform movements throughout the Muslim world that emphasized the need for a stricter application of the *sharīʿa* in religious and social life. The sharʿist reform tide had begun to swell in the seventeenth century, mainly in India and the Arab Near East, and it reached Islamdom-wide dimensions in the following two centuries, so that a "general orthodox revival"[24] was felt in this period from west Africa to Indonesia and China. In this *sharīʿa*-oriented revival lie some of the historical roots of the Islamic upsurge of the present day.

To account for the contemporaneity of these interrelated movements, three strands of explanation come readily to mind, each having produced at least some effect: (a) a growing discrepancy between actual practice and the Islamic law, stemming from the accretion of non-Islamic customs over the course of ten centuries of Muslim history; (b) the impact, direct and indirect, of the European expansion; and (c) a greater degree of communication across the entire length of the Muslim world in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries than has generally been supposed.

The eighteenth century is not too early to search for a wide Muslim response to the outward thrust of European naval power. The once-mighty Ottoman empire had lost her superiority in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea. Europeans dominated the seas between India and the East African coast, controlling access to the pilgrimage. The British and French controlled portions of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent, and the Dutch had established their supremacy in Indonesia. To this must be added the Muscovites' swallowing up of the Muslim remnants of the Golden Horde and their expansion across the entire northern rim of the previously Muslim-controlled Kazakh steppe. Finally, in the extreme northeast

[24] See Fazlur Rahman, *Islam* (Garden City: Doubleday/Anchor, 1968), chapter 12, "Pre-Modernist Reform Movements," pp. 237-260.

of Muslim Central Asia other non-Muslim presences had made themselves felt. The Zunghars and later the Ch'ing empire conquered the northeastern corner of the *dār al-Islām*.

However clearly or unclearly Muslims perceived the sum total of these facts, non-Muslim intrusions must surely have prompted some degree of feeling among Muslims that all was not right with their political order, and such a feeling would presumably have led to a little soul-searching, especially in intellectual centers like Medina and Cairo, where Muslims came to study from all the far-flung places of Islam. This remains a conjecture, however, because no scholar has yet constructed a convincing case for it on the basis of textual evidence in which the Muslims speak for themselves.

Unlike the Islamic resurgence that followed the rampages of the Mongols in the thirteenth century, in which sharʿism and Sufism stood over against one another to a considerable extent as opposite poles, the eighteenth century reform tide fused sharʿism and Sufism together, permeating virtually the entire network of the Sufi mystical paths' vast geographical outreach. The only notable exception was the "Wahhabi" movement in the Arabian peninsula, which opposed mysticism and all its works. Sufism became sharʿism's carrier, and the "orthodox" mystical paths came into prominence: the Naqshbandiyya, the Qādiriyya, the Khalwatiyya, and the north African mystical paths deriving from Aḥmad Idrīs al-Fāsī (d. 1537). In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries *shaykhs* of these mystical paths were numbered among the most forceful and effective of all the proponents of sharʿist-reformist thought.

Particularly important as sharʿist reformers were the Naqshbandiyya in India, who had adopted an increasingly activist sharʿist emphasis in the seventeenth century in opposition to the latitudinarianism of mysticism in the subcontinent, the religious libertarianism of the Mughal emperors, and also, perhaps, partly in response to the decline of Muslim political power and the growing strength of regional Hindu rulers. Indian Naqshbandīs--the spiritual descendants of Khoja Aḥrār, Bāqī Bi 'llāh, and Aḥmad Sirhindī--stood for sharʿism, political activism, propagation of Islam, and the Sunni consensus.

Intellectual historians have not yet established the precise contribution of Indian Naqshbandī reformism to the growth of sharʿist reform movements in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the Arabic-speaking countries of the Middle East. In the second half of the eighteenth and in the nineteenth century Naqshbandīs made a major contribution, perhaps the major contribution, to the "general orthodox revival" that swept the length and breadth of the Muslim world. Most of the leading Naqshbandī

reformers of this later period either were Indians themselves or else had absorbed strong sharᶜist influences from Indian Naqshbandī teachers. Similarly, in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries Indian Naqshbandīs played a prominent part in the Middle East in initiating and reinforcing sharᶜist tendencies.

THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE KURDS AND HUI: AL-KŪRĀNĪ, AL-KURDĪ, AND MA MING-HSIN

Among the earliest and most influential centers of Naqshbandī reformism in the Middle East was Medina, where pilgrims and students came continuously from all over the Muslim world. Here teachers of diverse origins propounded their ideas to listeners of even more diverse origins who later took these ideas home with them. Whether or not an explicitly constituted "school" of fundamentalist mystical teachers existed in Medina in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, fundamentalist ideas reflecting an acknowledged or unacknowledged consensus among influential (and rival) mystics were certainly in the air.[25] One of these teachers was a Kurd named Ibrāhīm b. Ḥasan al-Kūrānī (1616-1690). Al-Kūrānī was a Naqshbandī and also an initiate of other mystical paths. In matters of mystical practice, and even in his capacity as a Naqshbandī, he stressed the permissibility of using vocal formulae in the remembrance of God (*al-jahr bi-'dh-dhikr*)[26]--an uncommon position for Naqshbandīs, who generally insisted on the remembrance by "secrecy" (*sirr*), namely the silent *dhikr*, and condemned the use of "exclamation" (*jahr*, literally "making public").

Through his students and his students' students and those of his son Abu 'ṭ-Ṭāhir Muḥammad al-Kurdī (d. 1733), al-Kūrānī's influence spread far and wide. One of his pupils was ᶜAbd ar-Raᶜūf as-Sinkilī (d. post 1693), who studied with him for many years in Medina and then returned home to Sumatra, where he laid the groundwork for a further surge of Islam in Indonesia. Abu 'ṭ-Ṭāhir

25 See John Voll, "Muḥammad Hayyāt al-Sindī and Muḥammad ibn ᶜAbd al-Wahhāb: An analysis of an intellectual group in eighteenth century Madina," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, Vol 38, no. 1 (1975), pp. 32-39.

26 Al-Kūrānī wrote a treatise on the vocal *dhikr*, entitled "Itḥāf al-munīb al-awwāh bi-faḍl al-jahr bi-dhikr Allāh," mentioned in his biography in Muḥammad b. ᶜAlī ash-Shawkānī, *Al-badr aṭ-ṭāliᶜ bi-mahāsin man baᶜd al-qarn as-sābiᶜ* (Cairo: Matba'at as-Sa'āda, 1929/30), Vol. 1, p. 12.

was the principal influence on the life of the great Indian orthodox reformer Shāh Walī Allāh of Delhi (d. 1762), a figure to be reckoned with in much of the subsequent Islamic history of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Al-Kurdī also taught Muḥammad Ḥayāt as-Sindī (d. 1750 or 1752), who was the teacher of Muḥammad b. ᶜAbd al-Wahhāb (d. 1791), founder of the anti-Sufi "Wahhabi" movement. Among the other students of As-Sindī was Muḥammad as-Samman (d. 1775), who disseminated his fundamentalist Sufism through his own students to both west and east Africa, to Afghanistan, India, and Indonesia.

Closer to home, al-Kūrānī and his son al-Kurdī had many lesser-known pupils. Their teaching made an important impact on the succeeding generation of mystical teachers in Medina and also in the Yemen, where the Naqshbandiyya had recently been introduced from India by Tāj ad-Dīn b. Zakariyyā' al-ᶜUthmānī (d. 1640),[27] a student of Bāqī Bi 'llāh. One of al-Kūrānī's pupils from the Yemen was the Naqshbandī Sufi az-Zayn b. Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Bāqī al-Mizjājī (1643/4-1725), who has been described as one of the *mujaddidin* (renewers) of the beginning of the twelfth Islamic century.[28] His family home was at Mizjāja, a village on the outskirts of Zabid.

Az-Zayn had received his Naqshbandī initiation from his father Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Bāqī b. az-Zayn (post 1591-1663), who had received it directly from al-ᶜUthmānī, and al-ᶜUthmānī had appointed Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Bāqī to be his *khalīfa* after his death.[29] The form of *dhikr* that al-ᶜUthmānī taught to Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Bāqī was the Naqshbandī silent remembrance (*adh-dhikr al-khafī*),[30] and Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Bāqī had taught this same silent remembrance to az-Zayn.

It was probably az-Zayn who first authorized the remembrance by *jahr* among the Zabid Naqshbandiyya in addition to the traditional Naqshbandī remembrance by *sirr*. His association in Medina with the prestigious al-Kūrānī is likely to have weighed

27 See his biography in Muḥammad al-Amīn al-Muḥibbī, *Khulāṣat al-athar fī aᶜyān al-qarn al-ḥādī ᶜashar* (Cairo, 1868, reprinted Beirut), Vol. 1, pp. 464-470, and the translation in Ferdinand Wüstenfeld, *Die Cufiten in Südarabien im XI (XVII) Jahrhundert* (Göttingen, 1883).

28 Aḥmad b. Muḥammad Qāṭin, "Tuḥfat al-ikhwān bi sanad sayyid walad ᶜAdnān," MS Maktabat al-Imām Yaḥyā, Sanᶜa, North Yemen, #19 Muṣṭaliḥ (microfilm, Dār al-Kutub al-Miṣriyya, Cairo, #303), folio 100r.

29 Muḥibbī, Vol. 2, p. 283.

30 Qāṭin, fol. 133r.

heavily with him, and az-Zayn was also taught by al-Kūrānī's pupils Aḥmad an-Nakhlī (d. 1717) and al-Ḥasan b. ᶜAlī al-ᶜUjaymī (d. 1702). An-Nakhlī, who had received his Naqshbandī initiation from a Sufi from Central Asia, may have condoned the use of *jahr* by Naqshbandīs in the same way that his teacher al-Kūrānī did, but he also initiated his pupils into the Naqshbandiyya in accordance with al-ᶜUthmānī's procedures.[31] Al-ᶜUjaymī, who gave az-Zayn an authorization in religious studies in 1665/6,[32] pursued an avid interest in the various forms of *dhikr* associated with the different mystical paths, almost all of which used *jahr*, and he wrote an influential treatise on the subject.[33] Contact with teachers such as these would have put the use of *jahr* by "secrecy"-prone Naqshbandīs in a favorable light.

The Zabid Naqshbandiyya's receptivity to *jahr* in their remembrances of God probably reflects the influence of other mystical paths.[34] It is not known into how many paths az-Zayn's teacher, the *jahr* advocate al-Kūrānī, had been initiated in addition to his primary mystical path, the Naqshbandiyya. But throughout az-Zayn's lifetime the Qādiriyya clearly wielded considerable influence in Mecca, Medina, and the Yemen, and by the end of az-Zayn's life the Khalwatiyya, too, had begun their rise to prominence.

31 The name of an-Nakhlī's Naqshbandī initiator was Sayyid Mīr Kulāl b. Maḥmūd al-Balkhī. See Muḥammad Khalīl al-Muradī, *Silk al-durar fī aᶜyān al-qarn ath-thānī ᶜashar*, Vol. 1, p. 172. See also the description of the initiation ceremony in ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān b. Sulaymān al-Ahdal, *Al-Nafas al-Yamānī fī ijāzat Bani'l Shawkānī*, MS, al-Maktaba 's-Saᶜīdiyya, Tonk, Rajasthan #39 *hadīth* (microfilm, Arab League, Maᶜhad al-Makhṭūṭāt, #1293, *tā'rīkh*), p. 40.

32 Qāṭin, fol. 100r.

33 See Carl Brockelmann, *Geschichte der arabischen Literatur* (Leiden, 1943-1949), Supplementband II, p. 537.

34 In this connection, see Hamid Algar, "Silent and vocal dhikr in the Naqshbandi order," in *Akten des VII. Kongresses für Arabistik und Islamwissenschaft* (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, philologisch-historische Klasse, series 3, no. 98; Göttingen, 1976), pp. 44-45, who attributes, in part, the Naqshbandī use of vocal *dhikr* to "the practice of simultaneous affiliation to a number of different sufi orders." He instances Yasawī and Kubrawī affiliations, but says that Qādirī affiliations were more common. Algar hastens to add, however, that the Naqshbandiyya also have the vocal *dhikr* in their own right through a secondary line of spiritual descent leading back to ᶜAlī b. Abī Ṭālib.

Both the Qādiriyya and the Khalwatiyya sanctioned, indeed gloried in, the use of *jahr*.

The Yemen, and particularly its two cities of Sanᶜa' and Zabid, was one of the main grounds of learning in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries for students from the eastern parts of the Muslim world. Yūsuf al-Jāwī, famous for his *jihād* against the Dutch in Indonesia, had been one of the two main pupils of az-Zayn's father Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Bāqī[35] and, in Medina, of al-Kūrānī. Al-Kūrānī's other well-known Indonesian student, ᶜAbd ar-Ra'ūf as-Sinkilī, mentioned above, likewise studied in the Yemen.[36] The Chinese teacher Ma Lai-ch'ih, also mentioned above, studied in the Yemen for more than a year, well over a third of his pilgrimage trip to the Middle East. Being a Naqshbandī, Ma Lai-ch'ih could hardly have spent a year in the Yemen without visiting Zabid, and, not improbably, it may have been from az-Zayn, the Yemen's leading Naqshbandī teacher, that Ma Lai-ch'ih took most of his lessons.

Some years later another Chinese Muslim, Muḥammad Amīn Ma Ming-hsin (1719- 1781),[37] otherwise known as ᶜAzīz,[38] also

35 Ḥasan b. ᶜAlī al-Ujaymī, "Khabāyā 'z-zawāyā" (MS, Cairo, Dār al-Kutub, no. 2410, tā'rīkh), fol. 82v. The same passage establishes that Muḥammad ᶜAbd al-Bāqī was "born after the millenium," i.e., after December 19, 1591. Yūsuf al-Jāwī is the same as Shaykh Yūsuf, mentioned in G.W.J. Drewes, "Indonesia: Mysticism and activism," in G.E. von Grunebaum, ed., *Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilization* (Chicago, 1955), pp. 290-291.

36 One of al-Kūrānī's students, Muṣṭafā b. Fatḥ Allāh al-Hamawī (d. 1705 or 1706) wrote a book entitled, "Fawā'id al-irtiḥāl wa natā'ij as-safar fī akhbār ahl al-qarn al-ḥādi ᶜashar" (MS, Cairo, Dār al-Kutub, no. 1093 tā'rīkh), in which he speaks of al-Kūrānī's relations with his pupils from Southeast Asia.

37 So his name is given in Tawāḍuᶜ, *As-Ṣīn*, p. 115. F. Grenard, "Le Turkestan et le Tibet: Étude ethnographique et sociologique," in J. L. Dutreuil de Rhins, *Mission scientifique dans la Haute Asie, 1890-1895*, part 2 (Paris, 1898), p. 458, reports that his name was Muḥammad Amīn. Official Ch'ing dynasty sources refer to him as Ma Ming-hsin. For the Chinese year *chi-hai* (1719) as the date of his birth, see Nakada, *Kaikai*, p. 83, who draws on testimony from the Japanese Muslim Kawamura Kyōdō, published in 1927.

38 Both "ᶜAzīz of Ho-chou," as in Shan Hua-p'u, "Shan Kan chieh-yü lu," *Yü-kung*, Vol. 5, no. 11 (Aug. 1, 1936), pp. 98-99, reprinted in Pai Shou-i, comp., *Hui-min ch'i-i* (Shanghai, 1953), Vol. 4, pp. 310-311, and "ᶜAzīz of Kuan-ch'uan," as in the account by Ma Tzu-k'uo, published in 1949, cited by Trippner, "Islamische Gruppen," p. 163. Shan records *Erh-tse-tzu* as the Chinese transcription of ᶜAzīz, and

arrived in the Yemen after visiting Bukhara, where he and Ma Lai-ch'ih, then on his way back to China, are said to have studied together. Ma Lai-ch'ih was later referred to as Ma Ming-hsin's "companion" or "senior school friend,"[39] and it may have been that Ma Ming-hsin came to the Yemen because of the contacts that Ma Lai-ch'ih had already established there, or perhaps because of links between Naqshbandīs in Bukhara and the Naqshbandīs of Zabid.[40] Ma Lai-ch'ih returned to China, and Ma Ming-hsin went on to the Middle East, where he is said to have "studied at one of the houses in Yemen. He spent more than twenty bitter years in preparation before returning to China."[41] During these twenty years it is said that he "became a follower of the master of the path az-Zayn and, submitting to the severe discipline of the Jahriyya's *zāwiya*, received his secret teaching."[42]

Ma Tzu-k'uo has *A-chi-tzu*, which Trippner misconstrues as a transcription of *ḥājjī*. Saguchi Toru, *Jūhachi-jūkyū seiki Higashi Torukisutan shakaishi kenkyū* (Tōkyō, 1963), p. 572, reconstructs *Erh-tse-tzu* as ᶜAzīz, an identification which had been established earlier by Muḥammad Tawāḍuᶜ (a Chinese Muslim writing in Arabic), *As-Ṣīn*, p. 116.

39 Muḥammad Tawāḍuᶜ, *As-Ṣīn*, p. 115, where the term for "companion" is *zamīl*, and T'ang Chien-yu, "The Four Men Huans," tr. Claude L. Pickens, Jr., *Friends of Moslems*, Vol. 16, no. 1 (Jan. 12, 1942), p. 5. T'ang's Chinese text is not available to me. Assuming that the year of Ma Ming-hsin's birth was 1719 (see n. 36 above), Ma Tzu-k'uo, as cited in Trippner, "Islamische Gruppen," p. 155, must be in error when he places Ma Lai-ch'ih back in China as early as 1705.

40 According to A.A. Semënov, ed., *Sobranie vostochnykh rukopisei Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. 3 (Tashkent, 1955), pp. 361-362, a mystical path called "Jahriyya" is represented as being separate from the Yasawiyya in MS no. 2686. I have not been able to consult this manuscript, but it may well contain evidence relevant to the relationship between Ma Ming-hsin's "Jahriyya" in China and the *jahrī* Naqshbandīs of the Yemen.

41 Sun Yu-chen, "A glance at the Ningsia center of the Jeheriya" (Feb. 15, 1936), tr. C.L. Pickens, Jr., in the latter's private notebook on "Sects."

42 Kawamura Kyōdō (1927), cited in Nakada, *Kaikai*, p. 83. Az-Zayn's name is transcribed (into Japanese from Chinese) *Tsaini*, and his title in Chinese is recorded to have been *tao-chang* (literally, "elder of the path," i.e., master of the path). The term *tao-t'ang* (literally, "meeting hall of the path") surely refers to a *zāwiya*. Saguchi, *Jūhachi-jūkyū seiki*, p. 578, also equates *tao-t'ang* with

The sense in which Ma Ming-hsin became az-Zayn's "follower" remains open to doubt, because az-Zayn died on September 9, 1725, or shortly thereafter,[43] when Ma could have been no more than six years old, if the correct time of his birth was indeed the Chinese year *chi-hai* (1719). In fact, Ma is said to have been "in his seventh year" when he set out from China accompanying his grandfather on the pilgrimage,[44] and he spent at least a brief period in Bukhara. So he probably could not have reached the Yemen until about the time of az-Zayn's death, or perhaps even afterward. Fleeting contact in childhood or mystical *uwaysī* (Uways-like, see below) contact with az-Zayn's *rūḥ* or *rūḥaniyya* ("spirit") after the latter's death may have been enough to establish Ma Ming-hsin's claim to discipleship. But the initiatic chain recorded in northwest China by Martin Taylor in 1936[45] lists az-Zayn's son ᶜAbd al-Khāliq (ca. 1705-1740) as an intervening link between az-Zayn and Ma Ming-hsin. It is perhaps also significant that the first seven persons on these two essentially identical lists are headed by the name of Uways al-Qaranī (seventh century A.D.), for whom is named the mystical type of transmission known as *uwaysī*, whereby a person can receive knowledge or initiation directly from someone whom he has never met. At any rate, the listing of ᶜAbd al-Khāliq between az-Zayn and Ma Ming-hsin suggests Ma's presence in the Yemen sometime in the period between 1725, the year in which az-Zayn died, and 1740, the year of ᶜAbd al-Khāliq's death.

By ᶜAbd al-Khāliq's time the Zabid Naqshbandīs were practicing more than one remembrance. By then the Naqshbandī "*dhikr* of the heart" had come to be referred to in the plural (*al-*

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zāwiya. Muḥammad Tawāḍuᶜ, *As-Ṣīn*, p. 115, says that Ma Ming-hsin "visited the Yemen and obtained the Sufi path (*aṭ-ṭarīqa 'ṣ-ṣūfiyya*) there."

43 Qāṭin, "Tuḥfat al-ikhwān," fol. 100v, says that az-Zayn died "at the beginning of the year A.H. 1138," the first day of which was Sept. 9, 1725.

44 T'ang, "The Four Men Huans," p. 5.

45 See Joseph Fletcher, "The Taylor-Pickens Letters on the Jahri Branch of the Naqshbandiyya in China," *Central and Inner Asian Studies* 3 (1989), 1-35. For *uwaysī*, see the Teheran edition of Fakhr ad-Dīn ᶜAlī Kāshifī, *Rashaḥāt-i ᶜayn al-ḥayāt*, ed. by ᶜAlī Asghar Muᶜīniyān (Tehran, 2536/1977). The first names on the list are obviously not part of the *silsila* but reflect earlier renowned Sufis. Perhaps "Uways" is a heading, that is, the early list is connected "in the *uwaysī* fashion."

adhkhār al-qalbiyya),[46] and the use of *jahr* had come to be accepted. Like his father, ᶜAbd al-Khāliq studied with the distinguished teachers of Mecca and Medina, among them al-Kūrānī's son Abu 'ṭ-Ṭāhir and Muḥammad Ḥayāt as-Sindī.[47] Of these, the former, true to his father's teaching, was an advocate of the use of *jahr* in the Naqshbandī *dhikr*, whereas the latter was an advocate of *sirr* and rejected the use of "exclamation" by the Naqshbandiyya in their remembrance of God. By ᶜAbd al-Khāliq's time, however, the use of *jahr* seems no longer to have been a burning issue among the Yemen Naqshbandīs.[48] ᶜAbd al-Khāliq taught the *dhikr* to his disciples both "by secrecy and by exclamation" (*sirran wa jahran*),[49] and one of his disciples has explained that there was no "incompatibility" (*munāfāh*) between the two.

ᶜAbd al-Khāliq's life is widely covered in the biographical literature, more than the life of his father az-Zayn, but the son's career was a short one. When az-Zayn died in 1725 at the age of eighty-five by the Islamic calendar, ᶜAbd al-Khāliq was only twenty Islamic years old. Az-Zayn had appointed him to be his *khalīfa* after his death, and he and his brother Muḥammad made a name for themselves as teachers of the Naqshbandī mystical path. But rivalry between them soon prompted ᶜAbd al-Khāliq to leave for Sanᶜa',

46 See Qāṭin, fol. 96v. The precise types of *dhikr* that az-Zayn taught are not specified in any of the sources that I have read beyond the fact that az-Zayn's *dhikr* was "according to the Naqshbandī mystical path"--see, e.g., Muḥammad Zabāra, *Nashr al-ᶜarf li-nubata' al-Yamān baᶜd al-alf,* Vol. 1 (Cairo, 1940), p. 287.

47 Qāṭin, fol. 95v. According to testimony cited by al-Ahdal in his "'An-nafas al-Yamānī," p. 22, Muḥammad Ḥayāt as-Sindī gave ᶜAbd al-Khāliq an authorization to teach his treatise on *ḥadīth* entitled, "Al-wajāza fi 'l-ijāza li-kutub al-ḥadīth mā' baᶜd al-aḥādith al-mumtāza."

48 In fact, in the years following ᶜAbd al-Khāliq's death there seems to have been a noteworthy openness to new forms of *dhikr* among the Zabid Naqshbandīs. ᶜAbd al-Raḥmān al-Jabartī, *ᶜAjā'ib al-athar fī al-tarājim wa 'l-akhbār*, ed. by Muḥammad Qāsim (Bulaq, 1880), Vol. 2, p. 89, makes it plain that when the Khalwatī traveler ᶜAlī b. ᶜUmar al-Qinawī (d. 1784) visited Zabid, the *shaykhs* there were interested in hearing about his brand of mysticism and even joined with him in a *dhikr* circle in which he taught them *adh-dhikr al-jahrī* in accordance with his own mystical path, the Khalwatiyya. See also Ahdal, "An-nafas al-Yamānī," p. 68.

49 He taught both, for example, to Aḥmad ibn Qāṭin. See Qāṭin, fol. 95v.

which he reached in 1739, only to die early in 1740 at the age of thirty-six lunar years.

THE OLD AND THE NEW TEACHINGS

Apparently deeply affected by the neo-orthodox fundamentalist thinking in the Middle East, and among the Naqshbandiyya in particular, Ma Ming-hsin returned home to the Chinese northwest in 1761[50] fully committed to a career of disseminating his religious convictions. Ma Lai-ch'ih, who had returned to China many years before, may have recognized some of the "pre-modernist reform movements" becoming prevalent among Indian and Near Eastern Naqshbandīs during his experience in Bukhara, the pilgrimage cities, and the Yemen. But at the time of Ma Ming-hsin's return, Naqshbandism in China was still permeated by the flavor of Central Asian mysticism, with its heavy emphasis on the veneration of saints and the seeking of inspiration at tombs. Ma Ming-hsin's teaching appears to have contained two distinctive points related to practice: fundamentalism and the use of *jahr* in the *dhikr*.

Thus Ma Ming-hsin founded in China proper a new branch of the Naqshbandiyya that came to be known as the Jahriyya (the "vocal" ones), as opposed to other Naqshbandīs--the spiritual descendants of Khoja Āfāq--who were referred to as the Khufiyya, properly Khafiyya (the "silent" ones). This choice of names was all the more natural in that a Khufiyya-Jahriyya dichotomy already existed in Central Asia, where it distinguished the Naqshbandiyya (Khufiyya) from the Yasawiyya (Jahriyya), the latter being famous for their *jahrī* ("public") *dhikr*--called the *dhikr-i arra* ("the saw *dhikr*") because its sound was similar to the sound of the two-man saw (*arra*) cutting wood .

Although the terms Khufiyya and Jahriyya are attested in Chinese sources (as *Hu-fei-yeh* and *Che-he-lin-yeh* respectively), non-Muslim Chinese authors generally referred to the two branches of the Naqshbandiyya in China as the Old Teaching (the Āfāqiyya, Khufiyya) and the New Teaching (Ma Ming-hsin's followers,

50 Ma Ming-hsin may have returned to China earlier, going first to Yunnan in the company of an older teacher called Pan Ting Yeh, according to testimony of a certain Ting A-hung at Chin-chi-p'u on June 2, 1936, recorded by Claude L. Pickens, Jr., in his account entitled, "In Search of Moslems in China April 30th to July 2nd 1936" (typescript), p. 27. Pan Ting Yeh could be the Ma Lao-jen-chia mentioned in Shan Hua-p'u, p. 98 (top).

Jahriyya). English-speaking authors have commonly rendered these terms as "Old Sect" and "New Sect," but this is altogether inappropriate because the Naqshbandiyya were wholeheartedly Sunni and non-sectarian, indeed anti-sectarian in nature. The two groups were not in any sense sects but rather two factions of a single mystical path.

Later, as time passed and the religious politics of the Muslims of northwest China grew more complex, use of the New-Old dichotomy would lead to increasing confusion. In nineteenth century sources one can no longer be certain whether *lao-chiao* or *chiu-chiao* ("old teaching") is to be read "Old Teaching" (meaning Khufiyya) or "old teachings" (designating all the various schools of Islamic practice and belief as opposed to Ma Ming-hsin's Jahriyya). In the twentieth century, especially after the Ch'ing dynasty's collapse removed the ban on Chinese travel to the Middle East, *hsin-chiao* ("new teaching") also ceased to be a specific designation for Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching, which itself began to be classed as one of the "old teachings" of Chinese Islam.

Ma built his own mosque (*tao-t'ang*) in Kansu and made many initiates (*chiao-hsia*), and before long his forceful preaching among the Huis and Salars of northwest China provoked a reaction among the leaders of the Old Teaching (Āfāqiyya). As a master, authorized in Arabia, of a different Naqshbandī initiatic chain, Ma Ming-hsin was armed with excellent credentials to challenge the Āfāqiyya's power. He frowned on his fellow Naqshbandīs' excessive meditation at the tombs of saints, and he insisted on the permissibility of *jahr* in the *dhikr*. The latter point must have been especially shocking to the other Naqshbandīs, for ever since the time of ᶜAbd al-Khāliq Ghijduwānī in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, the Khwājagān and their descendants in the Naqshbandiyya had been virtually unanimous in rejecting the vocal *dhikr*.[51]

It will never be known how many Chinese pilgrims made their way to the Yemen and the holy cities of Mecca and Medina during the Ch'ing period (1644-1911), but the number must have been very small, not just because of the enormous distance separating China from the Arabian peninsula but also because of the Ch'ing government's ban on foreign travel. After the Ch'ing conquest of Sinkiang in the 1750s the ban must have been no less effective, and it not only hemmed in the Huis of China proper but also blocked the Muslim populations of Sinkiang from first-hand contact with the Middle East. In Ch'ing Central Asia one

[51] But see Joseph Fletcher, "The Naqshbandiyya and the *dhikr-i arra*."

consequence of this policy was to reinforce the Āfāqiyya's prestige by isolating the Muslim population from outside rival leaderships. In China proper the policy meant that if anyone did succeed in going to the Middle East and returning, he would be in a good position to win authority in the Hui population's eyes. In this respect the more secluded and remote a Muslim community was from the main centers of Islamic cultural life in the Middle East, the more susceptible it was to those centers' most recent trends.

In substance, the dispute between Old and New Teachings in eighteenth century northwest China seems to have been a struggle over the leadership of the Naqshbandiyya in China. Meditation at saints' tombs may have been one of the points at issue, but the quarrel itself centered on the performance of the *dhikr*. Ma Ming-hsin insisted on the permissibility of *jahr*, and the Old Teaching masters (the Chinese Āfāqiyya) insisted with equal vehemence on the traditional Naqshbandī silent *dhikr*.

THE CH'ING GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE

It was generally a time of unrest for the Muslims of northwest China. The Ch'ing government had just completed its conquest of Eastern Turkestan in 1759. Here, at Ma Ming-hsin's very doorstep, where Islam had only recently seemed to be gaining ground, the *dār al-Islām* had suffered a stunning defeat. In 1762 the provincial officials began posting warnings and taking other measures to suppress Muslim "violence." Relations between Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese in Shensi and Kansu were showing signs of strain. In 1765 Ush Turfan rebelled against the Ch'ing and was crushed, further demonstrating the state's extension of power into Sinkiang.

Disputations between the two Naqshbandī factions led to anger and violence, which the Ch'ing government tried to stem. Seeing Ma Ming-hsin and his New Teaching faction as the troublemakers, the Ch'ing clamped down on them and arrested Ma in 1781. The New Teaching adherents rose up in arms, trying to free their leader. The authorities executed him in Lan-chou and attacked the followers of the New Teaching, who defended themselves under the leadership of Su Ssu-shih-san. The Salars of central Kansu continued to offer armed resistance, but many of the Old Teaching Naqshbandīs and perhaps also the followers of other Islamic "old teachings" came to the aid of the government. After four months of fighting the Ch'ing suppressed the revolt. Ma Ming-hsin was buried on the eastern outskirts of Lan-chou and reverently remembered as the Venerable Founding Father (*Tao-tsu lao-yeh*) of the Jahriyya in China.

Three years later, in 1784, another upheaval occurred among the New Teaching adherents, this time under the leadership of an *ākhūnd* named T'ien Wu. After about three months of fighting, the Ch'ing government again restored order, killing T'ien Wu and instituting stern measures to prevent disputes and violence from breaking out again among the Muslims of the northwest. Although the restrictions that the Kansu provincial authorities instituted were directed mainly against the New Teaching, and although lands that had belonged to New Teaching "rebels" were given over to adherents of the Old Teaching who had cooperated with the government, the force of Ch'ing policy grew increasingly anti-Muslim. The conversion of non-Muslims to Islam was prohibited. Muslims were forbidden to leave their villages for prayer services. Preachers were barred from preaching outside their own localities. New mosques were not to be constructed. Muslims were ordered to refrain from adopting non-Muslim babies (formal adoption was in any case forbidden by Koranic law)[52] and were warned not to bring "false suits" against one another. The New Teaching was in effect proscribed although not unequivocally, in that a distinction was allowed between rebels and innocent (politically inactive) believers.

Adherents of the Old Teaching continued to live in harmony with the Ch'ing government, and during the White Lotus rebellion of 1796-1805 the Ch'ing recruited Salar followers of the Chinese Āfāqiyya to fight the rebels, assuming that Muslims would be more immune to the rebels' religious ideology than would non-Muslim Chinese. Despite official disapproval, Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching continued to grow.

THE MAKHDŪMZĀDA *JIHĀD* IN SINKIANG

The problem raised by the presence of Islam in Ch'ing China was minimized at first by the Ch'ing policy of segregating the empire's several cultural zones from one another. The Manchurian frontier, Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet, Sinkiang, and China proper were all isolated from one another insofar as such isolation was feasible. Even within Sinkiang sharp lines were drawn between the predominantly pastoral territories of Zungharia, north of the T'ien Shan mountains, and the agricultural oasis zones of Eastern Turkestan, south of the mountains. Administratively, Eastern Turkestan was subdivided into Altishahr and Uighuristan, with restrictions on travel and commerce between the two. Travel between Sinkiang and western Central Asia was forbidden to

52 But the raising of orphans as Muslims is not "adoption" *per se*.

subjects of the empire, but traders from Kashmir, Badakhshan, Kokand, and the cities of the Syr Darya valley as well as Kirghiz tribesmen in the T'ien Shan and the Pamirs kept the Altishahr population to some degree in touch with the Muslim lands west of Sinkiang.

Notwithstanding its policy of segregation, the Ch'ing government encouraged immigrants from China proper to settle and develop what had previously been pasture and waste lands in Zungharia. Among these immigrants came many Huis, who in one way or another maintained communications with Huis of northwest China proper. In the Ili valley, the Zunghars had earlier established a small Muslim population of East Turkestanis, and following the 1759 conquest of Altishahr the Ch'ing government had added to this population--labelled "Taranchi," "farmers"--by forcing other East Turkestani families to migrate to Ili from Ush Turfan and elsewhere. The Taranchis, of course, also retained ties with their fellow Muslims to the south. In short, the Ch'ing state's segegation policy was only moderately effective, but insofar as it functioned, it served, as in China proper, to reinforce the local Muslim hierarchy by blocking the entrance of rival leaders from outside.

The Altishahr Muslim leadership at this time consisted of various competing elements, most notably the class of indigenous notables (the *begs*) to whom the Ch'ing had given official posts in return for help against the Makhdūmzāda khojas. Some were Naqshbandīs of the Isḥāqī branch, but the Ch'ing government removed those among them who were descendants of the Makhdūm-i Aʿẓam and sent them to Peking, ennobling them as members of the titled imperial aristocracy. The Naqshbandī khojas of Kucha, descended from Jamāl ad-Dīn Katakī, mentioned above, had a considerable following, especially in northeastern Altishahr and among the Sinkiang Huis. Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching acquired a foothold in Sinkiang with the influx of Huis, and the Indian (*Mujaddidī*) branch of the Naqshbandiyya also established itself at Yarkand. Other mystical paths played important roles, too. The Uwaysiyya, founded by Khoja Muḥammad Sharīf Pīr (d. 1555/6 or 1566), had a large following among the Taranchis and Huis of Ili. The Qādiriyya enjoyed some strength, including the descendants of Hudāwī of Kucha, who held important Ch'ing administrative posts in Altishahr.

But of all these groups, the Āfāqī branch of the Naqshbandiyya continued to hold pride of place in the sentiments of most of the Altishahr population, which regarded the Āfāqī Makhdūmzādas as the legitimate rulers of the country. Ch'ing rule was seen as a transitory affliction, and its effects were limited;

imperial government kept its distance and, for the most part, left the local society to be administered in accordance with Islamic law. Taking advantage of this sentiment, the Makhdūmzāda khojas, who lived across the mountains in the Kokand khanate, mounted a series of invasions in a *jihād* against the Ch'ing empire, hoping to regain possession of Eastern Turkestan. The Ch'ing state, for its part, tried to maintain a distinction between the Āfāqiyya as a religious community on the one hand and the "rebel" supporters of the Āfāqī Makhdūmzādas on the other. So the Āfāqī tomb complex at Ḥaḍrat Āfāq (originally known as Yaghdu) outside Kashgar remained open and continued to be a center of Āfāqī activities, and the shrine of Satuq Boghra Khan at Astin Artish, a short distance to the northeast, became a similar Āfāqī center.

There is some evidence that Muḥammad Yūsuf, a grandson of Burhān ad-Dīn, one of the two Āfāqī khojas whom the Ch'ing army had driven into Badakhshan in 1759, may have accompanied a party of Kirghiz who raided the Ch'ing border in 1797. In 1814 a Naqshbandī named Ḍiyā' ad-Dīn, belonging to the Isḥāqī branch, raised a small revolt at Tashmaliq, southwest of Kashgar. Neither of these actions produced any response among the Altishahr population, but in 1817 Muḥammad Yūsuf's younger brother Jahāngīr declared a *jihād* against the Ch'ing and began, with Kirghiz help, a number of invasions that were to have serious consequences. In 1826 Jahāngīr's military successes at Kashgar induced the city's population to rise, and the khan of Kokand himself entered Altishahr at the head of an army. Sympathetic popular revolts at Yangi Hisar, Yarkand, and Khotan delivered those districts into Jahāngīr's hands, but the Āfāqiyya, instead of making common cause with their Isḥāqī rivals, used their position of strength against the Isḥāqiyya, thus permanently alienating the latter. When the Ch'ing army set out to reconquer the region in 1827, Jahāngīr and his followers plundered the cities under their control and fled, offering no resistance. It was not until 1828 that the Ch'ing succeeded in taking Jahāngīr prisoner; he was executed with much ceremony in Peking.

The Ch'ing took relatively slight reprisals. Official blame for the rebellion was placed in the most literal fashion on the invaders alone, including the Kokand government. But the Ch'ing studiously avoided any recognition of the problem posed by a militant Islam, with its competing view of the world order, that extended from beyond the imperial frontiers into the very heart of China proper. Just as the government, after the New Teaching upheavals of 1781 and 1784, had forbidden Muslims to adopt non-Muslim babies, it now, following Jahāngīr's *jihād*, prohibited non-Muslim Chinese

men from taking Muslim women to wife. From a Muslim point of view, neither of these measures was necessary, because Koranic law strictly forbade both adoption and the marriage of Muslim women to non-Muslims. Various interpretations of these prohibitions are possible, but it is likely that the Ch'ing government, which had extremely good facilities for finding out everything about Islam and the empire's Muslim communities, had chosen the course of superfluous prohibitions so as to maintain the government's standing in the eyes of the anxious Han Chinese by seeming to curtail the Muslims' propagation of Islam. At the same time they avoided any step that would stir up trouble with the empire's large (and steadily growing) Muslim minority.

Jahāngīr was the last Makhdūmzāda of real ability, but the Āfāqiyya played a central role for the next half century in the Kokand khanate's efforts to monopolize Sinkiang's foreign trade. In order to extract commercial concessions from the Ch'ing government, Kokand sponsored Makhdūmzāda invasions in 1830, 1845 (a local revolt with Makhdūmzāda encouragement), 1847, 1852, 1854, 1857, and 1861, but the destructiveness of these raids gradually diminished popular enthusiasm for the Āfāqī cause. Accordingly, the Isḥāqiyya's strength increased, especially in Yarkand. For the time being, out of opposition to their Āfāqī rivals, the Isḥāqīs grew increasingly supportive of Ch'ing rule.

As a whole, however, despite the Isḥāqiyya's loyalism toward the Ch'ing and the decline of the Āfāqiyya's popularity, the power of the Naqshbandiyya increased, carrying with it an underlying challenge to Ch'ing imperial rule. The Āfāqiyya still remained popular at Kashgar. The khojas of Kucha increased their strength in northeastern Altishahr. In Yarkand ᶜAbd ar-Raḥmān Ḥaḍrat, the local leader of the Naqshbandiyya's Indian Mujaddidī branch, also prospered and, to judge by subsequent events, probably won over to himself many of the adherents of the Isḥāqiyya. By the 1860s the Mujaddidiyya were a powerful force in southwestern Altishahr. Among the Huis north of the T'ien Shan, Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching increased in strength, and the Āfāqiyya (Old Teaching) must also have had many adherents. Naqshbandīs provided links with Kokand and other foreign lands. The British in India, for example, used a Naqshbandī agent, Khoja Aḥmad Shāh Naqshbandī Sayyid, to gather information for them in Eastern Turkestan. At Leh, the capital of Ladakh, the Naqshbandī master Khoja Shāh Niyāz maintained ties with his disciples in Yarkand.

THE SPREAD OF POLITICAL ACTIVISM

Ma Ming-hsin's New Teaching had gone underground after the Ch'ing suppression of T'ien Wu's revolt in 1781, but it had spread widely through the empire. In addition to its followers in Sinkiang, the Chinese northwest, and Shansi province, the New Teaching possessed adherents in Tsinghai, where the Ch'ing government had uncovered a New Teaching group in 1789, and even in Hupeh, Kirin, Heilungkiang, Tientsin and the Ch'ing capital itself. Having been suppressed by the imperial government, the New Teaching was probably the most anti-Ch'ing of all the Muslim groups in the empire, and therefore in the best position to provide dynamic leadership for a popular *jihād*.

Before his execution in 1781 Ma Ming-hsin had initiated many people into his Jahriyya. Su Ssu-shih-san and T'ien Wu had given leadership to the Jahriyya during the New Teaching upheavals of 1781 and 1784, although they may or may not have been Ma Ming-hsin's authorized successors. Tradition[53] has it that Ma Ming-hsin authorized two disciples (*t'u-ti*) as Jahrī masters (*lao-jen-chia*, "elder," by analogy with the Arabic *shaykh* and the Persian *pīr*). The name of one of these has been lost,[54] but the other was Muḥammad Rabbānī, also known as Mu A-hung (meaning either Ākhūnd Mu, a Chinese surname, or else Mu(ḥammad)) and as Mu Pa-pa (from Turkic *Baba*, "father"), whose tomb is at P'ing-liang in eastern Kansu.

Muḥammad Rabbānī became grand master (*chiao-chu*) and in turn authorized Muḥammad Jalāl, presumably a Hui, who somehow attracted the unfavorable attention of the Ch'ing authorities and was exiled to do penal servitude as a laborer for the army in Ch'uan-ch'ang, Heilungkiang. Since he died and was buried there, he came to be known as Ch'uan-ch'ang T'ai-yeh, "The Grand Master in Ch'uan-ch'ang." Subsequently a shrine seems to have been built for him in Ling-chou, near Chin-chi-p'u, south of Ningsia. Muḥammad Jalāl's successor was his son Ma Erh,[55] named Ssu-yüeh-pa Lao-jen-chia (*Shaykh* Eighth of the Fourth Month) or Ssu-pa T'ai-yeh (Grand Master Four-Eight) after the lunar date on which he was killed by the Ch'ing military authorities. Ma Erh received his first initiation, but probably not his authorization as a Sufi master, from Muḥammad Rabbānī. His authorization and succession as grand master would seem to have come from his father, Muḥammad Jalāl. Ma Erh is buried in Hung-lo-fu, near Chin-chi-p'u, on the Ningsia plain.

The Jahriyya's next grand master was Ma Erh's son, Ma Hua-lung, who received the succession from his father but acquired much of his training from a teacher named Ma Hsiu-jen,[56] buried in the same enclosure with him at Hung-lo-fu. Ma Hua-lung established himself at the stronghold of Chin-chi-p'u south of Ningsia on the east bank of the Yellow River. Down to this time, with the exception of the Āfāqī wars in Sinkiang, the Muslim "rebellions" seem not to have been *jihād*s at all and were rebellions only from the point of view of the imperial government. Except for Muslims living on those frontiers that adjoined a Muslim country, the Muslims of the Chinese empire could only have seen themselves as hopelessly outnumbered minorities. When, *qua* Muslims, they had clashed with the state within China proper, they had probably done so either because they were fighting among themselves or else because pressure from the non-Muslim Chinese had driven them to violence.

But the middle of the nineteenth century was a time of wars and rebellions in China. The Opium War, the Taiping and Nien rebellions, the Russian annexation of northern Manchuria, the upheavals among the Miao aborigines in Kweichow, the Anglo-French seizure of Peking and the flight of the emperor, coupled perhaps with the unrest created by the Āfāqiyya among the Sinkiang Muslims, made for an atmosphere in which *jihād* may have seemed to hold some possible chance of success. Pressure from the non-Muslim majority was certainly present in Yunnan and the Chinese northwest, but in the 1850s the rebellions raging among the non-Muslim Chinese, notably the Taiping, may have called the survival of the dynasty into question, making *jihād* seem a feasible undertaking, perhaps even a necessary one for Muslim survival were the dynasty to collapse.

In Yunnan and Shensi, in particular, friction between Muslim and non-Muslim had steadily worsened in the first half of the nineteenth century. Riots occurred in Yunnan in the 1820s, 1830,

53 Shan Hua-p'u, p. 99 (top).

54 W. L. Bales, *Tso Tsung-t'ang: Soldier and Statesman of Old China* (Shanghai, 1937), p. 217, implies that this could have been Su Ssu-shih-san.

55 His name is, interestingly, also given as Ma Ming-hsin in the Jahrī initiatic chain as recorded by Taylor and Street. Pickens himself, who visited the grave in Hung-lo-fu, was told that Ma Hua-lung's father was Ma Ming-hsin (recorded as such by caption in Pickens' photograph album).

56 Given as "Ma Hsiao-jen" (which represents the local dialect) in Pickens, "In Search," p. 26 (May 31, 1936). See also C.L. Pickens, Jr., "News from the Field: Hung Lo Fu, Ningsia," *Friends of Moslems*, Vol. 17, no. 1 (Jan. 1, 1943), p. 52, where the name is Ma Hsiu-jen.

twice in 1845, and again in 1855. In 1856 there was a great massacre of Muslims in Kunming, followed by months of mutual reprisals--killing, arson, and looting--and then broad uprisings among the Yunnan Muslims, known as "Panthays" after a Burmese word for "Muslim." These uprisings, referred to collectively as the Panthay rebellion, lasted until the Ch'ing army finally extinguished the last embers of revolt, after almost two decades of bloody upheaval, in 1873. The rebellion was not exclusively Muslim, for non-Muslim groups joined forces with the rebels. The Naqshbandiyya's role in the Panthay rebellion remains to be studied, but there are indications that Tu Wen-hsiu, who published the first complete Chinese translation of the Koran and adopted the title Sulṭān Sulaymān, trying to create an independent sultanate at Tali in western Yunnan, may have been an initiate of Ma Ming-hsin's branch of the Naqshbandī mystical path.

In Shensi the deteriorating relations between Muslims and non-Muslims flared up into riots and rebellion when Taiping forces invaded from Szechwan in 1862, touching off attacks and counterattacks between communities. Both sides committed acts of terrible savagery, and the authorities were unable to restore order. Many of the Shensi Muslims were driven from their homes and forced to take refuge in Kansu. One of these refugees was T'o-ming (also called T'o-te-lin), who appears to have been a Jahrī. He evidently spent some time as a disciple of Ma Hua-lung, the New Teaching grand master, at Chin-chi-p'u, then moved on, at the invitation of one of Ma's disciples named Su Huan-chang, to Urumchi in Sinkiang, where he soon attracted a large following. Later that year Ma Hua-lung joined the fray and before long made himself the principal figure of a more or less coordinated *jihād* in which the Āfāqī (Old Teaching) Naqshbandīs and the various other Muslim factions seem, for a while at least, to have cooperated with one another.

The *jihād* in northwest China isolated Sinkiang militarily from the center of the empire. In 1863 there was a sympathetic Muslim uprising in the Ili region, which the Ch'ing authorities managed to put down, but in 1864 six entirely separate *jihād*s against the Ch'ing empire were declared in different parts of Sinkiang. Particularly noteworthy in the Sinkiang *jihād*s was the active role played by the Tungans, or Huis.

Two of these jihadist movements--the *jihād* of Jamāl ad-Dīn Katakī's descendant Rāshidīn Khan Khoja at Kucha, known as the Yellow Khoja, and the *jihād* of ᶜAbd ar-Raḥmān Ḥaḍrat at Yarkand, who belonged to the Mujaddidiyya--were certainly led by Naqshbandī masters. Two others--the *jihād* initiated by Chin

Hsiang-yin and the Kirghiz chief Siddīq Beg at Kashgar, stronghold of the Āfāqiyya, and the *jihād* of T'o-ming, who adopted the title of Muslim King (*Ch'ing-chen Wang*) at Urumchi--were almost certainly led by Naqshbandī masters. And it is not inconceivable that the remaining two--the *jihād* of Ḥājjī Ḥabīb Allāh Muftī in the Khotan region and the *jihād* of the Taranchi leader Muᶜaẓẓam Dhāt, or Muᶜaẓẓam Khan, in Ili--were also led by initiates of the Naqshbandī mystical path. Muᶜaẓẓam Dhāt was descended from Muḥammad Sharīf Pīr, founder of the Uwaysiyya, but multiple initiations were common, and the prestige of the Naqshbandiyya was such that an Uwaysī *pīr* could easily have been a Naqshbandī simultaneously. The next year, 1865, the Muslims of Tarbagatai also revolted against the Ch'ing empire and received military aid from the Kazakhs.

In Sinkiang, unlike the situation then prevailing in northwest China, there was a crisis of leadership among the various Muslim groups. T'o-ming and Rāshidīn Khan Khoja cooperated, thus adding to the latter's influence at Kashgar. But Chin Hsiang-yin and Siddiq Beg countered this by asking the khan of Kokand to send them a Makhdūmzāda who might rally the Sinkiang population. Kokand sent Jahāngīr's son Buzurg Khan Tura and a token force of sixty-six men under an officer named Yaᶜqūb Beg. Buzurg Khan soon eliminated Chin Hsiang-yin and Siddiq Beg. His general Yaᶜqūb Beg defeated Rāshidīn Khan Khoja and ᶜAbd ar-Raḥmān Ḥaḍrat, then exiled Buzurg Khan, establishing himself as ruler under the title *Badawlat* (Fortunate). By 1868 he had consolidated all of western Altishahr under his authority.

In 1869 Yaᶜqūb overpowered Rāshidīn Khan Khoja and went to war against T'o-ming, whose power was greatly reduced by a mutiny in 1870. At first Yaᶜqūb allied himself with the local corps of non-Muslim Chinese under Hsü Hsüeh-kung in Zungharia, whose fundamental loyalties lay ultimately with China and the Chinese imperial order. Jointly Yaᶜqūb and Hsü attacked T'o-ming at Urumchi, but when Yaᶜqūb failed to appoint Hsü governor of the city after it had been taken, the alliance faltered, and Hsü withdrew his forces.

In northwest China, the Ch'ing army finally forced Ma Hua-lung to surrender in 1871, executing both him and his son. Ma's body is buried on the east bank of the Yellow River, near Chin-chi-p'u, and his head is entombed in Hsüan-hua-kang, just north of Chang-chia-ch'uan in south Kansu. Having defeated the strongest of the Hui leaders, the Ch'ing forces gradually moved on against the others, some of whom spread into Mongolia, attacked Khobdo, raided the Ordos, and drove northwards until they were at last

contained. It was not until 1873 that the imperial army was able to quell the last traces of revolt in northwest China, forcing Pai Yen-hu, the last of the Muslim leaders, to retreat to Sinkiang.

With T'o-ming destroyed, the main Muslim area in Sinkiang still outside Yaᶜqūb's control was Ili, where Muᶜaẓẓam Dhāt had been succeeded by Abu 'l-Oghlan, known as Aᶜlā Khan, self-styled "sultan" of a Muslim realm centered at Kulja. The Ili Muslims had successfully resisted Yaᶜqūb's pressure, but in 1871 the Russians invaded Ili and placed the region under Russian military administration. In 1874 the Ch'ing military forces began their reconquest effort in Sinkiang. Russia and Britain considered propping up Yaᶜqūb Beg's regime but decided against it. Token support from the Ottoman empire had little effect.

The Ch'ing army completed its conquest of Altishahr in 1877 with the help of Yaᶜqūb Beg's death, by suicide or assassination, earlier that same year. The followers of Yaᶜqūb Beg's son Beg Quli Beg and the army of the fugitive Hui leader Pai Yen-hu escaped into Russian territory, where they were granted asylum. After a lengthy period of negotiations the Ch'ing managed to get the Russian government to withdraw from most of Ili in 1882, at which time much of the Ili valley's Muslim population, in fear of Ch'ing persecution, emigrated into Russian territory alongside the withdrawing Russian occupation forces. Added to the emigrants who had fled to the Kokand Khanate (now annexed by Russia), the new emigrants of 1882 swelled the Hui communities of Russia; their descendants now make up the Dungan (Tungan) and Uighur (Taranchi and East Turkestani) nationalities of the U.S.S.R. In Russian Turkestan a descendant of Khoja Āfāq named Ḥākim Khan continued to represent the Makhdūmzāda line. Beg Quli Beg drew a Russian pension in Ferghana and continued to call himself king of Kashgar. Abū 'l-Oghlan settled in Verny, where the Russian government provided him with farmlands and an annual pension.

Ch'ing suppression of the *jihāds* cost huge numbers of Muslim lives. The army took bloody reprisals against Muslims who were considered guilty of rebellion, and in China proper relations between Hui and Han (non-Muslims), which had been deteriorating since the late eighteenth century, were now so hostile in the aftermath of the failed *jihād* that the Ch'ing authorities decided on segregation as the only practicable solution. Massacre of the Hui population was not an option open to the government, and Peking even avoided proscription of the Jahriyya on an empire-wide scale, although the regional authorities in the northwest did proscribe this branch of the Naqshbandiyya in Shensi and Kansu and encouraged the schooling of Muslims in traditional Chinese learning so as to

promote assimilation. Shensi Muslims who had fled to Kansu during the reconquest were forbidden to return, and their farmlands were distributed to non-Muslims. New development projects in less fertile Kansu were undertaken to accommodate the refugee Muslim population. Many Muslims of Chin-chi-p'u, Hsi-ning, and Su-chou were ordered to be moved to the P'ing-liang, Hua-p'ing, An-ting, and Lan-chou areas, although this measure did not prove to be lastingly effective. To control Sinkiang more tightly, the Ch'ing government abolished its earlier system of Muslim administration and in 1884 reorganized the entire territory as a province.

EPILOGUE

Systematic research on the Naqshbandiyya in the period after the 1880s remains to be done. The Ch'ing reconquest did not destroy the mystical path's various branches in Sinkiang. In northwest China even the Jahriyya, battered though they were by the Ch'ing suppression, continued to attract followers, although the Jahrī branch diverged into several rival lines. Most of Ma Hua-lung's family were killed, but a daughter survived and perhaps also a son. The daughter, exiled from Kansu, lived in Yunnan for a time and there married another Hui exile named Ma Yüan-chang (post 1855-1920), a disciple of her father but no relative, despite his identical surname. Ma Yüan-chang, whose prestige was no doubt enhanced by his marriage, eventually returned to Kansu, established himself at Sha-kou near Chin-chi-p'u, and began reassembling the Jahriyya's scattered remnants with the aid of his brother, Ma Yüan-chao. He succeeded in making himself Ma Hua-lung's generally acknowledged successor, establishing communication with adherents of the Jahriyya who lived as far away as Yunnan and Kashgar. After the fall of the Ch'ing in 1912 the Jahriyya were at last able to come out in the open and live normally. So it is probably from this time that they began to wear in public their distinctive two-peaked white caps, by which it was possible to identify a northwestern Jahrī.

The Jahriyya thus reconstituted themselves under Ma Yüan-chang, but in 1918 a grandson of Ma Hua-lung named Ma Chin-hsi advanced his own claim to the grand mastership, challenging Ma Yüan-chang's position. Ma Chin-hsi's father (son of Ma Hua-lung) had two sons. The elder, whose Chinese name is not given in the available Jahrī sources, died and was buried in Manchuria. The younger, Ma Chin-hsi, born sometime around 1880, was reared in southeastern Kansu at Chang-chia-ch'uan and after a period in obscurity moved to Chin-chi-p'u near Ningsia, where he contested

Ma Yüan-chang's leadership and established a center for himself called Pan-ch'iao.

Ma Yüan-chang died two years later, in the great earthquake of 1920, and was buried at Hsüan-hua-kang, but Ma Chin-hsi was unable to consolidate his control, and the Jahriyya split apart under four rival grand masters: Ma Chin-hsi at Pan-ch'iao, Ma Yüan-chao's third son Ma Hui-wu (d. 1946) at Hsüan-hua-kang, Ma Yüan-chao's sixth son Ma Tien-wu at nearby Lung-shan-chen, and Ma Yüan-chang's fourth son Ma Chen-wu at Ma-ch'iao in Sha-kou. In 1935 Ma Chen-wu took up residence in Peiping, where he remained in ill health until 1940, when he flew back to Kansu after discussions with Nationalist officials in Chungking. By the 1950s he had emerged as the Jahriyya's leader, with followers in Hopei, Shensi, Kansu, Ningsia, Yunnan, Sinkiang, and Kirin. But in 1958, under the Communist government, Ma Chen-wu came under attack as an "ultra-rightist" and his "crimes" were exposed at a Muslim people's forum.

Most descriptions of the Jahriyya at the time of Ma Hua-lung and after would seem to suggest that the fundamentalist element in Ma Ming-hsin's original message had disappeared by the middle of the nineteenth century. Ma Hua-lung is claimed to have traveled to the west before settling at Chin-chi-p'u, but his teaching has been described as containing serious innovations. It is said not only that he practiced wonder-working and "tomb worship" but also that he claimed to be a prophet and the equal of Muḥammad. Moreover, the Jahriyya are represented as considering the Shiᶜa to be their "fellowship" group, and a Christian missionary observer reports their belief that with the ninth succession of the Jahrī grand mastership in China, Jesus would return to earth.[57]

Apart from the attribution of wonder-working, which is undoubtedly correct, none of this testimony is convincing. Unfriendly official (Ch'ing and People's Republic) descriptions, reports by untrained Westerners who have mixed their observations with their interpretations, and statements by illiterate believers have combined to present a confused picture of the Jahriyya's teachings. That the Jahriyya built tombs for their deceased grand masters is beyond question, but the existence of a "tomb cult" remains wholly unproved. While Ma Hua-lung and his family may possibly have claimed to be descendants of the prophet Muḥammad, there is no reason to suppose that they claimed to be his equal. Sources and interpretations that suggest Shiᶜism or doctrinal innovation are all highly impeachable. Although initiation into the Naqshbandī *silsila*

[57] Martin Taylor's letter to C.L. Pickens, Jr., of Sept. 15, 1935, transcribed in Pickens' notes on sects.

did not automatically convey Sunni orthodoxy into an initiate's mind, the total history of the mystical path makes it unlikely that its Jahrī branch in China would have been vastly different from the Naqshbandiyya elsewhere in the world.

Another Muslim group in China proper who evidently belonged to the Naqshbandiyya were the followers of Ma Chan-ao of Ho-chou in southwestern Kansu. Some accounts claim that Ma Chan-ao was a *pīr* (grand master) of the Jahriyya,[58] although he is generally identified as a leader of the "Old Teaching." Whether "Old Teaching" refers in this instance to the Khufiyya (the Āfāqī branch in China) is not certain, but initiation in the "silent" path would not have ruled out the possibility of initiation into the "vocal" path also. Ho-chou was in any case the main center of the Āfāqiyya in China.

Ma Chan-ao, like Ma Hua-lung, had surrendered to the Ch'ing army in 1871, but unlike Ma Hua-lung, he was pardoned and enlisted into the Ch'ing administrative system, much as the Old Teaching (Khufiyya) Muslims had been enlisted to fight the White Lotus rebels at the end of the previous century. Ma Chan-ao's son and successor Ma An-liang remained loyal to the Ch'ing even after the dynasty's collapse, and, for reasons stemming mainly from local politics, Ma An-liang joined as a military leader in a restoration attempt for the Ch'ing empire. In 1913 he was forced to retire to Ho-chou, where he died in 1918. Ma T'ing-hsiang of Liang-chou, one of his successors, later fought against the Kuominchün army in 1927.

In 1948 the seventh successor in the Āfāqī line of Ma Wu T'ai-yeh (buried at Pi-chia-ch'ang outside Ho-chou) was still alive, and although the tenth and last successor of the Āfāqī line at Lin-t'ao in south Kansu died in 1890, a disciple not belonging to the family seems to have preserved the initiatic chain and is last reported to have gone to study with a certain Saᶜīd Ḥabīb Allāh at a Naqshbandī center in one of the Arab countries of the Middle East.

The role of the Naqshbandiyya in the Salar upheaval of 1895-1896 remains to be determined. The mystical path's strength among the Salars was such that Naqshbandīs could not but have been involved, but whether the dispute arose, as official sources suggest, from differences between the Old (Khufiyya) and New (Jahriyya) Teachings is unclear. Ch'ing officials seem to have used the "Old/New Teaching" dichotomy for divisions among Muslims as loosely as they used the label "White Lotus" to categorize political movements arising from Chinese popular religion.

[58] See T'ang Chen-yu, "The Four Men Huans," p. 5.

The history of the Naqshbandiyya in Yunnan and southwest China particularly needs study, as does the path's history in Sinkiang after the territory's reorganization as a province, both from the standpoint of outside influences and with regard to interconnections within China. The Naqshbandiyya were probably among the main conveyors of pan-Islamism after about 1900, and the number of Tungan (Hui) Naqshbandīs in Sinkiang was clearly very great. The lifting of the ban on pilgrimages to Mecca under the Republic of China must also have had important effects.

Of the state of the Naqshbandiyya in the People's Republic of China today little is known, but it seems safe to assume that the mystical path is still quite alive. It may play a role not unlike the one that Prof. Bennigsen has described in his chapter on the Qādirī and Naqshbandī brotherhoods in the Caucasus region of the U.S.S.R.

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The articles in this collection do not all use the same transcription system. Where the same name or term has been given two or more spellings in the text, we have cross-referenced them. Otherwise, names are entered in the index only as they appear in the text. Translations of terms and titles are likewise reproduced as found. Where the translation reproduces the literal sense of words, rather than the meaning or usage of the term as a whole, quotation marks are used. Dates and identification of individuals are likewise provided from the articles themselves, where possible, and for this reason usage varies somewhat from entry to entry. In accordance with Variorum policy, we have not indexed names and works of modern scholars.

Abbreviations

Ar. Arabic
Ch. Chinese
Ma. Manchu
Mo. Mongolian
Ott. Ottoman Turkish
Pe. Persian
Ru. Russian
Tu. Turkic

a-ch'i-mu po-k'o see *ḥākim beg*
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